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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
l'AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS 
The plaintiffs provide their supplemental brief in opposition to the defendants.' pending 
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dispositive motions as follows: 
A. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA HAS NO APPLICATION BASED UPON THE 
DEFENDANTS' FRAUD IN LIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION FOR DAMAGES AND 
RELIEF CONSISTENT WITH I.C. § 18-7803, JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL, ESTOPPEL, ETC. 
The claims of fraud, abuse of process, judicial estoppel, violations arising from the Idaho 
Racketeering Statutes, advanced by the plaintiffs prevent the defendants from asserting Res Judicata 
relating to the prior proceedings. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 537, Fraud or Collusion provides: 
Fraud by a party will not undermine the conclusiveness of a judgment unless the 
fraud was extrinsic, that is, it deprived the opposing party of the opportunity to 
appear and present his or her case. With respect to extrinsic fraud, the doctrine ofres 
judicata will not shield a blameworthy defendant from the consequences ofhis or her 
own misconduct. Accordingly, the principles of res judicata may not be invoked to 
sustain fraud, and a judgment obtained by fraud or collusion may not be used as a 
basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata. 
The claims relating to abuse of process, estoppel, violations of the Idaho Racketeering 
Statutes, have never been addressed by any prior proceedings. These claims relate to the wrongful 
practices ofthe defendants in obtaining the judgment based upon their misrepresentations and fraud 
in obtaining ajudgment. The individual Taylors in their deposition testimony establish a lack ofany 
cognizable legal interest in the trust. The alleged beneficiaries testified they were not going to obtain 
any money from the litigation (pp. 132, 133, 134, ofthe deposition ofReed J. Taylor) (74, 75 ofthe 
deposition ofDallan Taylor). The trust was liquidated and all cash was disbursed to the Settlement 
Agreement (36,37 ofthe deposition ofR. John Taylor). The trust corpus was distributed to the only 
beneficiaries that existed, after the settlement agreement was reached among the various family 
members. The individual Taylors, Reed, Dallan, and R. John, did not take any proceeds, and 
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judicially admitted their mother was the "sole beneficiary of the trust". 
"The party asserting a claim offraud on the court must establish that an unconscionable plan 
or scheme was used to improperly influence the court's decision and that such acts prevented the 
losing party from fully and fairly presenting its case or defense." 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments § 728 
(2006). In the present case the plaintiffs are specifically praying for damages as a result of the 
wrongful conduct of the defendants. The Idaho Racketeering Statute provides a remedy for the 
wrongful conduct of the defendants. The court may enter an Order divesting the defendants ofany 
interest, direct or indirect, in the real property consistent with Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and 
specifically section 18-7805 (c) (d)(1). The plaintiffs' claims for damages became viablt: only upon 
the completion ofthe wrongful conduct ofthe defendants in the prior proceeding. The re(;ord before 
this court contains evidence demonstrating the true status of the Taylors. 
All the named defendants acted in unison in providing the district court with verified 
pleadings, and/or executed pleadings which represented the status of the Taylors as beneficiaries. 
There is abundant evidence in the record that establishes that such was not the case. Their own 
admissions both under oath and/or through admissions to the court establish the falsehood. A person 
is subject to liability if he or she does a tortuous act in concert with the other or pursuant to a 
common design with him. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(a) (1977), Highland 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 341, 986 P.2d 996 (1999). 
The plaintiffs have plead claims asserting judicial estoppel, and estoppel generally. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel. Idaho Law provides that a 
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litigant who obtains ajudgment, advantage, or consideration from one party through means ofsworn 
statements is judicially estopped from adopting inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony, 
to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject 
matter. Judicial estoppel "precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and 
then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. The policies underlYlngjudicial 
estoppel are general considerations ofthe orderly administration ofjustice and regard for the dignity 
ofjudicial proceedings. Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent a litigant from playing fast and loose 
with the courts. Heinz v. Bauer, ID-ROI28.004 (S.C. 2008 No. 33579), Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 
87,277 P.2d 561 (1954). 
The Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part III provides attachment from the Idaho Supreme Court 
matter captioned Taylor v. Maile et. al. The Supreme Court has recently denied a motion to augment 
the record filed by the Appellants-Cross Respondents (plaintiffs herein). The requested motion to 
augment contained the transcript from the hearing dated May 2, 2005, before the Honorable Judge 
Beiter. The transcript is part of the record before this court, and it is asserted by the plaintiffs too 
contain additional admissions by R. John Taylor, once again under oath indicating the his mother 
is the beneficiary ofthe trust. This evidence as well as the prior sworn testimony ofR. John Taylor, 
the deposition testimony above alleged, support the allegations of fraud alleged by the plaintiffs as 
well as other claims set forth in the amended complaint. 
Jurisdiction is "the legal power and authority ofa court to make a decision that binds the parties 
to any matter properly brought before it." Black's Law Dictionary 856 (7th ed. 1999) (defining 
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judicial jurisdiction). A universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a court 
without jurisdiction ofthe subject matter are a nullity. Subject matterjurisdiction is the indispensable 
foundation upon which valid judicial decisions rest, and in its absence a court has no power to act. 
A judgment is void, when there is a want ofjurisdiction by the court over the subject matter. A void 
judgment is in legal effect no judgment. No rights are acquired or divested by it. It neither binds nor 
bars anyone, and all proceedings founded upon it are worthless. 
50 C.J.S. Judgments § 532, provides: 
§ 532. Fraud, collusion, or perjury 
A judgment may be collaterally attacked on the ground offraud where the fraud goes 
to the jurisdiction of the court. Where the fraud alleged was inherent in the cause of 
action, or in the character or procurement of the instrument sued on, it does not 
furnish a legitimate ground for impeaching the judgment in a collateral proceeding; 
and, as a broad general rule, where the court has jurisdiction, it is not permissible for 
a party or privy to attack a judgment in a collateral proceeding because offraud, such 
a judgment being voidable only, and not void. 
A judgment obtained by fraud may, however, be void under some circumstances, and 
subject to collateral attack, as where such fraud appears on the face of therecord or 
goes to the method ofacquiringjurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment maybe attacked 
collaterally where fraud has been practiced in the very act ofobtaining the judgment, 
or on the party against whom the judgment was rendered, so as to prevent him from 
having a fair opportunity to present his case. 
Judgments obtained by extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, fraud may be attacked 
collaterally. The extrinsic fraud which is required as a basis for collateral attacks on 
judgments is defined as fraud which is collateral to the issues tried in the case where 
the judgment is rendered. 
A judgment entered by a court without jurisdiction over subject matter is void. Andre v. 
Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,680 P.2d 1355, 1361 (1984). See generally 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 
1236 (1969). Purported judgments entered by a court without jurisdiction over the subjt:ct matter 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS - Pg 5 
000855
 
      Ulli      
 
1
          
            
           
  
     





are void and as such are subject to collateral attack, and are not entitled to recognition in other states 
under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution (Restatement of Judgments, 
§ 7 (1942)), State V. Annstrong, ID-0815.098 (C.A. 2008). 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs have alleged sufficient claims to withstand the defendants' motions for 
summary judgment. The underlying judgment in Taylor v. Maile, has been produced as a result of 
fraud and misrepresentations. The record contains ample evidence demonstrating actionable claims 
against the defendants. The defendants' motions must be denied in their entirety. 
Dated this -'1-day ofJanuary, 2009. !J 
~ 
THOMAS G. MAI~., 
Attorney for Colleen Maile and Berkshire 
Investments LLC and pro se 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 











John Taylor, DaHan Taylor
 
and the Theodore Johnson Trust
 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
 






CONNIE WRlGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON TN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
I
 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR STAY 
COME NOW THE DEFENDANTS Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, John Taylor and
 
DaHan Taylor, by and through their attorney ofrecord and hereby notify the court and counsel that
 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION 1
 
LAW OF'F'ICE:5 OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 

















































   
 
·
  l  
 r  
 
l i a
























































Defendants' counsel is not available to attend the Motion for Stay hearing Mr. Maile has scheduled 
for January 27, 2009, but do not oppose entry of a stay in this matter pending the ruling of the 
Supreme Court in the Taylor v. i\1aile, Supreme Court Docket No. 33781. 
Defendants believe it would be best that trial NOT be scheduled in this matter at this time. 
There is no way ofpredicting when adecision from the Supreme Court will be received and it would 
not be in the interest of judicial efficiency to schedule a trial date which would trigger many 
deadlines. 









CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~day of January, 2009 I caused to be se:rved a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addr~~ssed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV o u.s. Mail 
380 West State Street D Hand Delivered 
Eagle, ID 83616 o Overnight Mail 














onnie W. TaYlo~... rl~ r ­
Attorney for DefeL~/ 
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(FAX) (208) 385-5384 
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,
 
Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349 
MOFFA'IT, THOMAS, BARRE'IT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED ~IAN :: 0 2009 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
J. DAVID N.·W,1J1RAO, Clerk. 
By KATHY J. BIEHL 
Boise, Idaho 83701 DEPUTy 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
msp@moffatt.com 
17136.0306 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka 
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR STAY 









01/20/2009 12:48 FAX 2083855384 1 MOFFATT THOMAS I4l 003/004 
COME NOW the defendants Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and 
Paul T. Clark, by and through the undersigned counsel, and hereby notify the court and counsel 
that they do not oppose entry of a stay in this matter pending the ruling ofthe Idaho Supreme 
Court in Taylor v. Maile, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 33781. 
DATED this,;l C~Iday of January, 2009. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By 1_~ V; JA"~._f'
Mark SiPrusynskI - O~rm 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright 
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and 
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '2 C,bf day of January, 2009, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR STAY to 
be served by the method indiCated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LAw OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 W. State S1. ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ill 83616-4902 (~acsimile 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Connie W. Taylor (v{U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 ( ) Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 285 ( ) Facsimile 
Lewiston, ill 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 386-5055 




































CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 743-9516 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants 
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor 
and the Theodore Johnson Trust 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, 




CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k1a CON1\l"IE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 










AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR
 
Case No. CV OC 07 23232 
AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEf:NEY 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83'301 
000862
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CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state ofIdaho and a member of 
Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor and Theodore Johnson 
Trust in the above entitled matter. The information contained herein is of my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of the Supreme Court's latest 
Opinion in Taylor v. Maile, Docket No. 33781. 
3. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's ruling and granted costs to Taylors. 
/ .. ~tli 
DATED this _./_ day of February, 20 
~~,' ~----=---s= 
iiI! 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of February, 2009. 
/1 
;i {; /)) i{{74 C )(fII.) 
Notary Public in and fo~ the State of Idaho. 
Residing at Ii' U.,~ <.J1J2/ therein. 
My commission expir~s: ''':.'-;;'/12 l..( / lc I 'I-
I i 
! 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'Ill
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of February, 2009, I caused to be served a true
 




Thomas G. Maile, IV D U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street D Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, ID 83616 D Overnight Mail
 
"
 Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
 Mark Prusynski D U.S. Mail
 MOFFATT THOMAS D Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor D Overnight Mail
 





Ie W. Taylor 
ttorney for Defendants 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 33781 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and) 















MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS)
 






Boise, November 2008 Term 
Defendants-Counterclaimants­ ) 2009 Opinion No. 15 
Appellants-Cross-Respondents, ) 
------------------------------------------------------­ ) 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE) 
Filed: January 30, 2009 












MAILE, husband and wife, and )
 










Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State ofIdaho, Ada 
County. Hon. Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge. 
District court order granting summary judgment, affinned.
 
Dennis M. Charney, Eagle and Law Offices ofThomas G. Maile, Eagle, for
 
appellants. Dennis M. Charney argued.
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This case concerns an appeal by Thomas Maile IV, Colleen Maile, Thomas Maile Real 
Estate Company, and Berkshire Investments, LLC (collectively the Mailes) from a district court 
order granting summary judgment to Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and L. John Taylor 
(collectively the Taylors). The Taylors cross-appeal the district court's order denying their 
request for attorney fees. We affirm. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case has been the subject of a previous appeal. In Taylor v. lMaile, this Court 
summarized the facts underlying the lawsuit as follows: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV, is licensed in Idaho as both an attorney and a real estate 
broker. He provided legal representation to [Theodore L.] Johnson for many 
years, including advising him on the creation and administration of the [Theodore 
L. Johnson Revocable] Trust. The Trust owned approximately forty acres of 
property near Eagle, Idaho. In May of 2002 a third party offered to buy the fOfty 
acres for approximately $400,000. Mr. Maile advised Mr. Johnson to reject this 
offer, and he did in fact reject it. Two months later, on July 22, Thomas and 
Colleen Maile submitted an earnest money agreement to purchase the property 
from the Trust on terms and for a price similar to the rejected offer. Mr. Johnson 
accepted the offer and executed the agreement on behalf of the Trust on July 25. 
Mr. Johnson died before the sale transaction could be closed. Approximately a 
week after Mr. Johnson's death, the successor trustees, Beth Rogers and Andrew 
Rogers, closed the sale. The Mailes had formed Berkshire Investments, LLC, and 
assigned their contract rights to that entity, with the approval of Beth Rogers. The 
Rogers executed the warranty deed conveying the 40 acres to Berkshire over the 
objections of the Taylors, who are residual beneficiaries of the Trust. The record 
does not disclose whether the Rogers conducted any inquiry regarding the 
circumstances of the sale or the basis for the Taylors' objections, or whether the 
purchase price was at or near fair market value. The Rogers were not only co­
trustees of the Trust, but also beneficiaries of the Trust. . .. The Trust took a deed 
of trust on the property to secure payment of the bulk of the purchase price. 
Berkshire paid the balance of the purchase price and obtained a release of the trust 
deed in January of2004. 
142 Idaho 253, 255, 127 P.3d 156, 158 (2005) (Taylor I). 
On January 23, 2004, the Taylors (as beneficiaries) filed a complaint against the Mailes, 
alleging breach of fiduciary duty and professional negligence against Mr. Maile in his capacity 
as both realtorlbroker and attorney. The Taylors also sought damages and/or rescission of the 
land sale. The Mailes moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted their motion 







Court's decision in Taylor I affinning the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claims, but 
reversing and remanding "the dismissal of the professional negligence claim. 
While the first appeal to this Court was pending, the beneficiaries of the Trust executed 
the Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity Agreement (Disclaimer) in June 2004. In the 
Disclaimer, the beneficiaries, other than the Taylors, disclaimed any interest in the lawsuit 
against the Mailes. In addition, the Taylors disclaimed their interest in all other Trust property in 
favor of their mother, the beneficiaries agreed to an immediate distribution to beneficiaries, the 
Rogers resigned as trustees, the named successor trustee declined to serve as trustee, and the 
beneficiaries nominated and appointed the Taylors as trustees. 
In December 2005, this Court issued its opinion in Taylor I. In response, on March 9, 
2006, the district court allowed the Taylors to amend their complaint to comply with the Taylor I 
decision. Two months later, the district court granted the Taylors' motion for summary 
judgment on the remaining professional negligence claim. On June 7, 2006, the court entered 
judgment on that claim, quieting title to the Linder Road property in the Trust and dismissing the 
Mailes' counterclaims and defenses. On July 21, 2006, the court amended the judgment to 
clarify that the property is in a constructive trust, that Berkshire is entitled to repayment of the 
purchase price, and that the Mailes' counterclaim for unjust enrichment was the only remaining 
issue. That same day, the court also entered a decision denying the Mailes' motion for rule 54(b) 
certification and found the land sale contract void. 
In October 2006, the district court held a bench trial on the single remaining issue of 
unjust enrichment. After hearing two days of evidence, it denied the Mailes' claim for unjust 
enrichment, finding that the money the Mailes had expended on developing the property did not 
increase the value of the property. The Mailes then moved for reconsideration and sought 
prejudgment interest on the monies paid to the Trust. The district court denied this motion on 
April 4, 2007. The district court also denied the Taylors' request for attorney f(~es. Both parties 
appeal from the district court's judgments. 
II. ANALYSIS 
The Mailes assert that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the Taylors' claims 
because the Taylors lacked standing and because their claims were moot. The Mailes also 
contend that the district court erred in granting the Taylors' motion for summary judgment as to 







denying their motion for an award of prejudgment interest. On cross-appeal, the Taylors assert 
that the district court erred by denying their motion for attorney fees. 
A. The Taylors had standing to pursue their claims. 
The Mailes argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the Disclaimer 
divested the Taylors of standing to pursue their claims and made the issue moot. We disagree. 
We exercise free review over questions of jurisdiction, and such questions must be 
addressed prior to reaching the merits ofan appeal. Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 144--45, 158 
P.3d 305, 307-08 (2007). "Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court 
before reaching the merits of the case." Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 
1157, 1159 (2002). "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the 
issues the party wishes to have adjudicated." Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 
778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). To satisfy the requirement of standing, "litigants generally must 
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief 
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id. 
The Taylors argue their standing was established by Taylor I, making it the "law of the 
case," and that the Disclaimer did nothing to alter the decision. The "law of the case" doctrine 
provides that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a 
principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the 
case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon 
subsequent appeal." Suitts v. First Sec. Bank ofIdaho, NA., 110 Idaho 15,21,713 P.2d 1374, 
1380 (1985) (quoting Fiscus v. Beartooth Elec. Coop., Inc., 180 Mont. 434, 435, 591 P.2d 196, 
197 (1979»). The "law of the case" doctrine also prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal 
of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal. Bouten Constr. 
Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 762, 992 P.2d 751,757 (1999). 
In Taylor I, this Court determined that the Taylors had standing to pursue their claims as 
real parties in interest. 142 Idaho 253, 257-58, 127 P.3d 156, 160-61 (2005). Initially, the 
district court dismissed the Taylors' complaint pursuant to LR.C.P. 17(a). On appeal, this Court 
determined that the Taylors were real parties in interest, as required by this mle, because they 
would be entitled to the benefits of the action if it were successful. Id. at 258, 127 P.3d at 161. 
Additionally, the Court determined that the Taylors could proceed with their negligence claim 








fiduciary responsibilities and receiving the property with knowledge of the same." ld. at 261, 
127 P.3d at 164. We found the cause of action could be maintained against the trustees and/or 
the Mailes, and if the trustees refused to act, the Taylors could seek a constructive tIUst against 
theMailes.ld. Therefore, under the "law of the case" doctrine, both the issue of whether the 
Taylors were real parties in interest and whether they could maintain an action against the Mailes 
without joining the trustees were before this Court. Thus, the principles articulated in Taylor 1 
were necessary to the Court's decision. 
Nonetheless, the Mailes assert that the procedural posture of the prior appeal--coming to 
the Court from an LR.C.P. l2(b)(6) motion-and the Taylors' execution of the Disclaimer after 
the district court granted their motion to dismiss make the "law of the case~' doctrine 
inapplicable. The Mailes are correct that the Disclaimer could not have been raised in the prior 
appeal. The Disclaimer was executed by various beneficiaries in June 2004, which was after the 
district court granted the motion to dismiss that predicated the first appeal in Taylor I. As such, 
the Disclaimer was not part of the record during the first appeal and the Mailes' argmnent that 
the Taylors now lack standing because of this document could not have been raised during the 
course of Taylor I. We should thus reexamine the Taylors' standing. 
Although the Taylors executed the Disclaimer with the trustees, it does not divest them of 
standing. The Mailes argue that the Taylors, as beneficiaries, were required to pursue their 
action against the trustees. However, in deciding Taylor I, this Court announced the principle 
that beneficiaries could maintain a cause of action against the trustee, a third party, or both where 
the third party receives trust property with knowledge that the transfer is in violation of the 
trustee's fiduciary duty. !d. at 260-61, 127 P.3d at 163-64. While this Court was unable to 
consider the Disclaimer during Taylor I, the principles announced in that decision are still the 
law of Idaho. Therefore, we hold that the Taylors had standing to maintain suit against the 
Mailes and were not required to join the Rogers. 
Next, the Mailes argue that the Disclaimer made the suit moot because it worked to 
terminate the purpose of the Trust and to disburse all assets to the beneficiaries. "An issue 
becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being 
concluded through judicial decree of specific relief." Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise 
Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851, 119 P.3d 624, 626 (2005). Mootness applies when an 
















1072 (2004). Mootness also applies when a favorable judicial decision would not result in any 
relief. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2004). 
In the Disclaimer, the Taylors specifically reserved their ownership interest in the lawsuit 
against the Mailes. Therefore, they have a legal interest in the outcome of the case and a 
favorable decision will result in relief in the form of title to the Linder Road property. Moreover, 
under Idaho law, a chose in action is an asset. See Blake v. Blake, 69 Idaho 214, 219, 205 P.2d 
495, 498 (1949). Here, the current action is an asset that remained in the Trust, so the Disclaimer 
did not work to terminate the Trust. Thus, the Taylors' lawsuit is not moot and they have 
standing to pursue this claim against the Mailes. 
B. Summary judgment was proper. 
The Mai1es next contend that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
Taylors on the remaining claim of negligence. They assert that Beth Rogers was not acting 
under a conflict of interest, but even if she were, she acted reasonably and prudently. They also 
maintain that Johnson, as the original trustee, acted reasonably and prudently in his d.ecision to 
sell the property to the Mailes, and the Rogers acted reasonably in carrying out his decision. 
When reviewing a ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court applies the same 
standard used by the district court. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304,307, 
160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007). "Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and 
discovery documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law." Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988); see also 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). "In making this determination, all allegations of fact in the record, and all 
reasonable inferences from the record are construed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion." City ofKellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., 135 Idaho 239, 243, 
16 P.3d 915, 919 (2000). If no genuine issue as to any material fact exists, "then all that remains 
is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co., 129 Idaho 171, 175,923 P.2d 416, 420 (1996). 
In its order granting summary judgment to the Taylors, the district court noted that 
following Taylor I only a single cause of action remained-whether the Mailes had aided the 
trustees in breaching their fiduciary duty by receiving the property with knowledge that the sale 









Rogers had a conflict of interest because she was both a trustee and a beneficiary. The lower 
court also found that a trustee's power to close a land sale was subject to judici.al oversight 
pursuant to I.C. § 68-1 08(b) and Taylor 1. Since the sale of the Linder Road propl~rty was not 
approved by a court, the trial court found the contract for the sale of the property was void. 
Finally, the district court found that the Mailes had actual knowledge that Beth Rogers needed to 
receive court approval prior to closing the sale. 
The Supreme Court exercises free review over issues of statutory interpretation. Big Sky 
Paramedics, LLC v. Sagle Fire Dist., 140 Idaho 435, 436, 95 P.3d 53, 54 (2004). The Mailes 
argue that the Idaho Code provides a "reasonable prudence exception" to the requirement of 
court authorization under I.C. § 68-108(b). However, to accept the Mailes' argument it would be 
necessary for court authorization under I.C. § 68-108 to be the nonnal modus operandi and 
"reasonable prudence" under I.e. § 68-106 to be an exception. Instead, under the Unifonn 
Trustees' Powers Act, as adopted in Idaho Code Title 68, a trustee needs only to act with 
reasonable prudence in most situations and court authorization is the exception. Idaho Code § 
68-1 06(a) provides: 
From time of creation of the trust until final distribution of the assets of the trust, 
a trustee has the power to perform, without court authorization, every act which a 
prudent man would perform for the purposes of the trust including but not limited 
to the powers specified in subsection (c). 
Thus, under normal circumstances, a trustee can exercise her powers as trustee without court 
authorization if such actions are reasonable and prudent. 
Nonetheless, Idaho Code § 68-108(b) sets out limits on this power and provides, in 
pertinent part: 
If the duty of the trustee and his individual interest or his interest as trustee of 
another trust, conflict in the exercise of a trust power, the power may be exercised 
only by court authorization, except as provided in sections 68-1 06(c)(1), (4), (6),
 
(18), and (24) upon petition of the trustee.
 
Consequently, the plain, unambiguous language of the Unifonn Trustees' Powers Act
 
provides that even if a trustee's actions are reasonable and prudent, if a conflict of interest exists, 
the court must authorize the action before the trustee can exercise that power. This indudes the 
power to close a real estate sale under I.C. § 68-106(c)(7). Taylor I, 142 Idaho 253, 259, 127 










exercise of a trust power, such as the power to close a sale of real property, 'the power may be 
exercised only by court authorization .... '" (citing I.e. § 68-108(b))). 
Here, there are no issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment. Beth Rogers 
did not seek court approval before closing the sale of the Linder Road property. It is also 
uncontroverted that she had a conflict of interest because of her role as both trustee to the Trust 
and beneficiary under the Trust. As a trustee, she owed the beneficiaries a duty of loyalty. 
Taylor I, 142 Idaho at 260, 127 P.3d at 163 (quoting Edwards v. Edwards, 122 Idaho 963, 969, 
842 P.2d 299, 305 (Ct. App. 1992)). As a direct beneficiary, Rogers was entitled to an 
immediate distribution of the monies paid by the Mailes. However, the income and residual 
beneficiaries had an interest in seeing that the value of the property held in the trust increased. 
See Taylor I, 142 Idaho at 259, 127 P.3d at 162 (noting that theMailes.briefing on appeal 
indicated various classes of beneficiaries with different interests). As such, it was necessary for 
Beth Rogers to receive court approval before closing the sale. 
Moreover, it is also uncontroverted that the Mailes had knowledge of this conflict of 
interest. Thomas Maile, acting as Theodore lohnson's attorney, drafted the Trust that created the 
various classes of beneficiaries and named Beth Rogers as a successor trustee. See ld. at 259, 
127 P.3d at 162. Therefore, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
C. Prejudgment interest was properly denied. 
The Mailes also argue that the district court erred by not awarding prejudgment interest 
on all the money paid to the Trust from September 2002 until 1anuary 2004. They contend that 
pursuant to I.e. § 28-22-104(1), (2), (4), and (5), they are entitled to an award of prejudgment 
interest. The Taylors maintain that the Mailes are not entitled to prejudgment interest under 
equitable principles or pursuant to I.e. § 28-22-104. In its order denying the Mailes' claim for 
prejudgment interest, the district court stated: 
[The Mailes] are not entitled under I.e. § 28-22-104 . . . to an award of 
prejudgment interest. The $400,000 does not constitute money due by express 
contract, or money after the same becomes due, or money lent, or money due on 
the settlement of mutual accounts from the date the balance is ascertained, or 
money due upon open accounts after three months from the date of the last 
item.... Nor did the [Taylors] retain the money without the express or implied 
consent of the [Mailes]. 









This Court reviews the award or denial of prej udgment interest for an abuse of discretion. 
Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614, 617, 67 P.3d 93,96 (2003). A three factor test is used to 
prove an abuse of discretion: "(1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the boundaries of this diseretion and 
consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. Idaho Code § 28~ 
22-104(1) provides: 
When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest, 
interest is allowed at the rate of twelve cents (l2¢) on the hundred by the year on: 
1. Money due by express contract. 
2. Money after the same becomes due. 
3. Money lent. 
4. Money received to the use of another and retained beyond a reasonable 
time without the owner's consent, express or implied. 
5. Money due on the settlement of mutual accounts from the date the 
balance is ascertained. 
6. Money due upon open accounts after three (3) months from the date of 
the last item. 
The district court correctly found and stated the applicable legal standards and therefore 
did not abuse its discretion. It acted with the boundaries of its discretion .and consistently with 
the applicable legal standards by examining each factor of I.C. § 28-22-104(1) as it applied to 
this case. Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of prejudgment interest. 
D. Attorney fees were properly denied. 
The Taylors cross-appeal the district court's denial of their request for attorney fees. 
They maintain that they are entitled to attorney fees under the Earnest Money Agreement. The 
Mailes assert the Taylors are not entitled to attorney fees because they are not parties to the 
contract. 
An award of attorney fees is "within the discretion of the trial court and subject to review 
for an abuse of discretion." Ransom v. Topaz Mktg.. L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 
(2006). Whether a statute awarding attorney fees applies is a question of law over which we 
exercise free review. ld. at 644, 152 P.3d at 5. In addition, attorney fees may be awarded when 






The district court properly denied the Taylors' motion for attorney fees. The court 
determined that the Taylors could not receive attorney fees pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3) because 
the Earnest Money Agreement was between the Trust and the Mailes and, therefore, the Taylors 
were not a party to the transaction. Finally, the district court declined to award attorney fees 
pursuant to I.e. § 12-121 because it found the Mailes had not pursued their claims frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. We affirm the district court. 
The parties have argued the same basis for attorney fees in this appeal. For the same 
reasons we affirmed the district court, we deny attorney fees on appeal. . 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We hold that the district court had jurisdiction over the Taylors' claims, the Taylors had 
standing to pursue their claims, and the Taylors' claims are not moot. In light of our holdings, 
we affirm the district court order granting the Taylors' motion for summary judgment on the 
beneficiary claims and the court's denial of the Taylors' request for attorney fees. We decline to 
award attorney fees on appeal. Costs to Taylors. 
Justices J. JONES, TROUT, PRO TEM and KIDWELL, PRO TEM, CONCUR. 
Chief Justice EISMANN, specially concurring. 
I concur in the majority opinion, but write only to point out an issue that was not raised in 
this case. Theodore Johnson, as trustee, entered into a real estate contract agreeing to sell forty 
acres of trust property to the Mailes. AfterJohnsondied,BethRogers and Andrew Rogers, as 
successor trustees, closed the sale. Summary judgment was granted upon the ground that Beth 
Rogers had a conflict of interest that required court approval before she could clos(;: the sale. 
Based upon that lack of court approval, the district court set aside the entire transaction. There 
has not been any determination that Johnson breached his fiduciary duty by entering into the sale 
contract. The Mailes have not argued on appeal that the appropriate remedy for closing the sale 
without court approval would be to set aside only the closing, rather than also setting aside the 
contract of sale. Thus, we have not addressed the appropriate scope of the remedy for a violation 
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provide this Supplemental Memorandum Brief In Response to Supreme Court Opinion filed 
February 4, 2009 and as additional argument in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgement/Motion to Dismiss as follows: 
ADDITIONAL FACTS AND SUPPLEMENTAL STATUS OF THE RECORD 
The Plaintiffs' further incorporate their Memorandum Briefin Support ofPlaintiffs ' Motion 
to Compel & Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs Motion to Compel filed October 20, 2008 as if 
set forth in full herein both as to the facts and the law set forth therein. The Taylors have filed an 
Affidavit with the attached Idaho Supreme Court case captioned Taylor vs Maile. The opinion 
relates to a portion ofthe issues surrounding standing and provides that the individual Taylors had 
standing to pursue their claim based upon the disclaimer of interest wherein they did not disclaim 
an interest in the litigation. The Supreme Court, however, did not address or specify that the Taylors 
were or were not beneficiaries after the Settlement and Disclaimer Agreement. The court 
proceedings in Taylor vs Maile had as it central issue the standing or the beneficiary status of the 
Taylors as it allegedly affected the Taylors' claim of being deprived notice of the sale of the real 
property by a successor trustee who had a conflict ofinterest. Consequently, the issue oftheir status 
as beneficiaries has never been adjudicated and is central to the issue of their active 
misrepresentation before the District Court in maintaining their alleged status as btmeficiaries. Ifthe 
Taylors were, in fact, beneficiaries they alone were the only ones could have complained about being 
deprived ofcourt approval in 2002 when the property was sold in violation ofI.C. 68-108. However, 
if as they represented to the probate court, they were no longer beneficiaries as of 2004 and their 
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mother was the sole beneficiary, they no longer had a legitimate interest to complain that they were 
deprived notice affecting the trust in which they had no interest in after the Disclaimer & Settlement 
Agreement as verified by them under oath. 
Their active misrepresentation to the District Court and the Idaho Supreme Court by asserting 
that they were "residual beneficiaries" is a central element that has never been litigated in any prior 
litigation. It was solely as a result oftheir abuse ofprocess, fraud, and misrepresentation 10 the court 
system that they were able to achieve an order rescinding the real estate closing and restoring the 
property to the trust. Without their active misrepresentation the Honorable Judge Wilper would not 
have ordered the property restored to the trust. Judge Wilper's Memorandum Decision and Order, 
on July 28,2005 (attached to the Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part 2-Exhibit K), establishes that the 
trustee of the trust acting on behalfof the trust could not rescind the transaction since the action of 
the trustee, leading up to the closing and acts subsequent to the closing, established that the trust 
could not have the property restored as it waived that right to restore the real property to the trust. 
The trust was estopped from rescinding the sale transaction. That judicial detennination never was 
appealed by the Taylors. The only possible way for the Linder property to be restored to the trust 
was for the Taylors to continue to perpetrate the misrepresentation that they had in interest as 
beneficiaries ofthe trust. The issue oftheir classification as beneficiaries has not been litigated nor 
has the issue ofmisrepresentation been litigated. The Supreme Court was provided by the Taylors' 
counsel ofrecord with a copy ofthe complaint in the current action (Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part 
4-Exhibit Z ). The Supreme Court in its recent decision is silent on the issues of the Taylors 
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misrepresentations and their status as beneficiaries of the trust. 
As stated, there are five factors required for collateral estoppel to bar re-litigation ofan issue 
decided in an earlier proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the 
prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be 
precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits 
in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party to the litigation. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. The Tilcor, supra, 
case, actually dealt with "issue preclusion", which is also referred to as collateral estoppel. The 
plaintiffs provided the Supreme Court with a motion to augment the record to demonstrate the 
inconsistent prior sworn testimony of John Taylor before the probate court, however, the Supreme 
Court chose not to allow the record to be augmented. The issues of frauds, false prdense, and 
perjury have never been claims or issues presented in prior litigation. The issue involving the 
misrepresentations of the Taylors as beneficiaries in 2006, has never been decided, and the reading 
ofthe Idaho Supreme Court Decision demonstrates that point. The Supreme Court's Decision does 
not address, nor decide the issue of the Taylors' misrepresented status as beneficiaries. 
A critical component ofcollateral estoppel is missing in the present matter, Case law has held 
that the issue was actually decided in the previous litigation and that issue was necessary to the prior 
judgment. Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 885, 173 P.3d 1141, 1144 (2007). Were the Taylors 
beneficiaries in 2006 as they verified in their pleadings? Their misrepresentation under oath 
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purportedly gave them a basis to contest the lack ofcourt approval ofthe real estate closing pursuant 
to I.e. 68-106, which resulted in the sale be voided. But for their petjury there would not have been 
a voided real estate transaction. Once again the Honorable Judge Wilper had ruled that the trust 
itselfcould not rescind the transaction. The issue of the Taylors status as alleged benefieiaries was 
not decided nor was it necessary to the judgment affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Consequently, there is no defense of collateral estoppel and/or res judicata available to the 
defendants. 
The Plaintiffs herein have asserted a variety of claims and one only needs to examine the 
Idaho Racketeering Statute to determine that in the present case there can be no defensl~ based on 
res judicata since the Plaintiffs were not at any point in time damaged by Taylors misrepre:sentations 
until a Judgment was entered based upon the fraud perpetrated by the Taylors and their attorneys 
verifying under oath to be residual beneficiaries. Without a resulting damage, there could be no 
cause of action that could exist. A cause of action arising under the Idaho Racketeering Act 
explicitly contains language that precludes the current Defendants argument of res judicata. The 
language under I.e. sections 18-7803 and 18-704 clearly provides that a claim only arises as a result 
of activity amounting to the specific statutory criminal activity that is precisely allege:d to have 
occurred in the present matter. Specifically the Statutes provide: 
18-7803 DEFINITIONS. 
As used in this chapter, (a) "Racketeering" means any act which is chargeable or 
indictable under the following sections of the Idaho Code or which are equivale:nt 
acts chargeable or indictable as equivalent crimes under the laws of any other 
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(10) Fraudulent practices, false pretenses, insurance fraud, financial transaction 
card crimes and fraud generally (sections 18-2403, 18-2706, 18-3002, 18-3101, 
18-3124,18-3125,18-3126,18-6713,41-293,41-294 and 41-1306, Idaho Code); 
(17) Perjury (sections 18-5401 and 18-5410, Idaho Code);
 
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES.
 
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived directly 
or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person has 
participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or the 
proceeds derived from the investment or use thereofin the acquisition ofany inter,est 
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or real property. 
(b) It is unlawful for any person to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity in 
order to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any 
enterprise or real property 
It is the very actions of the defendants that gives rise to the claims and the trier of fact must 
determine if the defendants' wrongful conduct is actionable under Idaho Code 18-7803 et. seq. 
There is no doubt that collectively the defendants entered into a contingent fee agreement (See 
Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 4 exhibit "W"), thereby creating an enterprise pursuant to LC.18­
7803(c) to share in the proceeds of the litigation, thereby subjecting themselves to the components 
ofthe Idaho Racketeering Statute. In addition, the Plaintiffs have allegedjudicial estoppel as a cause 
of action against the Defendants. Judicial estoppel clearly applies in this matter as the Plaintiffs 
herein were deprived of their real property as a result ofstatements made under oath by the Taylors 
which ultimately contradicted their verified pleadings in January 2006. The Plaintiffs brought the 
facts surrounding the misrepresentation to the Idaho Supreme Court in their briefing as thl~y alleged 
that the Taylors had insufficient standing as beneficiaries to rescind the transaction as the Taylors 
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acknowledged under oath that they were no longer beneficiaries and that their mother was the sole 
beneficiary. Plaintiffs had a right to have that determined as an issue of standing. Standing is an 
issue that can be raised at any time at either the District Court level or at the appellate llevel. The 
Plaintiffs legitimately raised that issue and the Idaho Supreme Court chose not to address that issue 
and that issue remains unresolved to this date. 
A. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA HAS NO APPLICATION AS FRAUD HAS BEEN 
ALLEGED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND THE PLAINTIFFS ACTED WITH DUE DILIGENCE. 
The case of Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68, 878 P.2d 762, 767 (1994) 
provides the standard for the court to apply regarding the allegations of fraud in light of a defense 
of res judicata. The Shirey, court stated: 
The law in Idaho is that an action for relief on the grounds of fraud will not be 
"deemed to have accrued until discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the fads 
constituting the fraud." I.C. § 5-218(4). "[A]ctual knowledgeoffraud will be inferred 
if the allegedly aggrieved party could have discovered it by the exercise of due 
diligence." Kawai Farms v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 614, 826 P.2d 1322, 1326 
(1992), quoting Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. v. Harrison, 95 Idaho 546, 547, 511 P.2d 828, 
829 (1973). More specific to the facts of this case, before a claim of fraud can be 
dismissed on a motion for summaryjudgment based on res judicata, a court must first 
answer the question ofwhether there is more than one conclusion as to whether the 
party alleging the fraud has exercised due diligence in discovering the fraud. Id. See 
also Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437,849 P.2d 107, 
110 (1993). 
The plaintiffs brought to the attention ofthe court in the priorproceeding in theirbriefing that 
the defendants collectivelymisrepresented under oath the Taylors' status as beneficiaries as set forth 
in their verified amended complaint filed in January 2006. (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 4, 
Opening Brief, Reply Brief, Notice ofAppeal). The legal premise was the Taylors lacked standing 
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to set aside the real estate closing as beneficiaries of the trust, as they had admitted und,er oath that 
they were no longer beneficiaries ofthe trust as a result of the Settlement & Disclaimer Agreement. 
The Taylors changed their testimony from one court to another, to fit what appeared to be necessary 
at the time. By briefing this very point, the plaintiffs acted with "due diligence" after discovering the 
fraud which was perpetrated upon the district court. The plaintiffs relied upon establish(~d case law 
in Idaho that standing could be raised at any stage oflitigation including appeal. The Supreme Court 
in its recent determination, did not rule that the Taylors remained beneficiaries after the;: execution 
of the Settlement & Disclaimer Agreement. The Supreme Court did determine the Taylors had 
standing as they "reserved their ownership" in the litigation. The only way the real esta.te closing 
could have been set aside was for a beneficiary to assert the protection ofLC. 68-108. The Taylors 
misrepresented their status as beneficiaries in January 2006 which resulted in the district court 
entering the "Judgment on Beneficiaries Claim", filed June 5, 2006. 
The Notice ofAppeal filed December 21, 2006, and the subsequent briefing provides proof 
that the plaintiffs acted with due diligence in attempting to bring to the attention ofthe judicially that 
the Taylors acted improperly in asserting their status as beneficiaries in light of the Settlement & 
Disclaimer Agreement. A court must first answer the question of whether there is more than one 
conclusion as to whether the party alleging the fraud has exercised due diligence in discovering the 
fraud in light of the principl e ofres judicata. If there are no questions ofmaterial fact, the question 
is one oflaw. If there is conflicting evidence as to when a fact was known or reasonably should have 
been known, it is a question of fact. If there is a question of material fact as to whether plaintiffs 
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should have reasonably discovered the fraud upon the court the doctrine of res judicata does not 
apply. Kawai Fanns v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 826 P.2d 1322 (1992). Ifthe court finds thatthere 
exists more than one conclusion that such party exercised due diligence, then a material question 
of fact exists precluding a granting ofsummary judgment. Hall v. Forsloff, 124 Idaho 771, 864 
P.2d 609 (S.C.1993). The plaintiffs relied justifiably upon their ability to brieftht: issue ofstanding 
before the appellate court as a proper avenue to detennine if the fraudulent behavior defeated the 
Taylors' standing. The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of Taylors as beneficiaries but 
instead chose to hold that they had standing in "ownership interest in the lawsuit". But £:>r Taylors 
misrepresentation concerning their status in 2006 as beneficiaries, I.c. 68-108 would not have been 
available to set aside the closing of the real estate transaction. The plaintiffs filed their Notice of 
Appeal approximately 6 months after the entry of the "Judgment on Beneficiaries Claims". Such 
timing by the plaintiffs should be well within any standard for acting with due diligence., 
I.R.C.P. 60(b) also recognizes the district court's authority to entertain an independent action 
to relieve a party from a judgment on the basis of equity. Compton v. Compton, 101 Id. 334, 612 
P.2d 1175, 1181 n. 1 (1980). There is no express time limit for an independent action to relieve a 
party from judgment. Id., 101 Idaho at 334,612 P.2d at 1181. The power of the courts to entertain 
such an action is inherent, and is not, therefore, subject to the time limitations imposed by I.R.c.P. 
60(b). Id.; see also Gregory v. Hancock, 81 Idaho 221, 227, 340 P.2d 108, 111 (1959). The 
independent action must, however, be brought within a "reasonable time". Davis v. Parrish, 131 
Idaho 595 at 597,961 P.2d 1198, 1202 (1998); Compton, 101 Idaho at 334, 612 P.2d at 1181 (citing 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO SUPREME COURT 
OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 4,2009 - Pg 9 
000883
             









Gregory, 81 Idaho at 227,340 P.2d at 112)). 
The plaintiffs' complaint has requested that the title be set aside based upon the defendants' 
fraud and the title be quieted in the name ofBerkshire Investments LLC. The detennination whether 
an independent action was brought within a reasonable time is ordinarily a question of fact to be 
resolved by the trier of fact. Davis, 131 Idaho at 597,961 P.2d at 1200 citing Thiel v. Stradley, 118 
Idaho 86, 88, 794 P.2d 1142, 1144 (1990), Wallerv. State (S.C. 2008 ID-0826.l21). By analogy the 
same determination ofwhat constitutes a reasonable time should apply to the doctrine ofres judicata 
relating to the plaintiffs' due diligence in discovering and acting upon the fraud committed by the 
defendants. 
Furthermore, LR.C.P. 60(b) specifically preserves the following three means of attacking a 
final judgment:(1 ) to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from judgment, .... and (3) 
to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328,612 P.2d 
1175 (1980) Id. at 333-34,612 P.2d at 1180-81. Claims brought under LR.C.P. 60(b) are not barred 
by res judicata because they are one ofthe recognized "avenues ... for attacking a judgment." Davis 
v. Parrish, 131 Idaho 595, 599, 961 P.2d 1198, 1202 (1998). Pursuant to Rule 60(b), intrinsic or 
extrinsic fraud makes no difference in the court's analysis. 
The plaintiffs herein acted within a reasonable period of time in filing the present matter. 
The Complaint was filed on December 31,2007. The action was filed while the appeal was pending. 
The gravamen of the complaint clearly is centered upon the "fraud upon the court" committed 
collectively by the defendants. The evidence ofthe fraud, false pretenses, peIjury, is amply set forth 
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in the record. The following illustrates the overwhelming evidence ofthe actionable miseonduct by 
the Defendants. 
1.	 After the execution ofthe Settlement Agreement, the allegedbeneficiaries testified they were 
not going to obtain any money from the litigation (pp. 132, 133, 134, of the deposition of 
Reed J. Taylor) ( 74, 75 ofthe deposition ofDallan Taylor). 
2.	 The trust was liquidated and all cash was disbursed pursuant to the Settlement Agreement 
The trust corpus was distributed to the only beneficiaries that existed, after the settlement 
agreement was reached among the various family members. The individual TayJlors, Reed, 
Dallan, and R. John, did not take any proceeds, and judicially admitted thdr mother was the 
"sole beneficiary ofthe trust". (36,37 ofthe deposition ofR. John Taylor). 
3.	 There is no dispute that Connie Taylor, notarized her husband's signature on November 14th 
2004, wherein her then husband stated under oath in the verified petition before the probate 
court, on page two "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining 
beneficiary of this trust by virtue of the terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity 
Agreement". (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 2-Exhibit I). 
4.	 A portion of the hearing before the Probate Court wherein John Taylor testi1ied in the 
hearing before the Honorable Judge Beiter on May 2, 2005 provides: 
page 14, In 4: Q. Will you explain to the court just briefly why it is that you want 
to serve? 
6 A. Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have always thought 
it was	 a valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the 
beneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this claim. 
During that same hearing counsel for the Taylors provided in his closing argument 
before Judge Beiter on May 2, 2005 provided: 
page 17, In 12: MR. CLARK: Yes. Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that, based 
upon, first, the agreement of the beneficiaries -- they have all indicated that the 
Taylors should serve as co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that same agreement, 
have a guarantee in the disclaimer. So they have some interest in the proceeding. 
Their mother stands to gain and, thereby, they have an interest in the proeeeding" 
5.	 Page 1 ofthe Verified Amended Complaint states under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are 
residents ofNez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a resident ofAda County Idaho. All 
ofthe plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries ofthe Theodore L Johnson Trust. 
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6. The Taylors filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on February 9, 2006, and stated 
"Comes Now Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John Taylor (hereinafter referred to as "the 
Beneficiary Plaintiffs"). (Affidavit ofThomas Maile Par 2). 
7.	 The Taylors filed their Memorandum Brief in Support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment on February 9, 2006, and stated "The Plaintiff Beneficiaries seek summary 
judgment against the defendants on their constructive trust claim and an order quieting tilt! 
in the Linder Road property to them". (Affidavit ofThomas Maile Par 2). 
There are ample material facts in dispute to warrant a jury determination under these facts. 
Neither Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel have application as to any ofthe defendants and can not 
be a bar to the present proceedings.. 
A. THE RULE OF PRIVY RELATING TO THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO THE ATTORNEYS WHO PERPETRATED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
The lawyers have argued that res judicata bars the plaintiffs from pursuing their claims since 
they were the attorneys of record in the prior litigation. Such is not established Law in Idaho. 
Collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue ofultimate fact has once been dett:rmined by 
a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future 
lawsuit. Corcoran v. Dept. of Social Services, 271 Conn. 679, 709, 859 A.2d 533 (2004), see also 
1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 27, comment (a) (1982) ("rule ofissue preclusion is operative 
where the second action is between the same persons who were parties to tht~ prior action"); 1 
Restatement (Second), supra, § 34 (3) ("person who is not a party to an action is not bound by ... 
the rules ofres judicata"). See Suffield Development Associates Ltd. Partnership v. National Loan 
Investors, LP, 97 Conn. App. 541, 562, 905 A.2d 1214, (2006). The Suffield, supra, mattt::rinvolved 
defendant attorneys who were the attorneys of record for defendants in the prior proceeding. The 
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Connecticut Court did not allow the doctrine ofres judicata to defeat the plaintiffs' subsequent suit. 
Seethe case ofCont'I Sav. Ass'n v. Collins, 814 S.W.2d829 (Tex. App.1991), which held that under 
Texas law the mere representation of a party in a lawsuit does not establish privity between an 
attorney and his or her client. There is no showing by the defendants that privy is established by 
their mere representation of clients. They actively participated in the misrepresentations with their 
clients and equally committed false pretenses, fraud, and aided in the peIjury, when in truth and in 
fact they prepared pleadings which were signed by their clients under oath affirming that the sole 
beneficiary was Helen Taylor not their clients. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs have alleged sufficient claims to withstand the defendants' motions for 
summary judgment/motion to dismiss. The recent Supreme Court Decision in Taylor v. Maile, does 
not establish there was an adjudication of facts and/or law that give rise to the application of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel. The defendants' motions must be denied in their entirety. 
Dated this 12th day of February, 2009. 
J. J.J.''-'lYJ.r>.S G. 
Attorney for Col . e and Berkshire 
Investments LLC and pro se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 12th day ofFebruary, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing (1) SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO 
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SUPREME COURT OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 4, 2009, (2) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS 
MAILE PART FOUR, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
THOMAS G. AILE, ., 
Attorney for Co aile and Berkshire 
Investments LLC and pro se 
Mark Stephen Prusynski 
PO Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 785 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
(X) U. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
(X) U. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, N 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
::m;~F~iC, - ­
".~'''=''7P-M._-­ttfff f ZZ009 
J. DAVID N~VAF'"O, CII!rk 
By J, ~ANO~LL 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile OfI'lJTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £!k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS l'~AILE 
PART FOUR 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 







1.	 Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch­
Maile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the infonnation and facts set forth 
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can 
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
2.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "w" is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Counsel in 
Support of Motion for Fees and Costs with the attached Contingent Fee Agreement 
between the attorneys, Clark and Feeney, and the Taylors and the same is made a part 
hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
3.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "X" is a true and correct copy of the Appellants Opening Brief 
before the Idaho Supreme Court filed September 19, 2007 (excluding the attachments). 
4.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "Y" is a true and correct copy of the Appellants/Respondents 
Reply Briefbefore the Idaho Supreme Court filed November 14, 2007 (excluding the 
attachments). 
5.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "z" is a true and correct copy of the Respond{mts/Cross­
Appellants Affidavit in Support for Motion for Sanctions filed before the Idaho Supreme 
Court on January 17, 2008 (excluding the attachment which was the original complaint in 
the current case which part of the record herein). 
6.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "AA" and incorporated herein by reference as if set fi)rth in 
full herein are a true and correct copies ofpages as 5, 6, 7, 11,12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19,20, 
21,22,23,24, ofthe deposition of Helen Taylor, taken on October 3,2008, taken in the 
above captioned matter. 













7.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "BB" is a true and correct copy of the Appellants' Notice 
ofAppeal filed on December 21, 2006. 
DATED thisL Uday of February, 2009. 
. SUBSCRIDED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
/0 day ofFebruary, 2009. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Mary Sue Chase Residing at Boise, Idaho 
NOTARY PUBLIC My Commission Expires July 30, 2014 STATE OF IDAHO 
.......__.";>~,.~-"'~,..........~:1'": .......
_"_.,_-4 




~.,.......~...,-pro se and 
Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
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CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state ofIdaho, and one of the 
ttomeys for the Plaintiffs in the above entitled matter. The information contained here:in is of my 
wn personal knowledge. 
2. Clark and Feeney's representation of the Plaintiffs in this matter initially began as an 
ourly billing with payment expected on a monthly basis. When monthly payments wen~ not made, 
t was converted to a contingent fee agreement. I am attaching a true and correct copy of the 
ollowing documents: 
a. July 9, 2003 letter from Connie Taylor to Beth Rogers enclosing a standard 12 
fee agreement, which was Exhibit No. 32 to the ex parte deposition Thomas 13 




DATED this L 
ril 15,2006.Contingent fee agreement date 








Not~ Public i~ an~ for the State of Idaho.. 
23 Resldmg at CLw; S(J;)-1. therem. 
My commission expires: ,/~/l:(('(C,L 
24 
25 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
111h 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _'_,_ day of July, 2006, I caused to h~ served a true and
 
1
 orrect copy ofthe above document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
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E TIFICA   S I  
t h 
I EB  IF  that on the '  ,  day f July, 2006, I caused to h~ served a true and 
orrect copy f the above docu ent by the ethod indicated belo , and a ressed to the fol o ing: 
Thomas G. Maile 
~ 
U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law Hand Delivered 
380 W. State 0 Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616 Telecopy (FAX) 
Jack S. Gjording ~ .. U.S. Mail 
Gjording & Fouster b Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 2837 [J Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83702 Telecopy (FAX) 
Dennis Charney ~ 
U.S. Mail 
951 E. Plaza Dr. Ste. 140 
Eagle, ID 83616 0 
~ 
Connie . Taylor 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 3 
LAW O FICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 




LAW OF"F'ICES OF" 
RON T. BLEWETT 
CLARK AND FEENEY TELEPHONE 
PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
THOMAS W. F'EENEY 
TH E TRAIN STATION. SUITE 106 (208) 743-9 516 
SCOTT D. GALLINA "* 1229 MAIN STREET (800) 865-9516 
.JONATHAN D. HALLY 
RUBE G • .JUNES. 
P. O. ORAWER 285 FAX 
DOUGLAS L. MUSHLITZ LEWISTON. IOAHO 83501 (208)7~-9160 
CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN 
CONNIE TAYLOR"* cflaw@lewiston.com 
TINA L.KERNAN." 
*UCENSED IN W"SHINGTON .. OREGON ONLY 
*.LICENSI:D IN .DAHO ,. W"SH.fII0TON 
July 9, 2003 
Beth Rogers 
Trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust Agreement 
10816 Jay Road 
Boise, ID 83714 
Re:	 Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust 
Dear Beth: 
I am enclosing an original and one copy of Clark and Feeney's standard Fee Agreement setting 
forth the terms and conditions ofour representation of you relating to the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust. Please read the Agreement over very carefu]]y, and if it meets with your approval, 
please sign the original and return it to Clark and Feeney. The copy is for your file. Please note that 
we are required by law to have an agreement on file in a]] cases we undertake. 
I am also enclosing the original Complaint that I have drafted p~rsuant to our discussions last 
Sunday. I would appreciate it ifyou would sign the Complaint before a Notary Public and return it 
to Stacey as quickly as possible, as I do want to be sure that this Complaint is filed before July 22, 
2003, if Mr. Maile does not give us a written waiver of the one year statute oflimitations he drafted 
into the earnest money agreement for the purchase ofTed's property. 
Please ca]] if you have any questions. I will be checking in with my office periodica]]y while I am 
out of town, but if there is something urgent you can leave a-voice mail message on my ce:ll phone. I 
don't have cell phone coverage at the ranch, but I wi]] be able to check my messages from a landline. 
SiIlcetejJyours, 





B-1: Conme W. Taylor 
CWT:st 
Enclosures 
cc:	 Garth Fisher w/enc. 
Dallan Taylor w/enc. EXHIBIT NO. m. 
6 16:.4££5> 
DATE B- ! t 7CH 
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CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and R. JOHN TAYLOR, individuallyand as trustees 
ofthe Theodore Johnson Trust (hereinafter referred to as "client") does hereby employ and retain the 
. law finn of Clark and Feeney (hereinafter referred to as "attorneys") to render legal services on 
behalf of Taylors and THE THEODORE JOHNSON TRUST for a lawsuit against THOMAS 
MAILE IV ET AL. 
Said attorneys shall have the power and authority to bring suit or such other legal action(s) 
at such times as they shall think proper to enforce or collect the above mentioned claim. 
In consideration for the services perfonned and to be perfonned by said attorneys, the client 
does hereby agree to pay a contingent fee of Thirty-three and one-third Percent (33.1/3 %) of any 
settlement, verdict, judgment or recovery, including recovery of any amount as attorneys fees, 
obtained in such matter. 
Our right to the fee described above may be enforced by us against the df~fendant(s) 
independent of any right you may have to enforce collection of your share of the Gross 
Recovery. The purpose of the foregoing provision is to grant an ownership interest in the 
Gross Recovery that is created by our efforts so that you do not acquire any ownership interest 
in our share of the Gross Recovery. Nothing herein shall be construed to re~sult in an 
assignment of income by you to us; as such, our share of the Gross Recovery may not be 
includable in your income for tax purposes. Further, our interest in the Gross Recovery shall 
be in addition to any rights granted by the attorney lien statute set forth in Idaho Code Section 
3-205. Also, it is agreed that our interest in the Gross Recovery shall be in compliance with 
1....W OFFIe"'. OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IO).HO 83501 
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Rule 1.8U) of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Any requirement by the Court that anotherpartypayattorney fees or costs shall not affect this 
Agreement, except that the fee paid to the attorneys shall be the greater of such fee award collected 
or the applicable percentage of the total recovery including the fee award. Any court awarded 
attorneys fees in discovery or other such interlocutory disputes shall be the property ofthe attorney. 
In addition to said attorney's fees the client agrees to pay all out-of-pocket expenses incurred 
in the investigation and litigation of this claim, including but not necessarily limited to court costs, 
fees of court reporters, polygraph examination costs, deposition costs, charges for service of all 
papers, (including subpoenas), witness fees and expenses, and reports, including reports ofexperts 
and investigators, long distance phone charges, travel costs, and copying charges. All such expenses 
shall be payable regardless of the outcome of the matter for which the attorneys are rc~tained. The 
client agrees to advance to said attorneys at their discretion such sums as may be necessary for the 
payment of said expenses. 
The client agrees that associate counsel may be employed at the discretion of the attorneys 
and that any attorney so employed may be designated to appear on the client's behalfor undertake 
representation in this matter. 
It is agreed that no settlement shall be made in this matter without the consent of all parties 
hereto. 
It is agreed that the attorneys may withdraw at any time upon giving reasonabll~ notice. 
It is agreed that said attorneys shall have a lien upon our cause of action and the proceeds 
thereof as set forth in Idaho Code Section 3-205, which provides as follows: 
The measure and mode of compensation ofattorneys and counsdors at law 
2 
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is left to the agreement, express or implied, ofthe parties, which is not restrained by 
law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing 
a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause 
of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision, or judgment 
in his client's favor and the proceeds thereofin whosoever hands they may come; and 
cannot be affected by any settlement between parties before or after judgment.. 
The client does hereby bind his heirs, executors, personal representatives, legal 
representatives, and assigns to the terms and conditions set forth herein. 
I have read the above contract and fully understand it. 




I agree to comply with the terms of this agreement; to evaluate this claim, dl~termine its 
merits, and thereafter use my best efforts and professional skill with regard to this claim; ;and to make 
an accounting for all monies received from or on behalfof the client. 
Dated this __ day of -', 2005. 
Connie W. Taylor 
Clark and Feeney 
The Train Station, Suite 201 
13th and Main Streets 
P. O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
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onnie W. Taylor 
.. . ' .. 
is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties,which is notrestrained by 
law. From the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing 
a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause 
of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision, or judgment 
in his client's favor and the proceeds thereofin whosoever hands they may come; and 
cannot be affected by any settlement between parties before or after judgment. 
The client does hereby bind his heirs, executors, personal representatives, legal 
representatives, and assigns to the terms and conditions set forth herein. 
I have read the above contract and zr~tand it. 
Dated on this P day of ~,---,-I__,2005. 
I agree to comply. with the tenns of thIS agreement; to e a ate this claim, detennine its 
merits, and thereafter use my best efforts and professional skill with regard to this claim; and to make 
an accounting for all monies received 
Dated this is day of__
Clark and Feeney 
The Train Station, Suite 201 
13th and Main Streets 
P. O. Box 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This present matter is an appeal by Appellants, Thomas G. Maile, IV and Colleen Maile, 
husband and wife, and Berkshire Investments, L.L.C. (hereinafter refel1'ed to as "Appellant8") from 
the Summary Judgment and resulting Judgments entered by the lower court voiding a real estate 
transaction which closed on September 16,2002. The transaction involved the TIleodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust as seller (hereinafter refel1'ed to as the "Trust") and Berkshire Investments, L.L.C., 
as buyer. The Honorable Ronald Wilper, District Judge ofthe Fourth Judicial District, granted the 
individual beneficiaries' (Reed Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and R. John Taylor) motion for summary 
judgment on May 15,2006. The district court held that the successor TlUstee's, Beth Rogers, dual 
role as TlUstee and beneficiary created a conflict of interest as a matter of law, and that comt 
approval of the sales transaction was required under Idaho Code Section 68-1 08(b) regardless of 
whether or not the successor TlUstee acted in a reasonably plUdent manner, and fmther regardless if 
there existed exceptions to COUlt approval. (R., Vol. II, pp. 284-85.) 
B. Course of Proceedings 
This Honorable COUlt has previously considered celtain aspects ofthis litigation in the case 
captioned Taylor v. Maile, Docket No. 30817. After the appeal was filed by the Taylors in Case 
No. 30817, the Trust filed its complaint and demand for jury trial on July 19,2004. (R., Vol. r,p. 5.) 
. On October 20, 2004, the Appellants filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint and Demand 
for Jury TriaVMotion for Summary Judgment relating to the Trust's complaint. (R." Vol. I, p. 63.) 











By way of that motion, the Appellants argued that the complaint filed by the Trust should be 
dismissed because the Taylors had not received the required comt appointment to make them 
successor trustees, pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 68-101 and 68-107 and, as a result, had no 
authority to file suit on behalfofthe Trust. The Taylors initially denied any court appointment was 
necessary for their appointment as successor trustees. (Celtificate ofExhibits (hereafter refelTed to 
as C.E.) C.E. #11 exhibit "A.") Then, after receiving the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss, the: Taylors 
obtained an ex parte order from the probate cOUli on November 17, 2004, appointing them as 
successor trustees, retroactive to June 10,2004. (C.E. #39 exhibit "a" to exhibit "A.") 
On February 28,2005, the Appellants filed appropriate pleadings before the probate court 
requesting that the ex parte Order dated November 17,2004, be set aside. (C.B. #39 exhibit "C.") 
In the probate comi proceeding, the parties provided extensive briefing regarding the exparte order 
entered on November 17, 2004. (C.E. #40 exhibits "A" thru "F.") On April 18, 2005, the probate 
cOUli voided the ex parte Order. (C.E. #39 exhibit "D.") Then, on May 2, 2005, the probate court 
entered another order appointing R. John Taylor, Reed J. Taylor, and DaHan J. Taylor as successor 
trustees of the Trust. (C.E. #39 exhibit "E.") 
Subsequently, the district court entered its order granting in part and denying in part the 
Appellants' Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment. The district COUlt allowed the TlUSt 
to amend its complaint after the successor tmstees received the required appointment by the probate 
court and denied the Appellants' motion regarding that issue oflaw. The district court also held that 
the Respondents had waived their rights to rescind the contract as "once a party treats a contract as 













valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of recision, the right of recision is waived." 
(R., Vol. I, p. 149, Ll. 10-12,20-22.) 
The Respondents then moved for sununary judgment regarding the AppeHants' Counter­
claim. (R., Vol. I, p. 84.) The court granted the motion, in part, ruling that the Appellants were 
entitled to pursue p011ions oftheir counter-claim, to wit: tortious interference with contract claims, 
equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and their claim alleging a fi.'audulent transfer. (R., Vol. II, p. 244.) 
On December 23, 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision on the first appeal 
brought by the individual Taylors. (R., Vol. II, p. 227.) The individual Taylors filed their Amended 
Complaint on March 9, 2006, alleging "all of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust." (R., Vol. II, p. 260.) On March 21,2006, the Appellants filed their 
Answer and Counter-claim Re: Plaintiffs Amended Complaint by Beneficiaries incorporating all 
prior verified answers and counter-claims previously of record. (R., Vol. II, p. 270.) 
On February 13, 2006, the individual Taylors moved for summary judgment as to the 
Amended Complaint, which the Court granted. (R., Vol. II, pp. 255, 281.) Subsequent motions and 
ultimately a number of Judgments were entered precipitated by the Order granting the individual 
Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Theodore L. Johnson created a Trust in 1997 and at the time transferred a fOl1y-acre parcel 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Propelty") into the Trust. Thomas Maile acted as his attomey in the 
preparation of that Trust instrument. (C.B. #5 dep. Rogers exhibit H2') There was no additional 
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involvement between Mr. Jolmson and Mr. Maile until May 2002, when Mr. Jolmson recdved an 
offer from Franz Witte to purchase the property for $400,000.00. Mr. Johnson retained Mr. Maile to 
represent him in the transaction (C.B. #11). At the time Mr. Johnson received the offer, he had not 
determined ifhe wanted to sell the property. (C.B. #5 dep. Beth Rogers, pp. 19-22, and exhibit 23 
1'.2). 
In order to understand the possible tax ramifications ofa potential sale, Mr. Maile contacted 
Mr. Jolmson's accountant to explore those issues. (C.E. #11). She provided a letter outlining 
potential tax issues and Mr. Maile gave that letter to Mr. Jolmson. (C.E. 5 dep. Rogers Pl'. 24-26 
exhibit 5). The accountant noted in her letter that she knew of another 40 acres sold in 1996 for a 
larger sum and wondered if the prope11ies were comparable. The accountant was not qualified nor 
experienced in real estate valuations. (C.E. #79 Hetherington's dep. pp. 8,9, 17, 18, 19,20). 
On May 29, 2002, Mr. Maile provided a letter to Mr. Johnson advising of the possibility of 
submitting a counter-offer to the purchaser to help detelmine the market value of the property. On 
June 4, 2002, Mr. Maile provided a letter to Mr. Witte, the potential purchaser, on behalf of 
Mr. Johnson, in an attempt to determine if Mr. Witte would increase his price without committing 
to a counter-offer. (C.E. #5 dep. Rogers exhibit 7). 
Mr. Witte refused to increase his offer to purchase and indicated he had de.termine:d a fair 
price by researching recent purchase prices ofcomparable land in the area. This lett,:r was provided 
to Mr. Johnson. (C.E. #5 dep. Rogers exhibit 6). The last letter received from the potential 
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purchaser, Mr. Witte, indicated that his offer to purchase the propelty expired on June 20,2002. 
Mr. Johnson decided not to sell to Mr. Witte. (C.E. #5 del'. Rogers p. 92). 
Mr. Maile provided Mr. Johnson a bill for his services. Mr. Johnson paid in full, and the 
representation was concluded by July 1,2002. (C.E. #5 del'. Rogers Pl'. 27,28, exhibit 8.) Relating 
to the real estate offer, no additional services were provided to the Trust and/or Mr. Jolmson after 
the date of Mr. Witte's letter establishing that his offer was withdrawn as of June 20, 2002. (C.E. 
#11). 
Some time in the first part of July 2002 and after the withdrawal of the offer by Mr. Witte, 
Mr. Johnson retained a local licensed appraiser, Knife, Janos and Associates, to detennine the fair 
market value ofthe property. (C.E. #5 del'. Beth Rogers Pl'. 28-31 exhibit 9). The appraisal firm of 
Knife, Janos and Associates provided their appraisal report on July 17, 2002. The property was 
valued at $400,000.00. 
A few days later, Mr. Johnson appeared at Mr. Maile's office with a proposal to sell the 
propelty to Mr. Maile for the appraised price of$400,000.00. When Mr. Maile was approached by 
Mr. Johnson, Mr. Maile advised Mr. Johnson he could have an independent attorney to advise 
tlu'oughout the transaction. Mr. Jolmson replied that he trusted Mr. Maile with the drafting of the 
agreement. (C.E. #11 pp.2-3) (C.E. #49 del'. Maile pp.l 04-105). Mr. Maile thereafter prepared an 
earnest money agreement containing the terms requested by Mr. Johnson. Mr. and Mrs. Maile 
executed the agreement. On July 25, 2002, Mr. Maile met Mr. Johnson at his home and again 
explained that he could retain independent counsel regarding the transaction. Again Mr. Johnson 
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indicated he did not want to do so and executed the earnest money agreement making a modification 
on the addendum. (C.E. #49 dep. Maile pp.120"2l). The real estate contract provided that the 
buyers had the right to assign their interests, and thereafter an assignment was eXt~cuted, whereby 
Berkshire Investments, LLC was the agreed-to buyer. The written contract provided that Mr. Maile 
could not represent the interests of the seller. The real estate closing occun-ed on September 16, 
2002. 
In August 2002, Mr. Jolmson, was hospitalized with a heart attack. Beth Rogers, designated 
successor trustee under the Trust, executed the assignment ofearnest money agreement designating 
Berkshire Investments as the purchaser. (C.E. #5 dep. Rogers pp. 43, 44). In mid-August 2002, the 
Mrs. Rogers prudently took the appraisal and the real estate forms for a review by an independent 
attorney in Boise, Idaho. Independent counsel reviewed the contract, assignment, appraisal and 
provided some minor proposed changes to the proposed deed oftrust. (C.B. #5 dep Rogers pp. 44­
49). 
No other family members other than Beth and Andy Rogers were involved in the 
management ofthe Trust property. In fact, neither Reed Taylor nor John Taylor had seen their uncle 
for approximately 12 years. During the period of time prior to the closing, the Rogers were in 
constant contact with Mr. Johnson and advised Mr. Johnson of the meeting with thdr independent 
counsel. Mr. Jo1mson received the input from independent counsel and continued to SUppOlt his 
decision to sell the real estate for the appraised value. (C.B. #5 dep Rogers pp.l5" 48-52). Even 
before the executed real estate contract, Beth Rogers was involved with her uncle, Mr. Johnson, and 









other family members, discussing the independent real estate appraisal establishing the fair market 
value of $400,000. (C.E. #38 dep Rogers p. 23; C.B. #5 p.p. 33·34). 
Unfortunately, Mr. Johnson died on September 14, 2002, one day before the scheduled 
closing. Consistent with the agreement, Berkshire Investments paid the Trust $100,000.00 for the 
down payment. The remaining balance of$300,000.00 was secured with a promissory note and deed 
of trust. Reed Taylor, a beneficiary, attended the funeral of Mr. Johnson and was informed of the 
pending real estate transaction involving Berkshire Investments. He was dissatisfied with the 
purchase price. (C.E. #79 dep Reed Taylor pp. 32, 34 ). A few weeks after Mr. Jolmson's funeral, 
Reed Taylor, nephew ofMr. Johnson, stalted negotiations with the Rogers to acquire Mr. Johnson's 
home place. (C.E. #79 exhibit "A" dep Reed Taylor pp. 16, 17). During this time, the Taylors 
complained to Beth Rogers about the inadequacy of the price paid for the property acquired by 
Berkshire Investments. (C.E. #79 exhibit "C" dep D. Taylor pp.15B16). 
In the spring of2003, the individual Taylors continued objecting to the propel1y's sale and 
advised Beth Rogers not to accept any additional payment from the Appellants. (C.E. #5 dep 
Rogers pp.57-58). During 2003, the Taylors were aware that Berkshire Investments was attempting 
to refinance the propel1y. (C.E. #79 dep D. Taylor pp. 60,1). In July 2003, the Taylors requested 
Beth Rogers pursue legal action against the Mailes. Mrs. Rogers informed the Taylors that the Trust 
was not interested in pursuing litigation and cashed the check in the amount of $32,357.00, 
representing the first atmuaI payment from Berkshire Investments. (C.E. #5 dep Rogers pp.57-58 
exhibit 15). 














On July 7,2003, Connie Taylor transmitted a letter to Mr. Maile indicating she represented 
the successor Trustee, Beth Rogers, and the beneficiaries of the Trust and that litigation would be 
filed over the real estate transaction because the purchase was for less than fair market value. (C.E. 
#5 dep Rogers exhibit 19). Beth Rogers did not authorize such a letter and maintained that Connie 
Taylor did not represent the interests of the Trust in July 2003. (C.E. #5 dep Rogers pp. 67-69 
exhibit 19). 
In July 2006, the Taylors were demanding that Trustee make payment from the corpus of 
TlUst and an additional $50,000.00 payment be disbursed to their mother Helen Taylor. ShOltly 
thereafter, Beth Rogers made separate disbursements of$50,000.00 to Helen Taylor, Aunt Joyce, and 
Aunt Hazel. (C.B. #5 dep Rogers exhibit 23 paragraph 19). On or about July 22,2003, Beth Rogers 
wrote to Connie Taylor indicating the TlUSt would not be pursuing litigation against the Mailes as 
outlined in Mrs. Taylor's letter to Mr. Maile. (C.E. #5 dep Rogers exhibit 21). Beth Rogers shared 
her letter with a cover note to Mr. Maile on the same date, indicating "now they ar'e after us. Nice 
people." (C.B. #5 dep Rogers pp. 75-76 exhibit 22). 
. Berkshire Investments, shortly after the sale closed, commenced the process of developing 
the propelty. After Berkshire Investments received notification that the Trust was not interested in 
litigation, the Appellants obtained from the Idaho Independent Bank a constlUction loan secured with 
a commercial loan agreement in January 2004. Monies from the new loan were used to pay the TlUst 
in full on or about Janumy 8, 2004. The construction loan was secured by the subject property via 
recorded deed of trust on January 8, 2004. Under the tenus of the new loan, the Appellants were 








required to finalize construction by July 8, 2004. (C.B. #4). To that end, The Appellants incurred 
approximately $177,763.77 in engineering and construction related expenses and approximately 
$31,111.24 related to the construction of a barn on their home site. (yr., Pl'. 86- 94, exhibits 
12,13,14). 
The Taylors filed their complaint and demand for jUly trial on January 23, 2004. The Taylors 
also filed with the Ada County Recorder's Office their Notice ofUs Pendens. The filing ofthe Lis 
Pendens caused Berkshire Investments to default under the terms and conditions of the construction 
loan. (C.E. #45). 
While the Taylors' suit was pending, and while the Appellants undel100k the required 
construction, the Taylors, the Rogers, and the Beneficiaries entered into a global "Disldaimer, 
Release & Indemnification Agreement." (C.E. #5 del'. Rogers exhibit 25; C.E. #39-Addenclum #2). 
Under the terms ofthe Agreement the Taylors released the TlUstees, Beth and Andy Rogers, from all 
liability relating to the administration ofthe Trust. The Agreement further provided that the Taylors 
would be appointed as successor Trustees. The Taylors did not obtain court approval oftheir alleged 
appointment as successor Trustees. The Taylors, as successor trustees, filed litigation on behalfof 
the Trust on July 19, 2004. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Taylors, as individual beneficiaries, have standing to pursue their claims? 
2. Did the Taylors, by entering into an Agreement releasing the Rogers, defeat their standing? 
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3.	 Did the Agreement tenninate the Trust by renouncing any and all intert~sts in the Trust 
corpus, and agreeing to a full disbursement of the TlUst corpus, makjng the current 
proceedings moot as a matter of law? 
4.	 Did the district court err by lUling that the Trust, was not able to seek recision but allowed 
the Taylors as beneficiaries to have the property restored to the Trust and/or themselves? 
5.	 Did the court err by the entry of the summary judgment? 
6.	 Was Beth Rogers acting under a conflict of interest as a matter of law under Title 68 of the 
Idaho Code, considering the statutory exceptions set forth under Title 68? 
7.	 Did the successor Trustees act in a reasonably prudent manner? 
8.	 Did the court en in ruling that Rogers and/or the Appellants breached a fiduciary duty? 
9.	 Did Theodore L. Johnson's actions amount to a breach of fiduciary to the beneficiaries? 
10.	 Did the successor Trustees act properly in closing the propelty? 
11.	 Was Berkshire Investment a bona fide purchaser for value? 
12.	 Was the sales transaction void as a matter of law? 
13.	 Did the coul1 err by ruling that the contract was void when its prior orders were inconsistent 
with its judgment on beneficiaries claim filed June 7, 2006? 
14.	 Did the court ell' by ruling that the Taylors had properly filed their complaint as successor co­
Trustees without court authorization and does the Trust have standing? 
15.	 Did the trial court commit error in determining that Appellant Maile did not infonn 
Mr. Johnson as to his right to seek independent counsel? 

















16.	 Did the trial comi commit elmr in not awarding pre-judgment interest on the return of the 
$400,000.00 paid to the Trust by the Appellants? 
17.	 Are the Appellants entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Rules 40 and 41 of the 
Idaho Appellate Rules and Idaho Code Section 12-121? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A.	 The Taylors Lacked Standing to Pursue Their Claims 
The issue of standing is jmisdictional, and it may be raised at any time. See Tungsten 
Holdings, Inc. v. Drake, 143 Idaho 69,137 P.3d456 (2006). Theodore 1. Johnson, as the grantor of 
the Trust, and the Rogers, as successor Trustees ofthe Trust, acted in a reasonably prudent manner in 
selling and ultimately closing the transaction. The only evidence in the record relating to the 
reasonableness of the grantor and the successor Trustees is contained in the Affidavit of Gary 
McAllister. (C.E. #81-Addendum #3). Mr. McAllister established that there was no appearance of 
any improper action on the part of the Rogers in closing the transaction. There is no factual basis 
supporting a claim of a breach of fiduciary on the part of the Rogers or the grantor in selling the 
property for the price established by an independent appraisal and agreed to by Mr. Johnson prior to 
his death. 
Some time after filing their complaint in January 2004, the Taylors entered into a settlement 
agl'eement with the successor Trustees, captioned "Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement" 
which was dated July 15, 2004. (C.B. #5 exhibit "25"-Addendum #1 herein). Prior to that 
agreement, the Taylors repeatedly advised the Rogers that the sale was in their opinion a violation of 











the Trust. Even with such a history, the Taylors entered into the agreement with the successor 
Trustees releasing the Rogers of all liability. 
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 282 (1959) comment on subsection (2) provides: 
e. Where the Trustee fails to sue. If the Trustee fails to 
perform his duty to bring an action at law or suit in equity or other 
proceeding against a third person (see § 177), the beneficiary can 
maintain a suit in equity against the Trustee to compel him to perfOlm 
his duty. In order to settle the controversy in a single suit and avoid 
multiplicity ofsuits, the beneficiary canjoin the third person with the 
Trustee as co-defendants, and the matter will be disposed of in a 
single suit. 
If the Trustee does not commit a breach ofTrust in failing to 
bring an action against the third person, as for example where it is 
prudent under the circumstances to refl'ain from bringing an action 
(see § 192), the beneficiary cannot maintain a suit against the Trustee 
and the third person. 
The facts reveal that Rogers acted in a prudent mamler. Paramount to detemLining whether a 
beneficiary has standing to pursue a claim is an examination ofthe actions ofa Trustee. Thl~ record 
is now complete and ready for a determination ofthe actions ofMr. Johnson, the successor TlUstees, 
and the Appellants. 
The facts establish that Mr. Witte's offer in May 2002 to purchase the property for 
$400,000.00 was taken off the table by the buyer, who affirmed that he was not going to offer any 
more than what tumed out to be the appraised value of the property. The accountant, 
Mrs. Hetherington, provided testimony which demonstrated that she had no basis to theorize the 
possible numbers she used in her letter relating to the Witte offer. Mrs. Hetherington's opinions as 
to pricing were not based upon any credible fact or principle, as she had no training in real estate 
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valuations. (C.E. 79 dep Hetherington pp.8~ 9.) The accountant ftllther provided testimony that 
there were a number of offers in the grantor's file~ from the immediate preceding yt:ars all ofwhich 
were substantially below the appraised valuation. (C.E. 79 dep Hetherington, pp. 13-14). The 
grantor had information in addition to the appraised value which established that even though he 
placed his real property in Trust~ he was exercising pmdence in agreeing to sell the real propelty for 
the appraised value. Under these facts there is no doubt that the grantor and the suc:cessor Tmstees 
acted in a reasonable prudent manner. 
1.	 The Successor Trustees Were Authorized to Close the Real Estate Transaction 
and the Taylors Have No Standing to Pursue Their Claims Against the 
Appellants 
The district court seemed to analyze the facts and the law in a vacuum~ finding that COUlt 
approval was required for the conclusion of this transaction pursuant to Idaho Code § 68-1 08(b). 
Idaho Code § 68-108(b) requires court approval ofa trustee's actions ifthere is a conflictofinterest. 
Here, no conflict existed. Idaho Code Section 68-106(a) provides that no COUlt approval is m:cessary 
under any circumstance when the Trustee acts consistent with "every act which a pmdent man would 
perform," An examination ofthe action ofthe grantor and the Rogers establishes that relying upon a 
licensed independent appraisal that confirms a fair market value which coincidently was the value of 
a prior offer is totally reasonable and prudent. 
Carrying forward with the statutory intermption ofIdaho Code Section 68-1 08(b)~ there are 
celtain provisions (68-106(c)(l), (4)~ (6), (18), and (24» which are specifically excluded fi.-om the 
prospects ofany court approval. The successor Trustees were doing nothing more than finalizing a 
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bilateral contractual obligation which the grantor ofthe Trust had created. The Rogers had statutory 
responsibilities under Idaho Code Section 68-106(a) to administer the Trust as a prudent person 
would do. The specific language of Idaho Code Section 68-106(c)(1) clearly authOlized the 
distribution of the Trust property without court approval. 
There is no dispute that Mr. Johnson transferred the 40 acres to the Trust, executed the real 
estate contract, received independent counsel's advice prior to closing and confirmed his desire to 
sell to Berkshire Investments. The Rogers were doing nothing more than finalizing the transaction as 
a reasonably prudent person has a right to do under Idaho Code Section 68-106. Under the clear 
reading of Idaho Code Section 68-106(c)(1), the successor Trustees are specifically and 
unequivocally empowered under the statute to sell a Trust asset which was placed in Trust by the 
Trustor, all without court approval. 
The Revocable Trust Agreement is now part ofthe record. (C.E. #5 dep. Beth Rogers exhibit 
"2"-Addendum #1). The Trust provided for equal classes among Mr. Johnson's siblings. Each 
living sibling was to receive 20% of the Trust, with the surviving issue of the deceased brother, 
Richard Johnson, to receive itmnediately 20% of the property upon the death of Mr. Johnson. In 
fact, the Trust Agreement provided that the 20% share in which Richard Johnson's issue were to 
enjoy was not even to be held in Trust but rather was to be immediately vested upon the gmntor's 
death. The issue ofRichard B. Johnson were to immediately obtain 20% of the propel1y without it 
being held in Trust. The four living siblings ofTheodore L. Johnson were to receive 20%, with their 
p0l1ions to be held in Trust. Beth Rogers was the daughter ofthe deceased Richard Johnson. (C.E. 
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#5 dep. Beth Rogers exhibit 23 page 7). Her portion ofthe 20% share became vested upon the death 
of Mr. Johnson. Mr. Jolmson died two days prior to the execution of the closing documents by the 
Rogers. There is no dispute offact that Andy Rogers, as co-successor Trustee, was not a beneficiary 
under the terms ofthe Trust. Consequently, he could not under any theory be in a conflict ofinterest 
relating to the beneficiaries or the Trust. Therefore, he was authorized to close the transaction 
without limitation. There cannot be a conflict on the part of Beth Rogers' role in her role as a co­
successor Trustee, as her share immediately vested two days prior to filling the role as co-successor 
Trustee. 
Beth Rogers held an undivided interest in the 40-acre parcel which vested as to h(,r at the 
time ofMr. Johnson's death on September 14,2002. The Trust Agreement provided the suecessors 
Trustees' absolute discretion in selling property, including undivided interest in any property: 
9. In any case in which the Trustee is required, pursuant 
to the provisions ofthe Trust, to divide any Trust property into parts 
or shares for the purpose ofdistribution, or otherwise, the Trustee is 
authorized, in the Trustee's absolute discretion, to make the division 
and distribution in kind, including undivided interests in any 
property, ...., and for this purpose to make such sales of the Trust 
property as the Trustee may deem necessary on such terms and 
conditions as the Trustee shall see fit. 
(Agreement, p. 7 (emphasis added).) 
The Rogers were doing nothing more than finalizing the transaction as a reasonably prudent 
person would and proceeded with the closing without a court order which is specifically mandated 
under the language ofIdaho Code Section 68-l06(a)(c)(l) and (4) and the provision of the Trust 
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Agreement. Beth Rogers was acting as a reasonably prudent investor relying upon the advice of 
independent counsel and an independent appraisal supporting the sale consistent with Idaho Code 
Section 68-106(a)(c). 
This COUlt must construe the plain meaning and intention of Idaho Code Sections 68-106 
and 68-108 as well as the reasonableness of the grantor, Mr. Johnson, and the Rogers. The 
interpretation ofa statute is an issue oflaw over which this COUlt exercises free review. Idaho Fair 
Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n, 113 Idaho 959, 751 P.2d 107, 109-10 (1988). When 
interpreting a statute, the primary function of the coUIt is to determine and give effect to the 
legislative intent. George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990). 
Such intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue. Id. at 539, 797 P.2d 
at 1387--88. The present statutory scheme under Title 68 is unambiguous. There is no additional 
language contained in the statute that would defeat Berkshire Investments' rights to rely upon its 
status as bona fide purchasers ofvalue. The Taylors lacked standing to pursue their 'claim as there is 
no breach of duty by the grantor or successor Trustees Ullder these facts. 
2.	 The Restatement of Trust Codifies the Law Regarding the Rights of 
Beneficiaries to Assert Both Legal and Equitable Claims Against Third Parties 
and the Facts Established in the Record Defeat the Taylors' Standing to Pursue 
Their Claims for Either Remedy 
The Taylors were advised of the potential purchase of the property the day of the funeral of 
the grantor on or about September 17, 2002. (C.E. #79 dep. Reed J. Taylor pp. 12-14). 
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Approximately 15 months later they commenced their individual action against the Appellants. The 
Taylors pled for damages and for equitable relief against the Appellants. 
The District Court Judge ruled that the Taylors were entitled to the equitable remedy, 
rescinding the transaction between the Trust and Berkshire and restoring the real property to the 
Trust by declaring the transaction void. As stated in the Restatement (Second) ofTrust § 282, Suit 
In Equity By Beneficiary (1959): 
(1) Where the Trustee could maintain an action at law or suit 
in equity or other proceeding against a third person ifthe TlUstee held 
the property free of Trust, the beneficiary cannot maintain a suit in 
equity against the third person, except as stated in Subsections (2) 
and (3). 
(2) If the TlUstee improperly refuses or neglects to bring an 
action against the third person, the beneficiary can maintain a suit in 
equity against the Trustee and the third person. 
(3) If the Trustee cmmot be subjected to thejUlisdiction ofth~: 
cOUli or if there is no TlUstee, the beneficiary can maintain a suit in 
equity against the third person, if such suit is necessary to protect the: 
interest of the beneficiary. 
In order to have standing, the Taylors were required to proceed with litigation against both 
the Rogers and the Appellants. See Saks v. Damon Raike and Co., 7 CaI.AppAth 41,8 CaI.Rptr.2d 
869 (1992). The Taylors have failed to present any facts to support any theory that the Rogers were 
negligent in their failure to file suit against the Appellants. A beneficiary may hav~: standing if the 
Trustee improperly fails or neglects to pursue a legitimate claim. The case ofPillsbmy v. Katmgard, 
22 CaI.AppAth 743 (1994), illustrates the necessity ofa litigant to prove improper aetion on the part 
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of the Trustee to empower a beneficiary to have standing to sue a third party. No flvidence 
established that the Rogers breached a fiduciary duty, consequently the Taylors lack standing. 
3.	 The Taylors Entered Into an Agreement With the Successor Trustee~l Which 
Defeated Their Claim for Standing 
The Taylors were fully aware ofthe circumstances sunounding the transaction, the role ofthe 
grantor and the Rogers, by June 2004, approximately two years after the closing. The Agrec~ment in 
June 2004, was a release of all claims against the Rogers. Prior to the agreement, the Taylors had 
repeatedly advised the successor Trustees that the sale was in their opinion a violation ofthe Trust 
and fmther requested in 2003 that Beth Rogers not accept any monies from Berkshire Investments. 
The Taylors were fully advised by the Verified Answer and Counter-claim filed on February 23, 
2004, that Beth Rogers, as successor Trustee, had shared her letter ofJuly 2003, with the Appellants 
indicating the Trust fully stood behind the land sale transaction. The Taylors also knew the 
Appellants were asserting claims ofestoppel to prevent the reversal ofthe real estatf: closing. (Case 
No. 30817, Vol. I, p. 11, exhibit "C" p. 44.) Even with such a history, the Taylors entered into an 
agreement with the Rogers, which released the successor Trustees of any and an liabilily. The 
Restatement (Second) ofTrust § 315 (1959) illustrates: 
Rights of Transferee Where Beneficiary Consent to the: 
Transfer. Ifthe Trustee in breach ofTrust transfers Trust property to 
a third person, and the beneficiary by his consent to the transfer is 
precluded from holding the Trustee liable for breach of Trust in 
making the transfer, the third person takes the propelty free of the 
Trust. 

















The Taylors agreed that the Rogers would not be liable for any breach ofTrust, and as such 
had no right to pursue their claims against the Appellants. There was in fact a final accounting and 
disbursement agreed between the Taylors and the Rogers. The pertinent specific language contained 
in the Agreement. provides: 
3. Release ofTrustees Estimated Expenses. The undersigned 
hereby release and discharge Andrew T. Rogers and Beth J. Rogers 
from all claims or causes of action.... The undersigned further 
acknowledge that the Trustees have distributed, and he/she has 
received, all of the propeliy, money and benefits to which he/she is 
entitled under the tenTIS ofthe Trust.. .. The undersigned acknowledge 
the financial information he/she has received will constitute a final 
accounting; and he/she waives any right to a court-approved formal 
final accounting. (Addendum # 2). 
By releasing the Rogers, accepting a full accounting, and the full disbursement of the corpus, the 
Taylors have waived any claim that the propelty should be returned to the Trust and are barred for 
lack of standing to pursue such a claim. 
4.	 The Taylors Lacked Standing to Pursue Their Claims Because When They 
Entered Into the Agreement Their Claims Became Moot as a Matter of Law 
The Taylors, by entering into the agreement. telminated the purpose ofthe Trust. All assets 
were delivered to the appropriate beneficiaries under the tenns and conditions ofthe agreeme:nt. The 
Restatement (Second) of Trust § 342 (1959) Conveyance by Trustee to or at the Direction of the 
BeneficialY provides: 
...if there are several beneficiaries none of whom is under an 
incapacity and the Trustee transfers tlle Trust propelty to them or at 
their direction, the Trust telminates although the purposes ofthe Trust 
have not been fully accomplished. 
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The entire TlUst corpus was distributed in June 2004 to all beneficiaries. All that 
Mr. Johnson had intended to accomplish by his estate planning was nullified by the June 2004 
agreement between the beneficiaries (Addendum 2). The Agreement dispersed all the TlUst assets 
and terminated the Trust as a matter oflaw. The Restatement (Third), Trusts § 2, comment (I), p. 23 
(2003) provides, "if a Trust is created and subsequently the whole of the Trust property ceases to 
exist, the Trust is terminated because the Trustee no longer holds anything in the Trust." Each and 
every beneficiary agreed to the final accounting and complete disbursement ofthe assets ofthe Trust. 
The specific language contained in the Agreement provides: 
1.2 Disclaimer ofAll Other Interests.... l.2.3: Taylor. Reed 
J. Taylor, Dallan 1. Taylor, Mark J. Taylor, Gloria Rydaich, Virginia 
POlter and R. John Taylor, comprising all of the children of Helen 
Taylor, hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the Trust, in favor 
of their mother, Helen Taylor, and hereby approve immediate 
distribution to Helen Taylor. ( C..E. # 5 Beth Rogers deposition 
exhibit 25). 
The Taylors disclaimed all other interests in the Trust, including any right to existing corpus 
of the Trust. The agreement was created after the Taylors had filed their appeal with this (:ourt on 
June 4, 2004. (Case No. 30817, R., Vol. I, p. 101.) After the execution of the agreement, the 
Taylors, believing they had properly filled the role ofsuccessor Trustee, caused the Trust itselfto file 
its lawsuit on July 19,2004. (R., Vol. I, p. 5.) The TlUst ifit continued to exist, arguably became 
the real pwty in interest at that time, dispensing with the Taylors' individual claims fulfilling the 
issues of the real party in interest, under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17. 
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The reality however, is that the Trust corpus was fully disbursed consistent with the 
agreement. There was a final accounting and disbursement to all parties, and the Trust terminated as 
a matter oflaw. The Taylors by the terms ofthe agreement received nothing and renounced :;;my right 
to receive any monies, instead agreeing that all their interests to the Trust corpus, including all 
monies paid by Berkshire were disclaimed in favor of their mother Helen Taylor. (C.E. #5 dep 
Rogers exhibit 25 p.1). 
Fwtheln10re, another fundamental problem confronting the standing of the Taylors is 
present. Although all the beneficiaries agreed to the modification and final accounting ofthe Trust, 
no action was initiated by the Taylors to seek court approval of the modifications and/or final 
accounting. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 65 Telmination Or Modification By Consent Of 
Beneficiaries (2003) provides: 
(l) Except as stated in Subsection (2), if all of tht: 
beneficiaries of an irrevocable Trust consent, they can compel the 
termination or modification of the Trust. 
(2) If termination or modification of the Trust under 
Subsection (1) would be inconsistent with a material purpose of the: 
Trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its termination or modification 
except with the consent ofthe settlor or, after the settlor's death, with 
authorization of the court if it determines that the reason(s) for 
telmination or modification outweigh the material purpose. 
The purpose of the Trust and intention of Mr. Johnson have been fundamentally altered by 
the agreement. The probate cow1 has never addressed the issues of the modification ofthe Trust's 
material purposes. Mootness applies when a party lacks a legal interest in the outcome. State v. 
Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 99 P.3d 1069 (2004). An appellate cOUl1 is obliged to raise mootness 
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sua sponte because it is ajurisdictional issue. Gator.Com Corp. v. L.L. Bean. Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 
1129 (9th Cir. 2005). The corpus was, pursuant to the agreement, disbursed to Helen Taylor, their 
mother, according to her agreed-to share ofthe Trust. In fact, the Respondents themselves a.dmitted 
to the probate court in their petition for appointment of Trustees, "the petitiom::r's 88-year-old 
mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of Trust by virtue of the terms of a 
Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity Agreement" (C.B. #39 Exhibit "B"). A judicial admission is a 
statement made by a party or attomey, in the course ofjudicial proceedings, for the purpose" or with 
the effect, of dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fa.ct. Sun Valley 
Potato Growers. Inc. v. Texas RefinelY Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004). 
Mootness has been described as "the doctrine ofstanding set in a time frame: The requisite personal 
interest that must exist at the commencement ofthe litigation (standing) must continue throughout its 
existence (mootness).'" Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 1069 n.22 
(1997). The district court lacked jurisdiction to afford the Taylors the remedy ofa constructive Dust 
and to enter a judgment voiding the real estate transaction. 
5.	 The District Court Had Ruled That the Trust Was Not Able to Seek R.~cision; 
the Taylors as Beneficiaries Are Unable to Have the Property Restored to the 
Trust and/or Themselves 
The district court cOll'ectly perceived in July 2005, that the Trust had allowed too much time 
to pass before seeking recision. (R., Vol. I, p. 141.) The successor Trustee, Beth Rogers, had duly 
notified the Appellants in July 2003, that the Trust was allowing the transaction to stand and that the 
Trustee saw no merit in the contentions of the Taylors' claims. (C.B. #5 del'. Rogers Pl'. 72~76 
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exhibits 21, 22). The Restatement (Second) of Trust § 327 Rights of Beneficiary When Tmstee 
Barred by The Statute of Limitations or Laches (1959) provides: 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), ifthe Trustee is barred 
by the Statute ofLimitations or by laches from maintaining an action 
against a third person with respect to the Trust property, the 
beneficiary is precluded from maintaining an action against the third 
person. 
(2) If the third person knowingly participated in a breach of 
Trust, the beneficiary is not precluded from maintaining an action 
against him therefore, unless 
(a) the beneficiary is himself guilty of laches, or 
(b) a co-Trustee who did not participate in the breach 
ofTrust, or a successor Trustee knowing ofthe claim against the third 
person, fails to bring an action against him until he is barred by th~: 
Statute of Limitations or by laches. 
Even if the Taylors had standing to pursue their claims under the Restatement, above cited, the 
actions or inaction ofthe Trustee and/or a successor can be imputed to the beneficiaries. In addition, 
the beneficiaries themselves can be estopped from asserting a claim by their action or inaction. The 
Taylors in 2003 advised the Rogers to file suit against the Appellants. The Rogers were aware ofthe 
demands of the Taylors. Beth Rogers, fully aware of the intentions of her uncle Ted Johnson, the 
grantor chose not to file suit and so advised the Taylors of the position of the Trust. In July 2003, 
Berkshire Investments had the assurances ofthe successor Trustees, Beth and Andy Rogers, that the 
Trust was honoring the transaction. 
The Taylors opined in September 2002 that the Trust was selling the property to B(~rkshire 
Investments for a low price. (C.E. #79, dep. D. Taylor pp. 15-16). The Taylors knew in July 2003 
that the Rogers were not going to pursue any claims against the Appellants. The Taylors in 2003 
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demanded money from the sale from Beth Rogers and accepted those funds from the Trust in 2003. 
This money was a portion of the $100,000.00 down payment made by Berkshire Investments in 
September 2002. The Taylors, as well as all other beneficiaries, took all the proceeds ofthe JPropel1y 
sale in the summer of 2004 and accepted the fmal accounting from the Trustees. As stated by the 
district com1, "once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a 
light of recision, the right of recision is waived." (R., VoL I, p. 149, Ll. 10-12; 20-22, quoting, 
White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888, 104 P.3d 356 (2004).) The Taylors waited until after the real 
propel1y was completely refinanced and full payment was made to the Trust before filing their 
litigation in January 2004. Berkshire acquired new financing in January 2004, and committed to the 
new lender that the construction project would be completed within six months. The district court 
specifically found and so ordered, "the plaintiffs, now with standing as Trustees, did not act promptly 
to pursue recision once the grounds for it arose." (R., Vol. I, p. 149, Ll. 20, 21.) l11e district court 
balanced the equities and correctly ruled that recision for the "plaintiffs" was not proper. 
Consequently, the Taylors lack standing under the doctrine of laches to pursue th~: remedies they 
sought and summary judgment was improper. 
6. The Entry of Summary Judgment Was Improper 
The Appellants incorporate by reference all the preceding sections relating to the lack ofthe 
standing of the Taylors as the same substantive issues of law and facts apply as to whether the 
district court properly entered summary judgment. When reviewing a distdct court's grant of 
summaryjudgment, the appellate cOUl1 uses the same standard a district court uses when it rules on a 
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summary judgment motion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 589, 21 P.3d 908, 911 (2001). Upon 
review, the Court must liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving 
pWiy, and draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party. Bonz v. 
Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991). 
B.	 Beth Rogers as Successor Trustee Was Not Acting Undet· a Conflict of Inter,est as a 
Matter ofLaw Under Title 68 ofthe Idaho Code However Even ifThere Was a Conflict 
of Interest. the Successor Trustee Acted in a Reasonably Prudent Manner 
The Appellants incorporate their argument in section I herein, as the same U:lctual and legal 
issues raised as to standing apply to a determination of the appropriateness of the summaIy 
judgment. As examined in the preceding section, there was no conflict ofinterest on the pwt ofBeth 
Rogers. Under Title 68, a Trustee is not required to seek judicial approval ofa sale if the Trustee is 
exercising reasonable prudence. In addition, there exist two statutOly exceptions to any cOUlt 
approval requirement, both of which can be applied in the present matter. 
Theodore Johnson, and Beth and Andy Rogers, all had the benefit ofa reliable independent 
appraisal by Knipe Janoush Knipe, LLC. The question that must be addressed, under Idaho Code 
Section 68-106(a), is whether relying upon an appraisal from a licensed Idaho appraiser was prudent 
in this case. As provided by Gary MacAllister, the answer is, "yes." There is no evidencc~ in the 
record that would indicate otherwise. Likewise, there is nothing in the record set forth by any ofthe 
Respondents' legal experts stating that there was a violation ofthe standard ofcare by Mr. Maile or 
by Berkshire Investments that would lead to the conclusion that reliance under the established case 
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law and the plain reading of Title 68 was inappropriate in purchasing real property, without the 
successor Trustee obtaining cOUlt approval by the probate comt. 
In addition, the record includes another local licensed real estate appraisal. At the behest of 
Idaho Independent Bank, Tim Williams provided his appraisal establishing the fair market value of 
the property to be $410,00.00 in the fall of2003. (C.E. #23). Examining the record available before 
this Court, there was a prudent investigation ofthe fair market value and that Beth Rogers properly 
closed the transaction. The entry of summary judgment was improper. 
C.	 The Trial Court Erred in Ruling That Beth Rogers and/or the Appellants Had 
Breached a Fiduciary duty 
It is generally held that whether a fiduciary duty has been breached is a question of fact for 
the jUly and not for the trial court on motion for summaty judgment. See Western Alliance Corp. v. 
Western Reliance Corp., 57 Or.App. 263, 643 P.2d 1382, 1387 (1982). The case of Johnson v. 
Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 650 (1982) provides the generally accepted proposition that there 
must be a showing ofall the necessary elements including damages for any legal ma]!practictl claim. 
A breach offiduciary would require the same elements. There is nothing in the record to show any 
causal connection between any alleged breach of duty and resulting damages in favor of the Dust. 
There has been no detel1nination that the price paid by Berkshire did not represent the fair market 
value. There is nothing in the record to infer that Beth Rogers or any of the Appellants knew or 
should have known that the independent appraisal was not valid. There was no detennination by the 
lower comt that the exceptions to any requirement ofa court approval did not exist. Nor was there 
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any determination that the Rogers were not acting in a reasonably prudent marmer. SUlmnary 
judgment was improper. 
D.	 The Original Grantor, Theodore L. Johnson. Had Adequately and Properly 
Formulated a Basis to Determine Fair Market Value and Consequently His Action in 
Selling His Property to Berkshire Investment Cannot Be Considered a Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty. 
The record demonstrates that Mr. Johnson acted as a reasonably prudent man in determining 
his needs and desires to sell a portion of his Trust property for the established fair market value. 
Fratcher, Scott on Trusts § 330.11 (4th ed. 1989), states, inpw1: 
The reservation of a power to withdraw property from time to time 
from the Trust gives the settler power to terminate the Trust 
completely if he so desires. Where he simply reserves a power in 
general terms to revoke the Trust, he ordinarily has power to revoke it 
in part by withdrawing some ofthe propel1y from the Trust.. .. Where: 
the settlor reserves power to revoke, alter, or modify the Trust, he can 
properly withdraw part ofthe property from the Trust. 
Upon the death ofone ofthe settlors, the Trust becomes irrevocable, see L'Argent v. Barnett 
Bank, 730 So.2d 395 (Fla.App. 1999). The Rogers had no power to alter or amend the modiflcations 
to the corpus ofthe Trust that Mr. Johnson had chosen some two months earlier. The distrkt cOUl1 
eITed in entering summary judgment. 
E.	 The Successor Trustees Acted According to an Appropriate Standard in Executing the 
Closing Documentation on the Property 
The Rogers properly fulfilled their legal requirements to act in a reasonably ptudent manner 
in conveying the property. The case of Hatcher v. U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon, 560r.App. 643, 
643 P.2d 359 (1982) illustrates the law that a Trustee has as a duty to determine the fair mw'k(:t value 
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ofstock, which it could accomplish through appraisals or by "testing the market" to determine what 
a willing buyer was willing to pay. The Rogers fulfilled all the requirements placed upon them under 
Title 68 Chapter 5 of the Idaho Code. Idaho Code Section 68-502 provides the standard of care 
required for a Trustee. 
The court's authority to review a Trustee's actions is limited to assuring the terms ofthe trust 
are met. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187 (1959) provides: 
Where discretion is conferred upon the Trustee with respect to th{: 
exercise ofa power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court, 
except to prevent an abuse by the Tmstee of his discretion. 
Many jurisdictions have applied this rule and have limited review of Trustee actions to 
determining compliance with the Trust's terms, not replacing the TlUstee'sjudgrnent with that ofthe 
comt. "To the extent to which the Trustee has discretion, the court will not control his exerc:ise of it 
as long as he does not exceed the limits ofthe discretion conferred upon him." 2 Scott on Trusts (2d 
ed.1956) § 187 at 1374. 
The Rogers, acting with the aid ofan independent appraisal, which the grantor himselfrelied 
upon, conveyed the subject real property to Berkshire. The language ofthe agreem{mt, spedfically 
provided "the Trustee is authorized, in the Trustee's absolute discretion, to make the division and 
distribution in kind, including undivided interests in any property, or partly kind and pat11y in money, 
and for this purpose to make such sales ofthe Trust property as the Trustee may deem necessary on 
such telms and conditions as the Trustee shall see fit." (Trust Agreement, p. 7 (emphasis added).) 
Idaho Code Section 68-508 provides: 
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Compliance with the prudent investor rule is detelmined in light of 
the facts and circumstances existing at the time ofa Trustee's decision 
01' action and not by hindsight. 
What did the record establish at the time the district judge entered summary judgment? The 
Respondents failed to show and the record is devoid ofany evidence to demonstratt: that the Rogers 
failed to act in a reasonably prudent manner. The district court was incorrect in entering summary 
judgment. 
F.	 Berkshire Investment Was a Bona Fide Purchaser and Purchased the Real Property 
Not Subject to the Claims of the Beneficiaries 
Berkshire paid the price determined by an independent appraisal. The appraisal happened to 
be the same value as that represented by the withdrawn Witte offer. No argument can be set forth 
asserting that Berkshire Investment actively participated in any breach of fiduciary committed by 
Beth Rogers. The existing law at the time ofthe purchase would have not allowed cmy purchaser to 
believe there was a breach of fiduciary by Beth Rogers. 
There are specific statutory directives that require a Trustee exercise reasonable prudence. 
Those directives were met. There are clear exceptions to any court approval requirement, and the 
language of the Trust authorized the Rogers to proceed to close the transaction. Idaho Code 
Section 68-110 specifically provides protection to third persons dealing with a Trustee. There are 
no facts in the record to establish that Berkshire andlor any other Appellant knew there were any 
requirements to obtain a COUlt order regarding this transaction. The original grantor ~md Beth Rogers 
appeared to be acting under a reasonably prudent standard. 
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There are statutory exceptions that apply to any possible need for a com1 approval. The 
Restatement (Second) of Trust § 284 (1959) provides: 
Bona Fide Purchaser: (1) If the Trustee in breach of Trust 
transfers Trust property tOt or creates a legal interest in the subject 
matter of the Trust in, a person who takes for value and without 
notice ofthe breach ofTrust, and who is not knowingly taking part in 
an illegal transaction, the latter holds the interest so transferred or 
created free of the Trust, and is under no liability to the beneficiary. 
As stated in the Restatement (Second) ofTrust § 283 (1959): 
Where Transfer Is Not In Breach Of Trust: If the Truste{~ 
transfers Trust property to a third person or creates a legal or 
equitable interest in the subject matter of the Trust in a third person" 
and the Trustee in making the transfer or in creating the interest does 
not commit a breach ofTrust, the third person holds the interest so 
transfelTed or created free ofthe Trust, and is under no liability to the~ 
beneficiary. 
There is nothing in the record to establish that Berkshire Investments had any knowing participation 
ofany possible breach of fiduciary involving Beth Rogers. In fact, none of the experts reta.ined by 
the Respondents provided any opinions stating that any ofthe Appellants pro1icipated in any alleged 
breach by the Rogers by paying the propertyts fair market value as set forth in an independent 
appraisal and/or by not obtaining approval by a probate court. Interestingly, none ofthe complaints 
filed prior to the decision in Case No. 30817 provided any reference to any possible violations in the 
closing procedure, pursuant to Idaho Code Title 68. No one disputes that there was a legitimate 
closing of real estate documents by the Rogers, based upon the fair market value price and after 
obtaining independent advice of legal counsel. The entry ofsummalYjudgment was inappropriate. 
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III.	 THE DISTRICT COURT WAS INCORRECT IN RULING THAT THE SALES 
TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE TRUST AND BERKSmREINVESTMENTS WAS 
VOID AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The Rogers had properly fulfilled their legal requirements to act in a reasonably plUdent 
manner. The case of Edwards v. Edwards, 122 Idaho 963, 842 P.2d 299, 305 (Ct.App. 1992), 
involved a Trustee who entered into a contract with the TlUst for personal profits to himself. In 
that case the Court of Appeals affinned the district court ruling that a contract entered into by a 
Trustee in order to further the Trustee's ability to make profit from the Trust, was voidable, not void. 
The Edwards case involved entirely different factual issues than the case at bar. In the presf:nt case, 
the Trust settlor Ted Johnson had in fact authorized the sale and entered the real estate transaction 
based upon an appraised valuation and with the aid of independent counsel prior to closing. 
Even in cases in which the facts are somewhat similar to the present case, other jurisdictions 
have held the contract may be voidable. There is no basis to infer that a contract must be voided. 
The case ofPratt v Lavender, 319 So.2d 88 (1975) provides that a "failure ofTrustef: to comply with 
Dust Accounting Law was not sufficient to render Trustee's conveyance of Trust property to 
purchasers void, and did not affect the rights ofpurchasers in dealing with the Dust." There is no 
statutory directive under Title 68 ofIdaho Code, that would authorize the district court to detennine 
the transaction to be void. Other jurisdictions have held that a conveyance by a noncomplying 
Trustee is valid and not void, in the absence of express statutory language to the contrary, see 
Lentz v. Lentz, 5 N.C.App. 309, 168 S.E.2d 437 (1969). Idaho Law has no express statutory 
language directing that district court void a transaction made by a successor TlUstee" who acted as a 
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reasonable person. Even if a Trustee should commit a breach of Trust, unlike the case at hand, the 
transaction may stand. 
The Restatement (Second) of Trust § 291 (1959), comment m provides: 
m. Election by beneficiary to affirm. Although the Trustee 
transfers property in breach ofTrust to a person who takes with notic(;~ 
of the breach of Trust, the beneficiary can affirm the transaction..." 
Similarly, if there are several beneficiaries and if none of them is 
under an incapacity and they all agree, they can affirm the transaction. 
Ifthe beneficiary or one ofthe beneficiaries lacks capacity to make an 
effective election to reject or affirm the transaction, or if they do not: 
all agree, the court will reject or affirm the transaction as may in its: 
opinion be most conducive to effectuating the purposes of the Trust. 
So, even if this Court determines that the actions of Mr. Johnson, the Rogers, andlor any of 
the Appellants amounted to a breach of fiducialy, the above cited provisions of the Restatement 
make it clear that the transaction is not void, but only potentially voidable, and then only with a 
probate comt determination to effectuate the purpose of the Trust. To make that determination, the 
intent ofMr. Johnson must be considered by the appropriate court. Who was in the best position to 
provide testimony regarding Mr. Johnson's intent and to effectuate the direction of the Trust? 
Would it have been Mr. Johnson himself, the original grantor, who instigated the rea1l estate 
transaction? Would it have been the Rogers, who cared for and maintained a close re:lationship with 
the grantor? Or would it have been distant relatives who had not maintained any relationship with 
the grantor for more than 12 years prior to his death? The district court erred in rulIng the 
transaction void. 
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IV.	 THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED INCONSISTENTLY WITH ITS PRIOR ORDERS 
AND ERRED BY RULING THE CONTRACT VOID 
The district COUlt on July 28, 2005, ruled that the Respondents had waived rights to rescind 
the contract as "once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a 
right of recision, the right of recision is waived." (R., Vol. I, p. 149, Ll. 10-12,20-22.). 
On February 13, 2006, the district cOUl1 entered its Order allowing Appellants to proceed on 
claims of quasi-estoppel and equitable estoppel set forth in their counter-claim. The Order 
acknowledged the earlier Order ofJuly 28,2005. (R., Vol. II, p. 249, Ll. 10-13.) The district court 
recognized that the Appellants were entitled to pursue their counter-claims of estoppel against the 
Taylors and the Trust under the principles of estoppel. 
The purpose ofthe doctrines ofpromissory and quasi estoppel are to 
prohibit an individual from securing some advantage for himself, or 
to produce some disadvantage to tlte persons seeking tlte estoppel, 
after a party has been induced to change his position. See Hecl'l 
Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 839 P.2d 
1192 (1992). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Appellants were assured by the successor Trustees, in July 2003, that the Trust intended 
to allow the real estate transaction to stand. The Taylors tried for months to get successor Trustee, 
Beth Rogers, to change her mind, but to no avail. As early as July 2003, the Taylors intended to file 
a lawsuit. (C.E. #46, dep R. John Taylor "D" pp. 51-52; dep. D. Taylor exhibit "E'" p. 76). In early 
2003, Beth Rogers' attorney, Bart Harwood, contacted the Taylors. In September 2003, the Taylors 
received cOl1"espondence from Mr. Harwood, explaining that the Trust and other beneficiari'es ofthe 









 '   ,        ,  
Trust did not want to pursue legal action seeking recision of the contract. (C.B. # 58, dep. Bart 
Harwood, exhibit "C" pp. 9-12 exhibit 73). 
The Appellants relied upon Beth Rogers' assurances and the Taylors' inaction, and 
proceeded to incur new financing to pay the Trust in full. The tenns ofthe new financing required 
construction of the subdivision within six months ofthe loan. (C.E. # 46, ppJ-5 and exhibit "B"). 
Idaho Independent Bank considered the loan in default under the tenllS of loan, as no lots eould be 
released as a result of the Taylors' lis pendens. (C.E. # 45). 
Pursuant to the Agreement (addendum-2), the Trust and the beneficiaries took the money and 
disbursed the funds to all beneficiaries in June 2004. (C.E. # 46, dep. D. Taylor exhibit "E" p. 75). 
Note, the accounting records of Beth Rogers indicate that in 2003 the beneficiaries each received 
payments of$50,000.00 from the Trust, and all that was left by June 2004 were the monies paid by 
Berkshire Investments when the note was paid in full and the payment from the Taylors from the 
purchase ofTed Johnson's home. All these funds were paid to all the beneficiaries on July 23, 2004, 
with the individual Taylors renouncing any right or claim to the funds. (C.E. # 66, dep. Rogers 
exhibit "A" p.111, 118 dep. exhibit "40" and addendum #2). No tender or repayment was even 
offered to the Appellants by the beneficiaries and/or the Trust. A party seeking to re'scind a 
transaction on the ground of fraud must restore or offer to restore the other. party to the status quo 
before the contract was fotmed. Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 504,112 PJd 188, 792 (2005). 
Once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance offacts giving rise to a right ofrescission, 
the right of rescission is waived. See White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888, 104 PJd 356 (2004). 
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Even prior to the Trust obtaining the full payment on the contract in January 2004, the Taylors in 
January 2003 demanded and obtained monies from the Trust from the down-payment and the first 
annual payment made by Berkshire Investments to the Trust. (C.E. #5 dep. Beth Roger pp.64-66). 
The Appellants incun'ed considerable expenses associated with the construction costs and time in 
the development to avoid a default with the Idaho Independent Barne (C.B. # 66, affidavit of 
Mr. Maile p. 3). The Taylors waived their right to seek recision by accepting th(~ benefits of the 
transaction and failing to timely pursue such claims. The district court erred in entering summary 
judgment (see also section on standing re: laches & estoppel incorporated by reference herein). 
v.	 THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE TAYLORS TO FILE THE 
COMPLAINT AS COMTRUSTEES OF THE TRUST WITHOUT COURT 
AUTHORIZATION AND THE TRUST LACKS STANDING 
The Appellants filed their motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment on October 20, 
2004. (R., Vol. I, p. 63.) The motion related to the improper filing ofthe complaint by the TlUst on 
July 19,2004. (R., Vol. I, p. 5.) The legal premise of the Appellants' motion set forth that the 
Taylors, as alleged successor TlUstees, failed to obtain court approval as specifically require.d under 
Idaho Code Sections 68-101 and 68·107. The district cOUlt thereafter allowed the Trust to amend 
its complaint after receiving appointment in a probate proceeding and allowed the: amendment to 
relate back to the filing date of the complaint, July 19,2004. (R., Vol. I, p. 141.) Idaho Code 
Section 68-101 provides that: 
When a TlUst exists without any appointed Trustees or where 
any or all ofthe Trustees renounce, die, or are discharged, the district 
court of the county where the Trust property or some pOltion thereof 












is situated, must appoint another Trustee to direct the execution ofthe 
Trust. 
(Emphasis added.) Idaho Code Section 68-107 also specifically provides that the office ofTrustee 
is not transferable: 
The Trustee shall not transfer his office to another or delegate the entire administration ofthe 
Trust to a co-Trustee or another. 
Furthermore, Idaho Code Section 15-7-403 provides additional authority that successor 
Trustees, not nominated in the Trust documentation, need to apply for court appointment after notice 
to all interested pa11ies. These provisions clearly provide that a new Trustee cannot simply be 
appointed by the actions of the Trustee and/or beneficiaries to fill the legal position of a successor 
Trustee. The only Idaho case law on this subject confirms that where a Trust makes no provision for 
the appointment of successors, current Trustees are without the authority to fill vacanci(~s. See 
Sherman v. Citizens' Right of Way Co., 37 Idaho 528,217 P. 985 (1923). 
The district court was incolTect in determining that the amended complaint filed after the 
Taylors' received "proper" probate appointment to serve as successor Trustees, related back to the 
date of the filing of the Trust litigation. When a successor fiduciary steps into the shoes of a 
predecessor who, acting in fiduciary capacity, has brought lawsuit in a court vested with jurisdiction 
over subject matter of the suit, the "stepping in" relates back to the time when the original party had 
standing to sue, see Corbin v. Blankenburg, C.A.6th, 1994,39 F.3d 650, cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 
1256,513 U.S. 1192, 131 L.Ed.2d 136 (1995). In the present case it was improper for the district 
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COUlt to allow the amended complaint to relate back since there was no confusion as to the proper 
pmty that needed to file suit, and the Taylors and the Trust lacked standing. (See S(~ction I (C)(D).) 
VI.	 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MR. MAILE DID NOT 
INFORM MR. JOHNSON AS TO HIS RIGHT TO SEEK INDEPENDENT 
COUNSEL 
The trial court entered its Findings and Facts and Memorandum Decision, and alluded to a 
number of items that were not necessary to reach its decision relating to the Appe:llants' daim of 
unjust enrichment. (R., Vol. II, p. 352, L. 6.) One such issue was the point that Mr.. Maile failed to 
verbally inform Mr. Johnson ofhis right to seek independent counsel. (R., Vol. II. p. 351, L. 6.) The 
testimony of Mr. Maile established that he in fact did so inform Mr. Johnson. Mr. Maile testified 
that on two occasions him so infOlmed Mr. Johnson. (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 32-33, 137-38.) Unfortunately, 
Mr. Johnson has passed away. As stated in Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 1006, 829 P.2d 1355 
(Ct.App. 1991), "A court may not reject the positive, uncontradicted testimony ofa eredible witness 
unless her testimony is inherently improbable or impeached," Airstream. Inc. v. CIT Financial 
Services. Inc., 111 Idaho 307, 723 P.2d 851, appeal after remand, 115 Idaho 569, 768 P.2d 1302 
(1988). The trial cOUlt indicated in its decision that the "court has reached its conclusion and make 
its finding without regard to the deposition testimony ofBeth Rogers." (R., Vol. Ill' p. 351, L. 23.) 
There was nothing offered to impeach the testimony ofMr. Maile on that point. There is nothing in 
the record to infer that his testimony was inherently improbable. The district court determination 
was clearly en'oneous and such a rmding should be set aside and not considered in any future 
proceedings. 





             
L             
 
              
VII.	 THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT AWARDING PRE­
JUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE RETURN OF THE $400,000.00 
In the event the court disagrees with the Appellants on the substantive issues offact and law 
set forth above, the Appellants request the award of interest on the monies paid by Berkshire 
Investments. The trial court failed to award pre-judgment interest on the return ofthe monies paid 
by the Berkshire Investment to the Trust. The record established a total $442,021.11 was paid on 
three different payments. (September 2002, May 2003 and January 2004.) 
The Appellants should have been granted an award of interest on the monies which the TIUSt 
has retained for over five years. Subsections, 1, 2, 4, 5, of Idaho Code Section 28-22-102 have 
application under the present facts. Prejudgment interest should be awarded on a claim that is 
"liquidated or ascertainable by mere mathematical process." Ervin Const. Co. v. Van Orden, 
125 Idaho 695,704,874 P.2d 506, 515 (1993); Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon CQill., 125 Idaho 
409,415-16,871 P.2d 826, 832-33 (1994). There is no dispute that the Appellants provided timely 
payments under the deed of trust and promissory note due and owing to the TIUSt. Sum payments are 
liquidated and celtain. The law provides for pre-judgment interest on such liquidated and certain 
sums. 
VIII.	 THE APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, an award of attorney fees on appeal is appropriate 
when the prevailing party is entitled to attomey fees at the trial court level, pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 12-120 or Idaho Code Section 12-121. See, generally, Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 
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775 P.2d120 (1989); Spidell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857, 727 P.2d 1285 (1986). Idaho Code 
Section 12-121 provides for an award ofattorney's fees in civil actions. There is no disputf~ that the 
Respondents filed their motion for summary judgment approximately 18 months after they had 
entered into their agreement with the Rogers and all beneficiaries under the Trust. The Agreement 
amounted to all beneficiaries disclaiming their full interests in the Trust, the corpus, any interest 
and/or income as to the corpus assets, and fwther disavowed any contingent or remainder iinterests 
they may have in the corpus of the Trusts assets. The monies paid by Berkshire Investments has 
been disbursed to all beneficiaries agreed to under the Agreement, and a final accounting has been 
agreed to by all beneficiaries under the TlUSt. The Respondents failed to show any factual basis for 
any breach of fiduciary by the original grantor or the Rogers or the Appellants. The Appellants 
should be entitled to their attorney's fees and costs incul1'ed herein. 
CONCLUSION 
The Taylors lacked legal standing to pursue their claims and their claims must be dismissed 
for lack ofjurisdiction. There has been no factual evidence submitted by the Respondents that the 
original grantor, or the Rogers, committed a breach offiduciary. The Taylors enten:d into a release 
with the Rogers which prevented them from pursuing any claims. The Agreement fi1l1hermore 
amounted to a final accounting of the TlUst and as such the Trust was terminated. 
In the event this Court believes the Taylors have standing, the matter must be remanded 
since the district court improperly entered summary judgment. Material facts are in dispute. 
According to the evidence presented in the record, the Rogers acted in a reasonably plUdent manner 
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in closing the transaction and conducted themselves appropriately under the provisions ofTitle 68. 
Berkshire Investment paid the fair market value for the real estate, and was a bona fide purchaser for 
value. The Taylors have waived their right to seek recision under the facts in the record. 
There has never been a factual determination that Mr. Maile breachc~d his fiduciary either 
with the grantor or with the Trust. The contract specifically indicated Mr. Maile was not 
representing the Trust. The grantor was advised to seek independent counsel, and chose not to. 
Thereafter and prior to closing, the grantor and the successor Trustees obtained independent 
counsel's advice and chose to sell the real property based upon a price arrived at by an independent 
appraiser. The district court's findings set forth in Section VI were erroneous and must be stricken. 
The Taylors wrongfully filed a lawsuit as successor Trustees of the Trust, without court 
appointment as mandated by Title 68. The Appellants should be awarded their costs and attorney's 
fees. This matter should be reversed and remanded to the district court consistent th(~ Appellants' 
arguments contained herein. 
DATED this ~day of September, 2007. 
THOMAS G. MAl E, I ., co-counsel, for 
Appellants, Berkshire nvestments, Colleen 
Maile 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 
A. Condensed Course of Proceedings 
The lower court has lacked subject matter jurisdiction relating to the Taylors' beneficiaries 
claims for the last approximate 23 months oflitigation. The Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim was 
predicated upon a misrepresentation of material facts committed by the Taylors. On January 13, 
2006, R. John Taylor provided his verified amended complaint to the lower court. (R. Vol II. 
p. 260.) On May 15, 2006, the district cOUlt entered its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim. (R. Vol II. p. 281.) 
B. Statement of Essential Relevant Facts 
The Taylors filed their verified petition in the probate cOillt on November 12, 2004, 
requesting the probate court to appoint them as trustees ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. 
The petition was executed by R. John Taylor as a verification of the facts contained in the petition. 
(The petition alone is annexed as appendix 4 without its attachments which are part of the~ record 
see C.E. #39 exhibit "B.") Page 2 ofthe verified petition states under oath, "the petitioner's 88-year­
old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by virtue of the terms ofa 
Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement." 
On March 9, 2006, the Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors. Page 1ofthe 
Verified Amended Complaint states under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents ofNez Perce 













County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a resident of Ada County Idaho. All of the plaintiffs are: residual 
beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust." 
The written contract provided that Mr. Maile could not represent the interests of the seller. 
Thomas Maile complied with the appropriate Idaho Code ofProfessional Responsibility provisions 
that were in effect in the year 2002. The Theodore L. Johnson trust obtained independent legal 
counsel prior to closing the real estate transaction. Theodore L. Johnson was informe:d of the 
independent legal counsel's involvement and again approved his desire to sell the real estate based 
upon the appraised market value. The real estate closing occurred on September 16, 2002. The 
terms and conditions of the final sales transaction were fair and reasonable. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1.	 Are the Taylors entitled to their attorneys fees? 
2.	 Are the Respondents entitled to their attorneys fees in defense of the cross-appeal 
filed by the Taylors pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 ? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A.	 The Taylors Lacked Standing to Pursue Their Claims 
The issue of standing is jlU'isdictional, and it may be raised at any time. See Tungsten 
Holdings, Inc. v. Drake, 143 Idaho 69, 137 PJd 456 (2006). The Taylors' reliancl~ on the case of 
State v. Searcy, 120 Idaho 882, 820 P.2d 1239 (Ct.App. 1991) is misplaced. Jurisdictional issues 
such as standing and mootness are always subject to review at any stage ofproceedings (ailthough 










there are some issues which may be waived if not presented on appeal). Generally issues raised for 
the first time on appeal will not be considered. State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 578-79, 808 P.2d 
1322, 1323-24 (1991). Litigants, however, cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction, and it may be 
raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal, Idaho State Ins. Fund By and Through 
Forney v. Turner, 130 Idaho 190, 938 P.2d 1228, 1229 (1997). An appellate court will address 
jurisdictional issues even though not preserved for appeal by objection in the lower court, cf 
LR.C.P.12(h)(3). Whenever it appears by suggestion afthe parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jmisdiction of the subject matter, the COUlt shall dismiss the action. State v. Wood, 125 Idaho 911, 
912-13,876 P.2d 1352 (1993). Subject matter jurisdiction presents a question aflaw which we 
freely review. Peter Starr Production Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 
1986); Gage v. Harris, 119 Idaho 451,452,807 P.2d 1289, 1290 (Ct.App. 1991). 
The Taylors' first appeal was filed on June 4, 2004 (Docket No. 30817, R. Vol. 1. p. 101). 
Many of the issues that are germane to the issue of standing and mootness were not even factual 
issues existing at the time of the filing of the first appeal. Contrary to the Responde:nts' contention 
that the Appellants failed to raise the disclaimer issue before the district COUlt (Respondent's Brief, 
p. 10), the Appellants did raise the disclaimer issue before the lower COUlt. (C.E. #80.) 
The Disclaimer, Release, Indemnity Agreement was executed after the Taylors had fil,ed their 
first appeal. The Taylors, after the first appeal, filed their petition in probate court in November 
2004, requesting their appointment as trustees retroactively to June 10, 2004. The fact that the 
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Taylors specifically violated Idaho Code Sections 68-101 and 68-107 by failing to obtain judicial 
appointment to act as successor trustees was not established until discovery was undertaken in the 
subsequent lawsuit, where the Taylors initially admitted that probate court appointment was not 
necessary (C.E. #11 exhibit "A"). 
On April 18, 2005, the probate court, through the Honorable Judge Christopher M. Beiter, 
entered its Order declaring the ex-parte Order entered on November 17, 2004 void. (C.E. #39 
exhibit "D.") On May 2,2005, Judge Beiter entered all Order appointing R. John Taylor, Reed 1. 
Taylor and Dallan 1. Taylor as successor trustees ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust (C.E. 
#39 exhibit "E"). Taylor I had oral arguments on May 6,2005. 
As this COlllt indicated in the first appeal, Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 
(2005), the matter was reviewed pursuant to a motion to dismiss with nothing in the record except 
the bare allegations set fOlth in the Taylors' complaint. 
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted "unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim that would entitle him to relief." Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611, 
533 P.2d 730, 732 (1975). When reviewing a district court's dismissal of a CaS(l 
under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), this Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor ofth~: 
non-moving party. Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104,44 P.3d 1157,. 
1159 (2002). After drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving patty, the 
COUlt then examines whether a claim for reliefhas been stated. Jd. Where a case has 
been dismissed because of a lack of standing, this Court must examine "whether 
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the requisite elements of standing in their 
complaint to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." 
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ld at 257, 127 P.3d at 160. 
AI1 inferences were rightly given to the Taylors without the benefit ofa developed appellate 
record. The Taylors' reliance on the "law of the case" doctrine is inappropriate when analyzing a 
court decision stemming from a motion to dismiss. 
The Taylors summarily conclude that this COUlt created "law of the case" which precludes 
an examination of relevant facts which were not part of the record. The law of the case doctrine 
states that "upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a 
principle or rule oflaw necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the: law ofthe case, 
and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon 
subsequent appeaL." Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 PJd 1278, 1283 (2001). However, 
the United States Supreme Court noted that the law ofthe case doctrine "directs a court's discretion, 
it does not limit the tribunal's power." Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 
75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983). 
"The lUle is wel1 established and long adhered to in this state that where, upon an appeal, the 
Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law ne:cessary 
to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law ofthe case, and must be adhered to throughout 
its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal. ..." In re Barker v. 
Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 11 0 Idaho 871, 872, 719 P.2d 1131, 1132 (1986) (citing Suitts v. First 
Security Bank o/Idaho, 110 Idaho 15,713 P.2d 1374 (1985». The issues discussed surrounding the 




              
     
 
         
necessity ofany court approval for a sale consistent with Idaho Code Section 68~ 108, were not issues 
offact or law which were necessary to the decision rendered by this Com1. The court in Taylor Iwas 
granting the Taylors all inferences permissible and stated that given all inferences possible the 
Taylors had standing to pursue the allegations concerning a breach offiduciary. It was not necessary 
to its decision to comment on the particulars surrounding Idaho Code Section 68-108 compliance. 
In fact this Court never was able to examine the trust agreement itself, the two independent 
appraisals that supported the purchase price, the facts surrounding the reasonableness ofthe grantor's 
decision to sell the propelty for fair market value, or the reasonableness ofthe designated successor 
trustees' action in finalizing the sale of real propelty which was placed in the trust by th~~ grantor 
consistent with Idaho Code Section 68-106(c)(1). The principle pronounced in Taylor I provided: 
The general rule in trusts is that a third person who "has notice that the truste(~ 
is committing a breach oftrust and participates therein is liable to the beneficiary for 
any loss caused by the breach of trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 326 
(1969); see LaHue v. Keystone Investment Co., 6 Wash.App. 765,496 P.2d 343 
(1972); 4 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts, § 326.5 (1967). 
Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 260-61, 127 P.3d 156, 163-64 (2005). 
There was no opportunity for the Mailes to raise issues outside the limited pleadings which 
formed the basis ofthe district comi's initial order dismissing the Taylors' complaint in Apl'i12004. 
How could additional factual issues be raised in an appeal that stems from a motion to dismiss? 
Consequently, how can the Taylors now argue the Mailes waived their rights to present factual issues 
(page 14 of Taylors' brief)? Even more perplexing is how the Taylors can argue that the issues of 
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subject matter jurisdiction are waived. There can be no logical basis for such propositions, as many 
peliinent facts were generated by the Taylors themselves after the first appeal was filed and this 
Court was without an appropriate record substantiating relevant facts on the first appeal. 
1.	 The Taylors Are Precluded From Taking a Position Contrary to Their Sworn 
Statements in the Probate Court 
The Taylors petitioned the probate court for their appointment as succe:ssor trustees in 
November 2004. The petition before the probate court was only advanced after the Taylors admitted 
in discovery responses that they were not required to obtain judicial appointme:nt as successor 
trustees (C.B. #11 exhibit "A") and the Mailes had filed their motion to dismiss pursuant Ito Idaho 
Code Sections 68-101 and 68-107. (R. Vol 1. p. 63.) The record is clear and unambiguous, as to 
what the Taylors represented to the probate court. Under oath, R. John Taylor verified that Helen 
Taylor was the sole beneficiary of the trust in November 2004 pursuant to the Disclaimer, Release 
and Indemnity Agreement. To constitute a judicial admission, a statement must be a deliberate, 
clear, and unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact with that party's knowledge. See 
Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618, 930 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct.App. 1997); Cordova v. 
Bonneville County Joint Sch. Dist. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 167 P.3d 774 (2007). Clem'ly the 
admission was based both upon R. John Taylor's and his wife Connie Taylor's knowledge, as both 
were extensively involved in the negotiations and the actual execution ofthe agreement (appendix 2 
to opening brief). 
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What are the effects ofthe Taylors' judicial admission? Ajudicial admission is a statement 
made by a party or attorney, in the course ofjudicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, 
of dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact. Sun Valley Potato 
Growers, Inc, v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765,86 P.3d 475,479 (2004). In thle present 
matter both Mrs. Taylor's (as attorney of record) and her husband, R. John Taylor's, admissions 
dispense with any need to prove the "admitted fact" that from June 2004 to the present date Helen 
Taylor was the sole beneficiary of the trust. There is no room for the Taylors to argue facts or 
evidence to the contrary. The verified amended complaint executed under oath on January 13,2006, 
by R. Jolm Taylor was an attempt to take improper advantage ofthe Idaho Supreme Court's decision 
in Taylor I. The Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim entered on June 7, 2006, was ~:ntered pursuant 
to the misrepresentation of the Taylors as to their status as beneficiaries in January 2006. The 
Taylors perceived an opening to victory based upon the decision rendered by this Court, and chose 
to misrepresent their status as beneficiaries under the trust to the lower COUlt. The Judgm{mt must 
be set aside. 
2. The Taylors' Claims Are Moot 
It is a fundamental tenet ofAmerican jurisprudence that a person wishing to iinvoke (ll cOUlt's 
jurisdiction must have standing. Van Valkenburghv. CitizensjorTermLimits, 135 Idaho 121, 125, 
15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000). The doctrine ofstanding focuses on the party seeking rdiefand not on 
the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 





              




778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). In order to satisfy the requirements of standing, the petitioners must 
"allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested 
will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id 
An issue is moot "if a favorable judicial decision would not result in any relief or the pal1y 
lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 
1127, 1131 (2004). Idaho jurisprudence parallels that of the United States Supreme C0U11 in 
identifying that the mootness doctrine applies not only when an issue is dead, but also when the 
appellant lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome because even a favorab1t:: decision would 
not result in relief. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 102 S.Ct. 1181 (1982); Bradshaw v. State, 
120 Idaho 429, 432,816 P.2d 986, 989 (1991). 
Mootness has been characterized as "the doctrine ofstanding set in a time frame." Arizonans 
for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997). There must be a justiciable case or 
controversy. A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer "live" or the parties lack a 
legally cognizable interest in the outcome. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944 
(1969). 
The case of Scona, Inc. v. Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 286, 985 P.2d 1145, 1148 
(1999) also involved a case where the litigants claimed no interest in the underlying trust, nor in the 
property held in the bust. The court in Scona stated: 
When an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the 
issues raised, but upon the patty who is seeking the relief. Under the Idaho Rules of 
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Civil Procedure, actions can only "be prosecuted in the name of a real party in 
interest." I.R.C.P. 17(a). This Court has ruled that a real party in interest "is the 
person who will be entitled to the benefits ofthe action ifsuccessful." Carrington v. 
Crandall, 63 Idaho 651, 658,124 P.2d 914, 917 (1942). 
Scona, 133 Idaho at 288,985 P.2d at 1150. 
The record establishes that the majority of the beneficiaries, as well as the appointed 
successor trustees, of the trust did not want to pursue litigation that was contrary to the wishes and 
desires of Theodore Johnson. The Taylors sUl1"endered their standing in the present matter by 
bargaining with the successor trustees for the control ofthe trust. By so disavowing their individual 
beneficiary status to the trust, their claims are moot as a matter of law. The Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claim entered on June 7, 2006, was entered pursuant to the misrepresentation of the 
Taylors as to their status as beneficiaries in January 2006. The Judgment must be set aside. 
3.	 The Taylors Have Not Provided Any Authority Opposing the Appellants' 
Additional Claims of Lack of Standing 
The are a number of issues relating to standing that have not been addressed by the Taylors. 
The Taylors seems to be resting on the notion that the "law of the case" has bl~en established. 
However, the Appellants have previously addressed the issue of standing as it rdates to SUbject 
matterjurisdiction and as such other standing issues set f01th in the opening briefmust be considered 
by this Court regardless of the "law of the case" argument. Various sections of the Restatement of 
Trusts set forth in the Appellants' previous briefing SUppOlt the position that the Taylors lack 
standing. For example, in the Disclaimer Agreement the Taylors released the successor trustees from 












liability. This action precludes them from attempting to set aside the sales transa(;tion based upon 
what they allege to be the successor trustees' breach of fiduciary. Likewise, the questions of 
reasonableness of both the grantor's and successor trustees' actions are germane to the Taylors' 
standing. 
Even ifarguably the earlier decision in Taylor I supports the proposition that COUlt approval 
was required to close the sales transaction, the decision was silent as to the application of any 
exceptions to court approval ofthe sale. There are clear statutory exceptions that exist und.er Idaho 
Code Sections 68-1 06(a)(c)(I) and (4) that apply to the present case. Consequently, the exceptions 
could 110t be considered a bar to the present appeal as the earlier decision did not address whether 
exceptions applied. The "law of the case" doctrine cannot have any application to the underlying 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction and the Taylors' lack of standing. 
B.	 There Are Genuine Issues of Materinl Facts in Dispute Which Require a Trial in This 
Matter 
The Taylors summarily conclude that this COUlt created "law ofthe case" which precludes 
an examination ofrelevallt facts which were not part of the record. This point has been ad.dressed 
in Section A. The question of whether any of the Appellants had notice that the trustees were 
committing a breach of trust could be considered germane to the legal responsibility of the 
Appellants. However, to conclude that as a matter oflaw the Appellants knew the successor trustees 
were committing a breach of fiduciary is not supported by the facts or the law. The point bears 
repeating, that at the time of the closing of this transaction, there was no case law or statutOly law 










that would have led any reasonable person to believe that a closing on a real estat(~ transaetion by a 
successor trustee, who was finalizing a transaction created by the trustor, based upon a llegitimate 
appraisal representing fair market value, relating to property which was placed in trust by the tmstor 
himself, required any court approval. Once again, there were no opinions rendered by any experts 
in this matter, that any of the Appellants violated any standard of care or breached a fiduciary duty 
in closing this transaction without court approvaL In addition there is specific statutory protection 
for a third party in purchasing property from a trustee. See Idaho Code § 68-110. 
The case of Edwards v. Edwards, 122 Idaho 963, 842 P.2d 299 (Ct.App. 1992) provides: 
In enforcing the duty ofloyalty the court is primarily interested in improving 
trust administration by deterring tmstees from getting into positions of conflict of 
interests, and only secondarily in preventing loss to particular beneficiaries or unjust 
enrichment of the trustee. Quoting, G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, LAW OF 
TRUSTS § 95 (5th ed. 1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170, 
206 (1959); A. scon', ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170 (1960). 
Id. at 969,842 P.2d at 305. 
Mr. Johnson, Andy Rogers, and Beth Rogers had properly fulfilled their legal requirements 
to act in a reasonably prudent manner in conveying the subject real property. The case ofHatcher v. 
u.s. Nat. Banko/Oregon, 56 Or.App. 643, 643 P.2d 359 (1982) illustrates the law that a trustee has 
a duty to determine the fair market value of stock, which could have been done tluough appraisals 
or by "testing the market" to determine what a willing buyer was willing to pay. 








The successor trustees were acting consistent with the intentions of the grantor and were 
exercising reasonable prudence upon relying upon the appraisal by a licensed Idaho appraiser, and 
the advice of retained independent counsel, and closed the transaction on September 16, 2002. 
Specifically, Idaho Code Section 68-508 provides: 
Compliance with the prudent investor rule is determined in light of the facts 
and circumstances existing at the time of a trustee's decision or action and not by 
hindsight. 
The Respondents have argued that Mr. Maile advised his client, Mr. Johnson, not to sell to 
Franz Witte for $400,000.00. (Respondent's Brief, p. 29.) There is no citation in the record to any 
supp0l1ing facts for such an assertion. In fact Mr. Johnson made his own personal: decision not to 
sell to Mr. Witte. (C.B. #5 dep Rogers p. 92.) Mr. Maile advised Mr. Johnson to submit a Gounter­
. offer to determine market value. (C.E. #5 dep. Rogers exhibit "5.") An attempt was made to seek 
from Mr. Witte an increase in his initial offer to purchase without subjecting Mr. Johnson to a 
binding counter-offer. (C.E. #49 dep Maile p, 93.) There is no showing in the record that the 
Appellants breached any standard of care or fiduciary duty to the trust as a matter of law. 
1.	 There Was No Judicial Admission in the Prior Appeal That Beth Ro&crs Had 
a Conflict of Interest 
The language quoted by the Respondents' Brief, p. 17, relating to the briefing in Taylor 1, 
does not constitute ajudicial admission that the AppeHants in the first appeal admitted to anyeonflict 
of interest on the part of Beth Rogers. As stated in the opening brief, Beth Rogers' ownership 
interest vested at the moment of death of Theodore Johnson. Her interest is classified as an 
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undivided interest in the real property. Neither Andy nor Beth Rogers were Mr. Johnson's siblings. 
There were siblings of Mr. Johnson who could arguably have been interested in obtaining income 
from the corpus versus a contingent-remainder beneficiary of the trust who could have been 
interested in preserving the corpus. However, the interests ofBeth Rogers were not held in trust; she 
held an undivided interest in the real property (appendix 1). Such argument in briefing cannot, under 
the authority above cited, be construed to be ajudicial admission that Beth Rogers had a conflict of 
interest that required court approval. Nor can it be argued that the Appellants agr,eed that none of 
the statutory exceptions existed which negated any cOUl1 approval for an alleged! conflict by the 
trustee. 
2.	 There Arc Statutory Exceptions to Court Approval Which Predude the Entry 
of Summary Jud&ment 
The Respondents argue that there are no exceptions to Idaho Code Section 68-108 and go on 
to point out that in the Respondents' opinion the cunent real estate transaction falls within Idaho 
Code Section 68-106(c)(17). Neither Beth nor Andy Rogers acquired real estate in the name of the 
trust and such code provision has no application in the present case. 
The successor trustees received trust assets which were placed in trust by the grantor. Idaho 
Code Section 68-1 06(c)(l) allows them to sell such assets as a reasonably prudent person would sell 
any assets which were placed in the bust by the grantor, without a court order. The Respondents 
have not argued against that proposition since there is no dispute. That is exactly what happened in 











the present case. Idaho Code Sections 68-106(c)(1) and (4) clearly and unequivocally states that a 
successor trustee does not need to seek court approval for the following sale of property, to wit: 
(1) to collect, hold~ and retain trust assets received from a tlUstor until, in the 
judgment of the tlUstee~ disposition of the assets should be made.... 
(4) to acquire an undivided interest in a trust asset in which the trustl:::e, in any 
trust capacity, holds an undivided interest;. 
Id. 
The successor trustees once again were doing nothing more than finalizing a bilateral 
contractual obligation created by the grantor of the trust. The successor trustees had statutory 
responsibilities under Idaho Code Section 68-106 to administer the trust as a plUdent person would 
do, even ifthere was a conflict. The above-referenced Idaho Code section authorized the distribution 
of the tlUSt property without court approval, with the caveat that the transaction must be done with 
a reasonably plUdent standard. Nothing in the record set f011h by the Taylors rebl.lts Gary 
MacAllister's testimony that the successor trustees acted prudently. Their only defense is that 
"reasonable prudent standard" is not applicable to the present case. (Respondents' Brief, pp. 16, 
21,23.) 
The Rogers did not violate their position as tlUstees of the tlUst and there is not evidence to 
suggest that the Appellants participated or had any knowledge ofany breach of fidueiary on the part 
ofthe trustees. The present matter before the court requires this Court to construe the plain meaning 
and intention ofIdaho Code Sections 68-106 and 68-108. The interpretation of a statute is an issue 
of law over which this Court exercises free review. Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public Utilities 









    
               
l  
'­
Comm'n, 113 Idaho 959, 751 P.2d 107, 109-10 (1988). When interpreting a statute, the primary 
function of the COUlt is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent. George w: Watkins 
Familyv. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990). Such intent should be derived from a 
reading of the whole act at issue. 1d at 539, 797 P.2d at 1387-88. If the statutory language is 
unambiguous, "the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there 
is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction." Payette River Property 
Owners Ass 'n v. Board ofComm 'rs ofValley County, 132 Idaho 551,976 P.2d 477,483 (1999). The 
plain meaning of a statute, therefore, will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is 
contrary 01' unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. George W Watkins Famlly, 118 Idaho at 
540,797 P.2d at 1388; Driver v. S1 Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 429,80 P.3d 1024, 1030 (2003). In the 
present case there are clear and unequivocal statutory exceptions to any requirement for judicial 
approval in closing this transaction. 
3.	 The District Court Erred in Ruling That Berkshire Investments Was Not a 
Bona Fide Purchaser 
Under the facts in the record, it is undisputed that Berkshire Investments paid the fair market 
value for the real estate. There is nothing to establish that anyone, including any of the Appellants, 
knew or should have known that the Knipe appraisal was flawed in any way. There is evidence in 
the record that establishes both the Knipe and Williams appraisals were properly conducted and that 
Mr. Rudd's appraisal was not appropriate in a number ofpmticulars. (C.E. # 99 Corlett Affidavit.) 
There exists a genuine issue of material fact as to the whether the Appellants were knowingly 











participating in a breach of trust when Berkshire Investments had statutory protection to deal with 
the trustees. Idaho Code Section 68-110 provides: 
THIRD PERSONS PROTECTED IN DEALING WITH TRUSTEE. With 
respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or assisting a trustee in the conduct of 
a transaction, the existence of trust powers and their proper exercise by the trustee 
may be assumed without inquiry. The third person is not bound to inquire whethe;r 
the trustee has power to act or is properly exercising the power; and a third person, 
without actual knOWledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly 
exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the trustee as if th~ trustee 
possessed and properly exercised the powers he purports to exercise. A third person 
is not bound to assure the proper application of trust assets paid or delivered to th~ 
trustee 
Sound public policy supports giving effect to contracts entered into with trustees in good faith 
and for adequate consideration. In Re Strass Trust Estate, 11 Wis.2d 410, 105 N.W.2d 55~, (1960). 
Prospective purchasers must be provided the certainty that their contracts will be honored in order 
for trusts to be able to function effectively. Evans v. Hunold, 393 Ill. 195, 65 N.E.2d 373, 376 
(1946); Rock Springs Land and Timber, Inc. v. Lore, 75 PJd 614 (Wyo. 2003). In the present 
matter, the sanctity of the contract is supported by the fact that Berkshire Investments paid the trust 
in full for the fair market value of the real property and it qualifies as a bona fide purchaser ofvalue. 
4.	 The District Court Erred in Not Affordil1~ the Appellants the Opportunity to 
Pursue Their Affirmative Defenses and/or Claims ofOuasi Estoppel/ Egluitable 
Estoppel Against the Beneficiaries 
The claims of quasi-estoppel and equitable estoppel were claimed both as affirmative 
defenses and claims for reliefthat survived summaryjudgment at the lower level. However, shortly 
after concluding that such issues were germane to the ultimate determination between the patties, 
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the district court struck those equitable principles raised by the Appellants in awarding the 
beneficiaries judgment entered June 6, 2006, as a matter of law. The ultimate recission of the 
contract is an equitable remedy and equitable principles should have dictated that tlu: issues ofquasi­
estoppel and equitable estoppel should be resolved by the trier of fact. 
5.	 The Taylors' Discussion Concerninf: the Earnest Money as Repn,senting 
Unreasonable Terms Is Not Relevant 
The Taylors have advanced an argument pointing to the earnest money agreement as some 
sOli ofbasis to show there was unreasonableness on the part ofthe successor tlUste(~S in closing the 
transaction. (Respondents' Brief, p. 22.) For example, one of the issues raised by the Respondents 
is the modification of the statute of limitations contained in the contract. This was a provision that 
applied to both buyer and seller, however, in response to a letter from Ms. Taylor, Mr. Maile, by 
letter dated July 10,2003, specifically waived any reliance upon such a term. (C.E. #5 Rogl~rs dep. 
exhibit 20.) The reality is that the modification ofthe statute of limitation favored the sell,~r. The 
Respondents' expert, Richard Mollerup, also provided testimony indicating the provision favored 
the seller. (C.E. #62 dep. Mollerup pp. 38,39.) None of the provisions contained in the earnest 
money agreement can be shown by the Respondents to have resulted in any damages to tht;: tms1. 
The Respondents' argument relating to the terms of the earnest money agreement are 
misplaced. The successor trllstees executed a warranty deed for the closing and Berkshire 
Investments granted a deed oftnlst memorializing the debt owing to the tlUSt. 
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It is an established rule oflaw that prior agreements between parties are merged into deeds 
and/or mOltgages which are created based upon a contract to convey real property. The tenns ofthe 
deed and the deed of trust become the new telIDS and conditions between th(~ parties, as the 
underlying real estate earnest money is merged into the closing documents. Estes v. Barry, 
132 Idaho 82,85,967 P.2d 284, 287 (1998); Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373,414 P.2d 
879 (1966). 
There is a complete absence in the record to demonstrate that the transaction was not fair and 
reasonable for Mr. Johnson or the bust. The real estate earnest money has merged into the deed of 
trust and deed, and has no relevance in light ofthe unambiguous terms ofthe deed and deed oftrust. 
The Taylors' attempt to create an issue that the successor trustees acted unreasonably in closing the 
transaction based upon terms that merged into the closing documents is unfounded and has no 
relevance to the issues at hand. This is pmticularly true in light ofthe fact that the trust received all 
the monies and a reasonable interest rate for the purchase based upon the fair market value. 
Additionally, the record substantiates that the ultimate terms of the note as to the length of 
the note and interest rate were terms which were fair and reasonable for Mr. Jolmson" Mr. Johnson's 
accountant, Mrs. Hetherington, sent letter dated May 24, 2004, which provides "The five-year 
balloon and the seven percent interest rate are good provisions in the note." (C.E. #5 Rogl~rs dep. 
exhibit 4.) Gary MacAllister, an expelt in fiduciaries, affirmed that the transaction was fair and 
reasonable. There is no contradictory evidence submitted by the Respondents. 









The Respondents asselt that Mr. Johnson and the successor trustees were acti.ng unreasonably 
by selling the real property for the appraised value and not following the advice of Mr. Maile in 
obtaining various opinions and averaging the opinions. (Respondents Brief, p. 23.) In fact, Richard 
Mollerup provided in his testimony that if a client wanted to sell for a certain price he stated: 
"I don't try to make decisions for people, so I would have said, 'Fine.''' (C.E. #62 dep. Mollerup 
pp. 53, 54.) An attorney should provide competent advice; however, clients are free to make their 
own determination, and as such there is nothing unreasonable for either Mr. Johnson or the Rogers 
to rely upon an independent licensed appraiser's findings as to valuation and selling real property 
based upon such an appraisal. 
C.	 The Trial Court Erred in Determining That Mr. Maile Did Not Inform Mr. Johnson 
as to His Right to Seek Independent Counsel 
The Respondents have not properly pointed to any conflicting evidence in the record that 
would warrant the lower court's finding that Mr. Maile did not so inform Mr. Johnson to seek 
independent counsel. The testimony of Mr. Maile established that he in fact did so inform 
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Maile testified that on two occasions he so informed Mr. Johnson. (Tr. Vol. I 
pp. 32-33, 137-138). The Respondents argue and point to the deposition testimony ofBeth Rogers 
as creating conflicting evidence. (Respondents' Brief, p. 11.) The Appellants properly objected to 
the use of such hearsay testimony and the court sustained their objections. (Tr. Vol. I pp. 133-37, 
274-75.) The trial court properly concluded that it was not to be considered and consequently there 
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was nothing in the record that created any conflicting evidence as to the fact that ]\11'. Johnson was 
advised to seek independent counsel. The finding must be stricken. 
D.	 The Trust Received Independent Legal Counsel Prior to Closing and as Such the 
Taylors Cannot Demonstrate Any Overreaching by the Appellants 
The Respondents have argued that Mr. Maile committed violations under the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, breached his fiduciary duty towards the nust, and as such a constructive 
trust should. (Respondents' Brief, p. 26.) There is no basis for the Respondents to advance such 
theories in light of the issues framed by the issues on appeal, the notices ofappeals and/or the cross 
appeal. Consequently, under Idaho Appellate Rule 11, there is no basis for such a discussion 
advanced by the Taylors. However, in the event this Court disagrees, and without waiving such 
objection, the following is provided. 
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8, which was in affect during 2002, 
provided: 
Conflict of Interest:·Prohibited Transactions 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly 
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adv'erse to a 
client unless: 
(1) the tl'ansaction ami terms on wllicll tile lawyer acquires tile interestarefairand 
reasonable to tile client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to th{: 
client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client; 
(2) the client is given a J'easonable opportunity to seek tile advice ofindependent 
counsel in the transaction; and 
(3) the client consents in writing thereto. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The record contains the Affidavit ofRory Jones (C.E. #88). Mr. Jones, an Idaho attorney, 
provided his opinion based upon a review of the pe11inent facts and evidence in the record, that 
Mr. Maile had fully complied with Rule 1.8 ofthe Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, and opined 
Mr. Maile committed no wrongdoing. 
The record clearly demonstrates that Mr. Maile advised Mr. Johnson he could have an 
independent attorney regarding the transaction. Mr. Johnson replied that he trusted Mr. Maile with 
the drafting of the agreement. (C.E. #11 pp. 2-3; C.E. #49 dep Maile pp. 104-05.) The fact that an 
attorney has a duty to ensure that a client obtains the advice of independent legal counsel does not 
automatically invalidate any transaction between attorney and client in which the cllient has not had 
the benefit of outside counsel. See, e.g.. Jacobsen v. National Bank ofAustin, 65 Ill.App.3d 455, 
382 N.E.2d 277 (1978) (finding of independent counsel is not prerequisite to finding of fairness); 
McCray v. Weinberg, 4 Mass.App. 13, 340 N.E.2d 518 (1976) (holding that there is no rule that in 
the absence of independent advice a transaction between attorney and client must be set aside). 
Independent legal advice is only an evidentiary factor utilized in determining the existence 
ofoverreaching or undue influence in a transaction between attorney and client. Pollockv. Marshall, 
391 Mass. 543,462 N.E.2d 312 (1984). The Pollock court rejected an argumen1t invalidating a 
transaction in which the client did not have independent legal advice. The presenc;e or absence of 
independent legal advice is an evidentiary factor which may be weighed, along with other evidence, 







in determining whether undue influence was exercised. Green v. Evans, 156 MichApp. 145, 
401 N.W.2d 250 (1985). 
Thus, even if an attorney has not specifically advised a client to seek advice from an 
independent legal source, the attorney may be able to show that the omission was of no actual 
significance by showing that the attorney gave the client the same advice concerning the transaction 
as he or she would have given had the client been dealing with a stranger. Gold v. Greenwald, 
247 Cal.App.2d 296, 55 Cal.Rptr. 660 (1966). An attorney must give a client an the advice and 
information it would give if the transaction were made with a stranger. Abstract and Title Corp of 
Florida v. Cochran, 414 So.2d 284 (F1a.App. 1982); Goldman v. Kane, 329 N.E.2d 770 (Mass.App. 
1975); In re Conduct ofBishop, 297 Or. 479, 686 P.2d 350 (1984). 
There is no dispute that the trust received advice of independent counsel prior to closing. 
Theodore Johnson, with the aid of such advice, chose and directed that the proper~y transal~tion be 
consummated as he desired based upon the established fair market value. (C.E. #5 dep Rogers 
pp. 15, 48-52.) The failure to advise a client to seek advice of independent counsel may be excused 
ifthe client voluntarily and knowingly consents to the transaction and the fairness ofthe transaction. 
See, e.g., Pollock, indicating an attorney may show that any influence over a client which might be 
presumed to have arisen out ofan attorney-client relationship was neutralized by independent advice 
given to client, or by some other means, such as client's knowledgeable consent and absence of 
overreaching by attorney. See also Jacobsen, which held a transaction was fair despite attorney's 






           
       
failure to advise client to seek independent counsel since client voluntarily and knowingly entered 
into the transaction. 
An attorney's failure to advise a client to obtain independent counsel may also be regarded 
as immaterial if the attorney can show that the client in fact obtained independent lega.l advice 
concerning the transaction. Brown v. Pipes, 366 So.2d 261 (Ala. 1978) (showing of ind~:pendent 
advice would clearly rebut claim ofundue influence). The case ofKlaskin v. Klepak, 126 Ill.2d 376, 
534 N.E.2d 971 (1989) involved a case where a document was executed without inde:pendent 
counsel; however, the court held that whether a client obtained independent legal advic1e before 
completing the transaction at closing was a persuasive factor in determining whether an attol'l1ey has 
rebutted the presumption ofundue influence. See also In re Imming, 131 Il1.2d 239,545 N.E.2d 715 
(1989). 
At the time ofgranting the Taylors' summary judgment, all that was available to th~: district 
judge was the affidavit of Mr. Maile explaining that Mr. Johnson was in fact advis~:d of the right to 
independent counsel and Mr. Jolmson replied by saying he trusted Mr. Maile. The summary 
judgment entered had no bearing on any alleged breach offiduciary duty or breach ofthe Idaho Code 
of Professional Responsibility. 
There is, however, ample evidence in the record that Mr. Johnson was not su~~ected to undue 
influence in directing that the real estate transaction be consummated under the price and terms 
which he wanted. During the period oftime prior to the closing, the Rogers were in constant contact 
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with Mr. Johnson and advised Mr. Johnson of the meeting with their independent counsel, 
Mr. Wishney. Mr. Johnson received the input from independent counsel and continued to SUppOlt 
his decision to sell the real estate for the appraised value. (C.E. #5 dep Rogers pp. 15,48-52.) Even 
before the executed real estate contract, Beth Rogers was involved with her uncle, Mr. Johnson, and 
other family members in discussing the independent real estate appraisal establishing the fair market 
value of $400,000. (C.E. #38 dep Rogers p. 23; C.E. #5 pp. 33-34.) On or about July 22, 2003, 
Beth Rogers wrote to Connie Taylor indicating the trust would not be pursuing litigation against the 
Mailes as outlined in Mrs. Taylor's letter to Mr. Maile and further stated, "we also feel we have a 
moral obligation to follow Uncle Ted's wishes in the way in which he entrusted us to do." (C.E. #5 
dep Rogers exhibit 21.) 
Beth Rogers provided all affidavit based upon her own recollection of the records and the 
same is provided in the record. (C.E. #5 dep Rogers exhibit 22.) In describing her involvement with 
her uncle and his impressions of the real estate transaction, the relevant portions of her affidavit 
provide: 
He told several of us in the family that his attorney had offered to buy the property 
ifhe ever wanted to sell it, but that he just was not ready.... 
I do not recall that Uncle Ted ever specifically mentioned getting another legal 
opinion, but Andy and I decided to take the paperwork from Mr. Maile to areal estate 
attorney, David Wishney, to review. Mr. Wishney suggested that Mr. Maile 
substitute a standard form deed of trust, including a due on sale provision, to the 
earnest money agreement. I sent a copy of the letter to Mr. Maile and the: propel' 
changes were made. Uncle Ted was satisfied with the sale and never seemed 
interested in other opinions, as he considered it a good sale, I do not know if 
Mr. Maile told Uncle Ted to get another opinion on the sale, but I was not always 








with him at all of their meetings. Meanwhile, Uncle Ted received a letter in the mail 
from Knipe, Janoush, Knipe, LLC, saying that they perfOlmed land appraisals. After 
what I recall to be a few weeks, Uncle Ted decided to have the property appraised, 
and the appraisal report was completed on July 10,2002. The propelty was appraised 
for $400,000. When it was finally decided that he would go to an assist€:d living 
home, Uncle Ted said he may as well sell the property rather than leave it for Andy 
and I to have to deal with, and he talked to Mr. Maile about purchasing the land. 
Uncle Ted was having trouble with his legs, he kept falling and could not easily get 
back up. We began looking at assisted living centers as an alternative. Because h€l 
was a bachelor, Uncle Ted had taken out a good nursing home insurance policy that 
would help with his financial needs. He was very careful in all ofhis financial affairs 
and kept very good records. On July 22, 2002, Uncle Ted entered into an agreement 
to sell the property to Mr. Maile or Mr. Maile's company for $400,000. He seemed 
quite pleased with the sale and showed the contract to my brothers and his Sister 
Hazel Fisher. He even joked to us about whether or not he could live in the nursing 
home on the $100,000 down payment.... 
On July 6, 2003, the Taylors called a family meeting that was attended by four of the: 
Taylor cousins, Connie Taylor - who is John Taylor's wife and an attorney in 
Lewiston, myself, my brother - Scott Johnson, and Galth Fisher. They said that Aunt 
Helen was closing on her house arid needed $50,000.00 that week. They said they 
felt that Tom Maile had taken advantage of Uncle Ted in several ways in thl~ sale of 
the property and wanted to sue him for return of the property plus monetal'Y 
compensation. They wanted the suit to be named with Andy and myselfas plaintiffs, 
as we are the trustees. The suit would be initiated by Connie Taylor, as the attorney, 
and she discussed the fee schedule, etc., with us. Gmth, Scott and I all said that we 
would look into the matter but made no commitment at the time. After consulting 
with the Trust's accountant, I did make a paltial distribution of$50,000 to ea,ch Aunt 
Helen, Aunt Joyce and Aunt Hazel. I felt it was only fair that each of the aunts, not 
just Aunt Helen, receive the money. 
20. After a few days, we received a copy of the complaint and the attorney fee 
schedule for us to sign. After a cal'efulreading of the papers and a discussion with 
several family members, we decided that the suit really had no merit for the Trust. 
We had been told repeatedly that Andy and I had a fiduciary duty to the Trust. We 
agreed, and in this case we felt titat obligation was to follow Uncle Ted's wishes. 
He IIad sold tile property tI,e way lie IIad wanted amifelt good about it. 
(Emphasis added.) 






















The family members closest to Mr. Johnson, and the ones entrusted by him to m~U1age his 
affairs in trust, the Rogers and Garth Fisher chose to uphold his wishes and desirl~s. (C.E. #5 dep 
Rogers exhibit 21.) These family members knew what their uncle wanted and, based upon the 
family involvement with Mr. Johnson, there can be no showing of any undue influence on the part 
of the Appellants. The Taylors had little or no family involvement with their uncle for 12 years. In 
fact, when Mr. Johnson died, they did not know where he lived. (C.B. #5 dep Rogers pp. 15,48-52.) 
E. There Is a lack of Evidence for the Imposition of the Constructive Trust Remedy 
The Respondents have argued that a constructive uust could be imposed bas,ed upon 
Mr. Maile's breach of fiduciary duty. (Respondents' Brief, p. 26.) There is no basis for the 
Respondents to advance such a theory in light of the issues framed by the issues on appeal, the 
notices of appeals andlor the notice of cross appeal. Consequently, under Idaho Appellate Rule 11, 
there is no basis for such a discussion advanced by the Taylors. However, in the I~vent this Court 
disagrees, and without waiving such objection, the following is provided. 
The record is void ofany finding at the lower level that Mr. Maile breached a fiduciary duty 
and/or Mr. Maile committed professional negligence. Once again, to date there has been no 
determination ofall the necessary elements ofa breach offiduciary and/or breach ofstandard ofcare. 
Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 650 (1982). At best, one can argue at this point in time 
that there is conflicting evidence as to opinions related to the fair market value of the real t:state in 
2002. The Respondents have failed to demonstrate in the record that any ofthe Appellants knew or 
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should have known that the appraisal ofKnipe, Janoush and Associates ("Knipe"), was unsuppOlied 
or improperly conducted. The expeli opinions provided by the Respondents failed to make any 
connection that Theodore Johnson, the Rogers, or any of the Appellants, knew or should have 
known, that Knipe, Janoush and Associates' appraisal was flawed in any way. The Taylors' retained 
expert appraiser, Terry Rudd, conducted his assessment approximately three years after the Knipe 
appraisal and provided a contrary opinion as to market value but rendered no opinion that the 
Appellants should have known of any alleged deficiencies. 
The Knipe appraisal is suppOited by the Williams' appraisal. Conducted approximately 15 
months after the Knipe appraisal, this was provided as a totally disinterested third~party :licensed 
appraisal for the Idaho Independent Bank. There is testimony in the record provided by a third Idaho 
licensed appraiser, Joe Corlett, who provided opinions as to the underlying invalidity of the Rudd 
appraisal, based upon improper comparable properties considered by Mr. Rudd. Mr. Corlett, in 
addition, provided his opinion affirming the Knipe appraisal as an accurate appraisal ofthe subject 
property. (C.E. #99.) 
The Respondents' argument related to fair market value of the real property at best, has yet 
to be determined and has limited weight and has no relevance to the issues before this COUlt as to 
whether the summary judgment was proper and whether the Taylors have standing as well as the 
trust to pursue the claims. 
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Furthermore, the lower court has previously ruled that the trust does not have tht~ remedy 
available to it ofhaving the real property restored. As stated by the district court, "once a palty treats 
a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of recission, the right of 
recission is waived." (R. Vol 1. p. 149 LL. 10-12; 20-22.) The Respondents have: failed to appeal 
such a ruling. The Restatement (Third) ofThe Law Governing Lawyers, § 146, EFFECT OF CLIENT'S 
LACHES, provides, "But if a client desires to set aside a voidable conveyance to his or her attorney, 
the client must ordinarily take steps to do so within a reasonable time after the transaction." Once 
again, the trial court has previously ruled that the trust does not have the remedy of restoring the 
property. 
It is not appropriate for the imposition of a constructive trust without any finding of 
wrongdoing on the part of the Appellants that resulted in damages to the trust. The authority cited 
by the Respondents, on page 31, provides that, "when a duty is breached, the former client may bring 
a cause ofaction at law." Equitable remedies may be waived and/or a party may be estopped from 
claiming such equitable remedies. 
The imposition of constructive trust is not a proper subject for a motion for directed verdict 
or a judgment notwithstanding verdict, as the imposition ofconstructive trust is not an independent 
cause of action, but rather a remedy if a jury finds that a defendant was unjustly enriched. See St. 
Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 508 S.E.2d 646 (Ga. 1998). The remedy of a constructive trust, 
which is alleged to arise fi'om a breach ofa fiduciary duty by a defendant, presents questions whether 
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a fiduciary relationship existed at the time of the wrongful acquisition and is an issue for trier of 
facts. Smith v. Bolin, 271 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1954). 
As the district court stated relating to the claim ofunjust enrichment, "nevertheless, the Court 
believes that this case can be decided on its merits by analyzing the elements of the unjust 
enrichment claim, without proclaiming that Mr. Maile is barred from seeking equitable reli.efbased 
on the doctrine ofunclean hands." (R. Vol. 2. p. 352 L. 7.) Mr. Maile should be entitled to have any 
alleged violations of his duties determined ultimately by the trier of fact in the ev(~nt this matter is 
remanded to the district court, as the record is void ofany determination ofa duty owing, any breach 
ofduty, causation, proximate cause or any assessment ofdamages based upon a dete:rmination ofthe 
true value of the real property in September 2002. 
The district court has not found any breach of any fiduciary duty by the Appell:illts and 
further has not determined if there was a duty which was breached which resulted in a proximate 
cause ofdamages. The lower comt has ruled that the trust has waived the right to have the property 
restored. This case has never reached any conclusion that the necessary elements have been provided 
to show either negligence 01' a breach oftrust. The imposition ofa constructive trust is inappropriate. 
F.	 The Taylors Have Failed to Address of the Lack of Standin& by the Trust Itself in 
Failin& to Obtain Judicial Appointment of Successor Trustees as Required by Idaho 
Code Sections 68-101 and 68-107 
The Taylors have failed to address the issue raised by the Appellants in their opening brief 
that the trust itself improperly filed suit since the Taylors had not obtained judicial appointment 
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pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 68-101 and 68-107. The Taylors are incorrect in their assettion, 
that the issue surrounding the trust's standing is not an appealable issue. (Reply Brief, p. 1.) The 
Appellants have properly presented another jurisdictional issue before this Court which may be 
raised at any time in the proceedings. (See section 1.) The Appellants' argument was previously 
briefed and the Respondents have failed to address the claim or provide any authority opposing the 
authority cited in the Opening Brief at pages 35-37. The following illustrates the lack of standing 
of the tlUSt. 
The trust instrument (Appendix 1 of Opening Brief) is silent as to the appointment of 
successor trustees other than the Rogers and Garth Fisher. Beth and Andrew Rogers, after being 
threatened by the Taylors with a lawsuit, resigned (C.E. # 5Rogers dep pp. 75, 76), Sind Garth Fisher 
declined to serve as trustee after the resignation ofthe Rogers. When both the Rogers and Mr. Fisher 
expressed a disinclination to serve in the office of trustee, appointment of a new tmstee became a 
matter for the cOuti because the trust itself provided no guidance. It is both the general rule and 
Idaho law that neither beneficiaries nor tmstees can simply appoint a new trustee in the absence of 
a specific provision in a trust allowing them to do so. The general rule is that, "in the absence of 
power conferred by the trust instrument, the beneficiary of the trust does not have the power to 
appoint a new trustee." CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, TRUSTS, § 292. Similarly "in the absence of 
authority conferred by the tlUSt instmment, a trustee has no power to appoint his or her successor." 
Id., § 293. Courts have also held that a trustee simply does not have the power to delegate to others 








the power to exercise his discretionary functions. See, e.g., McNeil v. Bennett, 792 A.2d 190,219 
n.61 (Del. 2001), ajJ'd inrelevantpart, 798 A.2d 503 (2002); Jacob v. Davis, 738 A.2d 904,918-19 
(Md.App. 1999); Transamerican Leasing Co. v. Three Bears, Inc., 586 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1979); 
Gillespie v. Seymour, 823 P.2d 782, 801 (Kan. 1991); Jennings v. Murdock, 553 P.2d 846, 863 (Kan. 
1976). 
The above authority makes clear that in the absence of a provision in the trust instlument 
allowing for a trustee to appoint his or her successor, the only way a successor can be appointed is 
by court involvement. The Taylors' attempt, in June 2004, to remove Beth and Andrew Rogers and 
install themselves as trustees was invalid and without effect. Any actions taken prior to appointment 
by a cOUl1 with jurisdiction over the trust, including specifically the filing of the: complaint (R., 
Vol 1, p. 1), filed July 19,2004, are void. The Taylors' retroactive, and fundamentally flawed, 
attempt in November 2004 to COlTect their mistake cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the 
court. On April 18, 2005, the Honorable Judge Christophel' M. Beiter, entered his Order d,;:claring 
the ex-patte Order entered on November 17,2004, void. (C.E. #39 exhibit "D.") On May 2,2005, 
an Order appointing R. John Taylor, Reed J. Taylor and DaHan J. Taylor as successor truste(~s ofthe 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust was entered, however, it was not made retroactive. (C.E. #39 
exhibit "E.") 
Numerous courts have held that where an ostensible trustee fails to be properly appointed, 
ei ther by a court or according to the letter of the trust instrument, or where a trustee improperly 









delegates his discretion to a non-trustee, any actions taken affecting the trust are a nullity. For 
example, in Citizens Bank o/Edina v. West QuineyAutoAuetion, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1988), 
the Missouri Supreme COUli, sitting en bane, held that a sale ofproperty conducted by an individual 
other than the authorized trustee was void. In so holding, the court stated: "In a private trust ... 
[unless otherwise provided in the instrument of trust] the trustee may not delegate a discretionaty 
duty to a co-trustee, and such an exercise will be void as to the trust .. , Celiainly, ifa trustee cannot 
delegate a discretionary power to a co-trustee, he cannot delegate such a power to an unauthorized 
agent." Id. at 164 (substitutions in original). See also Columbia Union Nat. Bank v. Bundschu, 
641 S.W.2d 864, 877 (Mo.App. 1982) (trustee's delegation of a discretionary duty is void); 
Morrill v. Trump, 745 So.2d 559 (Fla.App. 1999). Similarly, In re Pinney's Estate, 294 NY.S. 29 
(N.Y. 1937), the comi held, "A trustee may delegate ministerial duties, but if he delegates 
discretiomuy powers he becomes a guarantor and if a trust is of a discretionary nature, the trustee 
will be responsible for all the mischievous consequences of the delegation, and the: exercise of the 
discretion will be absolutely void in the substitute." 
Godfrey v. Kamin, 62 Fed.Appx. 693 (7th Cir. 2003) (unpublished opini.on) involved a 
situation remarkably similar to this case. The question in that case was whether a successor trustee 
had standing to sue the former trustees ofa trust. The trust instrument in question provided that after 
the death of the settlor, it would be necessaty to always have two trustees. The plaintiff, Ellen 
Godfrey, initially brought suit against one ofthe trust's former trustees, alleging breach of fiduciary 
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duty. However, because Godfrey was only a contingent remainder beneficiary, tbe court held she 
lacked standing to sue. After the case was dismissed, the then-trustees resigned. Th<::reafter, Godfrey 
was appointed as one trustee, but a second trustee was not appointed. Godfrey re-filed her lawsuit 
in her capacity as tlUstee, but the defendant argued that because the second successor truste(~ had not 
been appointed, Godfrey lacked standing to sue on her own. The court agreed, holding that because 
the trust mandated that a second corporate trustee serve along with Godfrey, Godfrey lacked the 
authority to bring suit unilaterally, even though she was the only trustee in place at the time. 
Accordingly, the case was dismissed. Id. at 695-97. 
The Taylors failed to obtain the required court order to be appointed as successor trustees. 
The trust inshument did not provide for their appointment. A trust will not fail for want ofa proper 
appoint.ment. Restatement. (Third) of Trusts § 31 TRUST DOES NOT FAlL FOR LACK Or TRUSTEE 
(2003). The filing of the complaint on July 19,2004, was void under the law as th<:: Taylors lacked 
standing as proper trustees to file t.he lawsuit. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, 
and must be directed to dismiss the trust's claims as it was filed in violation of both Idabo Code 
Sections 68-101 and 68-107. 
G. The Respondents Were Not Entitled to Attorney Fees Before the Lower Cour~ 
Respondents argued for the award oftheir costs and attorneys fees occurred at both the trial 
level and the appellate level. However, the record before this Court establishes that the 
beneficiaries' judgment was predicated upon a misrepresentation to the lower court as to their true 










beneficiary status. The individual Taylors relinquished any and all rights to the trust and admitted 
that in their verified petition filed before the probate court. The Taylors' legal standing is now moot 
before this Court and was moot before the lower court. Consequently, the Respondents are not 
entitled to attorneys' fees predicated upon a claim that completely lacks merit and is unsupported 
by the true facts in the record. The Court must consider the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 3.3, which provides: 
Candor Toward the Tribunal 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct 
a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunnl by thl~ 
lawyer; 
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. 





[1] This Rule governs the conduct ofa lawyer who is representing a client in 
the proceedings of a tribunal. 
[2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court 
to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity ofthe adjudicative process. A lawyer 
acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the 
client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining 
confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to 
the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not 
required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence 
submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false 
statements of law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Com1 has the following facts which are germane, relating to whether there was a breach 
of Rule 3.3 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as grounds under Idaho Code 










Sections 12-121 and/or 12-123, for the award ofattorneys fees. Appendix 4 and Appendix 5 provide 
the misleading statements offact which were provided to the lower court. The Taylors simply were 
not beneficiaries under the trust at the time the Taylors attempted to take advantage of this Court's 
opinion in Taylor I. The Taylors, and Mrs. Taylor as their attorney, verified statements offact under 
oath that were misleading to the cOUl1 and to this tribunal. Mr. R. John Taylor is .a licens,~d Idaho 
attorney and an officer of the court. (C.E. #27- R. Taylor dep. pp. 7, 8.) 
Even though an action might be propel' at its commencement, facts might thereafter develop 
which indicate that the case was then pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. See 
Anson v. Les Bois Race Track, Inc., 130 Idaho 303, 939 P.2d 1382 (1997); Ortiz v. Reamy, 115 Idaho 
1099, 1101, 772 P.2d 737, 739 (Ct.App. 1989); Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 
137 Idaho 747, 753, 53 P.3d 330, 336 (2002). There simply cannot be any basis for an argumentthat 
the Taylors are entitled to attorneys' fees at the lower level 01' the appellate level under the facts in 
the record. 
Likewise, the Respondents are not entitled to attorneys' fee pursuant to the contract between 
the trust and Berkshire Investments and/or the Appellants. The Respondents argued before this 
Court in Taylor I that there could be no claim for attorneys fees and costs in the first appeal since 
the Taylors were not parties to the real estate contract. (Appellants' Reply Brief, p. 13 executed 
December 3, 2004.) Specifically, the Taylors and Mrs. Taylor, provided, "The Mailes are not 
entitled to attorneys' fees under the contract because the Taylors are not pal1ies to the contract and 
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they are not acting as the Trust. The Taylors are acting as beneficiaries." Once again, a judicial 
admission not only as to their status as beneficiaries but that they were not palties to the contract and 
no award of attorneys' fees is permissible. 
The Taylors now asselt, of course, that they are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs even 
though they were not parties to the contract and are not beneficiaries of the trust. This Court 
previously denied attorneys' fees in Taylor J, and the COUlt should be consistent with that ruling and 
deny the same to the Taylors in the present proceeding based upon the real estate contract. Idaho 
Code §§ l2~120, 12-121, or 12-123. 
Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper correctly analyzed the established case law and determined 
that the case of Craig Johnson Constr., L.L.C. v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 803, 
134 P.2d. 648, 654 (2006) applies for the proposition that a non-party to a contract cannot use the 
contract as a basis for an award of attorneys' fees. The court further correctly held that the Taylors 
were not part of any commercial transaction which would have justified an award ofattorm:ys' fees 
under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), citing Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 887 P.2d 1076 
(CLApp. 1994). 
In addition, there cannot be an award ofattorneys, fees associated with a def(:J1se to an unjust 
enrichment claim. Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 438,64 P.3d 959, 967 (Ct.App. 2002). Finally, 
there is nothing which could be constmed as a frivolous defense or appeal involving this lawsuit by 
the Appellants. The Appellants are pursuing legitimate issues, not only as to the issues ofthe legal 
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standing of the Taylors and the trust, but also the factual and/or legal issues surrounding the entry 
of the summary judgment. 
H.	 The Respondents Are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal 
The preceding section is incorporated by reference herein. The same argument against the 
award for attorneys' fees at the lower level applies to the Taylors' requests on the appeal. The 
Taylors are not entitled to attorneys' fees on the appeal either as Respondents or cross-Appellants. 
I.	 The Appellants Are Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs at the Appellate Level 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 12-123. I.R.C.P. Rule 11. and I.A,R.ll.1. 
40 and 41 
The Appellants requested their costs and attorneys' fees in their Opening Brief at page 38, 
The Taylors have provided no opposition to the Appellants' request in their reply brief. 
Additionally, the Appellants incorporate the preceding Section G relating to the argument 
sUl1'0unding the misstatements of material facts contained in the Taylors' verified pleadings as 
additional grounds for the award of the attorneys' fees under Idaho Code Sections 12-121 
and 12-123. 
In addition, the Appellants request their costs and attorneys' fees in the defense ofthe cross-
appeal filed by the Taylors. The Taylors have advanced absolutely no credible legal position before 
the COUl1 relating to their appeal. In reality, the Taylors have filed their cross-appeal, requesting 
attol11eys' fees at the lower level and the appe11ate level after obtaining the Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claim, when they were not beneficiaries and submitted a verified amended complaint 










which was false as to their status. The Taylors saw an opportunity to mislead the lower court as to 
their status as beneficiaries after having disclaimed their interests in the trust by written agreement. 
The Taylors signed verified pleadings before the probate court stating unequivocally that their 
mother was the sole beneficiary ofthe t111st pursuant to an agreement they signed. After the decision 
in Taylor I, the Taylors and their counsel executed verified pleadings stating they were beneficiaries 
ofthe trust. That was not true as they admitted before the probate court in 2004; Helen Taylor was 
the sole beneficiary. 
The Taylors, after having mislead the lower court, presented their argument for costs and 
attorneys' fees both before the lower court and before this tribunal which cannot possibly be 
determined to be meritorious. The Taylors misrepresented facts to the lower court and their action 
amounts to frivolous behavior. If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, quacks like a duek, it's a 
duck. 
The Appellants/Cross-Respondents request attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
Sections 12-121 and 12-123, and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. An award of attorneys' fees on appeal 
is appropriate "ifthe law is well-settled and the Appellants have made no substantial showing that 
the district court misapplied the law." Keller v. Rogstad, 112 Idaho 484, 489, 733 P.2d 705, 710 
(1987), quoting Davis v. Gage, 109 Idaho 1029, 1031, 712 P.2d 730, 732 (Ct.App. 1985). 
There can be no showing that the Taylors did not actively mislead the district court in 
obtaining their Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims. Both under Idaho Code Sections 12-121 





LANTS/ RO S- ESPONDENTS' 
and 12-123, the Respondents should be ordered to pay the costs and attorneys' fees inGurred in 
correcting the misrepresentations made by the Taylors before the lower court and this tribunal. 
If this Com1 determines that the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims was based upon a 
complete lack of foundation, this Court should be left with the "abiding belief that the appeal has 
been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation" and award a1torneys' 
fees and costs. See generally, Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634, 638 (1990) 
and McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,937 P.2d 1222 (1997). It is the position of the Appellants that 
should be the outcome. The Appellants should be entitled to their attorneys' fees and costs incurred 
herein. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Taylors lacked legal standing to pursue their claims and their claims must be dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is never waived. The Taylors actively 
misrepresented their status as beneficiaries before the lower court after the opinion in Taylor I was 
published. The Taylors verified under oath before the probate court pursuant to appendix 2 to the 
opening brief that their mother, Helen, was now the sole beneficiary under the trust. The Taylors' 
beneficiaries claims became 11100t as a matter of law. Other facts exist in the record that establish 
the Taylors do not have standing to pursue any claims against the Appellants. The Taylors, in their 
rush to obtain control of the trust, failed to obtain the necessary appointment as successor trustees 






as mandated by Idaho Code Sections 68·101 and 68-107. The actions ofthe Taylors, as trustees, in 
filing the litigation on behalfof the trust were inappropriate and the filing of the complaint is void. 
In the event this COUli believes the Taylors have standing, the matter must b(;: remanded since 
the district comi improperly entered summary judgment. Material facts are in dispute. A\::cording 
to the evidence presented in the record, the Rogers acted in a reasonably prudent maImer in closing 
the transaction and conducted themselves appropriately under the provisions ofTitle 68. Berkshire 
Investments paid the fair market value for the real estate and was a bona fide purc:haser for value. 
The Taylors have waived their right to seek recission under the facts in the record .. 
There has never been a factual determination that Mr. Maile breached his fiduciary duty 
either with the grantor or with the trust. There is no showing of any undue influence on the part of 
the Appellants regarding this transaction. 
The Appellants must be awarded their attorneys' fees and costs in defending the fi:ivolous 
claims of the Taylors at the lower level and on their cross-appeal. The Appellants are entitled to 
their attorneys' fees in this appeal as a result ofthe Taylors' misrepresentations oHact which resulted 
in the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims. This matter should be reversed and n::manded to the 
district couli consistent with the Appellants' argUlnents contained herein. 
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AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
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CLARK AND FEENEY 



























































County of Nez Perce )
 
CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I submit this affidavit in support ofthe motion for sanctions addressed in the Taylor's 
January 7,2008 memorandum opposing Mr. Maile's Motion to Dismiss. 
2. The Taylors request sanctions, including but not limited to costs and attorney fees, 
for filing a motion which is frivolous and not supported by either the law or the facts. 
3. In support of that request, and to demonstrate the Appellant Thomas Maile's 
continuing course of conduct intended to harass, cause unnecessary delay, and needless increase in 
the cost of litigation, I attach a true and correct copy of a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
which Mr. Maile filed in Ada County on December 3 I, 2007. 
4. This Complaint again raises claims which were rejected by the trial court in the matter 
that is currently before this court, and adds claims against Clark and Feeney, Connie Taylor, and 
Tom Clark for negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. 
M




SUBSC SWORN to before me this /1 day of January, 2008. 
~t:.~ ..... '.~~. .----;-:-. / .' ,."" 
.... +0 TAl" ~ /tllllltt/l?t i/7417<J 
: -. J- t Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho. 1 I (/ 
~.. -: Residing at Lewiston. Commission expin~s: i-2:fI Cf/"!fJ q 
.... lieL\C 
.,~... . . -- ­
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of January, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the above document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
~ U.S. Mail Thomas G. Maile 
o Hand Delivered Attorney at Law 
o Overnight Mail 380 W. State 
Eagle, ID 83616 % Telecopy (FAX) 
Dennis Charney 
Attorney at Law t 
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive o
Eagle, ID 83616 ,c' 
nnie W. Taylor 
Attorney for Respondents 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 3 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON, IDAHO B3!501 000996
I~t'h
t U.S. Mail 
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DE~ITION OF HELEN TAYLOR TAKEN '~-08 
1 Whereupon the deposition proceeded as follows: 
2 
3 HELEN TAYLOR 
4 a witness having been fIrst duly sworn to tell the truth, 




9 BY MR. MAILE: 
o Q. Good morning, Mrs. Taylor. Would you please 
1 state your name for the record? 
2 A. Helen Johnson Taylor. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 And where is it that you currently reside? 
5 A. 9483 West Harmonica Way, in Boise. 
6 Boise, Idaho. 
7 Q. And how long have you been at that residence? 
8 A. Six years. 
9 Q. And prior to that, where did you live, 
DO Mrs. Taylor? 
Dl A. On Fairview. 
D2 MR. TAYLOR: No. No. 
D3 THE WITNESS: I can't think of the number. It 
D4 was 95 something Fairview. 
D5 Boise. 
Page 
1 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) And how long did you live at within the last 45 days. 
2 that prior residence, how many years? A. Probably have. I don't know. 
3 A. From 1940 -- from 1942. 3 Q. Do you remember what might have been discussed 
4 Q. Did you start in 1942 living there? 4 with any of your sons concerning the documents 
5 A. Yes. 5 requested? 
6 Q. Okay. And that was continuous? 6 A. No. 
7 A. Yes. 7 Q. Have you talked to anyone about the deposition 
8 Q. Up until the time that you moved to your new i 8 testimony that you are providing today? 
9 home? I 9 A. (No response from the ·Witness.) 
o A. Yes. ,10 Q. Let me rephrase that. 
~ 1 MR. MAILE: Going to have this marked as Exhibit ;11 Mrs. Taylor, what did you do to pr'epare for this 
~2 No. 1. 12 deposition today? 
~ 3 (Exhibit 1 was marked.) 3 A. Well, I talked -- I just ga1hered up this thing, 
~ 4 Q. (BY MR MAILE) I'm going to hand you what is 4 talked to Connie. 
~ 5 marked as Exhibit No. 1 to this deposition, and I'll 15 Q. Okay. 
~ 6 represent to you that it's a note that's a copy of the 6 And when is it that you tallked to Connie? 
~ 7 Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Helen Taylor, 7 A. Yesterday. 
8 and that along with a subpoena that was served on you 8 Q. And is that the only time you talked to Connie 
9 some time ago. 9 Taylor about this deposition? 
'/0 Do you remember receiving that document? 20 A. I think so. 
'/1 A. Yes. '/1 Q. Now, you brought with you this morning a series 
72 Q. Okay. And did you review the entire document? ?2 of documents that I have gone through. You brought them 
'/ 3 Did you read it? 23 in a little plastic bag, some which I've taken and had 
'/4 A. Yes. 74 copies made. 
t:> 5 Q. And in that, if you could tum to Page 2 of 75 So I'm going to ask the court reporter to mark 
Page 6 Page 8 
2 (Pages 5 to 8) 










1 Exhibit 1, it asks for a series of docUlll{:nts to be 
2 produced, and they start with number one. 
3 Do you remember reviewing that, those requests 
4 for production of documents? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q. And what did you do in order to obtain the 
7 documents that you brought with you today? 
8 A Just went to the place where I had them 
9 stored. 
~o Q. Okay. 
~ 1 And where was that? 
~ 2 A In a chest that I keep for my valuable papers. 
I
i 3 Q. All right. 
4 And did you thoroughly read the questions, or 
5 numbers 1 through l4? 
6 A Yes. I think so. 
I 7 Q. Did you talk to anyone about the documents that 
! 
18 were being requested? 
~9 A No. 
~ 0 Q. Did you talk to your brother -- or excuse me. 
Q 1 Did you talk to any of your sons? 
! 
22 A I don't remember if I did or not. 
~ 3 Q. All right. 
2 4 And I'm asking about conversations you might 
b 5 have had with any of your sons concern.ing Exhibit No.1 
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DEP't"SITION OF HELEN TAYLOR TAKEN ·.....d-08 
A. I probably did. 
MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Just to avoid confusion, 
this is one of the earlier drafts. This was not the 
final that everyone signed. 
MR. MAILE: I appreciate that. 
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) You don't rem(:mber if you signed 
that draft? 
This might have been prepared back in 2004. At 
the bottom it says, "4/7/2004." 
A. What was it for? 
Q. Well, it's called a Release And Indemnity 
Agreement. It related to the trust, the Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust. 
MR. PRUSYNSKI: I don't have any page with a 
blank for her signature on it. 
MR. MAILE: I may not either. 
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Does that help you recall if you 
received and signed anything, or signed a copy of Exhibit 
No.3 that's in front ofyou? 
And if you don't remember, that's fIne. 
A.	 I don't remember. I don't know. It was...
 
MR. MAILE: Mark this.
 
(Exhibit 4 was marked.)
 
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) What is the date of that 
docum""t?	 Is thore' date a".he top of Exhibit 4? 
Page 11 
---._--­
A. July 22nd, 2003. 
Q. And do you recall receiving that document? 
A. I'm sure I did. 
Q. And this is something again that you brought 
with you from your home; is thalt correct? 
A. Yes.
 
MR. MAILE: And fIve.
 
(Exhibit 5 was marked.)
 
MR. PRUSYNSKI: Tom, just because I've been 
reading all of these depositions, I~ould you say what 
Exhibit 4 is, so that it's in the record? 
MR MAILE: Exhibit 4 is a letter dated 
July 22nd of 2003 from Andy and Beth Rogers to Connie 
Taylor. 
That was Exhibit 4. 
MR. PRUSYNSKI: Okay. 
MR. MAILE: Now, Exhibit 5, Mrs. Taylor, I'll 
represent to you, it has on the top the words Assignment 
Fonn 
And here again this is a document that you 
brought with you today. 
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Do you remem.her signing an 
Assignment Form like we have on Exhibit 5? 
(Witness conferring.) 
MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Just go ahead and tell them 
Page 12 
1 this as Exhibit 2. 
2 (Exhibit 2 was marked.) 
3 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) And I'll ask you to look at 
4 Exhibit 2 and explain to me if that is a series of 
5 documents that you found in your house that you brought 
6 with you? 
7 A. Oh. 
8 MR. PRUSYNSKI: Is that it, or? 
9 MR MAILE: Yes. It is. 
o MR PRUSYNSKI: Okay. 
11 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Does Exhibit 2 contain documents 
2 that were in your home that you brought with you this :12 
13 morning, a copy of which you brought with you this 13 
14 morning? 14 
5 A. You mean, did I have those in my house? 15 
6 Q. Yes.	 1 6 
7 A. Well, if! brought them, I did.	 17 
8 Q. Okay. And I know that seems a bit -- and I'll 18 
1 
9 ask you a series of questions, but were you able to 119 
E
o obtain any documents that you brought with you today that t2 0 
I 
1 were not at your house? 1 
2 A. No. 22 
3 Q. Okay. r3 
4 For example, none of your sons had any documents F4 
5 that you were able to provide here this morning? r5 
Page 9 
1 A. No. Everything I brought was from my house. 1 
2 Q. Okay. Now, an example, the Exhibit 2, it 2 
3 doesn't have anything signed by you? 3 
4 And review that, and indicate to me if you ever 4 
5 signed any of the paperwork that's contained in Exhibit 5 
6 No.2. 6 
7 A. I wouldn't know if I did or not. 7 
8 I don't know for sure what you are talking 8 
9 about. 9 
o Q. Let me ask you a question in general about the o 
1 way you conduct your affairs. 11 
2 When you sign documents, do you keep copies of 12 
3 any of your documents with your signatures on them? 13 
4 A. I don't think so. 14 
5 Q. All right. 15 
6 Who would you give those signed documents to? 16 
7 A. Well, if they said to send them back to the one 11 7 
8 that sent them to me, that's who I'd send them to. 118 
9 MR. MAILE: Let's have this marked as Exhibit 3. 119 
o (Exhibit 3 was marked.) ~ 0 













2 That has, if you tum to the back pages ofExhibit 3, 
3 there are no signatures on those pages. 
4 Do you remember signing Exhibit 3 and sending 








3 (Pages 9 to 12) 
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DEP-ef3ITION OF HELEN TAYLOR TAKEN ·.....,0-08 
There again, do you recall receiving Exhibit 
No.8? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, from the documentation that you brought 
with you today, it appears as though you have no 
documents that go past the year 2004. 
And I've asked in my Noti.;:e of Ta1<ing Deposition 
in the subpoena that you bring with you ~Uly and all 
documents up to the current date: relative to the Theodore 
L. Johnson Trust. 
And do you have additional documents that would 
be up-to-date? 
A. I don't have anything else. I brought 
everything I had. 
Q. Do you know that there is a lawsuit that's been 
filed regarding actions between Berkshire:: Investments and 
the Law Finn of Clark and Feeney? 
A. Not -- say that again. 
Q. Were you aware that there was a lawsuit filed by 
Berkshire Investments and others against Clark and Feeney 
and others? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how is it that you are aware of that? 
A. Well, let's -- I guess either Dallan or Connie 




A. I'm not sure. 
Q. When did you become aware of a lawsuit? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Have you been involved with any family functions 
in Lewiston for the last year? 
A. What kind of functions? 
Q.	 Well,just any family function. 
Let me ask it this way. 
Have you traveled to Lewiston within the last 
year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when was that? 
A. Clark's, for a funeral. 
Q. And that was the only time you traveled to 
Lewiston? 
A.	 Oh, let's see. 
Yes. I think so. 
Q. And could you describe for me contact you had 
with your sons? For example, the calendar year of 2008, 
this last year, do you see them on a weekly basis? 
A. Well, the ones that live around he:re, I see all 
the time. The others, I don't see as often. 
Q. Okay. Who lives around here that you see quite 
often? 
Page 16 
4 (Paqes 13 to 16) 
1 that. 
2 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Do you remember ifyou signed or 
3 not? 
4 A. I don't know if I did or not. I probably did, 
5 if I was supposed to. 
6 MR. MAILE: All right. Mark this as No.6. 
7 (Exhibit 6 was marked.) 
8 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) For Exhibit 6, you've been 
9 handed an exhibit that is labeled Exhibit 6. And it has 
0 a January 8, 2004 date at the top, and there's a 
11 signature on the bottom. 
12 Can you identifY that signature? 
3 A. It's looks right. 
4 Q. All right. And who is Reed Taylor? 
15 A. He's my son. 
~6 MR. MAILE: Here you go. 
~7 (Exhibit 7 was marked.) 
~8 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Exhibit 7 has been handed to 
~9 you, and the top says, "Disclaimer of Beneficiary," and 
~O then it has, "Beth Rogers, Trustee of the Theodore L. 
~1 Johnson, Revocable Trust Agreement." 
~2 MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: That's the same as Exhibit 
~3 No.2. 
b4 MR. MAILE: It looks like it. It looks like our 
l?5 copying didn't go as well as it should have. 































3 So we'll withdraw that No.7.
 
4 Mark this instead.
 
5 (New Exhibit 7 was marked.)
 
6 Q. (BY MR.. MAILE) Mrs. Taylor, we've now handed
 
7 you a new Exhibit 7 and asked you to identify that.
 
8 Exhibit 7 came from a document that you
 
9 provided me this morning. It's dated April 30th, 2003,
 
0 ,md it says, "To whom it may concern."
 
1 Do you recall receiving this on or about April
 
p-2 the 30th, 2003?
 
~3 A. If I had it, I guess I received it.
 
~4 Q. Okay. That's fme.
 
h5 MR. MAILE: Let's have this marked as Exhibit 8.
 
6 (Exhibit 8 was marked.) 
7 Q. (BY MR.. MAILE) And if you could take a look at 
8 Exhibit 8, and I'll represent to you that it's a copy of 
9 a letter dated August 20th, 2003 with the letterhead Law 
70 Offices ofClark and Feeney, and your name and address on
 
?1 Wright Street appears.
 
b2 Do you see where that is on the first page?
 
t13 A. Yes. Right.
 
b4 Q. And the back page has a signature line for
 
















































































DE~ITION OF HELEN TAYLOR TAKEN ~-08 
1 A. Just Dallan. 1 A. I haven't. 
2 Q. All right. 2 Q. Okay. And you've never paid any expenses 
3 And where do your other sons live? 3 related to the trust? 
4 A. Mark is in Indonesia on a mission; Reed and John 4 A. I don't think so. I don't think I have. 
5 live in Lewiston. 5 Q. Do you know what the trust consists of? Does it 
6 Q. And have either Reed or John come down to see 6 own real estate, or does it have bank accounts? 
7 you in Boise in 2008? l, 7 A. I don't know. 
8 A. Oh, yes. MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: I don't think she's 
9 Q. And what events do they come down for? 089 understanding your questions. 
o A. Well, I think Reed was going on a trip THE WITNESS: I don't lmderstand what you are 
1 somewhere, stopped by overnight. And John comes down ~ 1 getting at. 
2 every once in a while on business, so he always comes ~ ~ Q. (BY MR. MAILE) All right. Do you know if you 
3 out. are a beneficiary of the trust? 
4 Q. All right. And would that be similar for the ~ 4 A. Of Ted's, I mean? 
5 calendar year 2007? ~ 5 Q. Ted's trust. 
6 A. Yes. ~6 
! 
Well, I got some money. 
7 Q. And do you file tax returns? 11 7 Is that what it was? 
8 A. Yes. 'il8 MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: I'm sony. I can't answer 
~ 9 Q. And who prepares your tax return? ~ 9 it. 
t::> 0 A. Kent Rydalch. EO THE WITNESS: Well, I got somfl. 
t::> 1 Q. And where is his office? 21 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Okay. So from your brother's 
~ 2 A. He lives in Denver. ~ 2 trust; is that correct, the Theodore L. Johnson Trust? 
b 3 Q. And why do you have your tax returns prepared in 3l2 A. Oh, I don't know if it came from there or not. 
t::> 4 Denver? b4 Q. Okay. 
b 5 A. Because he's my son-in-law. l2 5 Do you receive any moneys on a n~gular basis 
1---­ . p_a_g_e_171 Page 19 
1 Q. All right. 1 from the Theodore L. Johnson Trust? 
2 And what is his occupation? 2 A. No. 
3 A. He's retired. He's a CPA. He's vice president 3 Q. When is the last time you might have received 
4 of a Great Western Insurance. 4 money from the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust? 
5 Q. All right. And how long has he been doing your 5 A. Oh, it's been two years or so. 
6 tax returns? 6 It's probably been -- it's b,een a long time. 
7 A. Twenty years, I guess. 7 Q. Do you have any conversations with any of your 
8 Q. All right. ! 8 sons about the trust? 
9 And let me ask you, ifhe does, to your 9 A. Yes. 
o knowledge, any tax preparation on behalf of the Theodore 0 Q. And what is discussed? 
h 1 L. Johnson Trust? 1 A. We just talk about what is going on. 
2 A. Not that I know of. 2 Q. Okay. And what have they been telling you what 
3 Q. Do you know of anybody that does any tax returns 3 has been going on? 
~ 4 for the trust? 4 A. I don't know. 
5 A. No. 5 Q. Now, have you retained an attorney to represent 
6 Q. What is your current involvement with the ~ 6 you? 
7 l1J.eodore L. Johnson Trust? ~ 7 A. Connie. 
8 A. Well, I don't know what you mean. 8 Q. Okay. Is she your attorney? 
9 Q. Okay. What is your interest in it? Do you 9 A. Yes. 
? 0 know? :;> 0 Q. And when did you retain her? 
? 1 A. I don't understand. ~ 1 A. I don't know how long it's been, two or three 
:;> 2 Q. Well, do you receive any money £i'om the Theodore ~ 2 years. 
b 3 L. Johnson Trust? t::> 3 Q. Okay. And what has she: done? What was she 
b 4 A. No. b 4 retained for? 
~ 5 Q. Do you pay any expenses related to the trust? b 5 A. To take care of this. 
Page 18 Page 20 
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7 you in Boise in 2008? 































DEp..,.,cITION OF HELEN TAYLOR TAKEN ·.....-d-08 
A. I forgot how long ago it was. 
Q. Do you remember receiving any correspondence 
that was an engagement letter by the lawyers? 
A. I don't know if it was a letter or not. 
Q. Do you receive any paperwork on an annual basis 
regarding the trust? 
A. Well, I just don't understand what you mean. 
Q. You've brought documents with you that go back 
to 2004 and before, and my question is if you receive or 
have you received anything related to the trust from the 
calendar year 2005 to the present date? 
A. Well, I wouldn't know of it. You mean -- well, 
do I receive letters, or? 
Q. Contracts, letters, agreements, rdated to the 
trust from 2005 to the present. 
A. You mean the things like I brought today? 
Q. Yes, of course things like you brought today, 
but from the period of 2005 to the pres(:nt. 
A. Well, I -- I don't know. I brought what I 
have. 
I don't know what the date is on them. 
Q. Have you provided any of your sons with a Power 
Of Attorney? 
A. Yes. 
Q_._An_d_W_h_O_d_id_y_O_U_p_r_o_Vl_'de the Power Of Attorney 
--_.Page 23 
to? 




I think that's all. I'm not sure.
 
Q. And when was that Power Of Attorney provided to 
those two? 
A. I don't know. I'd have to look. 
Q. Do you have a copy of it at home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has it been recorded in Ada County, for 
example? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who recorded that for you? 
A. Well, I did it myself, I think. 
Q. And what is the purpose to your understanding of 
why those two were provided a Power Of Attorney? 
A. Well, I wanted them to take care of things when 
I died. 
Q. And do you have a will now? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you hold title to your real property in your 
name, or do you have a trust that's set up? 
A. It's in my name. 
Q. And is there anyone else on the deed with you? 
A. I don't think so. 
Page 24 
1 Q. And by "this," what do you mean by that, "take
 
2 care of this"?
 
3 A. Of this trust.
 
4 Q. And I noticed, or I heard before we started this
 
5 deposition, Ms. Taylor had indicated there were certain
 
6 correspondences that would not be produced.
 
7 Is that your understanding as well?
 
8 A. I don't know what -- I just don't understand
 
9 what that would mean.
 
o Q. All right. Are there letters, or were there
 
1 letters that you had in your house that you did not bring
 
2 with you today from Connie Taylor?
 




5 MR. MAILE: And Counsel -­
6 THE WITNESS: I don't have anything else.
 
7 MR. MAILE: Counsel, you indicated that there
 




o MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Correct.
 
1 MR. MAILE: Okay. And can we have or expect to
 
2 receive a privileged log -­
3 MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Sure.
 
4 MR. MAILE: -- to be provided on that?
 
5 MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Uh-huh. It will be short.
 
Page 21 r_5 ..... 
1 MR. MAILE: Okay.
 
2 And does it just consist of letters?
 
3 MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Yes.
 
4 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Do you remember a deposition
 
5 that you were involved in back in April of 2005 where I
 
6 asked you a series of questions and other lawyers asked
 
7 questions of you?
 
8 A. I remember being here.
 




1 Q. At the point in time in 2005, it was indicated
 
2 in that deposition that you had not retained an attorney.
 
3 Do you recall that?
 
4 A. No. I don't.
 
5 Q. Well, if! represent to you that that deposition
 
6 testimony had indicated that, or Mr. Clark had indicated
 
7 on the record that the firm was not representing you,
 
8 would you disagree with that?
 
9 MS. CONNIE TAYLOR: Object to the form.
 
o THE WITNESS: Yeah.
 
1 MR. MAILE: Let me try to ask a question
 
2 concerning when you retained an attorney to represent
 
3 you, to represent your interests regarding -­
4 THE WITNESS: Oh, that was a long time ago.
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TO; THE RESPONDENTS ABOVE NAMED, AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF mCCORD, 
PAUL T. CLARK, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attorney above named, Appellants, Thomas G. Maile 
and Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments L.L.C., by through Dennis Charney, and Thomas 
Maile, attorneys for the Defendants/Counter-Claimants, hereinafter referred to as "Appellants", 
appeal against the above-named Respondents to the Supreme Court ofthe State ofIdaho, from the 
Memorandum Decision and Order entered on May 15,2006 and the subsequent Judgment entered 
June 5,2006, and the subsequent Order denying the Motion to ReconsiderlMotion to Amend, entered 
on June 20,2006, and the First Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries claim entered July 21,2006, 
in the above-entitled action by Honorable Ronald Wilper and the Court's failure to award pre­
judgment interest. 
1, Appellants have aright to appeal to the Idaho Appellate Court, from the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District ofthe State ofIdaho, In and For the County ofAda, and the Judgmert 
entered June 5,2006, and the Order denying the Motion to ReconsiderlMotion to Amend entered on 























June 20, 2006, and the First Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries claim entered July 21, 2006 
described above, are appealable Orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 of the LA.R., in that there was 
a final Judgment entered on December 11,2006 resolving all claims of the parties. 
2. That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the j udgmenls 
and orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 
11 (a)(2) LA.R. That pursuant to the Idaho Appellate Rules, jurisdiction is proper for the appeal. 
3. That no order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
4. A preliminary statement ofthe issues on appeal which the Appellants: intend to assert 
in the appeal, are as follows: 
a.	 Was the District Court correct in entering the Order Granting the Respondents Plaintiff 
Beneficiaries' Motion for Summary Judgment and thereafter denying the Appellants' Motim 
for ReconsiderationIMotion to Amend entered in the above-entitled action on June 20, 2006 
and entering Judgment on June ~,2006 and thereafter entering it's First Amended Judgment 
on Beneficiaries claim entered July 21, 20061 . 
b.	 Was the Court correct in determining that the Appellants were not bona fide purchasers for 
value in the real estate contract between the Theodore L. Johnson Trust and the Appdlants? 
c.	 Was the Court correct in detennining that pursuant to Idaho Code 68-108 a Court Order was .. 
required to close the real estate transaction, under the facts of the case established in the 
record at the time of above referenced Orders? 
d.	 Was the Court correct in determining that the Respondents were entitled to SummaI)' 
Judgement when the record established that the both the original trustee of the trust and the 








successor trustees did not violate their fiduciary to the trust or the beneficiaries inthe selling 
the real property at the price established by an independent Idaho licensed appraiser? 
e.	 Was the Court correct in denying the Appellants' Motion to DismisslMotion for Summary 
Judgement relating to the role of the successor trustees not obtainingjudicial appointment 
prior to filing suit on behalf of the "trust". 
f.	 Was the Court correct in determining that the Respondents as beneficiaries of the trust had 
standing to pursue the claims which were ultimately granted by the Beneficiaries' Motion for 
Summary Judgment? 
g.	 Was the Court correct in determining that the subject real property was being held by the 
Appellants under a constructive trust? 
h.	 Was the Court correct in determining t~at the original trustee and the successor breached 
their fiduciary to the Respondents? 
1.	 Was the Court correCt in determining that the Appellants were not bona fide purchasers for 
value in the real estate contract between the Theodore L. Johnson Trust and the Appellants 
and that the Appellants had breached a fiduciary and/or had a conflict of interest in the real 
estate transaction? 
j.	 Was the Court correct in determining that pursuant to Idaho Code 68-1 06 th(~ underlying rea 
estate transaction was either void or voidable? 
k.	 Did the Court err in failing to consider the effect of the Disclaimer and Indemnification 
Agreement executed by the Respondents and the successor trustees and the other 
beneficiaries of the trust relating the claims against the Appellants? 













1.	 Was the Court correct in determining that the Appellants were not able to pursue: a suit for 
specific performance even if the real estate transaction was voidable? 
m.	 Did the Court err in denying the Plaintiff Theodore L. Johnson's and the j;ndividual 
Beneficiaries' motion for Summary Judgment which indicated certain claims were viable 
asserted in Appellants' Counter-Claim including quasi estoppel and equitable estoppel and 
thereafter rule in favor of the beneficiaries motion for summary judgment? 
n.	 Did the Court err in not allowing the counter-claims ofthe Appellants to proceed to trial? 
o.	 Did the Court err in determining that the Theodore L. Johnson Trust was entitled to amend 
their complaint and relate back the complaint to the date of filing, when the successor 
trustees had not been properly appointed by Court Order as required pursuant to I.e. 68-101 
or 68-1017 
p.	 Did the Court err in not awarding pre-judgment interest to the Appellants on the SUITlS 
representing payments for the subject real property. 
Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. The following transcript is requested: and tre 
Appellants request the same to be made a part of the appeal as existing transcripts" to wit: 
a.	 Hearings dated April 3, 2006; June 15,2006, July 17,2006 and Dect::mber 20,2004; 
b.	 The transcript is requested in standard format and not compressed. 
c. That the estimated fee for the preparation of the transcript has been paid. 
That the Appellants have paid the estimated costs of the clerk's record. 
5. The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clcrk's record: 
PLEADINGS ASSOCIATED WITH ADA COUNTY CASE NO. CV OC 2004-03642 















1.	 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed January 23, 2004; 
2.	 Verified Answer to Complaint and Counter-Claim of Defendant Thomas & Colleen Maile, 
filed February 23, 2004; 
3.	 Answer to Counter-Claim, filed March 15, 2004; 
4.	 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed March 15,2004; 
5.	 Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, March 24,2004; 
6.	 Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss, lodged April 6, 
2004; 
7.	 Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion to Dismiss, lodged April 8, 2004; 
8.	 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, entered April 23, 2004; 
9. Civil Appeals to Supreme Court, filed June 4, 2004; 
10, Order (to reopen case), entered June 24, 2004; 
11.	 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed July 19, 2004; 
12.	 Defendant/Counter-Claimants' Motion to Consolidate and Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile in 
Support of Motion to Consolidate, filed August 12,2004; 
13.	 Defendants/Counter-Claimants' Renewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, Affidavit of Thomas 
G. Maile in Support ofRenewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens and Memorandum ofThomas 
G. Maile in Support ofRenewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, filed and lodged September 
10,2004; 
14.	 Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile as Managing Member for Berkshire Wl~st, LLC, filed 
September 10, 2004; 


















15.	 Affidavit ofPhillip Collear in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, executed 
September 14, 2004; 
16.	 Order Denying Motion to Stay, entered September 16,2004; 
17.	 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Objection to Defendant's Renewed Motion to Strike Lis 
Pendens, executed September 17, 2004; 
18.	 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Renewed Motion to Strike Lis 
Pendens, lodged September 20, 2004; 
19, Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Renewed Motion to Striike Lis Pendens, 
lodged September 21,2004; 
20, Order to Consolidate with Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-05656D, entered September 29, 
2004; 
21, Answer to Counter-Claim, filed October 4,2004; 
22, Order Denying Renewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, entered October 7" 2004; 
23, Defendants' Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary 
Judgment October 20, 2004; 
24, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 20,2004; 
25.	 Affidavit ofThomas Maile in Support ofMotion to DismisslMotion for Smnmary Judgment, 
lodged and filed October 20, 2004; 
26.	 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment arrl 
Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgmen~ 
lodged and filed November 8, 2004; 
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27. Affidavit ofThomas G. Maile in Support ofMotion to Show Cause, filed November 9, 2004; 
28. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment am 
Memorandum in Support ofDefendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits ofDalIan Taylor, Rew 
Taylor, Judd Taylor, Sam Rosti, COlmie Taylor and Dennis McCracken, lodged November 
12,2004; 
29. Order Granting Motion to Strike, entered November 24,2004; 
30. Order Granting Motion to Strike in Part, entered November 29,2004; 
31. Affidavit of Terry Rudd, filed December 2,2004; 
32. Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 3,2004; 
33. Affidavit of Beth Rogers, filed December 10, 2004; 
34. Affidavit of Tim Williams, filed December 23,2004; 
35, Supplemental Affidavit ofThomas G. Maile in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
filed February 3, 2005; 
36. Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile in Support of Motion for Summary Judgm,~nt; Motion f(I' 
Leave to City Unpublished Opinion; Affidavit of Elaine Lee; Second Supplemental 
Affidavit ofThomas Maile in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment; and Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants/Counter-Claimants Motion to Dismiss, filed ani 
lodged February 14,2005; 
37. Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile in Support of Defendants/Counter-Claimants Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, Second Supplemental Affidavit ofPhillip J. Collaer in Support 











' ...... ' .. ' 
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Supplemental Memorandum Regardiqs 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed and lodged February 15, 2005; 
38.	 Motion to Strike, Affidavit of Donna Jones, Affidavit of Richard White, Affidavit of 
Counsel, Affidavit of Richard Mollerup, Affidavit of Terry Rudd, Summary of Facts and 
Exhibits and Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment, filed and lodged 
. March 3, 2005; 
39.	 Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit ofR. John Taylor, Affidavit of Elaine Lee, Third 
Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment 
and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filco and lodged May 13, 
2005; 
40,	 Defendants' Second Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for SummaI)' 
Judgment, filed May 16,2005; 
41.	 Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile in OPP9sition to Motion for Summary Judgment; Affidavi 
of Al Knutson in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment; and Reply Brief h 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed and lodged May 24,2005; 
42.	 Supplemental Memo in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to DismisslMoticn for Summary 
Judgment and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, lodged May 31,2005; 
43.	 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion to Amend; Reply Affidavit in Support of Motion fa-
Summary Judgment; Supplemental Affidavit of Elaine Lee; Reply Affidavit of Thomas 
Maile in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; and Reply Brief in Opposition b 
Motion to Amend, filed ,md lodged June 3, 2005; 













44.	 Defendants Motion to Strike Portions of Richard MollerupAffidavit, Second Supplemental 
Affidavit ofElaine Lee, Defendants Reply BriefRe: Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summaty 
Judgment, Second Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summaty 
Judgment, Defendants Motion to Strike Affidavit of Richard 1. White, Memorandum in 
SUppOli of Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Richard 1. White, filed and lodged 
June 6, 2005; 
45,	 Memorandum Decision and Order, entered July 28,2005; 
46,	 Defendants Second Renewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens; Memorandum Brief in Support 
ofDefendants Second Motion to Strike Lis Pendens; Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support 
of Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, filed and lodged August 26, 2005; 
47,	 Verified Amended Answer and Counter-claim and Demand for Jury Trial, filed September 
7,2005; 
48.	 Memorandum in Opposition to Renewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, filed September 8, 
2005; 
49.	 Reply to Defendants Amended Counterclaim, filed September 26,2005; 
50.	 Amended Complaint, filed September 28,2005; 
51.	 Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit in Support of Anlended Motion fer 
Summary Judgment and Amended Reply to Anlended counterclaim filed October 3,2005; 
52.	 Order Denying Motion to Release Lis Pendens, entered October 5,2005; 
53.	 Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of Elaine 
Lee and Defendants Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, lodged and Eiled October 7, 


















   
 
2005; 
54.	 Supplemental Memorandum Opposing Second Renewed Motion to Strike Lis Pendens, 
lodged October 11,2005; 
55.	 Answer to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial; Reply Affidavit of Thomas 
Maile in Opposition to Plaintiffs Amended Motion for Summary Judgment; and Affidavi 
of Colleen Maile in Opposition to Amended Motion for Summary Judgment; arrl 
DefendantJCounter-Claimants' Reply Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for 
Summary Judgment, filed October 13, 2005; 
56,	 Affidavit of Elaine Lee; Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motiun DDr Partial 
Summary Judgment, filed and executed October 20,2005; 
57.	 Corrected Amended Complaint, executed October 21,2005; 
58.	 Mfidavit of Dan C. Grober and Supplemental Affidavit of Dan C. Grober, filed October 24, 
2005; 
59.	 Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment 
lodged November 3,2005; 
60.	 Second Supplemental Affidavit of Dan C. Grober and Affidavit ofElaine Lee, filed 
November 3,2005; 
61.	 Judgment Re: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, entered November 7, 2005; 
62.	 Memorandum Re: Motion to Amend, lodged November 9, 2005; 
63.	 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend, lodged November 10, 2005; 
64.	 Opinion Lodged by Supreme Court, lodged December 23,2005; 
















65,	 Order for Supplemental Briefing in Light of Remand, entered December 30,200.5; 
66. Plaintiffs' Memorandum Re: Supreme Court Remand, executed January 19, 2006; 
67, Joint Supplemental Brief in Light of Supreme Court Remand, lodged January 20, 2006; 
68.	 Order Re: Motion for Summary Judgment, entered February 13, 2006; 
69,	 Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim, Affidavit of R. John Taylor in 
Support of Beneficiaries' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim, filed and lodgoo. 
February 13, 2006; 
70.	 Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and Affidavit of Thomas Maile h 
Opposition to Beneficiaries Motion for Summary Judgment, lodged and filed March 14, 
2006; 
71.	 Answer to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed March 15,2006; 
72.	 Affidavit of Gary McAllister; and Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to TaylolS 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed and lodged March 17,2006; 
73.	 Answer and Counterclaim Re: Amended Complaint by Beneficiaries, filed March 21,2006; 
74.	 Affidavit of Counsel in Support ofPlaintiffs Reply Memorandum and Reply Memorandum 
in Support ofMotion, filed and lodged March 27, 2006; 
75.	 Affidavit of Counsel, filed March 29, 2006; 
76.	 Order Resetting Trial, entered May 1,2006; 
77.	 Order Granting Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries Claim, entered May 15,2006:; 
78.	 Motion to Reconsider and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider, filed and 

















lodged May 30, 2006; 
79. Objection to Proposed Judgment, filed June 6, 2006;
 
80, Judgment on Beneficiaries Claim and Affidavit of Elaine Lee, file June 7, 2006;
 
81.	 Plaintiff Beneficiaries' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider; Motion to 
Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Experts Affidavits; Motion to Shorten Time; Affidavit of Rory 
Jones, lodged and filed June 8, 2006; 
82.	 Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim; and Response to Motion to Strike Portions of 
Expert Affidavit, filed June 9, 2006; 
83.	 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim filed June 15,2006; 
84.	 Motion to Anlend Judgment Filed Jure 7, 2006 based upon an Error of Law and/or Motion 
to Reconsider filed on or about June 20, 2006; 
85.	 Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, entered June 20, 2006; 
86.	 Motion for Certification; and Brief in Supp~rt of Motion for Certification, filed and lodged 
June 28, 2006; 
87.	 Objection to Proposed First Amended Judgment, filed July 3, 2006. 
88.	 Affidavit of Thomas Maile July 13,2006; 
89.	 Memorandum Decision and Order entered July 21,2006. 
90.	 First Anlended Judgment on Beneficiaries Claims entered July 21,2006. 
91.	 Memorandum Decision & Order entered July 25, 2006. 
92.	 Motion to Anlend First Amended Judgment filed on August 1,2006; 
93.	 Affidavit of Brad Knipe dated September 14,2006. 



















94,	 Notice of Hearing re: Motion to Amend Judgment for Pre-Judgment Interest filed October 
4,2006, 
95, Judgment entered December 11,2006. 
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 LA.R. 
DATED this J-I day ofDecember, 2006. 
THOMAS MAILE, co-c6unsel for Appellants/ 
Defendants/Counter-Claim'ants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this (;:1 day ofDecember, 2006, I caused to be dlelivered 
a true and COlTect copy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL by depositing the same in the U,S. Man 
addressed as follows: 
Paul T. Clark (X) u. S. Mail 
Clark and Feeney ( ) Facsimile Transmission 
1229 Main Street . ( ) Hand Delivery 
Post Office Drawer 285 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 8350 I 
Fax # (208) 746-9160 
Mr. Jack S. Gjording (X) U. S. Mail 
Gjording and Fauser () Facsimile Transmission 
509 West Hays Street () Hand Delivery 
Post Office Box 2837 () Overnight Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Fax # (208) 336-9177 
Mr. Phillip Collaer (X) u. S. Mail 
Anderson & Julian () Facsimile Transmission 
250 South 5th Street, Suite 700 () Hand Delivery 
Post Office Box 7426 () Overnight Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
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Dennis M. Charney 
Attorney at Law 
951 East Plaza Drive, Suite 140 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Fax # (208) 938-9504 
Diane Cromwell 
clo Tucker & Associates 
605 West Fort Street 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
( ) U. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
(x) Facsimile Transmission 
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Ti~OMAS MAILE, co-counsel for Appellantsl 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limltedliability,andTHOMASG.MAILE,N,and 
COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAnOR, an 
individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership; 
PAUL T. CLARK an individual; THEODORE L. 
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, n Idaho 
revocable trust; JOHN DOES I-JOHN DOES X; 
AND ALL PERSON IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
MOTION FOR ORDER REMOVING LIS 
PENDENS 
COME NOW Defendants DaHan Taylor, Jolm Taylor, and the Johnson Trust, by and through 
their attorney of record, Connie Wright Taylor, and respectfully request that this Court issue an 
order removing the lis pendens from the Ada County Records. 
MOTION FOR ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDENS 
LAW OFFlee:S OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that the Idaho Supreme Court has 
recently affinned the District Court's order quieting title to the Linder Road property in the name 
of the Johnson Trust, on the same operative facts as exist in the present case. 
Oral argument is requested. 
t1r/JDATED this :d day of February, 2009. 
,. 
By "­
Connie . Taylor, a member of th 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-7t1r'
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _I?_ day ofFebruary, 2009 I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV o u.s, Mail 
380 West State Street D Hand Delivered 
Eagle, ID 83616 o Overnight Mail 
~ Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mark Prusynski o 
MOFFATT THOMAS o 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10111 Floor o 
PO Box 829 ~ 
Boise, ID 83701 
Conni . Taylor 
Attorney for Defendants 
MOTION FOR ORDER REMOVING LlS PENDENS 2 
\,AW OFFI<;E:S OF' 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, 




CONNIE WRlGHT TAYLOR, flkla CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN 
TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, 
AND JOHNSON TRUST 
AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and the Theodore Johnson Trust, by and through 
their attorney of record, answer the Complaint as follows: 
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1. Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs' Complaint which is not 
specifically admitted herein. 
2. Defendants admit the allegations as to the residence of the respective pluties. 
3. With reference to the multitude ofallegations relating to documents and!or pleadings 
filed with the Court, those docwnents speak for themselves and require no admission or denial; 
however, Defendants do not accept and specifically deny the Plaintiffs' characterizations of such 
documents. 
4. Defendants admit that the Plaintiffs attempted to purchase property from the 
Theodore Johnson trust, admit that the purchase was fmUld to be improper by The Honorable Ronald 
J. Wilper (whose decision was recently upheld by the Idaho Supreme Cowt), and admit that 
judgment was entered returning the property to the Johnson Trust. Defendants deny any impropriety 
on their part in the conduct of said lawsuit. 
5. Defendants deny the Plaintiffs' allegation that they were not beneficiaries of the 
Johnson Trust as it relates to the Linder Road property. The Idaho Supreme Court has nded that the 
Release and Disclaimer executed by the successor trustees and all beneficiaries specificaHy reserved 
to the Taylors all rights to the lawsuit against these Plaintiffs seeking recovery of the property they 
had acquired wrongfully. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a cause of action against these Defendants upon Which relief 
may be granted. 
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SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs failed to take reasonable steps to 
mitigate their claimed or alleged damages, if any. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs' claims are barred by LR.C.P. 12(b)(8) because there is another action 
pending between the same parties on the same cause. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, 
waiver, laches, and unclean hands. 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
For counterclaims against the Plaintiffs, the Defendants allege as follows: 
1. The allegations as to residency and jurisdiction admitted in the Answer above are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
2. Slander of Title. Plaintiffs have filed a number of lis pendens against the subject 
real property, even after the entry of the District Court Judgment quieting title in the Johnson 
Trust. The filing of these documents constitutes slander of title, as the claim to an o,vnership 
interest in the property was a slanderous statement which was false, done with malice, and 
resulted in special damages to the Defendants (in an amount which will be proved at trial) 
because it has prevented them from either financing or selling the Linder Road property. 
3. Abuse of Process. Plaintiffs, in filing this second action relating to the Linder 
Road property and issuing a lis pendens to prevent the Plaintiffs from having the Us e of the 
property, have affinnatively used a legal process primarily to accomplish an improper purpose 
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outside of simply gaining an advantage in the underlying litigation for which the proc<:ss was not 
designed (Le. keeping the real property tied up beyond the time of the appeal of the initial lawsuit 
in which the property was ordered returned to the Jolmson trust). Plaintiffs' actions have 
prevented the Defendants from selling the property, which has declined in value since the filing 
of this action, damaging the Defendants by misuse of the process external to the litigation that 
cannot be compensated in the underlying proceeding. 
4. Intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. By 
prohibiting the Defendants from selling the Linder Road property, Plaintiffs have committed the 
tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. Defendants have had 
several inquiries on the Linder Road property, but have been prevented from selling the property 
solely because of the Plaintiffs' lis pendens, resulting so far in the loss of an offer to purchase the 
property for $1.8 million dollars, to date, with additional offers being received. The F'laintiffs' 
interference was for an improper purpose, and has caused resulting damage to the Johnson Trust. 
5. Attorney fees: As a result of the actions ofplaintiff in this matter, defc:ndants 
have been required to retain the legal counsel from the law offices of Clark and Feeney, and are 
entitled to recover their attorneys fees incurred in this matter pursuant to IRCP 11 and Idaho 
Code sections 12-121 and 12-123. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that the Court enter an order granting the following 
relief: 
1. That the Complaint be dismissed and that the Plaintiffs take nothing th:=reby. 
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2.	 That Rule 11 sanctions be imposed on the attorney for the Plaintiffs for bringing 
this frivolous action. 
3.	 That the Defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in
 
responding to the Complaint pursuant to I.e. 12-121, 123 and I.R.C.P 11.
 
4.	 That judgment be entered against the Plaintiffs in an amount to be determined at 
trial for slander of title. 
5.	 That judgment be entered against the Plaintiffs in an amount to be detelmined at 
trial for abuse of process. 
6.	 That judgment be entered against the Plaintiff for intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage. 
7.	 That the Defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in
 
bringing their counterclaim. pursuant to I.C. 12-121, 123 and LR.C.P 11.
 
DATED this J2f~ay of February, 2009. 
CLARK and FEENEY 






Connie W. Taylor, a member of the firm. J 
Attorneys for Defendants. --' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I~day ofFebryary, 2009 I caused to be served a
 




Thomas G. Maile, IV o U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street o Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, ID 83616 o Overnight Mail
 
r
 Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
 
Mark Prusynski o U.S. Mail 
MOFFATT THOMAS o Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor o Overnight Mail
 
PO Box 829 Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384
 ~ 
Boise, ID 8370 1
 
.•.,' •""'t 
.' .' <:=t 
(. (, ....J.Coruiio W. Taylor 
Attorney for Defendants 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law "~~R 1 U LDU:l 
380 West State Street 
J. DAvlU I~MVA-U=-j,) ClerkEagle, Idaho 83616 
ByKATtty J. BIEHL 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 OEPUlv 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER 
OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN 
TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Thomas Maile 
hereby provide their Reply to Defendant's Amended Answer of John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and 
REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND 
JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 1 
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Johnson Trust and Counterclaim and further complain and allege as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' deny each and every allegation of Defendant's Amended Answer of John 
Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and Johnson Trust and Counterclaim which is not specifically admitted 
herein. 
2. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 of the Counter-Claim. 
3. Plaintiffs specifically deny paragraphs 2,3,4, and 5 of the Counter-Claim. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that the defendants have been required to return the 
purchase price of $400,000.00 by previous court proceedings. The same remains unpaid, 
including interest thereon and the plaintiffs are entitled to a ''vendee's lien" on the subj,ect real 
property pursuant to the previous court proceedings and further pursuant to Idaho Code section 
45-804. That in addition, the plaintiffs herein have previously filed their Lis Pendens in the prior 
proceedings which remains of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, as further 
protection ofthe vendee's lien. That such liens are superior to the Lis Pendens herein and as 
such the Lis Pendens filed herein has not impaired the title to the subject real property and as 
such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the present action. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs have alleged allegations of wrongful conduct in violation of Chapter 18 Title 78 
of the Idaho Code. That plaintiffs are availed of certain remedies set forth below including but 
not limited to: 
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES. 
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived 
REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND 




directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person 
has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or 
the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any 
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or real property. 
Whoever violates this subsection is guilty of a felony. 
18-7805 RACKETEERING -- CNIL REMEDIES. 
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a 
pattern of racketeering activity may file an action in the district court for the 
recovery ofthree (3) times the actual damages proved and the cost of the suit, 
including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(c) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy 
racketeering after making provisions for the rights of all innocent persons affected 
by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate 
orders. Prior to a determination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not 
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions, 
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with 
any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture or other restraints 
pursuant to this section as it deems proper. 
(d) Following a determination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not 
limited to: 
(1) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in 
any enterprise; 
That such potential remedy, including the request for a constructive trust, authorizes the 
filing a Lis Pendens herein and as such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are baITed in the 
present action. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs allege the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel by the 
action above referenced. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, A:~D 





Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damages. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants are not entitled to all or part of the relief they seek by way of their Counter-
Claim for the reason that the damages alleged in their claim reasonably could have been avoided 
by the counter-claimants. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, all possible 
affirmative defenses may not have been alleged and set forth herein because sufficient 11lcts are 
not available at this time to form an adequate factual basis for the defenses, after counter-
defendants have made reasonable inquiry to obtain such facts. Therefore, counter-defendants 
reserves the right to raise additional affirmative defenses as fact-gathering and discovery in this 
matter progresses. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial upon all facts triable by a jury. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
Plaintiffs have engaged the services ofThomas G. Maile, IV to defend this action and 
reasonable attorney fees plus costs should be ordered against the Defendants and Idaho Code 12­
120; 12-121; 12-123. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows:
 
1
 That Defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed against the Plaintiffs. 
REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND 







2 For Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees, plus costs. 
3 For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the 
premises. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 2009. 
THOMAS G. MA LE, IV., ro Se and counsel for 
Berkshire Investm ts Colleen Birch-Maile 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 5th day of March, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN 
TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Mark Stephen Prusynski () u. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
THOMAS G. MILE, IV., Pro Se and counsel for 
Berkshire Investmen s and Colleen Birch-Maile 
REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND 






MAl? 1:{ 2009 
Ada COl:nty Clerk 
Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
msp@moffatt.com 
17136.0306 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka 
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AMENDEDANSWEROFCO~ME 
WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND 
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AND COUNTERCLAIM 
AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND 
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO AMENDED COMPLAINT 












COME NOW the defendants, Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul 
T. Clark, by and through the undersigned counsel, and answer plaintiffs' amended complaint as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
2. These defendants deny each and every allegation of plaintiffs' complaint 
not specifically admitted herein. 
3. Responding to paragraph 1 of plaintiffs , complaint, defendants admit that 
the Mailes are husband and wife and reside in Ada County, that Berkshire Investments is an 
Idaho limited liability company, that Clark and Feeney is an Idaho partnership, that Paul T. Clark 
is an individual, but deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph. 
4. Responding to paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' amended complaint, defendants 
admit that Clark and Feeney, Paul 1. Clark and Connie Wright Taylor were at all relevant times 
licensed Idaho attorneys and were conducting business in the state of Idaho, but deny the 
remaining allegations of said paragraph. 
5. Defendants admit paragraph 3 of plaintiffs' amended complaint. 
6. Responding to a multitude of references in plaintiffs' amended complaint 
to documents and pleadings, those documents or pleadings speak for themselves and require no 
admission or denial; but defendants do not accept and specifically deny the plaintiffs' 
characterizations of such documents. 
7. Defendant admit that the plaintiffs attempted to purchase property from 
the Theodore Johnson Trust, admit that the purchase was found to be improper by The 
AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND 
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO AMENDED COMPLAINT 
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Honorable Ronald J. Roper, and admit that judgment was entered returning the propelty to the 
Johnson Trust. Defendants deny any impropriety on their part in the conduct of said lawsuit. 
8. Defendants deny the plaintiffs' allegation that they were not beneficiaries 
of the Johnson Trust as it relates to the Linder Road property. The Release and Disclaimer 
executed by the successor trustees and all beneficiaries specifically reserved to the Taylors all 
rights to the lawsuit against plaintiffs seeking recovery of the property they had acquired 
wrongfully. 
9. Defendants deny the remaining allegations of plaintiffs' amended 
complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
10. Plaintiffs' claims are barred pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(8) because there is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
11. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral 
estoppel, waiver, laches and unclean hands. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
12. Plaintiffs had no attorney-client relationship with these defendants and 
therefore lack standing to bring their negligence claims or breach of fiduciary duty claims. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
13. Plaintiffs' tort claims are barred by the economic loss rule. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
14. This action was brought frivolously and without foundation, in violation 
of Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND 
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO AMENDED COMPLAINT 





For counterclaims against the plaintiffs, the defendants allege as follows: 
1. The allegations as to residency and jurisdiction admitted in the Amended 
Answer above are incorporated herein by reference. 
2. Under the terms of the fee agreement between Clark and Feeney and the 
defendants, Taylors and Johnson Trust, Clark and Feeney has an ownership interest in the Linder 
Road real property. 
3. Slander of Title. Plaintiffs have filed a number of lis pendens against the 
subject real property, even after the entry of the district court judgment quieting title in the 
Johnson Trust. The filing of these documents constitutes slander of title, as the claim to an 
ownership interest in the property was a slanderous statement which was false, done with malice, 
and resulted in special damages to the defendants (in an amount which will be proved at trial) 
because it has prevented them from either financing or selling the Linder Road property. 
4. Abuse of Process. Plaintiffs, in filing this second action relating to the 
Linder Road property and issuing a lis pendens to prevent the defendants from having the use of 
the property, have affirmatively used a legal process primarily to accomplish an improper 
purpose outside of simply gaining an advantage in the underlying litigation for which the process 
was not designed (i.e., keeping the real property tied up beyond the time of the appeal of the 
initial lawsuit in which the property was ordered returned to the Johnson Trust). Plaintiffs' 
actions have prevented the defendants from selling the property, which has declined in value 
since the filing of this action, damaging the defendants by misuse of the process external to the 
litigation that cannot be compensated in the underlying proceeding. 
AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND 
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5. Intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. By 
prohibiting the defendants from selling the Linder Road property, plaintiffs have committed the 
tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. Defendants have had 
several inquiries on the Linder Road property, but have been prevented from selling the property 
solely because of the plaintiffs' lis pendens, resulting so far in the loss of an offer to purchase the 
property for $1.8 million, to date, with additional offers being received. The plaintiffs' 
interference was for an improper purpose, and has caused resulting damage to the Johnson Trust. 
6. Attorney fees: As a result of the actions of plaintiffs in this matter, 
defendants have been required to retain the legal counsel from the law offices of Moffatt 
Thomas, and are entitled to recover their attorney fees incurred in this matter pursuant to IRCP 
11 and Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 12-123. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that the Court enter an order granting the 
following relief: 
1. That the Amended Complaint be dismissed and that the plaintiffs take 
nothing thereby. 
2. That Rule 11 sanctions be imposed on the attorney for the plaintiffs for 
bringing this frivolous action. 
3. That the defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred in responding to the Complaint pursuant to 1.C. 12-121, 123 and 1.R.C.P 11. 
4. That judgment be entered against the plaintiffs in an amount to be 
determined at trial for slander of title. 
AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND 
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5. That judgment be entered against the plaintiffs in an amount to be 
determined at trial for abuse of process. 
6. That judgment be entered against the Plaintiff for intentional interference 
with prospective economic advantage. 
7. That the defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs 
incurred in bringing their counterclaim pursuant to 1.C. 12-121, 123 and 1.R.C. P 11. 
8. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just, including 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this /l.t:1day of March, 2009. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
Jl./;f,,"1 ' By__-f- _ 
Mark . Prusynski - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright 
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and 
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /2..{;Iday of March, 2009, I caused a true and conoect copy of 
the foregoing AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND 
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
COUNTERCLAIM to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 W. State St. 
Eagle, ID 83616-4902 
( ) Overnight Mail
(JFacsimile 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
Connie W. Taylor ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK AND FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
P.O. Drawer 285 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 (v1'Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 
Attorneys for Defendants 
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor 
and the Theodore Johnson Trust 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV Mj~R 17 2009 
Attorney at Law 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
380 West State Street ByA. LYKE 
DEPUTVEagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER 
OF CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK 
AND FEENEY AND PAUL T. 
CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Thomas Maile 
hereby provide their Reply to Defendants' Amended Answer of Connie Wrigth Taylor, Clark and 
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PAULT. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 1 
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Feeney and Paul T. Clark and Counterclaim and further complain and allege as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' deny each and every allegation of Defendants' Amended Answer of Connie 
Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark Trust and Counterclaim which is not 
specifically admitted herein. 
2. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 of the Counter-Claim. 
3. That based upon information and belief, plaintiffs admit paragraph 2, that under the 
fee agreement all defendants maintain an ownership interest in Linder Road real property. 
4. Plaintiffs specifically deny paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 of the Counter-Claim. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that the defendants have been required to return the 
purchase price of $400,000.00 by previous court proceedings. The same remains unpaid, 
including interest thereon and the plaintiffs are entitled to a "vendee's lien" on the subject real 
property pursuant to the previous court proceedings and further pursuant to Idaho Code section 
45-804. That in addition, the plaintiffs herein have previously filed their Lis Pendens in the prior 
proceedings which remains of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, as further 
protection of the vendee's lien. That such liens are superior to the Lis Pendens herein and as 
such the Lis Pendens filed herein has not impaired the title to the subject real property and as 
such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the present action. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs have alleged allegations of wrongful conduct in violation of Chapter 18 Title 78 
ofthe Idaho Code. That plaintiffs are availed of certain remedies set forth below including but 
REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK AND FEENEY AND 





not limited to: 
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES. 
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived 
directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person 
has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or 
the proceeds derivf~d from the investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any 
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or real property. 
Whoever violates this subsection is guilty of a felony. 
18-7805 RACKETEERING -- CIVIL REMEDIES. 
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a 
pattern of racketeering activity may file an action in the district court for the 
recovery of three (3) times the actual damages proved and the cost of the suit, 
including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(c) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy 
racketeering after making provisions for the rights of all innocent persons affected 
by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate 
orders. Prior to a determination of liability, such orders may include, but are not 
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions, 
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with 
any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture or other restraints 
pursuant to this section as it deems proper. 
(d) Following a determination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not 
limited to: 
(1) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, i.n 
any enterprise; 
That such potential remedy, including the request for a constructive trust, authorizes the 
filing a Lis Pendens herein and as such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the 
present action. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs allege the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel by the 
REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK AND FEENEY AND 









action above referenced. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damages. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants are not entitled to all or part of the relief they seek by way of their Counter-
Claim for the reason that the damages alleged in their claim reasonably could have been avoided 
by the counter-claimants. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Pursuant to Rule 11 ofthe IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, all possible 
affirmative defenses may not have been alleged and set forth herein because sufficient facts are 
not available at this time to form an adequate factual basis for the defenses, after count{~r-
defendants have made reasonable inquiry to obtain such facts. Therefore, counter-defendants 
reserves the right to raise additional affirmative defenses as fact-gathering and discovery in this 
matter progresses. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial upon all facts triable by a jury. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
Plaintiffs have engaged the services of Thomas G. Maile, IV to defend this action and 
reasonable attorney fees plus costs should be ordered against the Defendants and Idaho Code 12­
120; 12-121; 12-123. 
PRAYER 
REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK AND FEENjgY AND 




WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows: 
1 That Defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed against the Plaintiffs. 
2 For Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees, plus costs. 
3 For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the 
premises. 
DATED this 17th day ofMarch, 2009. 
TOMAS G. MAIL, ., Pro Se and counsel for 
Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 17th day ofMarch, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK 
AND FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM to be delivered, addressed as 
follows: 
Mark Stephen Prusynski (X) U. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 () Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor (X) U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY () Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
THOMAS G. MAILE, N., Pro Se and counsel for 
Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK AND FEENEY AND 





THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 




MAR 17 2009 
J DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
. evA. LYKE 
OEPUTY 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £'k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT R]~: 
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW, the undersigned, Thomas G. Maile, IV, pro se and attorney ofrecord for 
Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile herein, and hereby moves this Court to 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: DEFENDANTS' 
COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 1C"'""""'''''''''I..... '''....IAOOlERX8HIR.INV'd ''''...''''''tio__.... 
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enter Summary Judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs on the grounds and for the reasons, that the 
claims set forth in all ofthe defendants' counterclaim are barred as a matter oflaw, and there are 
no material factual issues in dispute. 
This Motion is based upon the Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment and In Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and the 
Memorandum Brief in Support of the Motion Summary Judgment, all filed concurrently herewith 
and further upon the file and record in this matter. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 17th day of March, 2009. 
THO S. ILE, IV 
Pro Se and couns I foy Berkshire Investments, LLC 
and Colleen Birch-'M~ile 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: DEFENDANTS' 







CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17th day of March, 2009, I served the foregoing (1) 
MOTION IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (2) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (3) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, together with the (4) NOTICE 
OF HEARING by having a true and complete copy personally delivered, by facsimile and/or by 
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed as follows: 
Mark Stephen Prusynski (X) U. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 () Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor (X) U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY () Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: DEFENDANTS' 
COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 3C_"""I"""'lffia.W>\IlEllKSHIRI>Md_jW_~ _"~_"" 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
\'0. -_·[[·ZO FILE ­
".M ..... _.~ ~.M. 
MAR 17 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
ByA. LYKE 
DEPUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £1da 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust~ JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT & IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE IV., IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 1 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.	 Your Affiant is a Pro Se litigant in the above captioned matter and attorney of r,ecord for 
the Co-Plaintiffs. That the information and facts set forth herein are based upon your 
affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can testify as to the truth of the 
matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this matter. 
2.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit ofThomas 
Maile filed in Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D, Taylor vs Maile and the same is 
made part hereof as if set forth in full herein. involved in either the current litigation 
and/or the litigation on appeal. 
3.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the Notice ofLis Pendens 
filed with the Ada County Recorders office on May 18, 2006, bearing Instrument No. 
106078472. 
4.	 Your affiant has never executed any documentation releasing said Notice of Lis Pendens 
(Exhibit "B") and as oftoday's date it remains a public record with the Ada County 
Recorder's Office. There have been no monies received from the Theodore L. Johnson 
Trust and/or the individual Taylors, relating to the return of the purchase price and/or 
interest thereon. 
5.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "c" is a true and correct copy ofthe Affidavit ofR. John 
Taylor in Support ofBeneficiaries' Motion for Summary Judgment in Ada County Case 
No. CV OC 04-00473D which was filed in February 2006. 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE IV., IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 





              





6.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Terry Rudd, 
dated November 23,2004 with the attachment representing his appraisal report, who 
opined that the Linder Road property was valued at $820,000.00 in Ada County Case No. 
CV OC 04-00473D. 
7.	 That in defense to the claims of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust and the Taylors' claims 
there were three (3) Idaho licensed real estate appraisers and an Idaho Realtor who were 
prepared to provide testimony and opinions that the fair market value of the Linder Road 
property at the time ofthe purchase was $400,000.00. That your affiant, his wife and 
Berkshire Investments were preparing the defense to the claims by the trust and the 
Taylors that the purchase price was fair and reasonable. That consistent with the prior 
ruling in Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D the Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper 
had ruled that "the Plaintiffs, now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to 
pursue rescission once the grounds for it arose" (page 9 of Exhibit "K" to Affidavit of 
Thomas Maile Part 2). That as a result of the criminal conduct and misrepresentations 
made to the court by the defendants, your affiant, Berkshire Investments and his wife 
were not able to defend such claims for money damages. 
DATED this 17th day ofMarch 2 09. 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE IV., IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 







17th day of March, 2009. 




Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
__S....t....A_~~ ?F IDAHO...
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30,2014 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE IV., IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 4 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law ' 
380 West state Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
FEB t 7 200S1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
REED TAYLOR, DALLANTAYWR, and 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, ' 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, rVand COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband 'and wife, and BERKSHIRE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
AFFIDAVIT OF INTEREST 
COMPUTATION 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 














1.	 Your Affiant is the attorney for the above-named Defendants/Counter-Claimants and 
further appears Pro .Se, and provides this Affidavit pursuant to Idaho Code 28-22-104. 
That the information and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal 
knowledge and/or observations and can testify as to the truth of the matters asserted 
herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this matter. 
2.	 That pursuant to the Court's determination that the title to the real property in the subject 
proceeding was restored to the trust, the Plaintiffs were obligated to Berkshire Investment 
LLC, to repay the purchase price of $400,000.00. No sums have been received from the 
plaintiffs to the current date. 
3.	 Your affiant computed interest pursuant to I.e. 28-22-104, on the First Amended
 
Judgment entered in this matter on July 21, 2006, as follows:
 
Principal amount of Judgment: $400,000.00
 
. .	 . 
Interest from date of Judgment (July 21, 2006)
 
to and including December 31,2006 (164 days)
 
at 12.0 percent per annum: $ 21,567.64
 
Interest from January 1,2007 to and
 
including December 31,2007 (365 days)
 
at 12.0 percent per annum: $ 48,000.00
 
Interest from January 1,2008 to and
 
including December 31,2008 (366 days)
 
at 12.0 percent per annum: $ 48,132.66
 
Interest from January 1, 2009 to and
 
including February 10,2009 (41 days)
 
at 12.0 percent per annum: $ 5,391.91
 
TOTAL AS OF February 10,2009:	 $523,092.21 
Interest per annum:	 $ 48,000.00 























Interest per diem: $ 131.51 
DATED this J1 day of February, 2009. 
/1 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
~ day of February, 2009. . . 
Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
Commission Expires July 30,2014 
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106078472Thomas MaileTHOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorney for Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
vs. 
THOMAS MAILE IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY and 















Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 















NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS - 1
 








































..... '	 ~. 
)
 
THOMAS MAILE IV. and COLLEEN )
 
MAILE, husband and wife, and )
 








. .. .,, TO:	 ALL INTERESTED PARTIES ~ 
RE:	 LITIGATION AFFECTING THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS BETWEEN AND 
AMONGST THE ABOVE-REFERENCED PARTIES 
The nature ofthe action supporting the above-named Defendants/Counter-Claimants' claim to 
the legal and equitable rights in the real property hereinafter described is a quiet title action, declaratory 
judgment, estoppel, filed in the above captioned matter in Ada County, State ofIdaho, including a claim 
for damages, detenmnation oftitle and interests to the real property, costs and attorneys fees. 
The above Defendants/Counter-Claimants' claims an interest in said real property or properties 
described as follows: 
Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, Block 1 of Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, 
recorded in Book 90 of Plats, at pages 10457 and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also 
known as, the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 'I West, 
.. .
Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho'. .. 
D 
DATED this.)/~ay of May, 2006.	 
\ 
11 
I"/~/II/,j/,'1 /'/1" / / / l \L'-vvl-
THOMAS G. MAIL'UV., individually, and as 
Managing member ofBerkshire Investments L.L.c. 
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS - 2 
Z:\AILO\MAll.E\TAYLOR'USPENDNOT May 18, :00)6 
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STAIE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) . 
• 
On this ~day ofMay, 2006, before me, the undersigned, a Not~ry Public in and for said 
state, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., known to be the managing member ofBerkshire 
Investments L.L.c., and the individual, and further known to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same ..... 
for Berkshire Investments L.L.c., and for himself individually. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the day and year last above 
written. 
I. 
NOTICKOF LIS PENDENS - 3 
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Residing at . ,Idah;' . 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys -for Plaintiffs 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-95] 6 
ISB No. 4837 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, )
 












THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN )
 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS )
 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, )
 


















THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLE )EN, 
MAILE, husband and wife, and ) 




AFFIDAVJT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 
Case No. CV OC 0400473D 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 
IN SUPPORT OF BENEFICIARIES' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 
LAW OFFICES OF 
EXHIBIT "C' CLARK AND FEENEY 
















































































County of Nez Perce )
 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years and make this affidavit from personal knowledge. 
2. I did not learn that the real property on Linder Road was being sold until after the 
transaction had closed on September 16,2002, which was two days after Uncle Ted's death. My 
siblings and I did not learn that the property was owned by a trust in which we and our mother were 
named as beneficiaries until several months after the sale. There was no court approval of that sale. 
To my knowledge, the successor trustees did not carefully examine the fairness and propriety of the 
transaction before closing it. When my brothers and I contacted Beth Rogers about our concerns 
over the sale, she initially agreed to bring an action on behalfof the trust, then abruptly changed her 
mind. This occurred right after we had asked her for a copy of the Trust tax return, which she 
refused to provide. The Rogers agreed to step aside as trustees only after all the btmeficiaries 
agreed not to sue them and to waive any accounting for the Trust. 
3. Under the terms of the Trust Agreement, (Exhibit A to this affidavit), thl~ $100,000 
down payment made by the Mailes was required to be divided into five equal shares. Because their 
father (Richard Johnson) had died, Beth Rogers and her brothers were entitled to immediate payment 
oftheir $20,000. My mother would have been entitled to only interest income on the $20,000 during 
her lifetime, at the discretion of the trustees. Of the remaining $300,000 received from the Mailes, 
Beth and her siblings were entitled to immediate payment of $60,000, while my mother would 
receive, at most, interest income on her share. Again, this would have been paid only if the trustees 
elected to do so. My siblings and I were to receive no payment until after our mother's death. 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 2
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4. If! had been notified that I was a beneficiary prior to the closing of the Mailes' 
purchase of the Linder Road property, I would have been adamantly opposed to the sale being 
approved. I was very aware in the fall of 2002 that real property values in the Eagle area were 
escalating rapidly, and I was shocked when I learned that this 40-acre parcel ofprime development 
land in Eagle had been sold for only $400,000. I knew that this property was in an area zoned for 
housing developments and was near the new Eagle high school. I was also personally a.ware of the 
high-end residential development that was occurring in the Eagle area near this real property. 
5. After Ted's death, there was absolutely no urgency to sell the Linder Road property, as 
there were other assets which were more than sufficient to pay Uncle Ted's debts (which were 
minimal) and to make substantial distributions. Because the principal of the trust would not be 
distributed to the members of my family in the foreseeable future, from our point of view it would 
have been much more financially beneficial for the property to be held by the Trust and then placed 
on the open market so that its value as development property could be explored and maximized. 
This is supported by the fact that in September of 2005 (less than three years later) we received an 
offer to purchase this property for $1.8 million dollars. A true and correct copy of that Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement is attached as Exhibit B to this affidavit. 
FURTHER your affiant sayeth naught.	 






SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _'_ day of February, 2006. 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TA YLOR	 3
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Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho. 
Residing at ( (/:·/[,...'-/7: G therein. 
My commission expires: (' ~ t ":; it 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the qfh day of February, 2006, I caused to be se:rved a true 
and correct copy of this document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas Maile 
Attorney at Law 
380 W. State 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Jack S. Gjording 
Gjording & Fouster 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, ID 83702 
Dennis Charney 
Attorney at Law 
951 E. Plaza Dr. Ste. 140 
Eagle, ID 83616 
g U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy (FAX) 
Pl U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy (FAX) 
U.S. Mail 
~ Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 






Attorney for Plaintiffs 
AFFlDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 4 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO B~'501 001058
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REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT 
THIS TRUST AGREEMENT is made and entered into this -----.!f.- day of November, 1997, 
between THEODORE L. JOHNSON, a single person, ofAda County, Idaho, hereinafter referred 
to as "Grantor", and THEODORE L. JOHNSON, hereinafter referred to as "Trustee". 
WIT N E SSE T H: 
WHEREAS, the Grantor desires to create this Trust Agreement effective this date and 
the Trustee agrees to act as Trustee thereof; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Grantor and Trustee agree as follows: 
ARTICLE I 




2. TRUST PROPERTY: The Grantor hereby transfer, convey and deliver to the trust 
the property set forth on Schedule "A" which is attached hereto and by reference made part 
hereof. All the property transferred and delivered to the trust shall, upon written acceptance 
thereof by the Trustee, constitute the trust estate and shall be held, managed and distributed as 
hereinafter provided. That no consideration was or will be given by the Trustee for the: 
conveyance or transfer to it of any of the Trust Estate; that the Trustee accepts such title to the 
Trust Estate as is conveyed or transferred to it hereunder, without liability or responsibility for 
the conditions or validity of such title; and that the Trust estate has been or will De conveyed or 
transferred to the Trustee, IN TRUST with power of sale, for the uses and purposes herein 
provided. , 
3. ADDITIONAL PROPERTY: The Grantor, or any other person, with the consent
 
of the Trustee, may name the trust as beneficiary of life insurance poliCIes, or deposit property
 
with the trust, or devise property to the trust.
 
ARTICLE II 
1. WITHDRAWALS BY Grantor: While Grantor is living, the Trust shall distribute
 




2. DISTRIBUTIONS BY TRUSTEE: The Trustee may distribute to or for the
 
benefit of the Grantor, such sums from income and principal as the Trustee deems reasonable
 
for the maintenance, support and health of Grantor.
 
3. CHARACTER OF PROPERTY: All property transferred to this trust by the 
Grantor shall retain its character as separate property during the lifetime of the Grantor and any 
withdrawal from the trust by the Grantor of sucn property shall be his separate property. 4. 
LIFE INSURANCE: The following rights and obligations apply to any life insurance'policies 
which designate the trust as beneficiary. 
a. Premium Payment: The owner or owners of any life insurance policies shall 
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pay all pre~1jums an~ ot~er charg~s to keel :!I force life insurance policies which. sUC;h owner or 
owners desire to mamtam on the life of Gr:,nlor. The trust shall be under no oblIgatIOn to pay 
premiums or other charges but may make such payments if sufficient cash is available to the 
trust. 
b. Collection of Benefits: Upon the death of the insured, the trust shall collect 
any benefits. The trust is authorized to take any action to collect the benefits which it deems 
reasonable and proper. The trust may compromise or settle any claim and may execute any 
property release or acquittance. 
c. Policy Rights: The owner of each policy shall retain and have the right to 
change the beneficiary and to exercise any option, right or privilege relating to each policy, 
including the right to borrow in accordance with the provisions of the policy and to pledge the 
policy as collateral. Nothing herein shall bestow upon Grantor, who does not own any policy, 
any nght, privilege or incident or ownership. ' 
ARTICLE III . 
1. RIGHTS OF THE GRANTOR: The Grantor specifically reserves the following 
rights: 
A. ADDITION TO THE TRUST ESTATE: The Grantor may, from time to 
time, by conveyance, assignment, transfer, or Will, add property of any kind or any pal1 thereof, 
to the Trust Estate, which shall thereupon be subject to all the terins and provisions of this 
trust. 
B. ALTERlNG OR REVOKING TRUST: While Grantor is living and
 
competent, the Grantor may, at any time or times, by written notice filed with the Trustee:
 
I. AJter or amend any provision thereof; 
2. Revoke this Trust in whole or in part, and in such event, the Tnlst Estate 
or portion as Grantor's separate property .. 
C. DIRECTION BY THE GRANTOR TO THE TRUSTEE: While Grantor is 
living and competent, the Grantor may, at any time or times, direct the Trustee in writing: 
1. To retain as part of the Trust Estate, any securities, properties, or 
investments at any tie held hereunder, for such length of time as such directions may provide; 
2. Or to sell, encumber, lease, manage, control, or dispose of any property 
of the Trust Estate; 
3. Or to invest available income or principal in specific securities, properties 
or investments. 
The Trustee shall not be liable for any loss sustained or incurred by reason of its 
compliance with any such written instruction of the Grantor. 
II. ADMINISTRATION BY THE TRUSTEE: 
A. THE TRUST BANK ACCOUNT: Deposits and withdrawals by the Grantor or 
Trustee to or from Bank or Savings and Loan accounts held by the trust shall automatically be 
deemed to constitute contributions to or withdrawals from the trust estate. 
B. PAYMENT OF TRUST EXPENSE: The Trustee shall pay or reserve 
sufficient funds to pay all expenses of management and administration of the Trust Estate, 
including: 
I. The compensation of the Trustee; 
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, 2. Out of pocket expelCs of management and administration of the Trust 
Estate; • 
3. Payments of interest and .,rincipal on any outstanding notes, whether or 
not secured by a Deed of Trust, on any real estate which may be part of the Trust Estate; 
C. DISTRIBUTION TO THE GRANTOR: All of the net income shall be 
distributed to or for the use and benefit of the Grantor while he shall live, in convenient 
installments, not less frequently than quarterly, as his separate property. In addition to the net 
income, the Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of the Grantor, out of the prindpal of 
the Trust Estate, such sums as trustee deems necessary for his reason- able care, support, health 
and comfort,l if in trustee's discretion, the income to which he is entitled is considered 
insufficient JOr such purposes. 
a. Distribution: The Trustee shall pay to or for the benefit of the Grantor such 
sums from the income and principal as the surviving Grantor may at any time request. 
b. Grantor Disabilitf Should the Trustee at any time consider the Grantor to be 
unable for any reason to direct the rustee with respect to disposition of such sums from the 
trust estate, the Trustee is authorized in its sole and absolute discretion to expend for the 
Grantor such sums from principal or income as the Trustee shall deem necessary or advisable 
for the Grantor's support, maintenance and health.. . 
D. UNDISTRIBUTED FUNDS: All undistributed funds in the Trust Checking 
Account at the time of the termination of the Trust, shall become a part of the Corpus of the 
Trust. 
III.	 ADMINISTRATJON OF THE TRUST UPON THE DEATH OF THE 
GRANTOR: 
A. FU1\~RAL EXPENSES: 1..!pon the death of the Grantor, the Trustee may pay 
the expenses of her last illness and funeral, from either income or principal, at the discretion of 
the Trustee, unless other adequate provision shall have been made therefore. 
B.	 TAXES AND OTHER CHARGES: 
]. Upon the death of the Grantor, any estate, inheritance, succession or 
other death taxes, duties, charges or assessments, together with interest, penalties, costs,
Trustee's compensation, and attorneys' fees incurred by reason of the Trust Estate or any 
interest therein being included for such tax purposes, may be paid by the Trustee from the Trust 
Estate, unless other adequate provisions shall nave been made therefore. Any such payments 
shall be charged to princIpal of the Trust Estate or the separate trust so included for such tax 
purposes. .$. 
2. The Trustee shall have full power and authority to pay from the Trust 
Estate any other taxes, charges or assessments for which the Trustee, the Trust Estate, or any 
interest therein becomes liable, and any such payments shall be made from and charged to either 
income or principal of the Trust Estate or any share or separate trust thereof, as the Trustee in 
its discretion deems proper. 
3. The Trustee may make any payments directly or to a personal 
repre~entative or other fiduciary and shall be under no duty to see to the application of an funds 
so paId. 
IV.	 DISPOSITJON OF TRUST ASSETS UPON DEATB OF GRANTOR: 
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. The Trustee shall hold, manage, imst and reinvest the Trust Estate and shall collect 
and receive the interest, income of profits li lerefrom for the benefit of Grantor for the life of 
Grantor and thereafter and upon the death of the Grantor the corpus of the trust and all income 
and interest acquired hereafter, shall be held, applied and distributed in the following manner: 
a. After the death of Grantor, the Trustee shall hold, manage and control the 
property comprising the trust estate for the benefit of the HELEN TAYLOR (20%); HAZEL 
FISHER (20%); BETTY FARNWORTH (20%); JOYCE SELLEY (20%), and the surviving 
issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RICHARD B. JOHNSON (20%), as follows: 
Twenty percent (20~) o(the trust estate shall be distributed immediately !JQon 
Grantor's death to the sUrvlvmg Issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RlCHARD B. 
JOHNSON, share and share alike. In the event any of Grantor's nieces or nephews born the 
issue of RICHARD B. JOHNSON; should fail to survive the death of Grantor, and leaves issue 
then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and share alike in the share of the 
predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime ofHELEN 
TAYLOR and u20n her death then the remaining portion shall be distributed to her issue share 
and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death of HELEN 
TAYLOR, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and share 
alike in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime ofHAZEL 
FISHER and upon her death then the remaining portion shalJ be distributed to her issue share 
and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death ofHAZEL 
FISHER, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and sha.re alike 
in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shaIl be held in trust for the lifetime ofBETTY 
FARNWORTH and upon her death then the remaining portion shall be distributed to h(~r issue 
share and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death of BETTY 
FARNWORTH, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and 
share alike in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime of JOYCE 
SELLEY and upon her death then the remaining portion shall be distributed to her issue share 
and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death of JOYCE 
SELLEY, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and share alike 
in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Discretiona Pa ents to Helen Tavlor Ha:zeJ Fisher Bea Famwort and 10 'ce 
Selley: The Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of Helen Taylor, Hazel Fisher, ~etty 
Farnworth, and Joyce Selley such sums from the income of their 20% share of the corpus of the 
trust, as the Trustee deems reasonable for the maintenance, education, support and health of the 
said beneficiary during their lifetime. The balance of the income of their respective trust not so 
distributed shall be accumulated and added to the principal thereof at the ena of each fiscal year 
of the trust. 
A. Income for Grantor's life: The Trustee shall distribute all of the income of this 
Trust in convenient installments, but not less frequently than quarter-annually, to or for the 
benefit of Grantor, so long as he shall live. 
B. Use of Principal for Grantor's life: So long as Grantor is living, the Trustee, in 
the sale exercise of the Trustee's discretion, shall distribute to or for the benefit of Grantor, so 
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much of the principal of this Trust as Tru~'ee shall deem necessary or desirable for his proper
heath, education, maintenance and support 
C. Creation of Beneficiaries' Issues Trusts if Issue are under the age of 35 years of 
age: After the death of HELEN TAYLOR; HAZEL FISHER; BETTY FARNWORTH; 
. JOYCE SELLEY, and the surviving issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RICHARD B. 
JOHNSON, and/or in the event any such beneficiary fails to survive Grantor's death and leaves 
issue who have not attained the age of thirty-five (35) years, the Trustee shall immediately 
divide all of the remaining principal and undistributed income of this trust into as many equal 
shares as represent the surviving issue of said beneficiaries, one share to each, per stirpes, and 
the Trustee shall establish a separate trust (except as to the share of any issue then thirty-five 
(35) years of age or older) for each issue then living and one for the issue of each deceased
 
issue, to be held and distnbuted as follows:
 
1. Distribution When Separate Trusts for Issue Created. If any issue of HELEN 
TAnOR; HAZEL FISHER; BETTY FARNWORTH; JOYCE SELLEY, and the surviving 
issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RICHARD B. JOHNSON shall not have attained the 
age of twenty-five (25) years at the time of distribution of their respective share of the principal
of this trust IS to conveyed to said issue, the Trustee shall immediately thereafter distribute 
absolutely to such issue one third (1/3) of his or her panicular share; If any issue shall have 
attained the age of thirty (30) years at such time, the Trustee shall distribute absolutely to such 
issue one third (1/3) of his or her share; and if any issue shall have attained the age of thirty-five 




2. Distribution oflncome and Principal for issue. The Trustee shall distribute to or 
for the benefit of each issue all of the income derived from his or her particular share. In 
addition, the Trustee, at any time and from time to time, shall distribute to or for the benefit of 
each issue so much or all or none of the principal of his or her share as the Trustee, in the 
Trustee's absolute discretion, shall deem necessary or desirable for the p'roper health, education, 
maintenance and support of such issue. Funher, the Trustee shall distnbute absolutely to or for 
the benefit for any issue one-third (1/3) of the principal of his or her share when such Issue 
attains the age of twenty-five (25), one third (1/3) of the remaining principal when such issue 
attains the age of thirty (30) years, and the remaining principal and undistributed income of his 
or her share when such issue attains the age of thirty-five (35) years. 
3. Distribution to Issue of Beneficiaries. Exceet as herein provided, if a share of this 
trust is at any time set apart for surviving issue of Grantor s deceased Beneficiaries above 
named, such share shall De immediately aistributed absolutely to such issue, free and dear of 
any trust unless said issue is under the age of thirty-five 05) years of age. 
4. Distribution Upon Death of Issue. Should any issue of any of the abOVI~ 
referenced beneficiaries die before his or her share has been distributed absolutely to him or her, 
the then remaining principal and undistributed income of such share shall be distributed, upon 
the death of the issue, absolutely to his or her then living issue,per stirpes. In the event there 
are no such issue then living, the then remaining principal and undistributed income of the share 
of the deceased issue shall be divided among the other beneficiaries above referenced or their 
living issue, per stirpes; any portion thereof so divided and set apart for any issue who is the 
beneficiary of a share of this trust which has not yet been fully dIstributed shall be added to the 
principal of such share and held in further trusts and managed and distributed as a part thereof 
under the tenns of this Article; and any portion thereof set apart for any issue who is the 
beneficiary of a share of this trust which has been fully distributed shall be distributed absolutely 
to such issue. In the event an of the beneficiary's last surviving issue shall die before the entire 
share set apart for such issue has been distributed absolutely to him or her and none of other 
beneficiaries issue are then living, the then remaining principal and undistributed income of such 
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share shall be distributed as follows: 
100% thereof to: The lawful heirs of Grantor consistent with the laws of intestate Succession 
under the Laws of the State of Idaho. 
5. Retention for Minors. In the event any beneficiary of the trusts created 
hereunder has not attained majority at the time a share thereof is required under the terms 
hereof to be distributed absolutely to such beneficiary, the Trustee, In the Trustee's absolute 
discretion, may retain the share of such minor beneficiary in further trust until he or shf~ attains 
majority. In such event and during such time, the Trustee shall distribute to or for the benefit of 
such beneficiary so much of the income and principal of such beneficiary's particular share as 
the Trustee, in the Trustee's absolute discretlOn, shall deem necessary or desirable to provide 
for the proper healt.h, ~ducation, maintenance and suppc;>rt of such beneficiary; any incc~me from 
such share not so dlsttlbuted shall be added to the pnnclpal thereof at the end of each flSCal year 
of the trust. At the time such beneficiary attains majority, or upon is or her death, whichever 
occurs first, the trust shall terminate as to such beneficiary's particular share, and the then 
remaining principal and undistributed income thereof shaII be distributed absolutely, fn::e and 
clear of any trust, to such beneficiary, or, if such beneficiary is then deceased, to hiS or her 
estate. 
D. PERPETUITIES AND ALIENATION: 
a. The absolute power of alienation of real property in the State ofIdaho shall 
not be suspended by an provision of this trust agreement for'a period longer than the 
continuance of the lives of the persons in being at the creation of any such limitation or 
condition and twenty-five (25) years thereafter. This trust agreement shall be construed to 
eliminate or modify any provisions violating the fore~oing sentence, but in such a manIler so 
that the provisions of this trust agreement are carriea out to the greatest extent possible. 
b. As to real property which is not in the State ofIdaho, each trust's interest in 
such real property shall termmate twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last survivor of 
such of the beneficiaries thereunder as shall be liVlng at the time of the death of the last Grantor 
to die, and thereupon such real property which is not in the State ofIdaho shall be distributed, 
discharged of trust, to the persons then entitled to the income of such real property in the 
proponlOns to which they are entitled to the income. 
E. CHARACTER OF DISTRIBUTIONS: Unless otherwise specifically stated, all
 
distributions, whether of trust income or principal, shall be the separate property of each
 
individual distributee. All income, rents, Issues, profits, gains and appreciatlOn of property
 
distributed to each individual distributee as separate property, shall also be the separate
 
property of each such distributee.
 
F. SPENDTHRIFT PROTECTION: Neither the principal nor the income of any
 
trust herein created shall be liable for the debts of any beneficiary or issue of a beneficiary, nor
 
shall the same be subject to seizure by any creditor under the writ of proceedimrs at law or in
 
equity, nor bankruptcy proceedings, nor other legal process. No beneficiary otissue of a
 
beneficiary, shall have the power to sell, assign, transfer, encumber or in any other manner to
 
anticipate disposition of his or her interest in the trust estate or the income produced thereby.
 
As used in this paragraph, the word beneficiary shall refer to any individual having a be:neficial
 




G. TRANSACTIONS '\11TH GRANTOR'S ESTATE: Upon the death of Grantor 
or any beneficiary the Trustee may, ifit deems such action necessary or advisable for the 
protection of the estate of the deceased Grantor or beneficiary, or in the best interests of any 
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.such estate or this trust and its beneficiaries: (a) purchase securities and other property from 
the legal representative of such estate and retain such property as part of the trust estate, or (b) 
made secured or unsecured loans to the legal representative of any such estate. The Trustee 
shall bear no liability for any loss resulting to the trust estate by reason of any such purchase or 
loan. H INVESTMENT DlRECTION BY GRANTOR: The Grantor, during his lifetime, 
reserve the righf to direct the investment of the trust estate. The Trustee shall not be liable for 
any investments made at the direction of the Grantor or of the surviving Grantor in accordance 
with the foregoing provisions. 
VI.. SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE: Should THEODORE L. JOHNSON, be unable or unwilling 
for any reason to continue to act as Trustee, ANDREW and BETH ROGERS, husband and 
wife shall become co-successor Trustee of this trust and shall have all authority herein granted 
to the "Trustee." Should ANDREW and BETH ROGERS be unable or unwilling for any 
reason to act or continue to act as Co-Trustees, GARlli FISHER shall become Successor 
Trustee of this Trust and shall have all authority herein granted to the "Trustee". 
VII. POWERS OF TRUSTEE: To cany out the purposes of the trust created under this 
Trust Agreement, and subject to any limitatIOns stated elsewhere in this Trust, the Trustee is 
vested with the following powers with respect to the trust estate and any part of it, in addition 
to those powers now or hereafter conferred by law. 




2. To lease trust property for terms within or be'yond the term of the trust; 
3. To borrow money, and to encumber or hypothecate trust property by mortgage, 
deed of trust, pledge, or otherwlse, provided sufficient security to manage the trust property. 
4. To carry, at the expense of the trust, sufficient Insurance m such kinds and in
 
such amounts as the Trustee shall deem advisable to protect the trust estate and the Trustee
 
against any hazard; .
 
5. To commence or defend such litigation with respect to the trust of any property 
of the trust estate as the Trustee may deem advisable, at the expense of the trust; 
6. To compromise or otherwise adjust any claims or litigations against or in favor 
of the trust; . 
. 7. To invest and reinvest the trust estate in every kind of property, real, Rersonal or 
mixed, and every kind of investments, specifically including, but not by way of limitation, 
corporate obligations of every kind, stocks, common or preferred, shares of investment trusts, 
investment companies, and mutual funds, and mortgage participation, which men of prudence, 
discretion, and to manage the trust property. However, that so long as an income beneficiary is 
also acting as Trustee herein, he shall not invest in any wasting assets; provided further that 
during the lifetime of Grantor no real property or other investments shall be sold, traded or 
disposed of without the written consent of Grantor. 
8. With respect to securities held in the trust, to have all the rights, powers, and 
privileges of an owner, mcluding, but not by way of limitation, the power ofvotmg, give 
proxies, any pay assessments; to participate in voting trusts, pooling agreements, foreclosures, 
reorganizations, consolidations, mergers, liquidations, sales, and leases, and incident to such 
partIcipation to deposit securities with and transfer title to any protective or other committee on 
such terms as the Trustee may deem advisable; and to exercise or sell stock subscription or 
conversion rights. 
9. In any case in which the Trustee is required, pursuant to the provisions of the 
trust, t divide any trust property into parts or shares for the pUl]Jose of distnbution, or 
otherwise, the Trustee lS authorized, m the Trustee's absolute dIscretion, to make the division 
and distribution in kind, including undivided interests in any property, or partly kind and partly 
in money, and for this purpose 10 make such sales of the trust propert)' as the Trustee inay 
deem necessary on such tenns and conditions as the Trustee shall see fit. 
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.VIII . BENEFICIARY STATUS: 
A. Upon the death of any beneficiary for whom a trust is then held, any accrued or 
undistributed net income thereon shall be held and accounted for, or distributed, in the same 
manner as if it had been accrued or received after the death of such beneficiary. 
B. Any instrument executed by the Trustee shall be binding on all parties hereto and 
on all beneficiaries hereunder. No person paying money to the Trustee need see to the 
application of the money so paid. 
C. The interest of any beneficiary in principal or income of this Trust shall not be 
subject to claims of his or her creditors or others, or liable to attachment, execution or other 
process of law, and no beneficiary shall have any right to encumber, hypothecate or alit~nate his 
or her interest in this Trust in any manner, except as provided for elsewhere herein. The 
Trustee may, however, deposit in any bank deSIgnated in writing by a beneficiary to his or her 
credit, income or principal payable to such beneficiary. 
IX. TRUSTEE TO PAY CERTAIN EXPENSES: 
The Trustee shall pay from income or principal of the Trust Estate or partly from 
each, in his discretion, all expenses, incurred in the administration of the Trust and the 
protection of this Trust against legal attack, including counsel fees and a reasonable 
compensation for his own services as such Trustee, which compensation and expenses 
constitute a first lien on the Trust Estate. 
X. AMENDMENT AND REVOCAnON: The Grantor may at any time during his life 
amend any of the provisions of this trust agreement by an instrument signed by Grantor and 
delivered to the Trustee. During the life of the Grantor, the trust created by this agreement may 
be revoked in whole or in part, by an instrument signed by Grantor and delIvered to the 
Trustee. Upon revocation, the Trustee shall distribute all or the designated portion of the 
property to the Grantor. 
XI. TRUST TITLE: This Trust shall be known and referred to as the THEODORE L. 
JOHNSON TRUST and shall be administered under the laws of the State ofIdaho. 
XIl CONSTRUCTION OF AGREEMENT: The headings and subheadings used throughout 
this Agreement are for convenience only and have no significance in the interpretation oftne 
body of this Agreement, and the Grantor directs that they be disregarded in construing the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I, THEODORE L. JOHNSON, as Grantor of the foregoing 
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The undersigned hereby accepts the trusts imposed by the foregoing Trust Agreement and
 
agrees to serve as Trustee upon the terms and conditions therein set forth.
 
Signed, sealed and delivered
 
in the presence of:
 
, ~~L.J~tee 
of THEODORE ~. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST 
Witness: 
':~;?j? Q~a.--:../-.__ ./1 . t. 
Witness: 
STATE OF IDAHO	 )
 
)ss. ~
 County ofAda)	 . 
On this -!- day of Lo/~'.t~, ,1997, before me, the undersigned, a Notary
 
Public in and for said State, personiffy appeared THEODORE L. JOHNSON, a single person,
 
known or identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed in the instrument, and
 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
 
IN 'WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set y hand anzaffixe·my official seal the
 
day and year in this certificate first above written.
 
/' 11......"':{'-;.:..a;.;;:I:II,,	 G~ .~'; A /;1 J 
(SEAL) .:-'.... '\~ ..........Z~~"'.."' -~ A.~t'~ {/:~~ 
f ~'t'... ~OTA ~ \~ \ ot~d u 5 or a 9:*: '''rJ- ~ 0	 : eSI mg at e:;./I'~ .A--' ­
E : -.- : Z	 E My ComrnissJOn xplres:__-:.~.:..:...;:....": . ~ .* . '; tfl·. ,:lJBLI C :-.. ~ ... ..-:"'""1".. .·0 ..'#, "Ii' ••••••• ~ ..
 
""OF ID!'> " ..
 
'.. I"~ 
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SCHEDULE "A" PROPERTY 
I Theodore L. Johnson, a single person, Grantor, do hereby quitclaim, convey and 
transfer to the Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust dated the day of November, :I 997, all 
of his right title and interest in and to the following described reaf"Property, to-wit: 
Parcel I: 
Government Lot 5 and the Southeast 1/4 of the Northwest 1/4 of Section 6, 
Township 4 North, Range 1West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
Parcel II: 
The Northwest Y:2 of the Southwest 1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range :I 
West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
In addition the I provide the following conveyance to the Theodore 1. Johnson 
Revocable Trust dated the 4lh day ofNovember, ]997 the following personal property, to wit: 
~~~~ DOREr. J sON 
STATE OF IDAHO j
ss. 
County of Ada / / 
On t~s ~ day of U~ ,1997, before me, the undersigned, a 
Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared THEODORE 1. JOHNSON, known or 
identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal in said 
County the date and year first above written. '. / . 
1~ /~k~'~ 
t~ u IC A ~. ~"","'11'"", esidmg at: ~ ~ Idahol.."I' \\ENDEh II", 
,...",,"~ ~~-"","'..r.l- - . --w. 0 '..~ Commission Expires: ~r 
, -. • ':.4... 
...... •... y .. 
.. ~. • JJlY ..=F-.: o~ • .. ':: ........ ~ \""":
...... .' . . 
:~: 
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' u· ::. ~ : : 
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT 
This Agreement is made effective as of September _, 2005, between Crandall 
Law Office ("Buyer"), and the Theodore 1. Jolmson Revocable Trust, and John, Reed and 
Dallan Taylor, as co-trustees of the estate ("Sellers"). 
The parties agree as follows: 
1. PURCHASE AND SALE OF PROPERTY. 
1.1 Property. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the Sellers 
shall sell to Buyer and Buyer shall purchase the following real property and other assets (the 
"Property"): The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, 
Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho known as 3900 Linder Road. The size of the 
property is approximately plus or minus 40 acres. 
1.2 Purchase Price Amount. The purchase price for the Property is One Million 
Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,800,000.00) (the "Purchase Price"). 
1.3 Purchase Price Payment. The Purchase Price shall be paid as follows: Eamest 
Money Deposit. Upon the execution of this Agreement by the Buyer and the Sellers, the Buyer 
shall deposit in escrow at Title One Title Insurance Company, Eagle, Idaho ("Closing Agent"), 
earnest money in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) to be held for the benefit of 
the Buyer and the Sellers. Such deposit shall be returned by the Closing Agent to the Buyer if 
this Agreement does not close because of (i) the failure of a condition precedent" or (ii) any 
reason not the fault of the Buyer. If this Agreement does not close because of any reason not 
specified in the preceding sentence, all earnest money shall be paid by the Closing Agent to the 
Sellers as the agreed liquidated damages which shall be the sole and exclusive remedy of the 
Sellers. The balance of the purchase price shall be paid in immediately available funds delivered 
at Closing to Closing Agent. . 
1.4 Conveyance of Title. Title to the Real Property shall be conveyed by a General 
Warranty Deed. Title to the Property shall be marketable and insurable and shall be free and 
clear of all liens, encumbrances, and restrictions, exclusive of (i) real property taxes for the 
current year which are not due and payable on or before Closing, and (ii) liens, encumbrances, 
and conditions accepted in writing by the Buyer on or before Closing. 
1.5 Title Insurance. Upon the acceptance of this Agreement by the Sellers, the 
Buyer, for the account of the Sellers, shall order a Commitment for Title Insurance 
("Commitment") issued by Title One ("Title Company"), covering the Propel1y. If any 
exceptions shown on the Commitment are not approved in writing by the Buyer prior to Closing 
and cannot be removed by the Sellers by Closing, then the Buyer shall have the right to 
terminate this Agreement, in which event all earnest money deposited shall be refunded to the 
Buyer and each party shall be fully released and discharged from any further obligations under 
this Agreement. 
At Closing, the Sellers shall purchase and deliver to the Buyer an ALTA 
Owner's Policy title insurance policy ("Policy") satisfying the following specifications: The 















Policy shall name the Buyer as the insured in the amount of the Purchase Price. The Policy 
shall insure the Buyer as the owner of the Property, subject only to the following special 
exceptions: (i) real property taxes for the current~ar which are not. due and payable on or 
before Closing, and (ii) liens, encumbrances, and conditions accepted in writing by-'flieBuyeron­
or before Closing. The Policy shall include the following endorsements: (I) an endorsement 
deleting the general exceptions to the Policy, (ii) an endorsement insuring that each street 
adjacent to the Real Property is a public street and there is direct and unencumbered pedestrian 
and vehicular access to such street from the Property, and (iii) an endorsement insuring that 
there are no encroachments by or onto the Property with respect to property, easement, or 
setback lines. 
1.6 Possession. Sellers shall deliver actual possession of the Property to Buyer at 
Closing. 
1.7 Risk of Loss. Until Closing, the Sellers shall assume all risk of loss or damage 
with respect to the Property. In the event of any loss or damage to all or any part of the Property, 
the, Buyer shall have the right to (i) terminate this Agreement, in which event all earnest money 
deposited shall be refunded to the Buyer and each party shall be fully released and discharged 
from any further obligations under this Agreement, (ii) close the purchase of the Property and 
reduce the Purchase Price by an equitable amount equal to the loss or damage, such reduction to 
be applied first to the cash payment at Closing to be delivered at Closing, or (iii) close the 
purchase of the Property and elect to receive all insurance proceeds paid or payable by reason of 
the loss or damage. 
. 1.8 Prorated Items. The following items shall be prorated as of Closing: (i) taxes 
and water assessments using the last assessments available prior to Closing; (ii) rents; and 
(iii) utilities. 
1.9 Time for Acceptance. This Agreement shall be null and void and of no force or 
effect unless a fully executed original of this Agreement is delivered to and received by the 
Buyer on or before September _,2005. 
2. REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES, AND COVENANTS OF THE SELLER. 
The Sellers represent and warrant to, and covenants with, the Buyer as follows: 
2.1 Authorit)' of the Sellers. The execution, delivery, and consummation of this 
Agreement by the Sellers has been duly approved in accordance with applicable law and any 
documents or instruments governing the Sellers. The execution, delivery, and consummation of 
this Agreement by the Sellers will not cause the Sellers to be in violation or breach of any law, 
regulation, contract, agreement, or other restriction to or by which the Sellers or the Property is 
subject or bound. If the Sellers are a corporation, the Sellers, at Closing, shall provide to the 
Buyer (i) a certificate from the State of Idaho dated not more than 45 days prior to Closing 
indicating that the Sellers are in good standing and qualified to do business in Idaho, and 
(ii) resolutions of the board of directors of the Sellers authorizing and approving this Agreement 
and the transactions contemplated hereby. If the Sellers are a partnership, the Sellers, at Closing, 
shall provide to the Buyer resolutions of the partners of the Sellers authorizing and approving 
this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby. 








2.2 Property Ownership. The Sellers own and possess all right, title, and interest in 
and to the Property free and clear of all covenants, conditions, easements, liens, and 
encumbrances. 
2.3 Condition of Property. All of the Property, including, but not limited to, 
parking areas, landscape areas, sprinkler system(s), structural components, electrical, plumbing, 
heating and air conditioning systems, is in good operating condition and repair, subject only to 
routine maintenance. 
2.4 Material Misstatement or Omissions. No representation or warranty made by 
the Sellers in this Agreement or .in any document or agreement furnished in connecti.on with this 
Agreement contains or will contain any untrue statement ofmaterial fact, or omits or will omit to 
state a material fact necessary to make the statements not misleading. 
2.5 No Default. The Sellers are not in default under the terms of any contract, 
agreement, lease, license or other understanding, and no condition or event has occurred which, 
after notice, the passage of time, or otherwise, would constitute a default under or breach of any 
such terms. The Sellers are not aware of any condition that will result in a default under any 
such terms. 
2.6 Broker Fees. Except as disclosed in writing to the Buyer prior to Closing, the 
Sellers are not obligated to pay any fee or commission to any broker, finder, or intelmediary for 
or on account of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement. 
2.7 Information to be Provided. Within ten (l0) business days after the date this 
Agreement is accepted by the Sellers, the Sellers shall deliver to the Buyer the following: All 
contracts of any kind or nature which shall survive the Closing and which relate to the Property; 
A copy of all leases relating to the Property, together with any amendments to such leases; A 
copy of any and all licenses, certificates, permits, approvals, conditions or similar items, in the 
Sellers' possession relating to all or any portion of the Property. 
2.8 Conduct Pending Closing. From the effective date of this Agreement to 
Closing, the Sellers shall (i) maintain the Property in good repair and in a broom clean condition, 
(ii) continue to operate the Property in the manner previously operated by the Sellers, (iii) not 
enter into any contracts or purchase orders relating to the Property, and (iv) perform all acts 
necessary to insure that the representations, warranties, and covenants of the Sellers shall be true, 
complete, and accurate in all respects on and as of the date of closing to the same force and 
effect as if made at Closing. 
2.9 Access to Property. After the Sellers' acceptance of this Agreement, the Buyer 
and the Buyer's authorized representatives shall have reasonable access to the Property for 
inspection. 
3. HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES. The terms "hazardous substance," "rdease," and 
"removal" shall have the definition and meaning as set forth in Title 42 U.S. C. 9601 (or 
corresponding provision of any future law); provided, however that the term "hazardous 
substance" shall include "hazardous waste" as defined in Title 42 U.S.C. 6903 (or cOlTesponding 





provision of any future law) and "petroleum" as defined in Title 42 U.S.C. 6991 (or 
corresponding provision of any future law). The Sellers represent and warrant to, and covenants 
with, the Buyer that: the Property is not contaminated with any hazardous substance, the 
Sellers have not caused and will not cause the release of any hazardous substcIDces on the 
Property, there is no asbestos on the Property, and there is no underground storage tank on the 
Property. 
4. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CLOSING. The obligations of the Buyer under 
this Agreement are, at Buyer's option, subject to the satisfaction of the following conditions: 
4.1 The representations and warranties of the Sellers are true, complete, and accurate 
as of the date of this Agreement and as of the date of Closing as if made as of such date. 
4.2 The Sellers have performed all obligations, covenants and agreements to be 
performed prior to Closing as set forth in this Agreement. 
4.3 The Title Company is prepared to issue a policy in accordance with this 
agreement. The Sellers shall have executed and delivered to the Closing Agent the Warranty 
Deed and same is recorded. 
4.4 The Buyer has obtained financing (effective to the date of Closing) from a bank 
or other financial institution, for a loan of $1,500,000.00, bearing interest at a fixed rate of not 
more than six and one-half percent (6 1'2 %) per annum, with a maximum of one (1) point 
payable at funding. The loan shall be repayable in monthly installments of principal and interest 
amortized over a thirty (30) year term. 
4.5 The Buyer has obtained an appraisal of the Property indicating that the fair 
market value of the Property is not less than the Purchase Price. The Buyer has obtained, at the 
Buyer's sole cost, an inspection of the Property, including, without limitation, parking areas, 
landscape areas, sprinkler systems, structural components, electrical, plumbing, heating and air 
conditioning systems and roofs and has approved the condition of the Property, in Buyer's sole 
discretion. 
4.6 That the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust has been awarded through 
successful negotiation, settlement or litigation, clear and unencumbered title to the property set 
forth in paragraph 1.1 of this Agreement. 
4.7 The Sellers deliver to the Buyer an affidavit executed by the Sellers under penalty 
of perjury that provides the Sellers' United States taxpayer identification number, and states that 
the Sellers are not foreign persons. 
5. CLOSING. The Closing Agent for this Agreement shall be Title One Title Insurance 
Company. ("Closing Agent"). Buyer and the Sellers shall each pay one-half of the Closing 
Agent's Closing Fees at Closing. Closing shall be at the offices of the Closing Agent on 
Explorer Drive in Eagle, Idaho on November 3, 2005, or at such other time, date, and place as 
may be mutually agreed between Sellers and Buyer. Buyer and Sellers shall execute and deliver 
to the Closing Agent instructions on the form generally provided by the Closing Agent with such 
modifications as are reasonably made by the Buyer. 





6.1 All notices, claims, requests and other communications ("Notices") under this 
Agreement (i) shall be in writing, and (ii) shall be addressed or delivered to the rele:vant address 
set forth in Section 7 below or at such other address as shall be given in writing by a party to the 
other. Notices complying with the provisions of this Section shall be deemed to have been 
delivered (1) upon the date of delivery if delivered in person, or (ii) on the date of the postmark 
on the return receipt if deposited in the United States Mail, with postage prepaid for certified or 
registered mail, return receipt requested. 
6.2 The Parties agree that if a party is in default under this Agreement, then such 
party shall pay to the other party (a) reasonable attorney fees and other costs and expenses 
incurred by the other party after default and referral to an attorney, (b) reasonable attorney fees 
and other costs and expenses incurred by the other party in any settlement negotiations, and 
© reasonable attorney fees and other costs and expenses incurred by the other party in preparing 
for and prosecuting any suit or action. This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho. The parties agree that the courts of Idaho shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction and agree that Ada County is the proper venue. Time is of the 
essence with respect to the obligations to be performed under this Agreement. Except as 
expressly provided in this Agreement, and to the extent permitted by law, any remedies 
described in this Agreement are cumulative and not alternative to any other remedies available at 
law or in equity.· The failure or neglect of a party to enforce any remedy available by reason of 
the failure of the other party to observe or perform a term or condition set forth in this 
Agreement shall not constitute a waiver of such term or condition. A waiver by a party (1) shall 
not affect any term or condition other than the one specified in such waiver, and (ii) shall waive 
a specified term or condition only for the time and in a manner specifically stated in the waiver. 
6.3 This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties and 
their respective successors, assigns, heirs, and personal representatives. This Agreement, 
together with the Exhibits, constitutes the entire agreement among the parties and supersedes all 
prior correspondence, conversations and negotiations. The invalidity of any pOJ1ion of this 
Agreement, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall not affect the validity of 
any other portion of this Agreement. This Agreement may be executed in one or more 
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which together shall 
constitute one and the same instruments. All representations, warranties, and covenants of the 
Sellers set forth in this Agreement shall survive the Closing and shall survive the recording of 
the Warranty Deed. 
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PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attomeys for Plaintiffs 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
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Case No. CV OC 0400473D REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
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 Case No. CV OC 04-05656D and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 6 
























AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY RUDD
 
vs. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, 


















THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN, 
MAILE, husband and wife, and 














1AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY RUDD 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEYEXHIBIT "D" 







































































STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
Terry Rudd, being first duly swom upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a Certified General Appraiser, and have been licensed as an appraiser since 1965. 
2. I am attaching a tme and correct copy ofmy September 22,2004, appraisal of the Linder 
Road property which Berkshire Investments LLC purchased from the Theodore Johnson Revocable 
Trust. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this {;~ day of November, 2004. 




Residing at ---l.L~'-!.....L.Ln~.....!:....lo~~-=- ' 
My commission expires: -¥C--I-'-=..,.L.J.~~--
I
I 
AFFIDAVlT OF TERRY RUDD 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 




L Terry Rudd .. - --- ..... -----
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Q3 day of November, 2004. 



















































CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day ofNovember, 2004, I caused to be served a true
 
and correct copy of the above document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
 
following: 
~ U.S. Mail Thomas G. Maile
 
Attorney at Law D Hand Delivered
 
380 W. State D Overnight Mail
 
Eagle, ill 83616 D Telecopy (FAX)
 
~ U.S. Mail Jack S. Gjording
 
Gjording & Fouster D Hand Delivered
 
P.O. Box 2837 D Overnight Mail
 
Boise, ill 83702 D Telecopy (FAX)
 
Phillip J. Collaer ~.S.Mail
 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP D Hand Delivered
 
P.O. Box 7426 D Overnight Mail
 
Boise, ill 83707-7426 D Telecopy (FAX)
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AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY RUDD 
LAW OFFJCES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 8:3501 001078












































I FEE SIMPLE INTEREST 
COMPLETE APPRAISAL-RESTRICTED-USE REPO:R~T 
I 
Theodore Johnson Trust Property 
I LOCATED AT 













I Taylor vs. Maile 

















TERRYR. RUDD, MAl 
RUDD APPRAISALS 
2901 PERRY LANE 
CLARKSTON, WA 99403 
(5°~)tJ~h3 rl" 














I	 TERRY ROOD, MAl 
I 
Connie W. Taylor, Attorney 
I Drawer 285 
Lewiston, 10 83501 
I 
I RE: Taylor vs. Maile 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust Property 
Linder Rd. 
Eagle, 10 
I	 In accordance with your request, I performed a Limited Appraisal of the 
above referenced property as retained The intended u~e of this report is, 
for internal analysis purposes to determine the value ,'of the property in 
I 
I question. Therefore, I am able to report the conclusions to you in a 
Restricted-Use format, as you are the only intended user of this report. A 
self-contained report will be prepared before trial. 
This report intends to inform you of my findings in a brief manner. I
I researched the local market for comparable sales- not only in physical 
comparison but similar appraisal date as the Knipe et. al. report and 
subsequent acquisition by Thomas Maile. I provided the results to you I verbally (as permitted) on 9/15/04 along with a critique of the Knipe report. 
You are already aware of the subject property's characteristics and realize I that it is located just inside the minimum 5 acre (subdivided lot) zone. 
Properties to the west are limited by a 10 acre lot minimum. Everyone I 
I talked with knows that there is a strong market for properties like this 
today- as well as in 2002; including realtors Dennis McCracken and Craig 
Van England of Sel Equity, Jack Kramer of Group One/Eagle, Ned Hansen 
1stI	 of Century 21 place, Mike Sety of ReMax Boise, ~iCk Sweeney of the 
Preferred Company and Betty Holton of Keller Willi ms Realty. The list 
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I Essentially the sales fall into two categories. The first one is home site 
acreages; 5 acre sites with proposed well and septic, but available 
irrigation, power, phone and road access including smaller sites down to 2 
acres plus typical urban lots in subdivisions with central water and sewage. 
I 
The second category of properties being actively bought and sold are 
larger acreages like the subject. The purpose of most such investors is toI subdivide into smaller home site parcels which are bringing very high 
prices. 
I 
Supporting this market are historically low interest rates and liberal
I- mortgages for new home construction- plus the ever expanding housing 
demand in the Boise basin. The subject direction of Boise's expansion is 
fueled by good existing roads, easily developable soil, permissive zoning, 
I available irrigation water, and pastoral/mountain views. 
I	 I valued the subject by two market approaches: larger acreage 
comparables and smaller home site sales. After investigating the sales and 
arriving at prices per acre, I reflected the breakdown prices to the subject 
I 
I in a comparable sales grid. That grid includes the most similar sales and 
adjusts for differences. to the sUbject in time, location, size and utility 
(development capability). 
I	 Time adjustments were small since the sales were matched to the appraisal date. A rate of 3% per year was obtained from Realtors and the 
Knipe report. Locale adjustments were based on demonstrated market
I desirability, general access and potential development changes. Size 
factors were based on a corrective grap~lic analysis of sales diffe!ring in 
size. This differs from the erroneous presentation in the Knipe report. Utility 
I 
I adjustments included differences in 
improvements, water, septic, sewer, 





zoning development potential, 









I	 Acreage Approach 
A quick summary of the best sales developed includes: 
I 
Sale1) 10.50	 acres sold 9/05/02 from Belau to Mahaffey for $283,500 I	 about 5 miles east of the subject just above Beacon Light on Ballantyne. It 
was on the market in July '02 which fits for time. It indicates $26,952 per 
acre which I had to decrease for size (refer to graph study in addenda).I	 Adjusted price reflects to the subject.................. $21,562 per acre
 
I Sale 2) 77.9 acres sold 2/24/03 from Harney to SAF, LLC. For $1150,000 
about 1 mile south of the subject at the northeast corner of Linder and
I Floating Feather. It was on the market for over 10 months which easily 
places it in the subject time frame. It indicated ·$20,~36 per acre and. 
adjusting up for size but down for being closer to s~\Ner. The adjusted I reflection to the subject is ,. :$20,126 per acre 
I 
I Sale 3) 15.50 acres sold 5/13/03 from Gray Trust to J & G Development 
less than 4 miles southwest of the subject just outside of Star for $387,500, 
indicating $25,000 per acre. It was on the market over 2 years which 
places it in the subject time frame. It's been re-zoned for more int,ensive 
development and has a better sewer chance, requiring a downward
I adjustment in utility. 
The adjusted price to the subject is... ... ... ... ... ... ... ..... $19,000 per acre 
I 
Subject Value	 by Acreage Sales: 
I	 Using three sales (and supported by several others) reflects a value of the 





The second avenue I applied was that of home site acreages, applying 
discounts for subdivision development per the size study: 
.J	 Sale 6) 5.00 acres was sold 6/24/02 for $147,900 about 2 miles southwest 

























I	 only adjustment needed was for size which brought the subject reflection 
down to $ 19,522 pe'r acre 
I 
Sale 7) 5.01 acres was sold 6/24/02 about 2 miles northeast of the subject 
I for $207,000 indicating $41,317 per acre. After deducting for barn and well, 
a significant size adjustment brings the subject value re"nection 
down to $19,419 per acre I 
Sale 8) 5.00 acres was sold 2/21/03 but was on the market for 140 days I placing it near the subject time frame. It sold for $210,000 indicating 
$42,000 per acre. It's located on Beacon Light near Eagle requiring a down 
I- adjustment in location as well as size and minor time correction. The 
reflected subject value is ,. $23,100 per acre 
I Subject Value	 by Home Site Sales: 
Using the three sales presented (supported by more than 30 others)I reflects $20,700 per acre x 40.00 acres = $828,000. 
I	 Final Subject Value 
I	 The correlated and concluded estimate weighting both approaches is­
I	 1820,000 
The appraisal conforms to the minimum standards of USPAP (Uniform 
I 
I Standards of the Professional Appraisal Practice). As permitted by the 
Appraisal Institute, I invoked the Departure Provision as provided within 
Standard Rule 2-2 (b) addressing reporting requirements. The summary 
discussions of data, reasoning and analyses were intended to be concise, 
no more than the requirements stated, for your intended use as loan
I collateral. All file information has been retained and available further 
review upon request. 
I 
I further certify that I have enlisted no assistance nor taken instruction as to 
























I	 subject and includes real property, land, improvements, and affixed 
appurtenances.
I 
No unrealistic assumptions are presented as basis for value presentation. 
I The value estimate was based on the current market and existing condition 
of the improvements. No inventory, business goodwill or blue sl<y was 
included in the value estimate. However, all appurtenant equipment 
I 
I necessary to the current operation of the property was included. It was 
also assumed that favorable loan financing may be in place and available 
to any new ownership. 
The information gathered was deemed pertinent and correct except as 
noted. Sufficient data from the marketplace was gathered to substantiate . I	 the market analysis. Data sources were referenced and the Assumptions 
and Limiting Conditions adjusted as necessary in the I following pages. I· 
included a certification and Curriculum Vitae. I also treated this appraisal I	 confidentially and have not disclosed this assignment to: any other parties. 
I Regarding the Competency Provision now required by USPAP, I have 
included an in-depth review of my qualifications in the Curriculum Vitae. I
 
began appraising in 1956 for the Department of Agriculture in Entlerprise

I Oregon. In 1963 I founded a private company which eventually appraised
 
all types of properties throughout the United States. In 1987 I sold that
 
company and continued to appraise independently with two assistants. I
 I	 am licensed to appraise property in the States of Idaho, Washington, and 
Oregon, and have appraised a number of properties similar to the subject. 
I I further certify, as indicated in the Assumptions and Limiting Conditions at 
the conclusion of the appraisal, that trlis assignment was not based on a
I requested minimum valuation, specific valuation, or approval of pE~nding 
action. No pressure was received from any party to the actions pending the 
subject property. I also certify that the analyses aQd presentations areI	 reasonable in light of the information as set forth in! this appraisal. Mark 
Rudd assisted in the preparation of this report. 
I This appraisal presents and supports current market values, though such 
transaction would necessarily occur in the future. The required exposure 
I	 period could allow for a change in the market by way of economic shift. 
The direction of this change cannot be positively identified, but I anticipate 



























I ! .' l. 
I This Restricted Appraisal Report sets forth only my conclusion of value. It 
I 
is emphasized that this appraisal cannot be understood properly without 
supporting documentation retained in my file. No extraordinary 
assumptions or hypothetical conditions were implemented. I'm qualified to 
I 


















































I I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief: The statements of fact contained in this report are true and correct. 
I The report analyses, opinions and conclusions are limited only by the reported assumptions and limiting conditions, and are my personal, impartial professional analyses, opinions arld conclusions. 
I I have no (or the specified, if indicated), present or prospective interest in the property that is the subject of this report, and I have no (or the specified, as indicated) personal interest or bias with 
respect to the parties involved. 




My compensation for completing this assignment is not contingent upon the development or 
reporting of a predetermined value or direction in value that favors the cause of the client, the amount 
of the value opinion, the attainment of stipulated result, or the occurrence of a subsequent event 
directly related to the intended use of this appraisal. 
I My analyses, opinions and conclusions were developed, and this report has been prepared, In 
conformity with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. 
I I have (or not, as indicated), made a personal inspection of the property that is the subject of this 
I 
report. The body of this report contains specific information as to which individuals, if not myself, 
made contributions to this appraisal which I relied upon and am fully responsible. 
, 
I 
No one provided significant real property appraisal assistance to the person signing this certification, 
except as otherwise specified or by signature. 
I 
I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions 
were developed, and this report has been prepared in conformity with the requirements of the Code of 
Professional Ethics and the Standards of Professional Practice of the Appraisal Institute. 
I I certify that the use of this report is subject to the requirements of the Appraisal Institute and to review by its duly authorized representatives. 




















I	 A~UMPTIONS AND LIMITING CO~ITIONS 
I 
This appraisal is subject to the following assumptions and limiting conditions: 
I	 1. The value herein coincides with the definition of market value presented as defined. 
No other value level is intended, unless presented and defined as located. 
I 
I 2. The subject property was appraised subject to existing easements, restnctIOns, 
encumbrances, leases, reservations, covenants, contracts, declarations, special assessments, 
ordinances and other specifications known to the appraiser as stated in the appraisal 
assignment. 
I	 3. The subject property is assumed to exist under the management of the c:ompetency and 
percentage basis stated. 
I	 4. Dimensions, legal descriptions, public record information and on-site;: investigations 
were assumed to present the information as would be found by a prudent marklet partiCipant. 
,
I 5. The data and conclusions within this appraisal are part of an entirety. No part of this 
appraisal is intended to stand out of context. Disclosure of information contained herein is 
I governed by the By-Laws and Regulations of the Appraisal Institute. 
6. I have no knowledge concerning the presence of any hazardous materials found on the I	 subject site as of the date of appraisal, except as stated otherwise. However, I have not 
conducted any environmental or engineering inspections to determine whether hazardous 
conditions or materials exist that were not readily observable from surface conditions or that I would be easily and expectedly discovered by a prudent market investor. .Any hazardous 
waste discovered, beyond that presented, could render this appraisal ineffective. Correction 
I thereof or for any errors found is reserved as a future right by this appraiser. 
7. The maps included in this appraisal have been relied upon in valuing the property. 
I	 The engineering survey and conditions presented were relied upon for the conclusions 
reached. No remeasurement, verification or lot boundaries or survey of the ac:cess roads and 
YI :lilil ::s ::;r:~::~::::nes that there are no hid~en ciditions as to ilie subsurface 
I conditions of the property that would render it less valua:e than presente:d. Again, no engineering study was performed which might otherwise discover such factors. This also 
applies to any possible infestations from insects such as termites, dry rot, water or earth
I	 movement damage not readily apparent upon surface inspection. The property was assumed 
to be free of such problems, unless otherwise stated. 
I 
I 9. This appraiser assumes no responsibility for legal matters affecting the property other 
than referenced herein. Nor does this appraiser render any opinion as to the condition of title 
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1 , ,. investor, free of defe~ clear of all liens and encumbran~, easements, restrictions and 
impediments except for those specifically presented in the report. 
1 
1 
10. The property is assumed to be held in responsible ownership, competent management 
and available for whatever highest and best use has been projected. With regards to the 
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) effective January 26, 1992, I have not made a 
1 
specific compliance survey in analysis of this property with regards to conformance and 
impact on the value level defined. A detailed compliance survey may indicate non­
compliance and such could have a negative impact on the subject value in its current 
condition. The highest and best use presentation, assumes compliance. Testimony or 
1 attendance at any legal hearing or court action is not required by reason of rendering this appraisal unless arrangements have been made in advance. 
1 11. The bifurcation of the valuation between land and improvements may present different 
figures than that of conjoined use. Separate valuations may have been presented in the 
approaches, but such was intended to produce a combined value, unless indicated otherwise. I··· 
12. Information, estimates and opinions furnished the appraiser in the normal investigation 
1 for this report were obtained from sources considered reliable. Any future inaccuracies are not deemed to present an impact on value until re-assessed by this appraiser. 
1 13. The final value concluded is based on the parameters stated herein and limited to the 
1 
character of the subject property as stated. Any changes in the property's character or the 
market within which it exists, including but not limited to physical, functional, economic, 
political and/or financial factors, may affect the value conclusion, whether it occurs within a 
different time frame or not. 
1 14. The value estimate presented within this report is based on the stated definition and 
market value level compatible with such function as stated. The location of this level, shown 
I below, identifies itself within the overall subject value range. No liability is assumed for any 
misapplication of this value as representing any other level: 
I 
o x INFINITY 
I Lower Range Mid Range Upper Range 
I 
15. This appraisal addresses the subject value as of the specified date stated. Value ranges 
change over time, as well as applications of the levels therein. Thus, the value level defined 
and the matching value presented may not reflect other reader's intentions or expectations. 
Also, future change by way of the cyclical nature of the markets may change the location of
I the range and thus the commensurate value estimate as well. 
I 16. Regarding proposed improvements, this appraisal is based on the specifications and cost projections obtained from the responsible parties referenced. While such information is 
presumed to be accurate, no means exists to the appraiser to assure such competency or 






I	 resultant difference. 1'rre valuation does assume local co~iance with applicable codes, 
occupancy and permitted usage. 
I 17. As a preliminary title report may not have been furnished, it's assume:d that the legal 
within, provided by the client or from the courthouse records, matches the lender's intended 
I collateral. No analysis of any conditions or exceptions otherwise was attempted. No 
leasehold interest either positive or negative was considered if the property is not leased. No 
detriment of any easements not observable from surface indications was included. The 
I 
I dimensions, legal description, public record information and on-site investigations were 
assumed to present an adequate information base for the appraisal and as would be found by a 
prudent market participant. 
18. The maps included in the appraisal are for assistance in comprehending the report 
I	 only. No engineering survey of the building or the land was attempted and thus no 
assumption or responsibility for discrepancies exists. The structures were measured on the 
exterior to the nearest foot (rounded). Interior measurements were made only where room I	 size entered into the appraisal or unfinished areas were found. 
19. This appraisal addresses the subject value as of the specified date only. PropertyI values range in cyclical fashion over time, as well as at the present. Values also vary per 
management and utilization. Thus, the value level reflected may not indicate: a future user's 
I intentions or expectations. Furthermore, additional cyclical change of the market may affect 
the subject value and thus render the current opinion invalid. 
I	 20. This appraisal, unless otherwise indicated and so adjusted, is based on quiet title and 
legal access to the property as physically described. All of the improvements purported to 
exist, including the utilities, water and sewage waste systems have not been separately I surveyed. In the absence of an engineering report otherwise, power, phone, TV systems, 
public or private water systems, sewer, septic systems and/or drain field are assumed 
I acceptable to all government authorities as well as the market and subjl~ct application. Additionally, except as indicated herein, all off-site improvements including the access road, 
are assumed to be fee simple or permanent easement open to year around ingress and egress. 
I Topography, drainage, landscaping and any flood potential are acceptable to both federal 
agencies, local government, immediate market and full and uninhibited use of the subject 
I	 ::opert:'llun~:::~:di:t::a:~::~~::te:rfO:;::~i::Hve~, Jng environmentill
willi any 
considerations, zoning variances or additional considerations ~th regard to local government I requirements are assumed to be in agreement with all local state and f(~deral agencies 
involved and find acceptance in the local market as well as being fully aCI:eptable to and 
I utilized by the subject property. Professional inspections of the property in any category 
where additional concerns may exist are recommended, even if no defects have been made 
known to the appraiser. This report is not warrantying the condition or status of any physical I	 or market feature of the subject property. This report is presented exclusively for the sole 
















I 22. It was not inteiMed that this appraisal should serve~ proof of condition or future 
expectancy for any of the parties which may be served. This appraisal was prepared for the 
I	 exclusive use of the client indicated and may reflect lending guidelines specific only to that 
client. Possession of this report, or a copy thereof, does not carry with it the right of 
publication. Any purchaser that may be involved should be aware that as of 1994, the States 
I 
I of Idaho and Washington require a "Property Disclosure Form" to be supplied by the grantor. 
That form and the answers thereto should be confirmed and verified. I did not receive a copy 
and therefore can offer no input, other than that which was relayed to me by the parties 
referenced. 
I 23. It is assumed that there is full compliance with all applicable federal, state, and local 
environmental regulations and laws. The presence of asbestos, ureaformaldehyde foam 
insulation, and other potentially hazardous materials or the existence of underground storage I tanks may affect the value of the property. I am not qualified to detect such. The value 
estimate is predicated on the assumption that there are no such materials on or in the property 
I- that would cause a loss in value. 
24. This appraisal has been developed under the assumption that there has been no discharge, 
I dumping, spillage, uncontrolled loss, seepage, migration, or storage of hazardous substances 
that would adversely affect the value of the subject property. No responsibility is assumed 
for any such conditions or for any expertise or engineering knowledge required to discover I them. The client is urged to retain experts in such fields as necessary. 
25. Mark Rudd, along with others whether identified herein or not, providl~d assistance inI	 this appraisal/report. Comparable properties, which' interiors were not observed, were 
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I '-' CURRICULUM VITAE 
I	 TERRYR. RUDD, MAl 
2901 Perry Lane 
I (Jarkston, VVll,99403 
I 
Phone: Direct (509) 758-0629 Office: (509) 758-3515, 
Fax: (509) 751-8820 E-Mail: trrndd@imbris.com 
I 
EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE: 40 Years Independent Fee Apprais(~r. 
5 Years Forest S~rvice Appraiser/Land Manager 











I	 Appraisal Institute: 
Basic I-A and I-B courseslFebruary 1965 
Income Analysis/June 1971I	 Grazing Lands & Cattle Ranches/June 1972 
Mortgage Financing/March 1980
I'	 Litigation ValuationIMarch 1986 
Capitalization Theory & Techniques, PartAJJanuary 1989 
Standards ofProfessional PracticelFebruary 1989I	 Standards ofProfessional Appraisal Practice, Part BlMarch 1993 
Standards ofProfessional Practice, Part A & Part B/May 1997 
Appraising Manufactured Housing/June 199'8I The Appraisal ofLocal Retail Pr~pertieslNovember 1998 
30 Specialized Appraisal IssuesIMay 1998 
I 
I Uniform Standards Per Appraisal Foundation/June 2001
 
On-Line FHA & The Appraisal Process/June200l
 




I The Technical Inspection ofReal EstatelDecember 1998
 Understanding Limited AppraisalsfNovember 1994
 
,Uniform Residential Appraisals/January 1994
 
I 
I Regression AnalysislFebruary 1998
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I	 Money & The Mo~tary System/1992 
Applied Sales Comparison Approach/1993 
I 
I FIRREA Overview and Application/1993 
Real Estate School ofWashingtonl1980 
Real Estate Law/1992 
Real Estate Education Council:
 
I Real Estate AppraisallNovember 1982
 Ratio Study StatisticslDecember 1985
 
Real Estate School of Washington






Idaho: Certified General Appraisal CGA-65 .
 
Washington: Certified General Real ~tate Appraiser 1100585












Fee Simple, Leased Fee, Leasehold Interest, Easements, Right-of-Ways and Appurtenances

I Property Type:




I	 Property Categories: 
LandlUnimproved: Undeveloped, developed: commercial, industrial, residential, timber 
land, geophysical, mining and mineral rights iI	 I 
LaridlImproved: Ranches, orchards, farms, vineyards, hunting remberships, water frontage,
I shorelands, lake and riverbeds. 
Improved: Office structures, retail stores, shopping centers, medical space, hospitals, 
I 
I recreation facilities, service stations, C-stores, truck· stops, auto and vehicle dealerships, 
governmental structures, military properties, restaurants, lounges, taverns, fast food facilities 
and greenhouses 
Industrial Plants, industrial parks, ports, airports, parking garages, subdivisions, golf courses, 

































~I ,­Single family resIQential prope~ies, multi-family apartments, condominiums, duplexes, four 
plexes, retirement centers, convalescent hospitals, shelter care, elder care, nursing homes,
I and fraternal buildings 
Right-of-Ways: Highways, power lines, reservoirs, utility lines, gas lines and water andI sewer plants 
I Revitalization projects, acquisition projects, sales distribution programs, graz41g rights, 
farming leases, air rights and mineral rights 
I 
I PRIMARY AREAS SERVED: 
Eastern Washington 
North and Central Idaho 
Western Montana 
Eastern Oregon





I Value ranges 
Consultation 
PartitionsI Condemnations 










Bank: of "Whitman 
First Savings Bank ofWashington 
First Security BankI Seaport Citizens Bank 
Twin River National Bank 
I U.S. Bank 
Washington Mutual 
Metropolitan MortgageI Westside Federal Savings & Loan 
Fidelity Mutual Savings Bank 








Central Washington Barlk 
Aetna Finance 
Avco Financial Services 
Blazer Financial Services 
Dial Finance . 
Transamerica Mortgage 
Oregon Mutual Savings Bank 
Peoples Mortgage Company 
PMI 
Lincoln National Life 
Bankers Life 
Travelers Insurance 























I Mountain View M~gage 
U.S. Property & Appraisal Services 
I Ditech 
Aetna Life & Casualty 
Pacific National:Bank of WashingtonI Intermountain Mortgage 
Bank ofAmerica 
I .Southern Pacific General American Credit 
Bank ofthe West 
Chesapeake Appraisal I Countrywide 
Express Financial Services 
I Security Bank 
US Bank/Oregon 
Security Funding I Conseco Financial 
National City Mortgage 
WA Federal Credit Union I GFS, Inc. . 
GMAC Mortgage
I Transunion Settlement 
Evergreen Community Development Assoc. 
Corporate Valuation Services I	 Nova Star Home Mortgages 
PlatinUlD: Mortgage 
Northwest Farm Credit Services I ·LoneRanger.Com 
I iNSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS: 
Chicago,. Milwaukee, St. Paul and 
P~cific Railroad Company I Burlington Northern 
Weyerhauser Timber Company 
I Potlatch Corporation Wickes Forest Industries 
Texaco, Inc. 
I 
I Atlantic Richfield Company 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
Shell Oil Company 
Mobile Oil 
Continental Oil Company






Citicorp Real Estate 
Appraisal & Title Management 
Associates Financial Services 
DataComp 
Far West Mortgage 
Columbia Trust Bank 














. GESA Ctedit Union 
D.M.I. :' 
Gateway Financial Services 
Settle Appraisal Services 
Idaho Claims Service 
Potlatch #1 Federal Credit Union 








Packaging Corporation ofAmerica 
Washington Water Power 
Oroark, Inc. 
True v*e Hardware Stores 
Boise C cade . 
Eucon orporation 
Norwest Aluminum Projects, Inc. 
Team Research and Engineering 
Kwik Lok Corporation 
Sherwin Williams Company 
Payless Stores Northwest 
University ofIdaho 





















































Battelle Northwest Elks Lodge
 
The Pillsbmy Company Moose Lodge
 
Tree Top, Inc. Paffile Trucking
 






Thousands of private property owners: homeowners, landlords, attorneys, business owners,
 
developers, investors, buyers, sellers, Realtors, ranchers, farmers, timber\land owners, trusts,
 




Local Communities Spokane County Parks
 
Bonneville Power Administration US Corps ofEngineers
 



















----R(')b-Brewster-~--------- - 509-995-7572 
Terry Savage 509-324-3555 
Ted Potter 509-735-1596 or 531-2121 








Dustin Ramsey . 509-972-1028
 










































Bllreau 01 OCctJpational licenses
 
Department of Self Governing Agencies
 
The person named has met the requirements for licensure and is entitled ( 
under the la~Js and rules of the State of Idaho to operate as a(n) 
CERTIFIED GENERAL APPRAISER 
TE~RYRUpD 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, N 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
MA~~ 17 2009 






IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RELATING TO THE 
DEFENDANTS' COUNTER­
CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The plaintiffs' have filed their Motion for Summary Judgment against all ofthe 
defendants' counterclaims. The defendants 'counterclaims asserts claims of slander and title, 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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intentional interference with a prospective business advantage, and abuse of process counts. The 
following Memorandum Brief incorporates by reference the affidavits of Thomas Maill~ as 
additional facts supporting the current motion for summary judgment, the Statement of Facts, 
together with the briefing ofthe plaintiffs in filed opposition to dispositive motions. 
STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS 
The Plaintiffs have previously filed a Statement of Uncontested Facts on October 8, 2008 
and the same is incorporated herein as if set forth in full herein. The defendant attorneys, the 
individual Taylors and the trust entered into a contingent fee agreement on April 15, 2005 
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 4 Exhibit "W"). 
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In ruling on a summary judgment motion pursuant to LR.C.P. 56©, all facts are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, IBM Corp. 
v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 677 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1984). The non-moving party is also given 
the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence in the record. Thomas v. 
Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984). 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. The Plaintiffs Have Properly Set Forth Allegations in Various Counts Which Cannot Be 
Considered Actionable by the Counter-claimants. 
The apparent basis of the counter-claims alleges that the filing of the Lis Pendens in the 
current case is actionable. The publication of the notice oflis pendens is not defamatory. It 
merely informs the public that the property is involved in litigation. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGM:ENT 
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 552, 165 P.3d 261, 266 (2007). The filing of a lis pendens cannot give 
rise to any actionable claim against the plaintiffs. 
In order for slander in title to occur there must be a proper showing of malice on the part 
of the plaintiffs in filing their complaint and lis pendens requesting restoration of the title to the 
real property to Berkshire Investments, LLC. In order for the counterclaim to even approach 
providing any viable claims there must be a determination as to the underlining complaint in the 
present action. 
The complaint sets forth a count of fraud requesting restoration of the title as the result of 
the fraud by the Taylors and their counsel in providing verified pleadings before the dis.trict court 
wherein they judicially admitted that the Taylors' mother was the sole beneficiary of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust as a result of the Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement. 
The plaintiffs have requested a constructive trust be imposed on the real property for the 
determination of the fraud committed by the defendants in obtaining the title. 
In addition to the count of fraud, the plaintiffs have alleged violations of the Idaho 
Racketeering Statute. This count sets forth allegations of violations of State Law relative to 
petjury, suborning petjury, and obtaining money by false pretenses by the defendants. The Idaho 
Racketeering Statue sets forth remedies that specifically provide that property may be n~stored to 
anyone that has been subjected to violations of Title 18, Chapter 78 ofthe Idaho Code. 
There cannot be any slander of title, interference with prospective business advantage, 
nor an abuse of process when the verified pleadings and the records clearly demonstrat(l that the 
defendants perpetrated misrepresentations by sworn testimony before the various court 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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proceedings. The Taylors and their attorney knew full well the facts as set forth in the verified 
petition before the probate court and the sworn testimony provided before the Probate Court. As 
a result ofthe "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement" dated July 15, 2004, the 
Taylors were no longer beneficiaries. They have judicially admitted such a point and R. John 
Taylor so testified before the probate court. 
The verified amended complaint among other counts sets forth allegations of"fraud upon 
the court", violations ofIdaho Racketeering Statute (encompassing allegations of specific 
criminal activity by all the defendants acting in unison). The amended complaint involves 
allegations that defendants, Connie Wright Taylor, f/k/a Connie Taylor, and Paul T. Clark, and 
Clark and Feeney, a partnership participated, directly or indirectly, and engaged in multiple 
instances of "theft", "false pretense", "peljury" and "suborning peljury", in violation ofIdaho 
Law. Specifically, the allegations ofthe complaint assert the defendants engaged in multiple 
instances of "false pretense", "theft" and "peljury" in violation ofIdaho Code Sections 18-2403 
and 19-2116. 
Both ofthese counts either by case law or by Statute allow the right to file a lis pendens advising 
the public of the claims relating to the real property. 
The elements ofthe tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage 
have been set forth in Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 
1004 (1999). The elements of slander oftitle have been set forth in McPheters v. Maile, 138 
Idaho 391,395,64 P.3d 317,321 (2003). The elements of abuse ofprocess have been set forth 
in Cunningham v. Jensen (2005 Idaho 31332). The counter-claims relating to each and every 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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allegation must fail as a matter oflaw. An allegation that a party acquired title to real property 
pursuant to a fraud, is justification for relief such as a constructive trust. A constructive trust 
arises where legal title to property has been obtained through actual fraud, misrepresentations, 
concealments, taking advantage ofone's necessities, or under circumstances otherwise rendering 
it unconscionable for the holder oflegal title to retain beneficial interest in property. A 
constructive trust can be imposed where property was obtained either fraudulently or through 
violation of a fiduciary duty. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 469, 886 P.2d 772, 774 
(1994), Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 722 P.2d 474 (1986). The filing of the lis pendens is 
proper in this case to advise the public that the acquisition of the title is being challenged. The 
filing of the lis pendens is proper under the facts involved in this litigation and cannot be 
construed to give rise to any tort claim as asserted in the counter-claim. The following briefing 
focuses only on two claims for reliefpled by the plaintiffs, however, the vast majority of the 
counts ofthe complaint, would also allow a lis pendens to be filed when title was obtained 
through an unconscionable manner. 
a. The Claims ofFraud Give Rise to a Legitimate Claim Against the Defendants. 
Berkshire Investments has requested relief to set aside the "Judgment on Benefi~ciaries' 
Claims", as the same was procured by fraud. The term "fraud upon the court" contemplates 
more than interparty misconduct, and, in Idaho, has been held to require more than perjury or 
misrepresentation by a party or witness. Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 334, 612 P.2d 
1175, 1181 (1980). It "will be found only in the presence of such 'tampering with the 
administration ofjustice' as to suggest 'a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGl\lENT 
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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safeguard the public.'" Id. (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 
246 (1944». The party asserting a claim of fraud on the court must establish that an 
unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly influence the court's decision and that 
such acts prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting its case or defense. Rae V. 
Bunce, (S.c. 2008 Docket No. 33996). 
The Honorable Judge '¥ilper had entered the court's Memorandum Decision and Order 
on July 28, 2005 allowing the "'trust" to amend its complaint after the successor trustees received 
the required appointment by the probate court. The district court in that Decision ruled that the 
trust had waived rights to rescind the contract, stating "once a party treats a contract as valid after 
the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of recision, the right of recision is waived." The 
District Court further found that the Plaintiffs (Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and the 
Taylors), now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to pursue rescission once the 
grounds for it arose. The district court prior to the Supreme Court decision would not aIlow the 
trust or the Taylors to rescind the real estate transaction (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Pad Two 
Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28, 2005 Exhibit "K"). 
The Affidavit of Thomas Maile filed in Support ofthe Motion for Summary Judgment, 
provides testimony concerning how the current plaintiffs were denied their defense in the 
consolidated cases before Judg1e Wilper. In the prior proceedings the Taylors retained an expert 
real estate appraiser, Terry Rudd, who opined that the Linder Road property was valued at 
$820,000.00. That in defense to the claims of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust and the Ta.ylors' 
claims there were three (3) Idaho licensed real estate appraisers and an Idaho Realtor who were 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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going to provide testimony and opinions that the fair market value of the Linder Road property at 
the time ofthe purchase was $400,000.00. The plaintiffs were preparing the defense to the 
allegations by the trust and the Taylors. The plaintiffs were prepared to establish that the 
purchase price paid was fair and reasonable to the trust. 
That as a result of the criminal misrepresentations made to the court by defendants, 
Berkshire Investments and the other plaintiffs were not able to defend such claims for money 
damages. Without the wilful criminal behavior by the defendants there would have been a trial 
for alleged money damages. But for the fraud, and criminal activity committed by the 
defendants, there would have been no "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims" voiding the real 
estate transaction. In the prior proceeding the Honorable Judge Wilper found that the property 
was valued at 1.8 Million Dollars in 2006 (Decision & Order dated November 29,2006, attached 
as Exhibit "D" to Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 14, 2:008). 
Quite a material misrepresentation by the Taylors and their counsel, providing sworn verified 
pleadings asserting the Taylors' status as beneficiaries to the trust in 2006 after they admitted to 
the probate court the Taylors' mother was the sole beneficiary. All of which was done in order to 
acquire the real property versus potential money damages. 
The record establishes that the plaintiffs raised the issue of the fraud, as an issue affecting 
the standing of the individual Taylors to rescind the real estate transaction as beneficiaries under 
the trust. The Taylors by judicial admissions acknowledged that they had disclaimed their 
interests in the trust and the mother was the sole beneficiary of the trust. The deposition 
testimony of Helen Taylor establishes she never was a party or was represented in the litigation in 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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which the Taylors misrepresented their status as residual beneficiaries of the trust (Affidavit of 
Thomas Maile Part 1 Exhibit "D" and Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 4 Exhibit "AA"). 
Likewise the deposition testimony of Reed Taylor confirms no assignment form was provided 
from Helen Taylor assigning her interests to the individual Taylors (Affidavit of Thomas Maile 
Part 1 Exhibit "C"). 
Defendant Connie Taylor, acting for the benefit ofthe Taylors in negotiating the terms of 
the Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement, drafted a letter to Bart Harwood on April 
14, 2004 which stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up their rights as beneficiaries ofthe 
trust unless Beth will affirm h(~r prior factual statements in the form of an affidavit and agree to 
cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. Ifwe aren't able to reach an agreement on that, they 
will seek a full accounting ofthe trust and a copy ofthe trust and estate tax returns". (Affidavit of 
Thomas Maile Part One deposition of Beth Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing deposition ,exhibit 
39). The Taylors got what thE:y wanted from Beth Rogers and agreed to give up their rights as 
beneficiaries. The Taylors and their attorneys judicially admitted the same in the verified petition 
in the probate proceedings and in sworn testimony before the probate court. 
The Taylors truly were not beneficiaries of the trust in 2006. The Taylors mislead the 
district court by claiming they were beneficiaries to take advance ofthe ruling in Taylor v. Maile 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court did not address the issue of the fraud in procuring the "Judgment 
on the Beneficiaries' Claims" since the appellate court felt that the Taylors had standing since 
they specifically reserved an interest in the litigation. The misrepresentations and criminal 
behavior committed by the def,endants was not decided since standing was resolved by the 
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"Taylors' interest in the litigation". 
When an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, but 
upon the party who is seeking the relief. See Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 
P.2d 757, 763 (1989). Scona Inc. v. Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 286,985 P.2d 1145, 
1148 (1999). In the present case the Supreme Court did not rule on the substantive issue of the 
fraud and misrepresentation of the Taylors and their counsel before the district court. The Idaho 
Supreme Court did not have to consider the same on its merits, since the Taylors had standing 
reserved by an "interest in the litigation". The material misrepresentations and the criminal 
behavior committed by the defendants have not been considered on the merits. There is no 
dispute that "but for" the misrepresentations, the current plaintiffs were deprived of their day in 
court to address the fair market value of the purchase of the Linder Road property. The Taylors 
may have had standing in the litigation, but that did not give them or their counsel a liclense to 
fraudulently misrepresent the Taylors' status as beneficiaries or to commit criminal activity 
before the district court. Without their misrepresentations as to their status as beneficiaries, the 
district court would have allowed a jury trial consistent with its earlier decision relating to claim 
of money damages. The district would not have had entered its "Judgment on Beneficiaries' 
Claims". 
There cannot be an dispute of fact that the defendants and their attorneys knew the full 
status of the facts in both probate and the district court matters. The amended complaint verified 
in January 2006, was fashioned after the Supreme Court ofIdaho authored its decision in Taylor 
v.s Maile 1. There was a clear motive and intent by the defendants to fashion a verified 
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amended complaint asserting "All of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. 
Johnson Trust." 
Specifically, the promoting, drafting, and ultimately filing of the verification of the 
amended complaint in January 2006 constitutes criminal behavior and/or fraud. The 
attachments to the present amended complaint and supporting affidavits of record, sufficiently set 
forth allegations to support the numerous claims pursued in the present matter. The plt:adings 
have verifications by Mr. R. John Taylor from the probate petition and the amended complaint 
(2006) which were both drafted by the defendant lawyers representing John R. Taylor as well as 
the other individual Taylors and the trust in the proceedings captioned Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LEC, Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV 
OC 04-00473D. The amended complaint in the Taylor v.s. Maile matter was verified under oath 
by R. John Taylor in January 2006, and was prepared and finalized by defendant attorneys and/or 
their staff who were active participates in the probate proceeding. 
The fraudulent statements were surely material as the Honorable Judge Wilper had ruled 
previously that the trust could not seek rescission of the real estate transaction. The Taylors' 
expert retained had provided all opinion that the real property was valued at $820,000.00, instead 
of the $400,000.00 valuation obtained by an independent appraiser at the time of the sale 
transaction. The value ofthe real property in November 2006 was established by the court as 1.8 
Million Dollars. Obviously the difference in valuation was material and the peIjured testimony 
surrounding the Taylors verification that they were residual beneficiaries allowed the court to 
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enter the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim". The actions of the defendants truly amounts to 
"tampering with the administration ofjustice" and should be considered as an absolute "wrong 
against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public". The claims ofthe plaintiffs 
are legitimate and well grounded in fact and law. 
B. The Claim ofIdaho Racketeering Violation is a legitimate claim against the defendants. 
Title 18 Chapter 78 provides the statutory authority for the present claims against the 
defendants. Relevant hereto, IC. 18-7803 provides: 
(a) "Racketeering" means any act which is chargeable or indictable under the 
following sections ofthe Idaho Code or which are equivalent acts chargeable or 
indictable as equivalent crimes under the laws ofany other jurisdiction: 
(10) Fraudulent practices, false pretenses, insurance fraud, financial 
transaction card crimes and fraud generally (sections 18-2403, 18-2706, 18-3002, 
18-3101, 18-3124, 18-3125, 18-3126, 18-6713,41-293,41-294 and 41-1306, 
Idaho Code); 
(17) PeIjury(sections 18-5401 and 18-5410, Idaho Code); 
(b) "Person" means any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or 
beneficial interest in property; 
(c) "Enterprise" means any sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, 
business, labor union, association or other legal entity or any group of individuals 
associated in fact altho1Llgh not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit 
entities; and 
(d) "Pattern of rack,eteering activity" means engaging in at least two (2) 
incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, 
accomplices, victims or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by 
distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one 
(1) of such incidents occurred after the effective date 
There can be no dispute of facts given the judicial admissions made by the deft::ndant R. 
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John Taylor and his attorneys of record before the probate court. To be a judicial admission a 
statement must be a deliberate, clear, and unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact 
within that party's knowledge." Strouse, 129 Idaho at 619,930 P.2d at 1364 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Judicial admissions may be considered for the purposes which they were made without 
admission into evidence, and I'l party making an admission may not controvert the statement 
on appeal. Id. at 619,930 P.2d at 1364. (emphasis added). There was only one benefieiary 
remaining in the trust after the execution of the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification 
Agreement". 
Specifically, the promoting, drafting, and ultimately filing of the verification of the 
amended complaint in January 2006 constitutes an allegation of criminal behavior and/or fraud. 
Idaho Code Section 18-5401 provides: 
PERJURY DEFINED. Every person who, having taken an oath that he will 
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, before any competent tribunal, legislative 
committee, officer, or person in any of the cases in which such an oath may by 
law be administered, wilfully and contrary to such oath, states as true any material 
matter which he knows to be false, is guilty ofpeIjury. 
The underlying offense of suborning peIjury is comprised of a corrupt agreement to 
testify falsely, followed by the wilful giving of material testimony which the witness and 
procurer know to be false. State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 492, 681 P.2d 1,2 (Ct. App.1984), 
citing 4 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 607 (14th ed. 1981). The undisputed 
facts establish that the attorneys prepared the verified petition which affirmatively stated "the 
petitioner's 88-year-old moth,~r, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary ofthis trust by 
virtue ofthe terms ofa Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement.". Approximately 14 
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months later the same attorneY8 prepared a verified complaint for their clients to executle stating 
"All ofthe plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Trust.". All the 
defendants actively participated in the procuring of a false verification to the court. 
Such conduct, by the dt:fendant attorneys and the individual Taylors and the trust leads to 
the inescapable conclusion they participated and prepared the necessary documents to the district 
court to attempt to materially affect the legal proceedings. Idaho Code section 18-5410 states: 
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY. Every person who wilfully procures another 
person to commit perjury is guilty of subornation ofperjury, and is punishable in 
the same manner as he would be if personally guilty of the perjury so procured. 
There is no dispute that Connie Taylor, notarized her husband's signature on November 
14th 2004, wherein her then husband stated under oath in the verified petition before the probate 
court, at page two "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining 
beneficiary ofthis trust by virtue ofthe terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity 
Agreement". Immediately above the signature the verification provides, ""R. John Taylor, being 
sworn, says that the facts set forth in the foregoing petition are true, accurate, and complete to the 
best of applicant's knowledge and belief'. Finally, there should be no doubt concerning the 
actual suboTIlation of petjury committed by the defendant attoTIleys. Both Connie Taylor and her 
then husband R. John Taylor were licensed attorneys at the time ofthe commission of the 
specific criminal conduct alleg,ed. 
The case of State v. Wolfrum; 175 P.3d 206 (C.A.2007) provides relevant standards 
involving a criminal case ofpeljury. Commencing at p. 210 of 175 P.3d Reports, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals provides: 
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The test for materiality is whether the testimony probably would or could 
influence a tribunal or jury on the issue before it. The false statement relied upon 
need not bear directly upon the ultimate issue of fact. A statement is material if it 
is material to any prop€:r point of inquiry, and if it is calculated and intended to 
bolster the witness' testimony on some material point or to support or attack his 
credibility. The degree of materiality is not important. Instruction No. 22, which 
quoted I.C. § 18-5406, stated: It is no defense to a prosecution for petjury that the 
accused did not know the materiality of the false statement made by him; or that it 
did not, in fact, affect the proceeding in or for which it was made. It is sufficient 
that it was material, and might have been used to affect such proceeding 
(emphasis added). 
The Taylors actively participated in the global disclaimer agreement between the 
beneficiaries of the trust and the successor trustees. The Taylors and their counsel presumptively 
read the Supreme Court case involving Taylor v. Maile 1. The Taylors presumptively read the 
issues of standing contained in the court's decision. R. John Taylor, an Idaho licensed attorney 
executed under oath the amended verified complaint in January 2006. There can be no 
disagreement in the record, the verification in 2006 was contrary to his earlier sworn verification. 
In addition to the allegations surrounding petjury, the actions of the defendants violated 
I.C. § 18-2403 which provides: 
(l) A person steals property and commits theft when, with intent to deprive 
another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he 
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof. 
(2) Theft includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding ofanother's 
property, with the intent prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, committed in 
any of the following ways: 
(a) By deception obtains or exerts control over property of the owner; 
(b) By conduct heretofore defined or known as larceny; common law larceny 
by trick; embezzlement:, extortion; obtainingproperty, money or labor under 
false pretenses; or receiving stolen goods (emphasis added). 
The record is abundantly clear. The defendants perpetrated the fraud a number of times 
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with pleadings asserting the Taylors were residual beneficiaries of the trust in 2006 (S(~e 
Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part 2 Exhibits "L", "M"). The Taylors acting with and through their 
attorneys on February 13, 2006, filed their Motion For Summary Judgment On Beneficiaries' 
Claim. The first sentence of the motion states, "Come Now Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John 
Taylor (hereafter referred to as "the Beneficiary Plaintiffs") (Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part 
Two Exhibit "L"). The truth and the facts establish they were not (false pretenses). The lawyers 
and the clients knew the truth from previous court proceedings before the probate court. 
The counter-defendants have correctly asserted a colorable claim under the Idaho 
Racketeering Statute against the defendants. The lis pendens is properly filed in the current 
action. In alleging wrongful conduct in violation ofChapter 18 Title 78 ofldaho Law, certain 
remedies are available including but not limited to: 
18-7805 Racketeering -.- Civil Remedies. 
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a 
pattern of racketeering activity may file an action in the district court for the 
recovery ofthree (3) times the actual damages proved and the cost ofthe suit, 
including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(c) The district cowt has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy. 
racketeering after making provisions for the rights of all innocent persons affected 
by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate 
orders. Prior to a detem:lination of liability, such orders may include, but are not 
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions, 
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with 
any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture or other restraints 
pursuant to this section as it deems proper. 
(d) Following a dekrmination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not 
limited to: 
(l) Ordering any person to divest himselfofany interest, direct or indirect, 
in any enterprise; 
The facts establish that an enterprise was created by the co-defendants to obtain an 
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interest in real property (Affidavit Part 4 Exhibit "W" Contingent Fee Agreement between the 
attorneys, Clark and Feeney, and Taylors). The activities ofthe defendants in committing 
perjury, suborning peIjury, and filing false pleadings to the courts, asserting the Taylors as 
residual beneficiaries, amounts to violations of Idaho Law and racketeering activity. I.e. 
18-7804 provides that is it is unlawful "for any person who has received any proceeds derived 
directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person has participated, 
to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or the proceeds derived from the 
investment or use thereof in th;:l acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation 
of, any enterprise or real property". Through the combined efforts of the co-defendants, can be 
no dispute that real property was acquired as a result of the alleged criminal activity. 
That such potential remedy, including the request for a constructive trust, authorizes the 
filing a Lis Pendens herein and as such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the 
present action. 
2. The Lis Pendens Are Properly Filed. 
There are two distinct counts which are authorize the filing of the lis pendens in the 
current proceeding as set forth above. A lis pendens is allowed to be filed in connection with a 
request for a constructive trust, where legal title to property has been obtained through actual 
fraud. In addition the Idaho Racketeering Statute authorizes specific relief, including restoring 
the real property to Berkshire Investments. A lis pendens is appropriate to safeguard that 
remedy. The plaintiffs have done nothing more than to provide public notice of their claims 
relating to the above referenced! counts. 
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The Affidavit of Thomas Maile filed concurrently demonstrates that the trust has not 
repaid its obligation owing to Berkshire Investments. Berkshire Investments has a statutory right 
to protect its repayment of the purchase price of $400,000.00. Idaho Law recognizes a vendees 
lien for the protection of the money which remains unpaid, including interest thereon. Maho 
Code section 45-804 provides: 
Lien of Purchaser of Real Property. One who pays to the owner any part of the 
price of real property, under an agreement for the sale thereof, has a special lien 
upon the property, independent of possession, for such part of the amount paid as 
he may be entitled to recover back, in case of a failure of consideration. 
The money paid to the Itrust remains outstanding, and until returned, Berkshire 
Investments lawfully has the protection of the statutory right, to maintain its interest in the real 
property pursuant to Law. Berkshire Investments has done nothing more to assert its statutory 
right to file a lis pendens to insure the return of the purchase price and interest thereon as may be 
determined due and owing. 
That in addition, the plaintiffs herein have previously filed their lis pendens in the prior 
proceedings which remains of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, as further 
protection of the vendee's lien (Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support of Motion Exhibi.t "B"). 
That the prior vendee's lien is superior to the lis pendens herein and as such the lis pendens filed 
herein has not impaired the tith: to the subject real property and as such the claims set forth in the 
counter-claim are barred in the present action. 
The plaintiffs are exercising nothing more than what the above Law grants. The plaintiffs 
are entitled to avail themselves of the protection of the vendee's lien and the case law gtmerated 
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for the imposition of a constructive trust. Statutory protection is a defense to any allegl~d 
wrongful recording of a notice of claim. See generally, Hewson v. Asker's Thrift Shop, 120 
Idaho 164, 167,814 P.2d 424, 427 (1991). Generally a right which stems from statutory 
protection is a defense to certain actions. See, generally, Rincover v. State, 128 Idaho 653, 656, 
917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996). 
The case of Clark v. Clark, 56 Idaho 6, 47 P.2d 914 (1935), illustrates, the point oflaw 
that acting pursuant to a statutory right, does not amount to malice. 
"It is quite generally held that what a person may lawfully do may be done with or 
without malice. (Authorities cited.) In other words, there can be no legal malice in 
contemplation of law where the thing done is lawful and the means employed are 
lawful. Courts must judge the intent a man has in doing an act by the means he 
employs and the thing to be accomplished, and if they all be lawful, courts cannot 
impute malicious or unlawful motives to the actor." 
Berkshire Investments claims rights to have the title restored to it and/or for the payment 
ofmonies due and owing. The vendee's lien is a creature of statute. In maintaining the lis 
pendens Berkshire is doing nothing more than the acting consistent with what Idaho Law allows. 
CONCLUSION 
There is ample statutory authority and case law cited above that warrants the plaintiffs' 
claims. The filing of the lis pendens to protect their rights both as to the remedies pled and for 
the repayment of the monies that are still outstanding which are lawfully due and owing to 
Berkshire Investments is prope:r. There is no legitimate basis for any of the three (3) counts of 
the counter-claim. The Counter-defendants are entitled to Partial Summary Judgment as to all 
counter-claims raised by the defendants. 
DATED this 17th day of March, 2009. 
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CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state of Idaho and a member of 
Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, Dallan Taylor and Theodore Johnson 
Trust in the above entitled matter. The information contained herein is of my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy ofan Idaho Repository printout 
with the record of actions for the District Court case, Taylor v. Maile CV OC 2004-00473D. This 
printout does not include all the pleadings filed in the two appeals cases associated with this case. 
DATED this ~ day of April, 2 
Connie Taylor ./ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J~y of April, 2009. 
Notary Public in,tu:d for the State of Idaho. 
Residing at Ltt{}/rilrn tl).erein. 
My commission expires: ()3ki..r L tc> I 'f, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
)~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day ofApril, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV U.S. Mail 
380 West State Street Hand Delivered 
Eagle, ID 83616 D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mark Prusynski U.S. Mail 
MOFFATT THOMAS Hand Delivered 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor D Overnight Mail 
PO Box 829 D Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384 
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Connie W. Taylor /
/ / //7­
Attorney for Defendants C__-----/ 
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01/23/2004 New Case Filed 
01/23/2004 Civil Complaint, More Than $1000, No Prior Appearance 
01/23/2004 (2)summons Issued 
02/02/2004 Another Summons Issued 
02/11/2004 Affidavit Of Service And Summons 2-5-04 
02/13/2004 Affidavit Of Service And Summons 2-7-04 
02/23/2004 Notice Of Service 
02/23/2004 Verified Answer,(hoag!and For T&c Maile No Prior 
Appearance 8, Berkshire Invest) 
02/23/2004 Special Motions, Counterclaim, With Prior Appearance 
02/23/2004 Motion For Order Of Disqualification 
02/23/2004 Motion Change Of Venue, Dismissal, & Compel 
02/27/2004 Order For Disqualification Of Judge Copsey 
02/27/2004 Notice Of Realssignment To Judge Wilper 
03/05/2004 Notice Of Status Conf-4/6/04 At 3:45 
03/15/2004 Notice Of Service 
03/15/2004 Answer To Counterclaim (taylor For Taylor) 
03/15/2004 Notice And Stipulation Of Substitution 
03/15/2004 (t Maile For: T & C Maile, T Maile Real Est 
03/15/2004 & Berkshire Investments) 
03/15/2004 DefThomas Maile's Motion To Dismiss 
03/15/2004 Memo In Support Of Motion To Dismiss 
03/15/2004 Hearing Scheduled - Motn To Dismiss (04/12/2004) Ronald 
J Wilper 
03/23/2004 Notc Of Assn Of Counsel (collaer For Maile) 
03/24/2004 Notice Of Sub Counsel(points For Thomas Maile 
03/29/2004 Certificate Of Mailing 
04/06/2004 Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition Of Motion 
04/06/2004 To Dismiss Lodged 
04/08/2004 Motion To Continue Hearing On Mtn To Dismiss 
04/08/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Continue Hr 
04/08/2004 Reply Memo In Suppt Of Def Motn To Dismiss 
04/12/2004 Affidavit Of Counsel 
04/12/2004 Motion For Order Shortening Time 
04/12/2004 Hearing Held - Motn To Dismiss 
04/23/2004 Order Grantin~1 Motion To Dismiss 
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05/19/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion 
05/19/2004 Notice Of Hearing (6-10-04 @ 4pm) 
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06/24/2004 Order (to Re-open Case) 
06/24/2004 Order Denying Motion Re: Lis Pendens 
08/04/2004 Notice Of Taking Deposition 
08/04/2004 Notice Of Taking Deposition 
08/09/2004 Motion For Protective Order 
08/09/2004 Motion For Order Shortening Time 
08/09/2004 Affidavit Of Counsel 
08/10/2004 Motion For A Protective Order Re:disclosure 
08/10/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion For Prot Order 
08/10/2004 Notice OfTa~ing Deposition Of S Johnson 
08/10/2004 Notice OfTa~ing Deposition Of Bret Johnson 
08/10/2004 Notice Of Ta~ ing Deposition Of Bret Johnson 
08/10/2004 Notice Of T a~ ing Deposition Of Hazel Fisher 
08/10/2004 Hearing Scheduled - Motn Fr Protect Order (08/30/2004) 
Ronald J Wilper 
08/10/2004 Amended Motn For Order Shortening Time 
08/1012004 Hearing Scheduled - Notc Of Objt (08/16/2004) Ronald J 
Wllper 
08/1112004 Motion For Order Shortening Time 
08/11/2004 Motion For Protective Order Re:defs Notc Dep 
08/11/2004 Affidavit Of Counsel 
08/12/2004 Def/counterclaimants Motn To Consolidate 
08/12/2004 Affidavit Of T .maile In Spprt Of Motion 
08/12/2004 Notice Of Taking Deposition 
08/12/2004 Amended Note Of Taking Deposition 
08/12/2004 Notice Of Hearing On Motn To Consolidate 
08/12/2004 Note Of Issue/request For Trial 
08/12/2004 Amended Motion For Order Shortening Time 
08/12/2004 Notice Of Hearing 8116104 @ 11 Am 
08/12/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion For P.o. 
08/13/2004 First Motn To Compel Discovery Responses 
08/13/2004 Affd Of J Hally In Support Of Motn 
08/13/2004 Notice Of Hearing Motn To Compel 
08/16/2004 Notice Of Service 
08/16/2004 Affidavit Of Tina L. Kernan 
08/16/2004 Memo Brief In Support Of Motions 
08/16/2004 Certificate Of Mailing 
08/16/2004 First Motion To Compel Discovery Responses 
08/16/2004 Affidavit Of J.hally In Sppt Motn To Compel 
08/16/2004 Notice Of Hearing(08/30104 @1:30) 
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08/16/2004 Hearing Held - Notc Of Objt 
08/16/2004 Order To Shorten Time 
08/16/2004 Motion Fr Order Staying Proceedings Pend Appl 
08/16/2004 Hearing Scheduled - Motn For Order (08/30/2004) Ronald J 
Wilper 
08/1712004 Motion For Sanctionslcosts & Attrny Fees 
08/17/2004 Affd OfT.maile N Oppstn To Motn To Compel 
08/17/2004 ··lodg·8 Memo Brief In Oppostn 
08/17/2004 Notc Of Compliance 
08/17/2004 Certificate Of Mailing 
08/18/2004 Order For Protective Order 
08/25/2004 Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition 
08/30/2004 Hearing Held - Motn For Order 
08/30/2004 Hearing Held - Motn Fr Protect 
08/30/2004 Acceptance Of Service 
08/30/2004 Notice Vacating Defs Motion To Consolidate 
08/30/20042 Amended Notice OfTaking Deposition 
09/08/2004 Acceptance Of Service 
09/08/2004 Second Amended Notice 
09/08/2004 Third Amende·d Notice 
09/08/2004 Notice Of Status Conference (10/26/04 @ 4pm) 
09/08/2004 Hea.ring Scheduled - Renewed Motion (09/27/2004) Ronald 
J Wllper 
09/1012004 Amended Notice Of Hearing (9-27-04@3:00pm) 
09/10/2004 Dfndnts Renewed Motn To Strike Lis Pendens 
09/10/2004 Affd Of T. mailt:~ In Spprt Of Motn To Strike 
09/10/2004 Memo In Spprl Of Dfndnts Renewed Motn 
09/10/2004 Dfndnts Motion To Compel&rnotn For Costs& Fees 
09/10/2004 Affidavit Of T .maile In Spprt Of Motn Compel 
09/10/2004 Notice Of Hearing On Motn Compel(9-27-04-3:30 
09/10/2004 Affd Of T .maile Managing Member Of Berkshire 
09/16/2004 Order On Protective Order 
09/16/2004 Order To Compel 
09/16/2004 Order Denyin~1 Motion To Stay 
09/20/2004 Pltfs Memo Oppos Motn To Strike Lis Pendens 
09/21/2004 Reply Memo In Support Of Defs Renewed Motion 
09/21/2004 Certificate Of Mailing 
09/23/2004 Notice Of Service 
09/23/2004 Notice Of Service 
09/27/2004 Hearing Held - Renewed Motion 
09/28/2004 Notice Of Compliance 
09/29/2004 Hearing Schecluled - Defs Motion (11/22/2004) Ronald J 
Wilper 
09/2912004 Hearing Vacated - Defs Motion 
09/29/2004 H~aring Scheduled - Defs Motion (11/22/2004) Ronald J 
Wllper 
09/2912004 Order To Consolidate W/cvoc0405656d 
10/01/2004 Supplemental Affidavit In Support Of Motion 
10/04/2004 Answer To Counterclaim 
10/05/2004 Objection To Proposed Order 
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10/06/2004 Notice Of Compliance 
10/07/2004 Order On Motion To Strike Deposition 
10/07/2004 Order Denying Motion On Lis Pendens 
10/07/2004 (6) Notice Of Taking Deposition 
10/07/2004 Amended N01ice Of Taking Deposition 
10/07/2004 Certificate Of Mailing 
10/12/2004 Notice Of Service 
10/12/2004 Acceptance Of Service1 0-7-04 (garth Fisher) 
10/12/2004 Motion To Bifurcate Trial 
10/12/2004 Hearing Scheduled - Motn To Bifurcate (10/26/2004) Ronald 
J Wilper 
10/15/2004 Notice Of Service 
10/19/2004 Affidavit Re: Motion To Compel Answers 
10/19/2004 Motion To Compel Answers 
10/20/2004 Motn To Dismiss Complaint 
10/20/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion 
10/20/2004 Lodged-memo Brief In Suprt Of Motion 
10/20/2004 H~aring Scheduled - Motn To Bifurca (11/15/2004) Ronald J 
Wllper 
10/20/2004 Notice Of Hearing 11/22/04 @ 11 am 
10/21/2004 Objection To Motn To Bifurcate Trial 
10/21/2004 Notice Of Ser/ice 
10/22/2004 Order On Motion To Strike 
10/25/2004 Notice Of Service 
10/26/2004 Hearing Scheduled - Motion (12/20/2004) Ronald J Wilper 
10/26/2004 Hearing Vacaled - Motn To Bifurca 
10/28/2004 Notice OfTrial Setting 
10/28/2004 Jury Trial Scheduled - (12/07/2005) Ronald J Wilper 
11/03/2004 Motion For Protective Order 
11/03/2004 Affidavit Of T Maile In Support Of Motion 
11/03/2004 Notice Of Compliance 
11/03/2004 Certificate Of Mailing 
11/05/2004 Notice Of Service 
11/05/2004 Motion To Deny Or Vacate Motn For Partial Smj 
11/05/2004 Affidavit In Spprt Of Motn To Deny 
11/05/2004 Notice Of Hearing On Motn Deny 11-22-04@11am 
11/08/2004 Memo In Opposition Of Defs Motion For Psj 
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Counsel In Opposition To Motion 
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Dallan Taylor 
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Reed Taylor 
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Jud Taylor 
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Sam Rosti 
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Dennis Mccracken 
11/08/2004 Affidavit Of Richard L Zamzow 
11/08/2004 Motion For Appointment Of Discovery Master 
11/08/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion For Apptment 
11/08/2004 Hearing Scheduled - Motn For Apptmt (12/06/2004) Ronald 
J Wilper 
11/09/2004 Motion For Exparte Order To Show Cause 
11/09/2004 Affidavit OfT Maile In Support Of Motion 
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11/09/2004 Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition 
11/09/2004 Notice Of Compliance 
11/09/2004 Notice Of Service 
11/12/2004 Reply Memo In Support Of Defs Motion For Sj 
11/12/2004 Memo In Support Of Defs Motn To Strike Affds 
11/12/2004 Affd Of Thomas Maile In Support Of Motion 
11/12/2004 Memo In Oppos To Pltfs Motion For Contunuance 
11/12/2004 Affd Of Thomas Maile In Support Of Motion 
11/12/2004 Notice Of Association Of Counsel 
11/15/2004 Supplemental Affidavit Of T Maile In Support 
11/15/2004 Hearing Held - Motn To Bifurca 
11/22/2004 Hearing Held 
11/22/2004 Motion To Compel Discovery Responses 
11/22/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion 
11/22/2004 Hearing Vacated - Motion 
11/24/2004 Order Granting Motion To Strike 
11/29/2004 Order Granting Motion To Strike In Part 
11/29/2004 Defendants Natice Of Objection To Plaintiffs 
11/29/2004 Motion For Appointment Of Discovery Master 
12/02/2004 Notice Of Service(2) 
12/02/2004 Affidavit Of Te rry Rudd 
12/03/2004 Hearing Vacated - Motn For Apptmt 
12/03/2004 Supplemental Affidavit OfThomas G Maile 
12/03/2004 Certificate Of Mailing 
12/10/2004 Affidavit Of B Hogers 
12/14/2004 2nd Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition 
12/23/2004 (2)notice Of Compliance 
12123/2004 Affidavit Of Tim Williams 
12/23/2004 Certificate Of Mailing 
12/23/2004 (2)affidavit Of Service(12/16/04) 
12/27/2004 Notice Of Sel'\lice 
12/30/2004 2nd Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition 
12/30/2004 3rd Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition 
12/30/2004 Certificate Of Mailing 
12/30/2004 Notice Of Service 
01/05/2005 Hearing Scheduled - (03/17/2005) Ronald J Wilper 
01/10/2005 Notice Of Service 
01/10/2005 Notice Of Service 
01/20/2005 Notice Of Service 
02/03/2005 Supplemental Affidavit Of Thomas G Maile In 
02/03/2005 Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment 
02/14/2005 Second Supplemental Affidavit OfThomas Maile 
02/14/2005 In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment 
02/14/2005 Motion For Leave To Cite Unpublished Opinion 
02/14/2005 Affidavit Of Elaine Lee 
02/14/2005 Spplmtl Memorandum In Sppt Def Motn Dismiss 
02/14/2005 Notice Of Service 
02/15/2005 Affidavit Of Thomas Maile In Support Of Defs 
02/15/2005 Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
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02/15/2005 Second Suppk~mental Affidavit Of Phillip J 
02/15/2005 Collaer In Support Of Motn For Partial Sj 
02/15/2005 Supplemental Memorandum Lodged Re:motn For Sj 
02/15/2005 Note Of Hring (03/17/05@3:00)motn:partial Sj 
0310312005 Motion To Strilke 
03/03/2005 Memorandum In Support Of Motn For Sum Judgmt 
03/03/2005 Summary Of Facts And Exhibits 
03/03/2005 Affidavit Of Donna Jones 
03/03/2005 Affidavit Of Richard White 
03/03/2005 Affidavit Of Counsel 
03/03/2005 Affidavit Of Richard Mollerup 
03/03/2005 Affidavit Of Tel-ry Rudd 
03/07/2005 Fourth Amen "'Iotice OfTaking Deposition 
03/08/2005 Hearing Vacated - Motn For Partial Sum Judgmt 
03/08/2005 Fifth Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition 
03/08/2005 Hearing Scheduled - Motn For Summry (03/17/2005) Ronald 
J Wilper 
03/0912005 Notice Vacatin!~ Hearing Re:motn To Dismiss 
03/28/2005 6th Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition 
03/28/2005 Hearing Scheduled - Motn Summ Jdmt (06/13/2005) Ronald 
J Wilper 
04/2512005 Notice OfTaking Deposition 
05/06/2005 (2) Notice Of Taking Deposition 
05/06/2005 Notice Of Service 
05/10/2005 (2) Notice Of Taking Deposition 
05/12/2005 Notice Of Hearing(06/13/05@1 :30)re:partial Sj 
05/13/2005 Notice Of Service 
05/13/2005 Motion For Surnmary Judgment 
05/13/2005 Memo In Support Of Motn For Summary Judgment 
05/13/2005 Affidavit Of R John Taylor 
05/13/2005 Notice Of Hearing (6-13-05 @ 1:30) 
05/13/2005 Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee 
05/13/2005 3rd Supplemental Affidavit Of Thomas G Maile 
05/13/2005 In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment 
05/16/2005 Defs 2nd Supplemental Memo In Support Mosj 
05/17/2005 Certificate Of Mailing 5113105 
05/18/2005 (6) Notice OfTaking Deposition 
05/20/2005 Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint 
05/20/2005 Lodged Memo In Support Of Motion For Leave 
05/24/2005 Certificate Of Mailing 
05/24/2005 Affidavit Of Thomas Maile In Opp To Mosj 
05/24/2005 Affidavit Of AI Knutson In Opp To Mosj 
05/24/2005 Lodged Reply Brief In Opp To Mosj 
05/24/2005 Motion To Amend Answer And Counter-claim 
05/24/2005 Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Amend 
05/24/2005 Notice Of Hearing Re:amend(6/13/05@ 1:30 Pm) 
05/27/2005 Memo In Oppo~,tion To Pint Motion To Strike 
05/27/2005 Defendant Maill~'s Motion For Protective Order 
05/27/2005 Defendant's Memorandum Lodged In Suppt Motion 
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OS/27/2005 Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee 
OS/27/2005 Notice Of Hearing (06/13/05@1:30) 
05/31/2005 (4) Affidavit Of Service (5-18-05) 
05/31/2005 Affidavit Of Ser'ice (5-19-05) 
05/31/2005 Affidavit Of Ser'ice (5-23-05) 
05/31/2005 (6) Notices OfTaking Deposition 
05/31/2005 Suppl Memo In Opp To Defs Motn To Dismiss 
05/31/2005 Motn For Sumrn Judg & Part Summ Judg 
05/31/2005 Notice Of Hearing- Motn Amend Complaint 
05/31/2005 (6-13-05 @ 1:30 Pm) 
06/03/2005 Affidavit In Opposition To Motion To Amend 
06/03/2005 Reply Affidavit In Support Of Mtn Summary Jdm 
06/03/2005 Replly Breif In Oppstn To Mtn Amend Lodged 
06/03/2005 Notice To Withdraw Mtn To Amend Answer & Ctcl 
06/03/2005 Certificate Of Mailing 
06/03/2005 Supplemental Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee 
06/06/2005 Def Motion To Strike Portions R.mollerup Affd 
06/06/2005 Second Supplemental Affidavit Elaine Lee 
06/06/2005 Def Reply Brief Re:motn To Dismiss/ Mosj 
06/06/2005 Second Reply Memorandum In Support Of Motion 
06/06/2005 For Summary Judgment 
06/06/2005 Defendant's Motion To Strike Affidavit Of 
06/06/2005 Richard J White 
06/06/2005 Memorandum In Support Of Motion Lodged 
06/06/2005 Notice Of Hearing(06/13/05 At 1:30 Pm) 
06/07/2005 Notice Of Service 
06/09/2005 Notice Vacating Deposition 
06/09/2005 Objection To Hearing On Motn To Strike 
06/10/2005 Lodged Rply Me,mo Re Motn Protective Order 
06/13/2005 Hearing Held - Motn Summ Jdmt 
06/15/2005 (2) Notice Of Vacating Deposition 
06/17/2005 Notice Of Compl~iance Re:response To Interrogt 
06/17/2005 Notice Of Service 
06/29/2005 Hearing Scheduled - Motn Summry Jud (08/15/2005) Ronald 
J Wilper 
06/29/2005 Notice Of Service 
06/30/2005 (2) Notice Of Compliance 
07/12/2005 (2)notices Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum 
07/12/2005 Notice OfTakin~1 Deposition 
07/20/2005 Notice Of Compliance 
07/22/2005 Hea.ring Scheduled - Motn Summry Jud (08/29/2005) Ronald 
J Wllper 
07/22/2005 Hearing Vacated - Motn Summry Jud 
07/28/2005 Memo Decision I~ Order 
08/02/2005 Memorandum 01 Costs And Attorney Fees 
08/03/2005 Amen Notc Of Hearing On Motn Amen Answer Set 
08/03/2005 Continued (8-29·05@3pm)motn To Amend 
08/08/2005 Notice Of Compliance 
08/10/2005 Hearing Vacated - Motn Summry Jud 
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08/17/2005 Acceptance Of Service (07/12/05) 
0811712005 (2) Notice Of Compliance 
08/24/2005 Stip Re:def Counter Claimts Motn To Amen Answ 
08/24/2005 And Counterclaim 
08/26/2005 Def 2nd Renewed Motion To Strike Lis Pendens 
08/26/2005 Memo Brief Of Def 2nd Motn To Strike 
08/26/2005 Affidavit Of Thomas Maile In Support Of Motn 
08/26/2005 Hearing Schedul ed - 2nd Renew Motn To Strike (09/15 
12005) Ronald J Wilper 
08/30/2005 Order Re: Stipulation To Amend 
09/01/2005 Notice Of Compliance Re:5th Set Of Requests 
09/01/2005 Notice Of Compliance 
09/02/2005 Notice Of Servic,e 
09/07/2005 Verified Amended Answ &Counterclaim & Demand 
09/08/2005 Memorandum Opposing Renewed Motion To Strike 
09/09/2005 Notice Of Service 
09/14/2005 Hearing Scheduled - (10103/2005) Ronald J Wilper 
09/15/2005 Hearing Vacated - 2nd Renew Motn 
09/16/2005 (2) Notice Of Service 
09/16/2005 Notice Of Service 
09/21/2005 Notice Of Compliance Re: Defs 9th Responses 
09/26/2005 Reply To Def Amended Counterclaim 
09/28/2005 Amended Complaint Filed 
09/30/2005 Notice Of Servicl~ 
09/30/2005 Notice Of Service 
10103/2005 Order Granting Costs-matter Of Right 
10103/2005 Amended Motion For Summary Judgment 
10103/2005 Affidavit In Support Of Motion 
10103/2005 Lodged-memorandum In Support Of Motion 
10103/2005 Hearing Schedulled - Summ Jdmt Motn (11/03/2005) Ronald 
J Wilper 
10103/2005 Amended Reply To Amended Counterclaim 
10103/2005 Notice Of Service 
10103/2005 Notice Of Compliance 
10103/2005 Notice Of Compliance 
10103/2005 Defnd Disclosure To 5th & 6th Set Of Interrgs 
10103/2005 Case Taken Und,er Advisement 
10105/2005 Order Denying Motion To Release Lis Pendens 
10107/2005 Defs Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment 
10107/2005 Memo In Support Of Renewed Motion 
10107/2005 Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee 
10107/2005 Hearing Scheduled - Motion (11/07/2005) Ronald J Wilper 
10/1112005 Supplemental Memorandum Lodged Opposing 2nd 
10/11/2005 Renewed Motion To Strike Lis Pendens 
10/11/2005 Answer To Amended Complaint And Demand 
10/13/2005 Notice Of Compliance Re: Repsonse To Pint Rqs 
10/13/2005 Notice Of Compliance Re:def 12th Response 
10/13/2005 Reply Affidavit Of T. Maile In Opposition To 
10/13/2005 PI. Amended Motion For Summary Judgment 
9 of 17 41112009 2:31 PM 
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10/13/2005 Lodged-reply Brief In Opp To Motn For Sum Jdt 
10/13/2005 Notice Of Compliance Re: Defs 11th Splmntl 
10/13/2005 Responses To First Set Of Interrogatories 
10/13/2005 Certificate Of Mailing 
10/13/2005 Affd Of C Maile In Opp To Amen Motn For S Jdt 
10/20/2005 Motion To Compel Discovery Responses 
10/20/2005 Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Compel 
10/20/2005 Motion In Limine 
10/20/2005 Lodged Memorandm In Supprt Of Motn In Limine 
10/20/2005 Note Of Hearng Motn In Limine & Mtn To Compel 
10/20/2005 (11/03/2005 @ ~i:OO Pm) 
10/20/2005 Affidavit Of E Le,e 
10/20/2005 Lodged Memo In Oppstn To Motn For Part Smj 
10/21/2005 Hearing Vacated - Summ Jdmt Motn 
10/21/2005 Hearing Scheduled - Motn Part Smj & Motn Cmpl (11/10 
12005) Ronald J Wilper 
10/21/2005 Affidavit Of Mailing 
10/24/2005 Affidavit Of Mailing 
10/24/2005 Affidavit Of Dan C Grober 
10/24/2005 Lodged Memo In Opposition To Def Renewed Msj 
10/24/2005 Notice Of Assoc Of Counsel(charney For Maile) 
10/24/2005 Supplemental Affidavit Of Dan Grober 
10/25/2005 Sheriffs Affidavit Of Service 
10/25/2005 Notice Of Taking Deposition 
10/25/2005 Notice Of Taking Deposition 
10/26/2005 Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint 
10/26/2005 Memorandum In Support Lodged 
10/27/2005 Motion To Continue And Notice Of Hearing 
10/27/2005 (11/10/05@3pm) 
1012712005 Motion To Strike And Notice Of Hearing 
10/27/2005 (11/10105@3pm) 
10/27/2005 LOdged-brief In Support Of Motn To Strike 
10/27/2005 Answer To Corrected Amended Complaint 
10/27/2005 Motion To Vacate Hearing 
10/27/2005 Affidavit Of Jack S Gjording 
10/27/2005 Notice OfTaking Deposition 
10/27/2005 Second Notice OfTaking Deposition 
10/28/2005 Lodg Memo In Opp To Motn To Compel Discovery 
10/28/2005 Affidavit OfThomas Maile 
10/28/2005 (5)affidavit Of Sel'Vice (10/26/05) 
10/28/2005 Affidavit Of Service (10/27/05) 
10/31/2005 Answ/26 Entered In Error On 10/27/05 
11/01/2005 Notice Of Compliance 
11/01/2005 Affidavit Of Service (10/26/05) 
11/01/2005 Affidavit Of Service (10/27/05) 
11/01/2005 Affidavit Of Service (10/31/05) 
11/0112005 Amended Notice OfTaking Deposition 
11/01/2005 Amended Notice OfTaking Deposition 
10 of 17 4/1/20092:31 PM 
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11/01/2005 Amended Hearing Scheduled - Def Renewd Motn (11/17
 
12005) Ronald J Wilper
 
11/03/2005 Lodged Reply Memo In Support Of Amended Mosj
 




11/0312005 Notice Of Hearing (11-17-05@4:00 Pm)
 
11/03/2005 2nd Supplemental Affidavit Of Dan Grober
 
11/03/2005 Opposition To Plaintffs' Motions In Limine
 
11/03/2005 Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee
 
11/04/2005 Stipulation To Vacate & Reschedule Defs
 
11/04/2005 Renewed Motion For Summary Judgement And
 
11/04/2005 Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Amend
 
11/04/2005 Notice Of Servicl~
 
11/04/2005 (3) Notice Of Taking Deposition
 
11/07/2005 Notice Of Takin~1 Deposition Of Thomas Maile
 




11/07/2005 Hearing Vacated - Motion
 
11/09/2005 Memorandum Re Motion To Amend Lodged
 
11/10/2005 Case Taken Under Advisement - Motn Part Smj
 
11/10/2005 Memorandum Lodged In Opposition To Motn:amend
 
11/10/2005 Notice Of Service
 
11/10/2005 Notice Of Service
 
11/14/2005 Motion In Limine
 
11/14/2005 Hearing Scheduled - (11/28/2005) Ronald J Wilper
 
11/1412005 Brief In Support Of Motion Lodged
 
11/14/2005 Motion To Amend Caption
 
11/14/2005 Dfnd Motn In Limine
 
11/14/2005 Memo In Suppon Of Dfnd Motn In Limine
 
11/14/2005 Notice Of Hearin9 11/28/05@3:00pm
 
11/15/2005 Motion To Quash Subpoena, Motn For Protective
 
11/15/2005 Ordr,and Motn For Sanctions
 
11/15/2005 Lodged Memo In Support Of Motn To Quash
 
11/15/2005 Motion To Continue Trial Date
 
11/15/2005 Notice Of Hearin!~ 11/28/05@3pm
 
11/15/2005 Amended Notice Of Hearing (11/28/05 @ 3pm)
 




11/16/2005 Hearing Scheduled - Motion (11/17/2005) Ronald J Wilper
 
11/1612005 Affd Of T .g. Maile In Oppos To Continue Trial
 
11/16/2005 (2) Notice Of Compliance
 
11/16/2005 Defendants' Opposition To Motion For Order
 
11/16/2005 Shortening Time & Notc Of Hrng (11/28/05)
 
1111612005 Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee In Support Of Defs'
 
11/16/2005 Opposition To Motn For Order Shortenin Tm
 
11/17/2005 Hearing Held - Motion
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11/21/2005 Hearing Vacated - Jury Trial 
11/22/2005 Affidavit Of Service 11/07/05 
11/28/2005 Order Vacating Trial, Hearings 
12/23/2005 Opinion Lodged Supreme Court #30817 
12/30/2005 Order For Supplemental Briefing - Remand 
01/20/2006 Lodged Joint Supplemental Brief in Light of Supreme Court 
Remand 
01/23/2006 Motion for Leave, to Amend Complaint 
01/23/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Mot~on 02/27/2006 03:00 PM)Motn for 
Leave to Amend Complamt 
01/23/2006 Lodged Memo 
01/31 /2006 Remittitur-Affirmed/Reversed Supreme Court #30817 
02/10/2006 Notice of Hearin!1 (Motion for Summary Judgment) 
(03/13/2006 01 :~IO PM) 
02/13/2006 Order Re: Motion for Summary Judgment 
02/13/2006 Motion For Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim 
02/13/2006 Affidavit of R John Taylor In Support Of Beneficiaries' Motion 
For Summary Judgment 
02/13/2006	 Lodged Plaintiffs Memorandu.m. in. Suppo~ Of Motion For 
Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim 
02/24/2006	 Hearing result for Motion held on 02/27/2006 03:00 PM: 
Hearing Vacated 
02/24/2006 Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment held on 
03/13/2006 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
02/24/2006 Amended Notice of Hearing Re: Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Beneficiaries Claim (4/3106 at 11) 
02/24/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/03/06 at 11) 
03/02/2006 Request for Trial Setting 
03/03/2006 Notice of Scheduling Conf-4/3/06 at 11 
03/0612006 Stipulation RE: Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint 
03/06/2006 Lodged Amended Complaint 
03/09/2006 Order Granting Motion to File Amended Complaint 
03/09/2006 Amended Complaint Filed 
03/14/2006 Lodged Brief In Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
03/14/2006 Affidavit ofT Maile in Opposition to motion for Summary 
Judgment 
03/14/2006 Certificate Of Mailing 
03/15/2006 An~wer to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
(Gjordmg for Defendants) 
03/17/2006 Affidavit of G Mcallister 
03/17/2006 Lodged Memorandum in Opposition to Taylors Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
03/21/2006 Answer.a~d Counterclaim Re: Amended complaint by 
beneficiaries 
03/27/2006 Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Memorandum 
Support 
03/27/2006 Lodged Memorandum in Support of Motion 
03/29/2006 Affidavit of Counsel 
04/03/2006 Hear!ng result for Motion held on 04/03/2006 11 :00 AM: 
Heanng Held 
05/01/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10111/2006 09:00 AM) 
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05/01/2006 Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference 09/26/2006 
03:30 PM) 
05/01/2006 Order Resetting Trial 
05/05/2006 Amended Order Resetting Trial 
05/10/2006 Motion for Disqu alification of Alternate Judge 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street APR 0 L 2009 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 J. DAVID i,-,j\', "'-,r-,d. Cierk 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 8~' l.I"~'j~ZS 
OFI,iTY
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE 
PART FIVE 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County ofAda ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 












1.	 Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-
Maile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the infonnation and facts set forth 
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can 
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
2.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "CC" is a true and correct copy ofthe reporter's transcript 
from the hearing dated October 11, 2006 before the Honorable Ronald Wilper in the Ada 
County Case No. CV OC 04-000473D. 
3.	 That Berkshire Investment, LLC and your Affiant had invested approximately 
$260,000.00 in capital improvements on the subject property based, in large part, on the 
representations of Beth Rogers acting as trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust that the 
Trust would not seek to rescind the real estate contract and further based upon the fact 
that Berkshire Investment, LLC had obtained construction financing that requin::d the vast 
majority of those capital improvements to be made on the Linder property consistent with 
the tenns of the construction loan contract which was incurred by Berkshire Invl~stments, 
LLC and guaranteed by your Affiant and his wife. 
DATED this lcIay of April, 2009. 
THOMA G. IL ,IV, pro se and 
Attorney for Ber ire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
~ SUBSCRIBED AND S'WORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
~_ day of April, 2009. 









Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30, 2014 








Wednesday, October 11, 2006, 8:50 a.m. 
THE COURT: Please be seated. The Court will take 
up the case of Taylor vs. Maile, Case No. CVOC 0400473-D. 
This is the time scheduled for a court trial. The 
remaining issue in this case, to be tried before the 
Court, is the issue of unjust enrichment, that has been 
pled by the Mailes and opposed by the Taylors. 
Fair enough? 
MR. CHARNEY: Fair enough. 
THE COURT: Now, who will be presenting the case 
on behalf of the Taylors, and who will be presenting the 
case on behalf of the Mailes? 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I will be presenting on 
behalf of the Taylors and the Trust. 
MR. CHARNEY: And I will be presenting on behalf 
of the Mailes and Berkshire, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Would either of the parties - ­
do we have any preliminary matters before we get started 
with the trial? I think that there was a motion to 
strike, and maybe we should get that out on the table, 
the motion to strike a particular witness that the 
Taylors wanted to call. 
MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor. There was a motion 
. 
. 
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1 to strike, I believe it was Mr. Taylor, who was going to 
2 be called for some measure of accounting expertise. 
3 There was very late disclosure of that particular 
4 witness, and we've not had an opportunity to depose him 
5 or otherwise obtain further discovery, and the 26(b) 
6 disclosure was pretty thin, at that. I think it's in the 
7 court file. And so, I don't even know if the Taylors 
8 still intend to call him as a witness, but we would 
9 object to him being called. 
10 THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, how do respond? 
11 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, we do intend to call 
12 Mr. Taylor as a witness. I disclosed him as an expert in 
13 an abundance of caution. They do know he is an 
14 accountant. I don't intend to elicit any sophisticated 
15 accounting. 
1 6 What I will ask him is within the knowledge 
1 7 of any layperson. If they get money for this property, 
18 they'll have to pay taxes on it. We won't attempt to do 
1 9 any calculations or estimations of the amount. 
20 TIlE COURT: Is that the only way you can get that 
2 1 evidence in before the Court? 
22 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: And given that limited purpose for 
24 them calling that particular witness, Mr. Charney, to you 
25 still object? 
Page 12 
1 MR. CHARNEY: If it is limited to that, I think 
2 that that's acceptable. 
3 MS. TAYLOR: We will have other testimony from the 
4 witness, but not in an expert context in any way. Just 
5 that -- the fact that the Trust hasn't received any 
6 money, nor have the beneficiaries. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Was he disclosed as a lay 
8 witness previously? 
9 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. From the beglnning. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Fair enough. 
11 Are there any other preliminary matters? 
12 MR. CHARNEY: Would you like to talk about 
13 possible stipulations, things like that? 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 MR. CHARNEY: We stipulate to the admission of the 
1 6 exhibits, what are the numbers, 111 through-­
17 MS. TAYLOR: 101 through 134. 
18 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 101 through 134, we stipulate 
1 9 to the admissibility of those exhibits. 
20 THE COURT: By the Plaintiffs? 
21 MR. CHARNEY: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Is there a similar stipulation, 
23 by the Plaintiffs, to defense witnesses -- or to defense 
2 4 exhibits? 
25 MR. CHARNEY: They stipulate to all ofmy 
Page 13 
1 exhibits, except for Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 9. And I 
2 believe that the basis of the objection to 7 is that it 
3 violates attorney-client privilege, and the objection to 
4 No.9 is on the grounds of hearsay. 
5 So we can cross that bridge when we go 
6 through the exhibit packets, I presume. 
7 MS. TAYLOR: No.7 was also on hearsay, but I 
8 understand they have subpoenaed Mr. Harwood to court on 
9 Friday so, obviously, that objection may be addressed. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. We have three 
11 days. 
12 MR. CHARNEY: There's one other stipulation. 
13 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
14 MR. CHARNEY: I believe we have another 
15 stipulation that Mr. Maile did, in fact, pay a fair 
16 market value for the property, in the sum of $400,000. 
1 7 So the appraisals, I think, would be appropriate 
1 8 considerations for the Court. 
1 9 Am I mistaken? 
2 0 MS. TAYLOR: Totally mistaken. 
21 MR. CHARNEY: My bad. 
22 MS. TAYLOR: What I have suggested we stipulate to 
23 is that whether or not Mr. Maile paid a fair market value 
24 for the property is not at issue in unjust enrichment. 
2 5 That would let us avoid having the testimony as to 
Page 14 
1 what -- who did what prior to the closing, and all of 
2 that. 
3 So I think it's just as irrelevant, !~ven the 
4 rulings of the Court, the contract has been set aside. 
5 Whether he did or did not pay fair market value, I don'tll 
6 think has any value on the improvements, which is the 
7 issue we're here to try. 
8 We did not stipulate to the admission of any 
9 appraisals or -- and we did not stipulate that he did pay 
10 fair market value. We just don't think that that's an! 
11 issue that is before the Court. j 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Charney, do you believe that the ' 
;
13 fair market value of the property, at the time that , 
14 Mr. Maile purchased it, is a relevant, material issue ! 
15 that needs to be proven? I 
16 MR. CHARNEY: I don't think, in my case in chief, I 
17 it does. But I think, if they -- if the defense to the 
1 8 unjust enrichment claim is that Mr. Maile engaged in 
1 9 misconduct that either put the property in his hands, or 
2 0 engaged in misconduct subsequent to the -- to the 
2 1 contract being entered into, then the fair market value 
22 of the property, at the time he purchased it, may very 
23 well become relevant. 
24 But, as far as my case in chief, initially, 
2 5 no. It would be something to respond to. 
~:i*~~;;ggg ;;;;,g~{",{Miim"""tth -'''-C<-,';'l> 
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1 THE COURT: All right. 1 MR. CHARNEY: Not at the moment. Could we keep it 
2 And, Ms. Taylor, is it your intention to 2 open, somewhere throughout the course of this 
3 present evidence that would essentially support an 3 proceedings, though, so I can get that back in my head? 
4 unclean hands theory? 4 TIlE COURT: Fair enough. 
5 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, it is, Your Honor. But not as 5 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 
6 to the value of the property. 6 TIlE COURT: We won't address it right now. Let's 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Are you saying that you are -­ 7 do our best to use our time as efficiently as we can. So 
8 MS. TAYLOR: No. 8 we'll come back in at 10 minutes until th{~ hour, by that 
9 THE COURT: -- stipulating that ]\11". Maile did pay 9 clock. And I think that clock is off. I don't know what 
10 fair market value? 1 0 time you folks have. 
11 MS. TAYLOR: No, I'm not, Your Honor. I'm saying 11 MS. TAYLOR: Depends on what time you have, 
12 that I don't think whether he did or not is relevant at 12 Your Honor. That's what -­
13 this time. Our unclean hands argument will go to conduct 13 TIlE COURT: Well, I have 8:42. I just set it to 
14 after-­ 14 the computer, which is set to the electronic clock in 
15 THE COURT: Subsequent. 15 Colorado, so I know that my watch is right. So that 
16 MS. TAYLOR: -- after the transaction was closed. 16 thing is about 3 minutes fast. But we're going to take a 
17 THE COURT: All right. We can cross that bridge 1 7 5-minute recess, then we'll reconvene. 
1 8 when we come to it, as well, then. Let's do this. 1 8 And we will -- how do the parties intend to 
1 9 Now, we -- I don't know how long the parties 1 9 proceed? Do you intend to present your {~vidence fust, 
2 0 intend to take to present their -- their proofs to the 20 on your case ofunjust enrichment, Mr. Charney? 
21 Court. This case is scheduled to go for three days. 21 MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor. 
22 Mr. Charney, do you believe that we can have 22 TIlE COURT: How many witnesses? 
23 this case wrapped up in three days? 23 MR. CHARNEY: Two, maybe three, 
24 MR. CHARNEY: I do. 24 TIlE COURT: Okay. And then you'lll present your 
25 THE COURT: And, Ms. Taylor, ~,arne question? 25 evidence and testimony in opposition to their evidence 
Page 16 Page 18 
1 MS. TAYLOR: I do. 1 and testimony? 
2 THE COURT: Very good. All right. We will take 2 MS. TAYLOR: Correct, Your Honor. It was my 
3 a real brief recess, we'll come back in in about 3 understanding that they would use all of the time today, 
4 5 or 6 minutes. Will you folks be ready to go? 4 so I don't have any witnesses ready to go until tomorrow 
5 MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor. 5 morning. Ifwe get done early, I could put Mr. Taylor 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 6 on. He is here. 
7 MR. CHARNEY: Do you have a copy of my exhibits? 7 THE COURT: Fair enough. 
8 THE COURT: I have the Plaintiff, exhibits, from 8 MR. CHARNEY: That may be a likely circumstance. 
9 Taylor. But that's all I have. 9 THE COURT: All right. We'll reconvene in 
10 MR. CHARNEY: All right. 1 0 5 minutes. Thank you. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 11 
12 
13 
MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I also received a notice 
of hearing, for 8:30 this morning, on thdr motion to 
12 
13 
(Recess taken 8:50 a.m. to 8:56 a.m.) I 
14 arnend the July 21 st judgment. Are we not addressing 14 THE COURT: The Court is again on the record in 
15 that? 15 the case of Taylor vs. Maile. 
16 MR. CHARNEY: We need to take that up at some 16 Are the -- I think I'll just refer to the 
17 later point, because I need to look at it, see what it 17 parties as the Taylors and Mailes. Are the Mailes ready 
18 is, if that's okay? 18 to proceed on their case in chief? 
19 THE COURT: Was that something; that you filed, 19 MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor. I 
20 Ms. Taylor? 20 THE COURT: And are the Taylors prepared to 
21 MS. TAYLOR: No. It was something that the 21 proceed? 
22 Defendants filed. 22 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 23 THE COURT: Very well. 
24 Mr. Charney, you're not asking to be heard on 24 Mr. Charney, ifyou feel it would be helpful 
25 any other motion at this time? 25 to make an opening statement, you may do so. You're not 
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5 MR. CHARNEY: You know what, I think that both
 
6 parties are going to dispense with an Opt:ning. I think
 
7 you probably know a little bit about this case.
 
8 THE COURT: Okay.
 
9 MR. CHARNEY: So we'll go straight to testimony.
 




12 MR. CHARNEY: We'll call Thomas Maile.
 










18 one of the defendants herein, called as a witness by and
 
19 on his own behalf, being first duly sworn, was examined
 






23 BY MR. CHARNEY::
 
24 Q. Will you please state your name and spell
 
25 your last for the court reporter.
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1 A. It's Thomas Maile, M-A-I-L-E
 
2 Q. How are you presently employed, sir?
 
3 A. I'm a licensed Idaho attorney.
 
4 Q. Tell the Judge a little bit about your
 
5 practice as an Idaho attorney.
 
6 A. Oh, I was licensed in 1979, clerked with
 
7 Jess Walters for one year. Went into private practice,
 
8 and have been in private practice for, I 1hink, 28 years.
 
9 Q. Where do you currently practice?
 
10 A. My office is in Eagle. Primarily Ada -­
11 Ada County and Canyon County.
 
12 Q. Has your practice been primarily in Eagle the
 
13 entire time that you've been in private practice?
 
14 A. My office opened there in 199].
 








19 Q. Here in court with you today?
 
20 A. She is.
 
21 Q. And as far as just identifying oither parties
 
22 in this case, what is Berkshire Investments?
 
23 A. Berkshire Investments is a limited liability
 
24 company that was established in 2002. lts members are my
 





1 Q. Do you also have any expertise in the real 
2 estate area? 
3 A. I've maintained a broker's license, in Idaho, 
4 since maybe 1980. Back in nineteen -- in the late '70s 
5 and early '80s, the Idaho Real Estate Commission provided 
6 reciprocity, if you will, so that you didn't need to 
7 complete any educational requirements to obtain a license 
8 as a real estate broker, or agent, ifyou, in fact, were 
9 a licensed Idaho attorney. 
10 So I've been actively licensed as ,ill Idaho 
11 real estate agent for the state of Idaho. 
12 Q. Okay. Did you occasionally buy and sell 
13 properties? 
14 A. Yeah. For my -- for our family investments. 
15 I can't remember ofan occurrence where I bought or sold 
16 property for a third party, with the exception of2004. 
17 If I could elaborate, the real estat(~ -­
18 having a real estate license is just that. But there's 
19 another level of real estate called the multiple listing 
20 service, which is a fee required to partak~: of that 
21 service. And with that service, you can access the 
22 database and look at various sales and acltivity that are 
23 listed by real estate agents. 
24 So in nineteen -- in 2004, I activated that 
25 MLS fee with the American Realtors Association, and I did 
Page 22 
1 sell, I think -- either sold one property for a client,
 
2 and -- two properties for a client, I think, in 2004.
 
3 And the intent of reactivating my MLS was to market the
 




6 Q. Is Fairfield Estates the 40 acres that has
 
7 been the subject of this litigation?
 
8 A. Yes; that's correct.
 
9 Q. Okay. Let's go back in time a little bit.
 
10 Did you know an individual by the name of Ted Johnson? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. How did you become acquaintc~d with 
13 Mr. Johnson? 
14 A. Ted came to my office in Eagk, in about 
15 1993, as a legal client for some collection work. 
16 Ted had a tenant farmer out in his Star 
17 property, where Ted lived. And the tenant farmer had 
18 leased the farm ground for a year or two and hadn't paid 
19 Ted, so we did a collection effort for th(~ money that was 
20 due and owing. And we were able to gd a default 
21 judgment and ultimately collect on the judgment for Ted. 
22 That was in 1993. 
23 Q. Did you do some other legal matters for 
24 Mr. Johnson over the years? 
25 A. Right. In 1997, Ted came back to the Eagle 
,,', 
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office and indicated he wanted to do some estate 
planning. Ted was not married. He had some strong 
family connections with Beth Rogers, and some ofhis 
immediate family in the Valley. SO WI~ prepared, and Ted 
executed, a trust agreement for his estate planning. 
And I also think I did a last will and 
testament and also power of attorney, for Beth Rogers, to 
kind of act and oversee on his behalf. I can't remember 
if I did a durable power or a health care proxy, but it 
was -- it was along that line of work. 
Q. When, in the relationship that you had with 
Mr. Johnson, did you become aware that he had this 
40-acre parcel out on Linder Road? 
A. Well, back in '93 and then, again, in '97. 
Ted talked about his two different famIs, one in which he 
lived on in Star and the other one was the 40 acres on 
Linder Road. 
Q. Did you ever have just some general 
discussions with Mr. Johnson regarding the sale of that 
property? 
A. On the -- on the 40-acre parcel, I can't 
remember with specific clarity, but I -­ it was either 
'93 and/or '97, because we talked a number of times 
about, ifhe ever wanted to sell his property, that my 



























think is when the first conference was. 
Q. What did you do in response to Ted bringing 
you that information? 
A. Well, we sat and talked about it. And Ted -­
you know, I was reviewing the contract on one side ofmy 
desk, and Ted was sitting on the other. And Ted, during 
the course of the discussion, he goes, well, this is the 
40 acres that you and I had talked about you some day 
buying, if you wanted to. 
I said, oh. I said, well, does that create a 
problem? The fact that I've expressed an interest in 
buying this property, that could be construed as a 
conflict. Does that bother you, in me representing you 
in dealing with this potential buyer? 
And Ted said, no, no. Not at all. 
Q. What happened next? 
A. So, from that point, in that discussion, Ted 
really didn't know what he wanted to do. By that I mean, 
he didn't know ifhe wanted to buy it -- or sell it or 
keep it, and we talked about pricing of it. And I told 
him, I said, well, you have a $400,000 offer on the 
table. Do you know what it's worth? 
He says, well, I really don't know. I said, 
I don't really know either, Ted. 



























the 40-acre parcel, ifhe ever decided to sell it. 
I told him we had horses, and that we were on 
an acreage in Eagle, and the kids were getting older, and 
it would have been nice to enlarge our property in Eagle. 
Q. All rigllt. So the idea would be, you and 
Colleen would live on one parcel and maybe your kids 
would live in the same area? 
A. Yeah, that's true. But that wasn't really 
communicated with Ted until 2002, that I can remember. 
Earlier, in '93 and '97, it was just 
generally discussing the prospect ofTed, if you ever 
want to sell your property, let me know. I would be 
interested in buying it. 
Q. Okay. Nevertheless, did there come a point 
in time when Ted came to you with an unsolicited offer to 
purchase the property? 
A. In May of 2002, Ted, who I hadn't seen for a 
few years, came to my office, either by scheduling an 
appointment or just showed up, I can't remember which, 
but I remember he filled out a client information sheet. 
And he had a real estate contrac:t that was 
given to him by his, as I recall, his tenant farmer, 
Sam Rosti. And it was from Franz Wilte, the landscaping 
contractor in Boise, for the 40-acre parcel on 




























can try to establish a good opinion on tilir market value. 
You can have a combination ofreal estate agents, or an 
appraiser or two, give you some opinions as to what it's 
worth. 
The long and short of it, at the end of the 
conference, was that we came up with somewhat of a 
strategy that we would -- I would write his accountant to 
find out what tax ramifications he would have, relative 
to ifhe sold the property versus whether he retained it 
and held it during -- at the time of his death. Because, 
if you hold property at the time of your death, you get a 
stepped up basis, so there is an advantage to that. 
So before responding to the attorney 
representing the buyer, the potential buyer, I called 
Ted's accountant, Imogen Harrington, and talked with her 
about the issues of tax and the valuation of the 
property. And, then, she did a follow-up letter to both 
Ted and I, one -- I think the original carne to my office 
and Ted got a copy of the letter. And she outlined the 
tax consequences, if Ted held the property versus Ted 
selling the property. I~ 
Q. SO what happened next? It 
A. Well, we had another telephone conference in IIII 
that period of time. And then, ultimately, I think at liiii 
the end ofMay -- because all this took about a week, to Iii 
5 (Pages 23 to 26) 
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1 I should have put on the record, at the
 
2 accountant -- I met with Ted. And then, at that point in
 
1 get the accountant on line, to get the letter from the 
2 beginning of this trial, I would like a continuing
 
3 time, Ted still really didn't know what he wanted to do,
 3 objection on the same grounds, and also on the grounds
 
4 buying -- or selling or retaining the property.
 4 that, under the cause we're going forward on now, unjust 
5 So I said, well, the only thing we can do is 5 enrichment, the manner in which he initially acquired the 
6 see if we can keep the ball rolling for you, Ted, in so 6 property is not relevant. So I would like a continuing
 
7 many words, and write a letter to the potential buyer,
 7 objection to that.
 
8 and indicating we think your offer is low, and let's see,
 8 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to overrule the
 
9 Ted, ifhe'll come up without even presenting a
 9 objection on relevance. It may be true that the fair
 
1 0 counteroffer to him.
 1 0 market value might end up not being relevant on the issue
 
11 Because I explained to Ted that, ifyou -­ 11 ofunjust enrichment. It may be so.
 
12 you have a $400,000 offer on the table, and if you
 1 2 But, on the other hand, I think that to rule
 
1 3 present a counteroffer for X amount of dollars and he
 13 this early in this proceeding that the manner in which
 
14 accepts it, you've got basically a contract. So I said,
 14 the property was acquired is irrelevant is -- is perhaps
 
15 this is a safe way to see if there's any budge, or any
 15 premature.
 
1 6 movement, in the potential buyer to get them up and above
 1 6 I think that the manner in which the property
 
1 7 $400,000.
 1 7 was acquired is relevant, for purposes of this
 
18 So we did that letter, or I did thf: letter,
 18 proceeding. So that objection is overruled on the
 
1 9 and Ted got a copy of it. And that went out ofmy office
 1 9 grounds of relevance.
 
2 0 at the end of May, 2002.
 2 0 Now, we might -- I think it would be 
,21 Q. Did Mr. Witte budge on his offer? 21 appropriate to listen to both sides' argument on the 
f 
22 A. No. In fact, he was pretty -- Wi;: got a reply 22 issue of statements attributed to Ted Johnson before his
 
2 3 letter back that was very certain that he had done his
 23 death.
 
2 4 research and $400,000 was his top end. He would not go
 24 Now, Ms. Taylor, you have suggested that any
 
25 any higher than that. And in fact, his research, that
 25 statements by anybody other than Ted Johnson, on what 
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1 the adjoining property sold for $7,300 an acre. 1 Ted Johnson allegedly said at a certain time before his 
2 Q. As opposed to? 2 death, are objectionable and they should not be heard; 
3 A. $10,000 an acre is what he was offering. 3 correct? I 
4 Q. Okay. So what happened after Mr. Witte 4 MS. TAYLOR: That is correct. I:5 refused to raise his offer? 5 THE COURT: You're basing that objection on -­
6 A. Well, I didn't -- I had no more contact from 6 MS. TAYLOR: Primarily, Your Honor, on the dead 
7 Ted. I sent Ted the letter from Mr. Wi1te. And I think 7 man statute. And we have argued that previously, the Ii 
8 the letter to Mr. Witte said, this offer of $400,000 will 8 Court found it didn't apply. 
9 only stand until June 20th, or thereabouts, and our 9 We were in a completely different context at 
1 0 family was on vacation, in New York. And when I came 1 0 the time. Now, we're solely looking at a cause of unjust
 
11 back, the letter was a little late getting out to Ted. 11 enrichment, which I think is virtually identical to a
 
12 But I got it out before that deadline of the 20th, and 12 claim against an estate.
 
13 Ted never responded. I never heard from Ted again. 13 Because of the fact that Mr. Maile was the
 
14 I had sent him bills for my legal work, and 14 one that did the estate planning, there was a pour over
 
15 he had paid the bills. And I think my last statement was 15 will, all of the assets went into the trust.
 
1 6 in July, and it showed that it was paid in full as of 1 6 Essentially, the trust is the estate and the;: situation is
 
17 July 1st, I think. 17 indistinguishable from filing a claim against the estate.
 
1 8 Q. SO after that, tell Judge Wilper what 18 He is seeking repayment from the trust.
 
1 9 happened next. 1 9 THE COURT: Okay.
 I 
20 A. Well, now-- 20 How do you respond, Mr. Charney? I' 
2 1 MS. TAYLOR: Excuse me, Your Honor. I neglected 2 1 MR. CHARNEY: I would disagree with the assertion 
22 to do a housekeeping issue at the beginning. We had 22 that the dead man statute operates to prohibit the 
23 previously filed a motion objecting to Mr. Maile relating 23 statements regarding Mr. Johnson. But it's also 
24 any conversations he had with Mr. Johnson under hearsay 24 important to note that most ofwhat we're talking about 
2 5 and the dead man statute. 2 5 here, with respect to the unjust enrichment claim, and 
6 (Pages 27 to 30) 
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1 what Mr. Johnson did or didn't say, isn't being offered 1 contract, it's fine. I trust you on that. Just do the 
2 for the truth of what he did or didn't say, but rather 2 same terms that were in the other contract, as far as the 
3 just to explain why Mr. Maile took the next steps along 3 length of time, the down payment. 
4 the way as he proceeded to purchase the property. 4 I said, well Ted, it will take me a couple of 
5 And, as the Court is aware, most of this case 5 days. I'll get back to you, or Beth, because he had 
6 is going to involve things that occurred after 6 referenced that he wanted either -- well, I had asked 
7 Mr. Johnson's death anyway. So every:hing we have done 7 him, I said, do you want Beth involved with this 
8 thus far is kind ofhistorical groundwork and foundation, 8 transaction? 
9 if you will, to explain why Mr. Maile, and the other 9 He goes, yeah. That's-­
1 0 parties defended here, are entitled to the moneys that 10 Q. Could we stop just a second. We've talked 
11 they're going to be talking about later on. 11 about Beth having some interplay here with Ted Johnson. 
12 THE COURT: All right. 12 But, did you know Beth Rogers at this point? 
13 The objection is overruled, to the extent 13 A. No. No. I don't believe I had ever met her 
1 4 that the information elicited from this vllitness is not 14 prior to July of 2002. 
15 being offered for the truth of the matter asserted in the 15 Q. Who was Beth Rogers, in relation to 
16 statements by Ted Johnson, but simply to explain why 1 6 Mr. Johnson? 
1 7 Mr. Maile took action that he took. 1 7 A. Well, I -- he had described her as someone 
18 MR. CHARNEY: Exactly. 18 that was very active in his life. It was a niece. You 
19 THE COURT: All right. I'll overrule the 19 know, her and her husband, Andy, had cared for Ted's cows 
2 0 objection. 20 out on the Star property. They were active in his health 
21 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: So where I was, Mr. Maile, 2 1 care issues, you know. And I know that he had put a lot 
22 was asking you to tell Judge Wilper about the next time 2 2 of trust in her. 
23 that Mr. Johnson showed up in your office. I believe 2 3 Q. You know, another thing we haven't 
2 4 this was the unannounced visit. 24 established in this record is, how old was Mr. Johnson? 
25 A. Right. Approximately six weeks had gone by 2 5 Was he a young guy, middle-aged? 
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1 since I had seen Ted, or heard from Ted, and he was in my 1 A. No, no. I had a father-in-law, at the time, 
2 lobby of my office in Eagle. And I think my door was 2 that was probably 88. Ted was quite a bit younger, then. 
3 open, so I saw him out there, and I just came down the 3 I think he was in his early 70s, like 73 or somewhere in 
4 hallway. I remember waving at him. I said, Ted, what 4 that neighborhood. 
5 are you doing here? 5 Q. All right. Still capable ofliving on the 
6 And, of course, he stood up. Audhe goes, 6 farm, making decisions for himself? 
7 well, I want to talk to you. So we ended up having a 7 A. Oh, sure. 
8 conference. And he said, are you still interested in 8 Q. Okay. 
9 buying the property? 9 A. He drove himself to the office. You know, he 
1 0 I said, well, Ted, I've always be~:n 1 0 was astute, very alert. 
11 interested in buying your property. 11 Q. All right. So going back to the 
1 2 And he said, well, I had an appraisal done. 12 conversation, then. I departed for a moment. 
13 I said, oh? Well, how much do you want for your 13 A. Well, we -- again, I know, in this 
1 4 property? And he handed the appraisal to me, and he 14 conference, I talked to Ted specifically about how much 
1 5 goes, I want the appraised value. 15 money he could make on the property. I said well, you 
16 So I said okay. I looked at it. And, at 1 6 have the potential of developing the property, because in 
1 7 that point in time, I said well, Ted, you Imow, I need to 1 7 the appraisal itself, it had indicated that the highest 
18 check this out with my wife. You always have to do that. 18 and best use, the most likely purchaser, would be a 
1 9 And I said, we'll get back to you. But I would be very 1 9 developer. 
2 0 interested in buying the property. 2 0 And that kind of made sense. You really -­
2 1 I said I can prepare the real estate 21 and I always recall saying, and I said this to Ted, well, 
2 2 contract, but since I have represented you in the past, I 22 you can't grow onions on ground that's worth $10,000 an 
23 said, I have an obligation, ethically, to tell you that 23 acre. It just doesn't pencil, there's no economics to 
2 4 you have the right to seek independent counsel. 24 it. I said, well Ted, you could make more money doing I 
25 To which he replied, you know, if you do the 25 different things on the property, perhaps even developing 
7 (Pages 31 to 34) 
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1 like a fair price. It was an appraised value. 1 it for yourself. 
2 Q. This was even in light ofMr. Witte's letter, 2 And it just wasn't -- it wasn't his desire to 
3 where he said he didn't think it was w0l1h that amount? 3 do that. He didn't want -- I don't think he used the 
4 A. It was six weeks after that, yeah. 4 word, he didn't want to jump through the hoops, but it 
5 Q. All right. Let's move to the exhibit packet 5 was along that line, that he just didn't want to deal 
6 then, if we can. Do you have a packet in front of you?6 with the governmental issues resolved in trying to take a 
7 MR. CHARNEY: No, no. I've got one and I've got 7 piece of property and getting it developed. 
8 one for the Judge. Do you need another one? 8 So, I think the conference concluded after 
9 THE COURT: This is the original; correct? 9 that. And I told him, I said, I -- you know, we'll 
10 MR. CHARNEY: That is the original. 1 0 prepare a contract and we'll call Beth up and she can 
1111 come and pick it up. 
12 (Exhibit packet handed to the witness.) 12 So, I think that probably happened in July, 
1313 19th as best as I can remember. I never -- I never noted 
14 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: So, let's start looking at 14 anything in my calendar, never filled out a new client 
15 these exhibits, then, and start with Exhibit 1, under the15 sheet, because it wasn't -- but I'm pretty sure it's 
16 July 19th that he was at my office. The appraisal was 16 first blue sheet? 
17 THE COURT: As a housekeeping matter-­1 7 dated the 15th, I think, of July. 
18 Q. Did you eventually enter into a written 18 MR. CHARNEY: Yes? 
19 contract with Mr. Johnson? 19 THE COURT: -- the parties had stipulated, I 
20 A. Well, my wife and I went out there, and we 20 believe, that Defendant/Counter-Claimants', that is 
21 walked the property. And, you know, we said well, 21 Mailes' Exhibits 1 through 6, and No.8" and 10 through 
22 16, would come in without objection, is. that accurate; 22 this -- this could work. This is a nice location. It 
23 was about three miles diagonally from where we had been 23 Ms. Taylor? 
24 MS. TAYLOR: That is, your Honor. 24 living for 20 years. 
25 THE COURT: But you're reserving your right to 2 5 So I went back, prepared a contract from some 
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1 object to Exhibits 7 and 9? 1 of the computer forms that I had in my electronic file 
2 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. 2 base. And prepared the contract, and called Beth Rogers 
3 up, and indicated that there was a contract prepared for 3 THE COURT: Very well. Then, for the record, 
4 Defense Exhibits -- are you moving the admission of these4 her and Ted's review. 
5 at this point? 5 Q. What was the purchase price reflected? 
6 MR. CHARNEY: I will offer the -- those exhibits, 6 A. Oh, it was $400,000, the appraised value. 
7 Q. That was consistent with the appraisal? 7 Your Honor. 
8 A. Yes. Exactly. 8 THE COURT: And reserving -- I won't make any 
9 ruling on 7 and 9, at this time. ]'11 take some argwnent 9 Q. Did you have any participation, whatsoever, 
1 0 on it at the appropriate time. But other than that, lOin the preparation of that appraisal? 
11 A. None. Didn't even know it was going -­ 11 without objection from you Ms. Taylor, I will admit 
12 didn't know it was being done. 12 Defendants, or Maile's, Exhibits 1 throur,h 6, and No.8, 
13 Q. Did you have any -- did you make any efforts 13 and 10 through 16, inclusive. They are admitted. 
1414 to solicit Ted to sell you the property after the 
15 Franz Witte offer died? 15 (Exhibits No.1, 2, 3, 4,5,6,8, 10, 11, 
16 12,13,14, 15, and 16 admitted.) 1 6 A. Not before and not after. 
171 7 Q. And after you received the appraisal, did 
18 you ever attempt to negotiate a better price with 18 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Before we get to Exhibit 1, 
19 Ted Johnson, anything less than $400,000? 19 one other question I had, the appraisal that you looked 
2 0 A. No. I kind of remember that -- that 20 at, was that the one that was prepared by Tim Williams, 
21 Tim Williams and Brad knight? 21 conferencing, telling him and asking him, are you 
22 A. No. It was Brad Knipe. 22 comfortable with this price? 
23 Q. Brad Knipe. 23 And he said yes. And he said he didn't want 
24 to pay for an additional appraisal, didn't want to get 24 A. That's correct. It was -- it was 
25 real estate commissions involved. But to me, it seemed 25 appraised -- the report of July 15, 2002. 
8 (Pages 3S to 38) 



































  . 
.......,,%::::="'"''''-~::::=::::=::::=....,...,....,...,~= ",::::= ,","', ,::::=""::::=,,::::=,',.,'....,...,'1!!m"C"~~::::=::::=::::="'!7':':::::=::::=~....,........,....::::=::::=_~::::=== """"~ ",,=m~=,....,....-'::::=,,~::::" ::::=::::=::::=::::=_'1 
Taylor v. Maile ,- 10/11/2006 ­
Page 39 Page 41 11 
1 Q. All right. Now, let's take a look at 1 So Ted was concerned that Sam Rosti should 
2 Defendant's Exhibit No.1. What is E]lhibit No.1? 2 have the benefit of going through and having another year It 
3 A. This is a real estate contract that I pulled 3 of seeds off of his onions. So I said, that's not a 
4 out ofmy computer and modified for the contract with 4 problem. I said, it's going to take a long time to get 
5 Ted Johnson and my wife and I. 5 the governmental applications through. Five acres, down 
6 Q. Is that the first four pages, which 6 in the corner, is not a problem to keep his onion seed 
7 constitutes the contract, at least the initial contract? 7 there. 
8 A. That's true. 8 So we initialed that as agreement that he 
9 Q. And did Mr. Johnson sign thaI: in your 9 could have -- Mr. Rosti could have five acres of onions. 
1 0 presence? 10 Q. And, then, are the last 2 pages just the form 
11 A. He did. I had called Beth Rogers, she came 11 Deed ofTrust that you had on your computer? 
12 in and picked it up. My wife and I had signed it. So 12 A. Yes. It was -- well, they were one of them, 
13 she must have picked it up the 22nd. I remember meeting 13 yeah. This Exhibit A-2 was attached to the contract-­
1 4 her, for the first time, in the hallway of my office. I 14 Q. All right. 
1 5 said, here's the contract. 15 A. -- as a form. 
16 I remember specifically telling her, too, if 16 Q. Now, let's move to Defendant's Exhibit No.2. 
1 7 you want to take it to an attorney to have it reviewed, 17 What is Exhibit 2? 
1 8 feel free to do that. So she called back -- Beth Rogers 18 A. Exhibit 2 is the assignment that was 
1 9 called back, probably the 24th or 25th, and said 19 referenced in the Exhibit 1. I explained to Ted, on 
20 everything looked fine, and they had mviewed it. 20 Exhibit 1, that the first paragraph gives Colleen and I 
21 I said, does Ted want to come to the office 21 the right to assign. And I explained to Ted that we 
22 or what does he want to do? She said, oh, you can go out 22 would be setting up an LLC to hold titk to the property, 
23 to his house. So I didn't know where he lived. So I 23 which ultimately happened. 
2 4 ended up calling Ted, asking Ted the same thing, do you 24 And, then, sometime in mid-August, maybe 
2 5 want to come in the office or do you want me to go out to 25 the -- just mid-August, I sent a letter to Beth Rogers 
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1 the house. 1 indicating that we had prepared the assignment, 
2 He said, come on out here. So I ended up 2 consistent with Exhibit 1, and it had been signed, I 
3 going out to his house. 3 think, August 15th, by my wife and I. 
4 Q. All right. Signed in your presence though? 4 Q. Now, I note that Beth Rogers signed it and 
5 A. Yeah. We had a long conference about it. I 5 she put title, power of attorney. Was Ted still alive at 
6 went over the substance of the contract. I explained the 6 that point or had he passed away? 
7 essential terms with Ted. And during that conference, I 7 A. Ob, he was alive. 
8 again advised Ted, I said, do you want to seek an 8 Q. Did Beth Rogers have the authority to sign 
9 independent lawyer, because I represented you in the 9 that? Did she have, in fact, have the power of attorney 
10 past? And he declined that, and he said everything 10 from Mr. Johnson? 
11 looked fme with the exception of one provision. 11 A. I believe so. 
12 Q. And that's what I wanted to talk about next. 12 Q. Okay. Moving to Exhibit No.3. Can you tell 
13 There's some handwriting on the frrst page of the 13 Judge Wilper what Exhibit No.3 is. 
14 document entitled Addendum to Real Estate Agreement, 14 A. Exhibit 3, down to the corner, is initialed 
15 which I believe is the fifth page of Exhibit I? 15 with my name T. Maile, 8-20-02. 
16 A. Right. 1 6 This was the pre-application hearing required 
17 Q. Talk about that, if you would. 1 7 ofAda County to start this subdivision process. And 
18 A. Well, Ted had leased his ground to Sam Rosti, 1 8 this neighborhood meeting was scheduled for a certain 
19 for five acres of onion seeds, and the balance of 19 date. We did a mailing consistent with Ada County 
20 34 acres was in alfalfa seed. 20 Developmental Services. You have to do a mailing to the 
21 And I didn't know this at the time, but onion 21 adjoining property owners, and to the titkd owners, 
22 seeds take 3 to 5 years to make them commercially viable 22 which would have been the Theodore L. Johnson Revokable 
23 and profitable, and Mr. Rosti was in his fourth year. He 23 Trust, indicating your intention of doing a subdivision 
I 
24 had one more good year ofonion seeds, whatever the math 24 application. 
25 worked out to be. 2 5 And, at this stage, I had referenced eight ·1 
9 (Pages 39 to 42) 
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1 lots of five acres each, and that was ultimately reduced 
2 down to seven lots of 5-plus acres each. 
3 Q. Okay. Moving to Exhibit 4, what is 
4 Exhibit4? 
5 A. lbis is the warranty deed received, from the 
6 Trust, to Berkshire Investments LLC, September 16, 2002, 
7 regarding the subject property. 
8 Q. Now, I note that that is signed by Beth and 
9 Andy Rogers, as trustees. Had Ted Johnson passed away at 
1 0 that point? 
11 A. Yes. He had passed away, I think, two or 
12 three days prior to this. Well, I think th{:y signed-­
13 I think his death was September 13th. 
14 Q. Okay. Now, after Mr. Johnson passed on, did 
15 you then begin to undertake development efforts for the 
16 property in question? 
1 7 A. Well, I started actually earlier. And 1-­
18 the contract itself, Exhibit 1, had a provision that said 
1 9 I had to do certain due diligence. I have a backhoe, so 
20 I went out and did backhoe tests, perk te,;;ts. 
21 We knew -- we -- we believed, based on Ted's 
2 2 comments, that there was high water in this area. High 
2 3 water is a real problem for development. 
24 So probably in early August we went out, I 
25 went out, and physically dug seven test holes with the
.----------t--------'------"------------1J 
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1 run tests for a -- basically a full irrigation season. 
2 So all of 2003, either I, or my staff, or other folks, 
3 would go out there and measure the water table in our 
4 test holes to determine the fluctuation of ground water. 
5 So we did that all during 2003. The 
6 engineering continued to progress through 2003. 
7 Once we received a preliminary plat approval 
8 from Ada County, which was in 2003, we then, with the 
9 engineers, started work on the construction drawings and 
1 0 construction criteria to satisfy Ada County Highway 
11 District, satisfy DEQ, Ada County, City of Eagle. All of 
12 that is a tremendous amount of work to oversee and 
13 accomplish before you even get to the construction phase. 
14 Q. All right. Now, the transaction was closed 
15 in the late summer of 2002. And recognizing that there 
1 6 has been a court order already, indicating that 
1 7 Beth Rogers had an obligation to go see:k court approval 
18 to close the transaction, did you personally know of that 
19 obligation at that time? 
20 MS. TAYLOR: Objection; relevance. 
21 THE COURT: Overruled. 
22 THE WITNESS: On the contrary. There's been a 
2 3 Supreme Court -- is that the -­
24 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: The question is, did you 
25 know of -- did you know that you need{:d to tell Beth to 
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1 backhoe. I enjoyed working the backhoe, so I went out 
2 and did that. 
3 So I started early on, pursuant to the 
4 contract. And, of course, we did the work with 
5 Ada County. And, of course, I had the ,engineer involved 
6 in early August, 2002, as well. 
7 Q. What other steps did you take? 
8 A. Well, we had the neighborhood meetings, 
9 through the fall of 2002, working extensively with Ada 
1 a County Developmental Services and with the engineering 
11 staff. 
12 In 2002, the water was a huge problem for the 
13 property. And by that I mean, it was -- the water table 
14 was so high on the southwest corner of !the 40 acres, the 
15 engineering staff and I concluded that we had to enlarge 
16 the lots on the south side of the road, on the road to be 
1 7 constructed, so that people can put a septic tank closer 
18 to the center of the property, because the southwest 
1 9 corner of the property was so high with water table. 
2 0 So, we worked with the water -- soil 
2 1 conservationists, and engineers, and specialists in 
22 water, ground water. We had to monitor the ground water 
23 for DEQ and Idaho Department ofEnviJronmental Quality. 
2 4 And it was touch and go, as far as the level 
25 of water goes. But, ultimately, after -- they make you 
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1 go get court approval? 
2 A. No. I did not tell her. And no, I did not 
3 believe she needed it. And she was represented by 
4 David Wishney at the time of the closing. She had 
5 retained another attorney, which I had conversation with 
6 in August or early September, 2002. 
7 Q. Okay. Had you thought that court approval 
8 would be required, would you have simply advised, Beth, 
9 go have a judge sign off on this contract so we can go 
10 forward? 
11 A. Had I believed that -- if something is 
12 required under the law, I most certainly would have 
13 advised somebody to follow the law. 
1 4 Q. And, in fact, had you known that or done 
15 that, those files -- piles of files right there probably 
1 6 would not exist, if I'm not mistaken; cOIrect? 
1 7 A. I don't know. Rephrase that question. 
18 Q. I'm sorry. It was more of a point of 
1 9 argument than anything else. I: 
20 So let's, then, move on. Did you, then, Ii 
21 become aware that the relatives in the Lewiston area were 
22 making some waves about the sale, sometime after it Ii 
23 occurred? I 
24 A. Well, we have Exhibit 5. 
25 Q. Which I was going to get to. But prior to 
10 (Pages 43 to 46) 
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1 Exhibit 5, were you aware of any consternation, from the 
2 northern relatives, that maybe this sale: shouldn't have 
3 gone through? 
4 A. Maybe in March or April of 2003, I had a 
5 letter, either from Connie Taylor, representing her 
6 husband as a beneficiary and her mother-in-law, wanting 
7 some sort of accounting, financial accounting, concerning 
8 the trust. So I knew that -- and Beth had referenced 
9 something, perhaps, in March of 2003 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. Because I had to do something, I had to pull 
12 files. I had to pull files in the spring of 2003 because 
13 Beth wanted information to pass on to some of the 
14 beneficiaries about the financial aspects of the trust. 
15 Q. Moving, then, to July 7, 2003 and Exhibit 5, 
16 did you recognize Exhibit 5? 
17 A. You bet. 
18 Q. What is Exhibit 5? 
19 A. I received this on or about July 7,2003. 
20 And it was an indication that Beth Rogers, acting on 
21 behalf of the Trust, was -- had asserted., through her 
22 apparent attorney, Connie Taylor, that I had violated 
23 certain rules of professional conduct. 
24 Q. Let me -- let me stop you there. After 
25 July 7,2003 did you continue to invest money and effort 
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1 into the development of the property?
 
2 A. It was ongoing.
 
3 Q. All right. Now-­
4 A. It actually became more work, in my life,
 
5 than the practice oflaw for that year, I would say.
 
6 Q. All right. But did you continue to invest
 
7 your time resources and your finances to continue to
 




10 Q. All right. Now, let's talk about this 
11 letter. The first few words of the letter indicate 
12 that I am -- Connie Taylor says, I am n:presenting 
13 Beth Rogers, the successor trustee of the 
14 Theodore Johnson Revokable Trust. 
15 Did you later determine that was a false 
16 statement? 
17 A. I did. 
18 Q. Was that one reason why you continued to 
19 develop the property? 
20 A. Well, Beth Rogers -­
21 Q. We'll get forward. Don't jump ahead. I know 
22 you're a lawyer, too, but -- was that om: reason why you 
23 continued to do the development, because, in fact 
24 Ms. Taylor was not representing Ms. Rogers? 





2 Q. Now, the second paragraph indicated that it
 
3 is apparent that you had purchased the property for far
 
4 less than the fair market value. Was that also a
 




7 Q. Based on what?
 
8 A. Well, Ted had the benefit of gt:tting the
 
9 appraisal from Brad Knipe and Associates, who I knew to
 




12 Q. And, at that point in time, had you also had
 




15 MS. TAYLOR: Objection; hearsay.
 
16 THE WITNESS: That was done later.
 
17 THE COURT: Well-­
18 MS. TAYLOR: Move to strike.
 
19 THE COURT: Hang on. How do you respond to the
 
20 hearsay objection to the appraisal?
 
21 MR. CHARNEY: It was -- actually, I'll withdraw
 
22 the question, because it was my mistakl~. I thought that
 
23 that second appraisal had come prior to this letter. So
 
24 I'll withdraw the question.
 
25 THE COURT: All right.
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1 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: But, in any event, you did 
2 have the first appraisal, and you disagre:ed with the 
3 assertion that you purchased the property for far less 
4 than the fair market value; is that fair? 
5 A. Absolutely. 
6 Q. Okay. So did you, then, after looking at the 
7 assertions in this letter, decide that you were going to 
8 continue to develop the property? 
9 A. At some point in time, yes. 
10 Q. Now, moving to Exhibit No.6. Do you 
11 recognize Exhibit 6? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. What is Exhibit 6? 
14 A. This is a letter that I received. It was -­
15 there was two parts to this Exhibit 6. The first part is 
16 the letter dated July 22, 2003, signed by Beth Rogers. 
17 And then there's a note that was -- a sticky 
18 note that's -- the original is on our counter over there. 
19 Beth Rogers had put a sticky note on top of -- on top of 
20 this letter that she sent on off to Connie Taylor. 
21 And the sticky note provided that she wasn't 
22 at all in support of the theories by Connie Taylor, and 
23 just made it pretty apparent that she didn't like what 
24 they were doing. 
25 Q. All right. Was Beth still the tmstee at 
",'" ''''''''d 
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1 that point in time? 
2 A. Her and Andy were co-trustees; that's 
3 correct. 
4 Q. In reading that portion of the July 22nd 
5 letter, it says, we know we have a fiduciary duty to the 
6 beneficiaries of the Trust to act in their best behalf, 
7 but we also feel we have a moral obligation to follow 
8 Uncle Ted's wishes in the way in which he entrusted us to 
9 do. 
10 Did that give you further support, I guess, 
11 for the conclusion that it was safe to go forward and 
12 develop the property? 
13 A. Absolutely. Because I kept bdieving, or 
14 thinking, that maybe these people from northern Idaho 
15 don't believe that I had -- that there was an independent 
16 appraisal on this property. 
17 So I said, combination of the fact that I 
18 paid fair market value, as established by an independent 
19 appraisal, and that the grantor of the TlUst was doing 
20 what he wanted to do, in the guidelines of being a 
21 reasonably prudent person, I said, it just doesn't make 
22 sense to me. 
23 Q. Okay. Moving to Exhibit 7, and we actually 
24 need to first talk about the third page of Exhibit 7, 





2 MS. TAYLOR: Pardon me.
 
3 MR. CHARNEY: The Wishney le:tter?
 
4 MS. TAYLOR: Exhibit 7 is the Harwood letter.
 
5 MR. CHARNEY: Well, there's two letters on there.
 
6 MS. TAYLOR: No. Actually the third page, only,
 
7 of Exhibit 7, I don't have an objection 10.
 
8 THE COURT: All right. For the record,
 
9 Defendant's Exhibit 7 consists of three papers. The
 
10 first and second papers appear to be pages 1 and 2 of the
 
11 two-page letter dated September 5th 2003, on the
 
12 letterhead of Hall, Farley, Oberrecht, and Blanton,
 
13 addressed to Ms. Connie Taylor.
 
14 And I have not read it. I have it in front
 
15 ofme. It's been offered. Well, it hasn't actually been
 
16 offered yet, but anyway, page 3 of Defl:nse Exhibit 7 is a
 
1 7 one-page letter, dated September 5, 2002, on the
 
18 letterhead of David Wishney.
 
1 9 Ms. Taylor, are you saying that you have no
 
20 objection to the admission ofpage -- this third page,
 
21 this September 5th, 2002 letter?
 
22 MS. TAYLOR: Correct, Your Honor.
 
23 THE COURT: All right.
 
24 And you're moving its admission?
 
25 MR. CHARNEY: I will offer this document, at this
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1 point, and then we're going to go back and talk about the it 
2 Harwood letter in a moment. 
3 THE COURT: Very well. Then, for sake of the 
4 record, I have those original exhibits be:fore me. And I 
5 am going to mark on the lower, left-hand comer of the 
6 third page that this is Defendant's Exhihit 7-A. And it 
7 is admitted. 
8 
9 (Exhibit No. 7-A admitted.) 
10 
11 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Maile, talking about 
12 this particular exhibit, did there come a point in time 
13 when you became aware of the September 5, 2002 letter? 
14 A. It was during litigation that I n:ceived a 
15 copy of the letter. 
16 Q. Were you still in the process of developing 
17 the property when you received this letter? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. After looking at this letter, did you see any 
20 indication that the Trust needed to seek court approval, 
21 after Mr. Wishney looked at the documentation? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Did that lend further support to your 
24 conclusion that everything, as far as the: closing went, 
25 was okay? 
Page 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Now, we need to talk about the Bart Harwood 
3 letter. 
4 MR. CHARNEY: And I understand, Your Honor, that 
5 the objection by the Taylors, in this case, is simply 
6 that this is a privileged communication, subject to the 
7 attorney-client privilege. 
8 THE COURT: Let's fmd out. 
9 Ms. Taylor, Mr. Charney has now moved the 
10 admission of the remainder of Defendant's Exhibit No.7; 
11 is that correct, Mr. Charney? 
12 MR. CHARNEY: I will offer that at this point. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 And, Ms. Taylor, let's hear your objection. 
15 MS. TAYLOR: My objection is nO!: only 
16 attorney-client privilege, but also hearsay. 
1 7 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MS. TAYLOR: If it's not offered to prove the 
1 9 truth of the matters asserted, it's not relevant. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 Mr. Charney, how do you respond to those two 
22 objections? 
23 MR. CHARNEY: The hearsay argument is hard to get 
24 around, so I'll simply just have to call Mr. Harwood or, 
25 unfortunately, perhaps Ms. Taylor, which I don't care to 
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1 do. If there is really truly a hearsay oc~ection to 1 need some foundation to determine in what -- and maybe 
2 this, I can establish the authenticity and get over the 2 you could clear this up for me, Ms. Taylor. Who -- is it 
3 hearsay issue. 3 your contention that Bart Harwood was representing you, 
4 As far as the privileged issue, so that we 4 as an individual, or was representing a client of 
5 don't call Mr. Harwood here and then that be an exercise 5 yours -- can you help me out -- when h,~ wrote this 
6 in futility, I think that the privilege issue is a red 6 letter? 
7 herring. The attorney-client privilege applies to 7 MS. TAYLOR: When he wrote this letter, 
8 communications between an attorney and a client that are 8 Your Honor, he was representing the trustees of the 
9 intended to be confidential in nature. 9 Trust. 
10 Here we have Mr. Harwood, after meeting with 10 THE COURT: The trustees, Beth Rogers and 
11 the Trustees in this case, communicating some thoughts 11 Andrew Rogers. 
12 regarding the matter to Connie Taylor. And I would point 12 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. And the Trust, as an 
13 out that, while Ms. Taylor does represent the Trust right 13 entity, was his client. 
14 now, the previous trustees clearly had intended that this 14 The trust, as an entity, is now my client. 
15 communication, this letter, be sent to somebody else and 15 And I believe he needs the current trustee's permission 
1 6 there is no indication whatsoever that there is any 16 to disclose any confidential information. 
17 confidential, or attorney-client privilege type of 17 And where I'm getting at with this objection, 
1 8 communications in here. So I think that the privilege 18 Your Honor, is -- the other objection I have to this is 
19 argument just rings hollow. 19 relevance. Because-­
20 THE COURT: Well, I haven't read the letter. 20 TIIE COURT: Well, wait a minute, really truly. 
21 MR. CHARNEY: And that's the bind you're in. 21 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. One at a time. 11 
22 THE COURT: Correct. I think the best thing to 22 THE COURT: If someone who is entitled to rely on 11 
2 3 
24 
do, at this point, is reserve ruling on the issue 
completely. Let me make a couple of Gomments. 
23 
24 
the attorney-client privilege waives thai: privilege by 
disclosing the otherwise protected communication with IiI 
25 Mr. Charney, you said that you thought that 25 other people, doesn't that waive the privilege? In other 
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1 you could call, apparently, the author of this letter, 1 words, if the trustee -- if the then trustel~ of the 
2 Bart Harwood, okay, to get over the hearsay objection or 2 Trust, Beth and Andrew Rogers, receive a letter from the 
3 to establish the authenticity. 3 attorney representing them as trustees, and they take 
4 It seems to me if you called Bart Harwood to 4 that letter and they communicate it and disclose it to 
5 testify about what Bart Harwood said in this letter, that 5 other people, how is that consistent with. relying on that 
6 certainly gets over the hearsay issue, but it doesn't 6 privilege that they're allowed to keep these 
7 necessarily allow you to admit the document. 7 communications confidential, at that point? 
8 MR. CHARNEY: True. 8 Do you see what I mean? 
9 THE COURT: Now-­ 9 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. 
10 MR. CHARNEY: I've got the business records 10 THE COURT: And then, realizing that there are 
11 exception, which I think would be -­ 11 successor trustees now, you're saying, well, now they -­
12 THE COURT: Perhaps you could get around a hearsay 12 that the new trustees want to assert the Trust's 
13 objection to the letter in that fashion, by calling 13 attorney-client privilege. 
14 Mr. Harwood; okay. 1 4 It just seems to me that if the cat's already 
1 5 Now, with respect to the attorney-client 15 out of the bag, if that attorney-client privilege has 
1 6 privilege, I really want to discuss this at :,ome greater 1 6 previously been waived by the people who were, then, 
1 7 length. And, again, I -- and I promise all the parties. 1 7 acting as the trustees for the Trust, that it's gone 
18 I truly have not read the contents of this letter. 1 8 forever, isn't it? 
1 9 I'm looking at the date, the letterhead, it's 19 MS. TAYLOR: As to that isolated document, yes. 
20 obviously from a law firm. There's no dispute about 20 TIIE COURT: Yeah. 
21 that. It's written to Ms. Connie Taylor, at Clark and 2 1 MS. TAYLOR: It is, Your Honor. 
22 Feeney, in Lewiston. And just so the record is clear, 22 The problem I am seeing is, it's dear, from 
23 there is no question but that Connie Taylor is an 23 the way this case has progressed, what the Defendant is 
24 attorney. 2 4 going to try to do is infer, from this letter, that 
25 I suppose the question is, perhap8 I would 25 because of this position, there weren't other discussions 
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1 between Beth Harwood -- or Beth Rogers and Bart Harwood 
2 as to whether the Trust had the power to do the sale, 
3 whether the they needed court approval, all of that -­
4 all of that will be privileged. 
5 We will be prevented from answering this 
6 inference. And they shouldn't be allowed to do that, 
7 when they know that we won't be able to cOWlter it. 
8 THE COURT: But you're representing the Trust. 
9 You don't have to rely on the privilege. [mean, as -­
10 Mr. Charney, let me ask you a question. 
11 MR. CHARNEY: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: Are you trying to get the Harwood 
13 letter in, in order to show the effect that the knowledge 
14 of this letter -- I mean, are you going to find out-­
15 are you going to elicit testimony from Mr. Maile, this 
16 morning, to the effect that Mr. Maile was aware of the 
17 contents of this letter and relied on it, in some way, in 
18 further activity that he took? 
19 MR CHARNEY: There are a couple ofpoints, 
20 Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. CHARNEY: First off, that there was some 
23 knowledge about the letter, and -- well, it's difficult 
24 for me to talk about it in a vacuum. 
25 THE COURT: Well-­
Page 60 
1 MR. CHARNEY: But there's indieations in here 
2 that, we will just simply argue, led him to feel safety 
3 about continuing to invest in the property. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. So what -- l'm taking your 
5 comments as, essentially, an offer of proof -­
6 MR. CHARNEY: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: -- that -- are you telling me, then, 
8 that Mr. Maile will testify, if asked, that he was, in 
9 fact, aware of this letter, that it was disclosed to him, 
10 by Beth and Andrew Rogers, while they were still 
11 trustees? 
12 MR.. CHARNEY: Not at the time, but at a later 
13 point in time. 
14 THE COURT: While they were still trustees though? 
15 MR.. CHARNEY: I think I need to confer before I 
16 can -- with Mr. Maile before I could state, clearly, the 
17 answer to that question. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Well, if you are able to 
19 establish that the people to whom this letter was 
20 addressed, that those folks revealed thi~; letter to 
21 others, to Mr. Maile, while they were still the trustees, 
22 then I think that I would overrule the attorney-client 
23 privilege objection to the admission of this letter. 
24 Now, there may be a question, still, as to 
25 relevance. And there may still be a question as to, 
Page 61 
1 frankly, hearsay, and whether or not you're offering it 
2 for the truth of the matter or the affect that it had on 1 
3 the hearer. 
4 MR CHARNEY: Well, there's no doubt the 
5 document's hearsay. 
6 TIlE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR CHARNEY: So, if I have to deal with that 
8 objection, I would just deal with it with an appropriate 
9 witness. 
10 Let me ask Mr. Maile this question about the 
11 letter. 
12 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Maile, when did you come 
13 into possession of September 5th, Bart Haywood letter. 
14 A. The years kind of run together, but I really 
15 think it happened during the deposition of Bart Harwood. 
16 So it probably was -- this is 2006. It was probably in 
17 preparing for last year's trial, maybe September of '05. 
18 Q. September of 'OS? 
19 A. Yeah. I think so. 
20 Q. Now, how did you come into possession of the 
21 letter? 
22 A. I took Bart Harwood's deposition. 
23 Q. He brought this with him? 
24 A. Yes, he did. 
25 Q. Was there any claim of privilege at the time 
Page 62 
1 of the deposition, when he disclosed it? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Was Ms. Taylor there at the deposition? 
4 A. I think Mr. Clark was. 
5 Q. That would be Paul Clark? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Who is also in Ms. Taylor's firm -­
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. -- and represents the trustees? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 MR. CHARNEY: I guess then, Your Honor, it seems 
13 to have been volWltarily disclosed and no objection being 
14 raised when it was initially disclosed. 
15 Another point in the offer of proof has to do 
16 with -- I don't want to talk about the contents of the 
17 letter too much Wltil you rule on it, but the absence of 
18 any indication that one would have had to seek court 
19 approval to close the sale. 
20 Just about a year after the sale was closed, 
21 
22 
which is also seeming to be an area whe:re the Court has 
obviously had concern, but we've had -- this letter, I 
h 
23 think, would demonstrate, one attorney looked at it, 
24 Mr. Wishney looked at it, Mr. Maile looked at it, and 
25 nobody ever had said, hey, there's a -- you know, red 
,~"m" 
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1 alert here. You needed to have a judge sign offon this.
 
2 And that would be a secondary reason for offering this
 
3 letter as the absence of that point, as well.
 
4 THE COURT: Well, I wouldn't 1<::t it in just for
 




7 Ms. Taylor, let me ask you, how do you
 
8 respond to the argument that this letter was disclosed,
 
9 without objection, during a deposition?
 
1 0 MS. TAYLOR: I don't think that I can argue that
 
11 it isn't -- that the attomey-client privilege prohibits
 
12 it from being admitted, just the letter itself.
 
13 But again, where we're headed is an attempt
 
1 4 to raise an inference that, because something isn't in
 
15 here, conversations that would absolutely be privileged
 
1 6 didn't occur.
 
1 7 THE COURT: Okay. Well, what I'm -­
18 MS. TAYLOR: That's our issue.
 
19 THE COURT: -- going to do then -- okay.
 
20 MR. CHARNEY: Your Honor -­
21 THE COURT: No. I don't think fb.ere's any more
 
22 argument required. The issue facing me, right this
 
23 moment, is the admissibility or inadmissibility of the
 
2 4 two-page letter that has been marked D)r identification
 
25 as Defense Exhibit 7.
 
1 It's not authenticity, it's more relevance; isn't it? 
2 You tell me why you want -- why you think I need to see 
3 this. Are you offering it for the truth of the matter or 
4 why are you offering this? 
5 MR. CHARNEY: I'm offering it, as I stated, for 
6 two basic reasons. One, to demonstrate that -- to defeat 
7 any claim that -- let me back up. 
8 Mr. Maile is here on an unjust enrichment 
9 claim, because he continued to develop property after 
1 0 knowing that there was at least a threat of litigation. 
11 And I think it's important for the Court to 
12 recognize that David Wishney looked at the transaction 
13 and didn't see the need for court approval. Mr. Harwood 
14 looked at the transaction and didn't see the need for 
15 court approval. 
1 6 THE COURT: Now, is that last assertion what you 
17 believe will be established by the admission of his 
18 letter? 
19 MR. CHARNEY: I believe in part, yes. And then, 
2 0 fmally, I think that the letter, to the extent that 
21 Mr. Maile had it in his possession and may have continued 
22 to develop the property, after seeing this and knowing 
23 some of the facts that were set forth in this letter, 
2 4 also demonstrates his good-faith reliance on the trust 
25 not going forward with litigation against him, in
1 I had previously overruled the objection, 
2 with respect to -- to relevance. Well, maybe I didn't. 
3 Maybe what I said was, I really had to wait and see how 
4 Mr. Charney wanted to handle the objeetion on hearsay and 
5 relevance; okay? But the attomey-client privilege was 
6 the issue that was most concerning to me. 
7 Now, based upon the fact that tlcis letter was 
8 produced during a deposition, the attorney-client 
9 privilege has been waived, given the fact that Ms. Taylor 
10 had an opportunity, during the depositions -- as I
 
11 understand the testimony, that Ms. Taylor was present at
 
12 the deposition where Mr. Harwood disclosed the letter,
 
13 and didn't assert any attomey-client pri"ilege.
 
14 Is that untrue, Ms. Taylor?
 
15 MS. TAYLOR: Actually, Mr. Clark was there, but it
 
16 would have the same affect.
 
17 THE COURT: Thank you.
 
18 So the attomey-client privilege i~ waived;
 
19 therefore, the objection based on attomt:y-client
 
20 privilege is overruled.
 
21 Now, we still have two other issues, one is
 
22 hearsay. I suppose Bart Harwood could come in and -- or
 
23 the custodian of this particular record could come in and
 
24 establish the authenticity of the letter.
 
25 But that's not the real question, i~ it?
 
1 continuing to develop the property.
 
2 So what I would ask you to do is, on the
 
3 relevance, whether the Court views it as marginal
 
4 relevance or, you know, overwhelming relevance, it's
 
5 still relevant to the issues here.
 
6 On the hearsay, I'm going to ask the Court to
 
7 conditionally admit it, just so we can continue to
 
8 proceed in an orderly fashion. And I will backfill and
 
9 call Mr. Harwood if, in fact, we can't work out the
 
1 0 hearsay issue on some kind of a break. 
11 THE COURT: Well, I think that what you're 
12 suggesting is that ifMr. Harwood had thought that there 
1 3 was a need to get court approval before the sale had gone 'I 
14 there, that that would have been contained in this Ii 
15 letter. 
16 Now, maybe this letter says, I've checked it 
17 out and you don't need court approval or something like 
18 that. But even at that -­
19 MR. CHARNEY: It doesn't say that. I mean, it 
20 doesn't say that. It talks -- well, I want to be careful 
21 that I don't tell you what is in the letter, unless you 
22 want to-­
23 THE COURT: That's all right. 
24 Ms. Taylor, you have risen to your feet. Did 
25 you have something to enlighten me with? 
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1 MS. TAYLOR: Well, I actually just never sat down
 
2 since the last time, Your Honor.
 
3 But I -- I'm in the same position that
 
4 Mr. Charney is in. Without discussing what is in the
 
5 letter, I think it's improper and irrelevant to try to
 
6 infer that a conversation hadn't occurred between
 
7 Mr. Harwood and his clients, at the time, just because he
 
8 chose not to put it in a letter that he was writing to
 
9 someone who was at odds with that client.
 
10 THE COURT: Well, I -­
II MS. TAYLOR: This letter is long after the sale 
12 had closed. 
13 MR. CHARNEY: And Mr. Harwood can come testify, 
1 4 and they have the right to waive the privilege. And if 
15 Mr. Harwood has notes that said, they should have got 
16 court approval, and I had this conversation with Beth and 
1 7 Andy Rogers, then you would think that that would be 
18 testimony that would be offered by the Plaintiffs or -­
I 9 yeah, by the Plaintiffs in this case, and they would want 
2 0 to put that before the Court. 
2 1 So we're not making any inferen<;e. If 
22 they've got that type of evidence, then let's -- I would 
2 3 think that that would be very important. 
24 THE COURT: Well, that can go to argument. I am 
25 not going to admit the letter, at this time. As both
1 Q. Yes. What I want to know is, after closing 
2 the transaction, you sought financing for the property in 
3 question through Idaho Independent Bank? 
4 A. Yes, I did. 
5 Q. Why did you do that, and when did you do 
6 that? il 
7 A. Well, in mid-2003, I had approached Beth by 
8 phone, and I asked Beth if she would consider -- if she 
9 wanted to modify the promissory note 1md deed of trust to 
1 0 allow the Trust to be paid off in what's called lot 
11 splits. So, when I would sell a lot, I could pay a 
12 portion of the balance owing to the The:odore L. Johnson 
13 Trust. 
14 Q. Would this have been a modification of the 
15 prior agreement? 
16 A. Yes. 
1 7 Q. All right. 
18 A. And she said she would talk to her accountant 
19 about it, because it could have had advantages to the 
20 Trust, in addition to having advantages to us. 
21 Anyway, she got back maybe a week or 10 days 
22 later. I either called her as a follow-up, or she called 
23 me back and said, basically, the accountant wasn't 
2 4 interested in adjusting anything. And they just wanted 
25 to be paid off in full.
---------+----=----------------------/\ 
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1 attorneys are -- it's obvious that I don't want to know 
2 exactly what's in this letter, because I'm in this 
3 position ofbeing the finder offact, as well as the 
4 Judge determining, as a rule oflaw, what evidence makes 
5 it into this record, and what evidence the finder of fact 
6 considers. 
7 I don't want to consider this letter from 
8 Bart Harwood, at this time. It seems to me there hasn't 
9 been any showing that Bart Harwood would not be an 
1 0 available witness. There's no showing that -- at this 
11 point, that Mr. Maile relied on certain assertions that 
12 were contained in a letter that he was aware of at a 
1 3 certain point in time. 
14 So, I'm going to just have you move on from 
15 here, Mr. Charney. There may be another way to get 
16 Mr. Harwood's, you know, belief in, later on in the 
1 7 trial, at an appropriate spot. But I'm not going to let 
1 8 it in at this point. 
19 MR. CHARNEY: All right. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. CHARNEY: I'll move forward. 
22 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Maile, let's tum to 
23 another aspect of your testimony, not Exhibit 8 as you 
24 just did. 
25 A. I'm just ready for you. 
1 So that caused us, my wife and I, to consider 
2 different avenues with financing, for construction 
3 financing on the project. 
4 So we went to -- I went to a couple of banks. :111 
5 And Idaho Independent Bank was the barlk that expressed an II 
6 interested in doing the take-out fmancing, to payoff 
7 the Trust and to provide construction financing for the 
8 project, Fairfield Estates. 
9 Q. All right. Now, turning to Exhibit 8, is 
10 Exhibit 8 the deed of trust that was entere:d into between 
It
11 Idaho Independent Bank and Berkshire Investments, and I 
12 believe it's the second line, on January 8th, 2004? 
13 A. I was looking for the Ada Coun~y Recorder's 
14 stamp on it. It's on the first page. It was recorded on 
15 or about that, January 10, 2004. Yes. It is signed by I' 
16 my wife and I, as member managers of Berkshire 
17 Investments LLC. 
18 Q. Now, I note, from the deed of tITlSt, that it 
19 reflects a loan in the amount of $53 1,150. Is that the 
20 amount of money that you borrowed? That's the top line, 
21 I believe, right under where it says deed of trust. 
22 A. That was the extent of what was available to 
23 us. Initially, we borrowed, in January, just a 
24 sufficient amount ofmoney to payoff the Theodore L. t 
25 Johnson Trust in full. 
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3 A. That's true.
 
4 Q. What was the credit line for?
 
5 A. Construction. We-­
6 Q. Go ahead.
 
7 A. The way the commercial loans work is that you
 
8 provide the lending institution with estimated costs of
 
9 construction and development by a certified engineer,
 
10 Joe Canning in this case, outlining -- so the bank would 
11 be comfortable in realizing what the costs would be in 
12 developing the project. The dollar amount to payoff the 
13 Trust, plus those estimated costs, represent the dollar 
14 amount of$531,000.
 
15 Q. AIl right. And for lack of any better term,
 




18 A. Yeah. I don't think we actually used all of
 
19 it. It was, you know, a combined effort of money in,
 
20 money out, and just trying to keep your interest payments 
21 down as best as you could. So I can't remember, but I 
22 don't think we tapped it out. 
23 Q. Okay. And the deed of trust having been 
24 recorded January 8,2004, was there a development portion 
25 of the loan that required you to have tht: property split, 
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1 developed, ready for sale by a certain point in time? 
2 A. Right. The -- AI Knudsen, with Idaho 
3 Independent Bank, and the banking documents, provide that 
4 there has to be construction done within six months, and 
5 the lots have to be marketable within six months, which 
6 really puts your feet to the fire to get everything done.. 
7 Q. What is the purpose of that? 
8 A. Well, the bank, through regulators, they just 
9 have to have the assurances that, when they loan money, 
10 things are getting done and there's going to be a 
11 fInished product that will pay back the b.mk, up to the 
12 amount that it's borrowed by my wife and I. 
13 Q. Turning to Exhibit No.9. 
14 A. Yeah, I'm there. 
15 Q. Do you recognize Exhibit No.9? 
16 A. Yes, I do. 
17 Q. What is Exhibit No.9? 
18 A. Well, what had happened -­
19 Q. No, no. Just what is Exhibit No.9? 
20 A. It's a letter from Idaho Independent Bank. 
21 Q. Is it addressed to you? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Is it signed by AI Knudsen, Vice President of 
24 Idaho Independent Bank? 




1 Q. Is this a record that was kept in the
 




4 Q. Was Berkshire Investments' business the
 








9 THE COURT: Any objection?
 
10 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. I object on
 
11 hearsay. The business record exception doesn't apply to
 
12 the person who just has it in their file. It applies to
 
13 the person who created it.
 
14 THE COURT: Right. That's a fact. I mean, the
 
15 business records exception is a valid exception to the
 
16 hearsay rule. But, an otherwise hearsay document
 
17 doesn't -- you know, it doesn't become admissible merely
 
18 because the person who has it kept it in the ordinary
 
19 course ofbusiness. It's still hearsay. It's authentic,
 
20 but it's still -- it's still hearsay.
 
21 Do you have any other exception that you want
 
22 to offer it under?
 
23 MR. CHARNEY: Well, I could try 803.24, but I
 
24 haven't given the appropriate advance notice. So I'll
 
25 call Mr. Knudsen for purposes of getting this in.
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1 THE COURT: The objection is sustained, and
 
2 Exhibit 9 is not admitted.
 
3 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: After receiving Exhibit
 
4 No.9 -- well, let me say. Before receiving Exhibit
 
5 No.9, did you feel a certain pressure to get this
 
6 project, at least the development portion of
 
7 Fairfield Estates, completed?
 
8 A. You bet.
 Ii 
9 Q. Why? 
10 A. Well, the bank -- I advised the bank -- I 
11 thought it was my obligation to go tell the bank, Ii12 AI Knudsen, in February or March of2004, after the 
13 lawsuit was filed, that these folks had filed a lis Ii 
14 pendens on the project.
 
15 So I went to AI and I said, well, you know,
 
16 this is filed. But, by golly, we feel pretty optimistic
 
Ii17 about it and we're going to try our best to get it 
18 resolved in court quickly. And we're still trying to do 
19 that. 
20 But he -- we -- I had conversation with 
21 him -­
22 MS. TAYLOR: Objection; hearsay. 
23 MR. CHARNEY: I'm not asking what Mr. Knudsen 
24 said. 
25 MS. TAYLOR: I may have been premature, but... .....".", 
17 (Pages 71 to 74) 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. You would object to this 1 payoff 
]2 witness testifying as to what Mr. Knudsen may have said? 2 Q. And in the first few months of the 
3 Okay. And I don't think that was the tenor of the 3 litigation, was there any indication, by way of any court 
4 question, yet. So you're acknowledging that your 4 orders or anything else the Plaintiffs had done, that 
5 objection was premature, Ms. Taylor? 5 would lead you to conclude that the appraised value was 
6 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. 6 bad, or you had engaged in any misconduct which was going 
7 THE COURT: All right. 7 to undo the sale? 
8 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Go ahead, Mr. Maile. 8 A. No. And, in fact, the court order was 
9 A. Okay. So I felt obligated to tell Al what 9 entered dismissing ground one, or the Taylors' complaint. 
1 a was going on. And we had a number ofphone conversations 10 That was in about April of 2004. Beth Rogers and 
11 throughout the following months, February, March, April 11 Andy Rogers were still at the helm, as trustees, and 
12 May of 2004, because my reading of the commercial loan 12 everything was thumbs up from them. 
13 documents that I had executed, Exhibit 8, that, you know, 13 Q. Had Idaho Independent Bank also commissioned 
14 we had certain obligations to the bank. 14 their own appraisal regarding this property before doing 
15 And we had to pursue development or they were 15 this deal? 
16 going to -- they had the right to call the loan due, not 16 A. Yes. That was completed in December of 2003, 
1 7 only for nonpayment of the amount, but any liens that 1 7 by Williams. 
18 were flied against it, and anything that would give them 18 Q. Was the appraised value that was set forth in 
19 a sense of insecurity about the project, including me not 19 the December '03 report also an indication to you that 
2 a doing construction. 2 a you had, in fact, paid fair market value for the 
21 Q. If they called the note due, did you have the 2 1 property? 
22 funds liquid to pay it off in order to protect the 22 MS. TAYLOR: Objection; calls for hearsay as to 
23 property? 23 the amount of the -- the appraisal is not in evidence. 
24 A. No. 24 It has not been submitted as an exhibit. 
25 Q. Had they called the note due, could they have 25 THE COURT: Okay. But that -- as I understand the<-------'-----1------------------------ ­
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1 simply foreclosed on the property and Idaho Independent 1 question, the question was not asking how much the thing 
2 Bank would be the owner now? 2 appraised for. The question was whether or not there was] 
3 A. Absolutely. Well, somebody would-- 3 anything, including an appraisal or anything else, that 
4 Q. Somebody-- 4 would have put Mr. Maile on notice that he might lose thei 
5 A. Someone would have purchast:d it at the 5 property, or that the sale would be rescinded in some? 
6 foreclosure sale, I'm sure of that. 6 way. ' 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Charney, let me ask you to 7 Is that essentially what you were asking. i! 
i8 establish something else, and I may have just missed it 8 MR. CHARNEY: It is, Your Honor. And it's also 
9 during the testimony. 9 offered to show the effect on the listener, or on the 
10 MR. CHARNEY: That's all right. 1 a reader, as to why he felt comfortable continuing to 
11 THE COURT: Did you have Mr. Maile testify as to 11 develop in light of allegations, at the timl~, that he had 
12 the date of the lis pendens, when he first was informed? 12 paid less than fair market value. 
13 MR. CHARNEY: I was -- I have a big star right by 13 THE COURT: All right. Now, I'm going to overrule 
1 4 that very question. 14 the objection. And, Ms. Taylor, it's diffi,;;ult for me to 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 15 see, just because of the configuration of I:he courtroom. 
16 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: I want to talk about -- go 16 MR. CHARNEY: I'm sorry. I'll move aside when she 
1 7 back to refresh your memory on -- Exhibit 8 was entered 17 objects, Your Honor. I: 
18 into January 8th of 2004; correct? 18 THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection 
19 A. Yes. 1 9 because, as I take it, the amount of the appraisal is not 
2 a Q. When was it that you got sued and the lis 2 a being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 
2 1 pendens flied in this case? 21 In other words, I don't know whal: that is, 
22 A. I think it was January 23, 2004. 22 but assuming it's say $400,000, it's -- it's not being 
2 3 Q. SO well after you had already obligated 2 3 offered to establish to the fmder of fact, or the trier 
2 4 yourself to Idaho Independent Bank? 24 of fact, that the thing really was worth $400,000. It is 
25 A. About two weeks after the Trust received the 2 5 being offered to show the effect that it would have had 
18 (Pages 75 to 78) 
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1 construction being done for the final plat, and all the
 
2 proceeding in spite of this contrary knowledge.
 
1 on the person who, you know, is being charged with 
2 governmental hoops that have been approved; highway 
3 Do you see what I mean? So I'm going to 3 district, irrigation districts, U.S. Department of
 
4 overrule the objection.
 4 Geology.
 
5 MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
 5 So I think this is all -- for all intents and
 
6 THE COURT: Go ahead.
 6 purposes, the final plat.
 
7 Q. BY MR.. CHARNEY: So let's -- so that we're
 7 Q. I would note that it appears that the road
 
8 clear, did part of that first lawsuit allege that you had
 8 goes into the center of the subdivision, and maybe -- it
 
9 paid less than fair market value for this property?
 9 looks like most of the driveways, then, would peal off of 
lOA. Yes, it did. lOa center court there? 
11 Q. It was a significant allegation against you, 11 A. Each lot would be serviced, have a driveway 
12 wasn't it? 12 on West Cornerstone Lane, except those that are on the 
13 A. Seemed to be. 13 cul-de-sac. But the entire road is called West 
14 Q. SO we already know, from the record, that we 14 Cornerstone Lane, and it's a private road as opposed to a 
15 had the initial appraisal from Mr. Johnson at $400,000. 15 public road. 
16 A year and a halflater, how much was Mr. Williams' 16 Q. Is it developed with the center, I'll call it 
1 7 appraisal? 17 a cul-de-sac if you will, because of the septic issues 
1 8 A. Well, that was done for Idaho Independent 1 8 and that's the way it needed to be designed to deal with 
1 9 Bank. And it said, at that point in tim~:, the property 1 9 the septic issues you talked about? 
2 0 was worth $4 I 0,000 in the unimproved state that I had -­ 20 A. The center issue, ultimately, was going to be 
21 that we had acquired it in. 21 a landscape area that had a pond that was dug, and anI 
22 Q. SO, with the two appraisals, and then 22 irrigation system was going to be hooked up in the center 1 
23 entering into the deed of trust that obligated you to go 23 area. And that was going to be the irrigation source for 
2 4 forward, and then a lawsuit that said you had paid less 2 4 the seven lots. 
25 than fair market value, did you feel comfortable going 25 So -- and quite a bit of the work had been --------'''----=:..--+----------=---------------11 
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1 forward with the development, on one hand comfortable 1 done to effectuate that, except the actual installation
 
2 because of the appraisals, and on the other hand,
 2 of the pump and the fmal landscaping.
 
3 uncomfortable because you had to develop to maintain
 3 Q. Now, I understand you began construction on a
 
4 consistency with your obligations under the loan?
 4 bam?
 
5 A. Well, to this day, I know that I paid a fair
 5 A. Yes. Up in Lot I.
 
6 market value for the property. And I did back then, as
 6 Q. Was Lot I to be your lot?
 
7 well.
 7 A. My wife and I; that's correct. Ii 
8 And I also know the pressure from the lending 8 Q. Was there any obligation, under the Idaho .1 
9 documents, that I had to get the job done or it was going 9 Independent Bank note, for you to build the bam? 
10 to be called due. I was between the proverbial rock and 10 A. No. 
11 the hard place. 11 Q. That was something you chose to do? 
12 Q. Okay. Let's move to Exhibit 10. What is 12 A. Right. I wanted to build the bam first, and 
13 Exhibit 1O? 13 we had plans drawn up for the house. We were -- that was 
14 A. Exhibit 10 is just a docu -- part of the 14 going to be our home site. 
15 documentation referencing, from B and A Engineering, the 1 5 Q. Had you, at some point in the liIigation, :' 
16 Fairfield Estates Subdivision, which is the 40-acre 16 decided that it would be a wise idea to stop construction 
17 parcel that's the subject of this litigation. 1 7 on the bam? 
18 Q. What does it take to get, I guess, a project, 1 8 A. Well, including paying your bill and a 
19 a development project, to this state where you've got it? 1 9 variety of other reasons, yeah. I stopped construction 
20 Is this a preliminary plat, or is this a final plat? 2 0 of the bam. 
21 That's a question to you. 21 MR.. CHARNEY: Your Honor, I might ask, can we 
22 A. It is a question to me. It looks like part 22 take, maybe, a five-minute break? We're: going to move 
23 of the date is deleted from this sheet. 2 3 into a lot of the drier stuff -- I! 
24 There really isn't much change between the 24 THE COURT: Sure. 
25 preliminary plat and the fmal plat, other than the 25 MR.. CHARNEY: -- about and stufflike 
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3 THE COURT: All right.
 
4 MR. CHARNEY: Just five minutes.
 
5 THE COURT: Fair enough.
 
6 MR. CHARNEY: Thanks.
 




9 (Recess taken 10:14 a.m. to 10:25 a.m.)
 
10 
11 THE COURT: Please be seated. 
12 Are you all set, Mr. Charney? 
13 MR. CHARNEY: I am all set. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Maile, a couple of 
16 follow-up questions, here, before we get into the 
17 finances. 
18 With respect to both of the complaints that 
19 had been filed, the one that we talked about in '04, 
20 January of '04, and the second one, was there ever an 
21 allegation, in either of those complaint;;, that the sale 
22 should be undone because the trustees did not seek prior 
23 court approval? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. SO you wouldn't have had an opportunity to 
Page 84 
1 research that, to see if there was any validity to that
 




4 A. Based on the complaint, I had no reason to
 




7 Q. All right. Finally, on that point, was all
 
8 of the development that you are seeking reimbursement
 
9 for, by way of this proceeding, completed, done prior to
 
10 the point in time when there were court rulings 
11 indicating that that might have been an issue? 
12 A. That's true. The Supreme Court ruled, in 
13 December of ,OS, that -- on that narrow issue, and the 
14 subdivision was fully completed and platted in October of 
15 '04. 
16 Q. Let's continue to move through the exhibits, 
17 then. I think we had left off at 10. So let's move to 
18 Exhibit No. 11. There are several page;; in Exhibit 
19 No. 11. 
20 What is Exhibit No. II? 
21 A. It should be a record of the tax payments 
22 that my wife and I were making on the property since the 
23 acquisition. 
24 Q. Have you, in fact, kept the tax~:s current on 
25 all of the tax years in question? 
"0' "',"''''', 
Page 
1 A. Up through the Supreme Court's ruling, yes.
 
2 Q. And it appears to me that the second to last
 
3 page of this summarizes those amounts?
 
4 A. Well, for the calendar year -- no, it doesn't
 
5 summarize the entire amounts. Let me -- let me try to
 
6 explain it. Going through Exhibit 1 -­
7 Q. I?
 
8 A. Excuse me, 11, page 1, shows dlat in the
 
9 calendar year 2004, there was a total of ..- of two
 
10 payments made of $406.02. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. We made those payments on the property. 
13 The next page of Exhibit 11, actually, one, 
14 two, three, four five, the next five pages ofExhibit 11 
15 come from the Ada County tax records, showing what the 
16 assessed values are after the subdivision is platted. 
17 You go from agricultural base ground in 2004, and now, in 
18 2005, the Ada County Assessor's Office is basing it on an 
19 improved subdivision. 
20 And then, the page, the following page -­
21 Q. Let's back up, just so that we're clear about 
22 this. It appears that the property address on the second 
23 page, for example, is 4680 West Cornerstone, the third 
24 page is 4602 West Cornerstone and so on, and so forth; is 
25 that fair? 
Page 
1 A. That's true.
 






5 Q. And have you kept those current?
 
6 A. Up through -- paying in December 'OS, I paid
 
7 $9,527.69 for that tax year, 'as.
 
8 Q. And then the fmal sheet in page -- in
 
9 Exhibit 11, I should say, is what?
 
10 A. It shows the calendar year 2003, My wife and 
11 I paid $702.98 for real estate taxes on the subject 
12 property. 
13 Q. As far as the unjust enrichment claim goes, 
14 do you believe that you should be repaid by the Trust for 
15 making these tax payments? 
16 A. Yes, I do. 
17 Q. Why is that? 
18 A. Well, the Court has ruled that it's their-­
19 the title is in the Trust, currently, and they would have 
20 had to have made those payments. And][ was acting under 
21 the color of title, if you will, that the property was 
22 ours. So I made the payments during that period of time. 
23 Q. Let's move to Exhibit 12. Do you recognize 
24 Exhibit 12? 
25 A. Exhibit 12 was a docunlent m 
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1 discovery, in response to interrogatories, that tries to
 
2 give a summary, a reconstruction of the various items for
 
3 construction that were incurred, and when they were paid.
 
4 This would be for Fairfield Estates, partial costs.
 
5 Q. When did you prepare this?
 
6 A. Probably in 2005.
 
7 Q. Does this reflect all of the expenses
 
8 associated with the development of Fairfield Estates?
 
9 A. No. I don't -- I don't think it did because,
 
10 the work sheet, Exhibit 13, probably is a better overall 
11 of the -- of what I consider to be expenses associated 
12 with the development of the Fairfield Estates 
13 Subdivision. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. But we could not make a paper trail for the 
16 entirety ofExhibit 13. So some of the items in 13 were 
1 7 not included in 12, because we didn't -. we couldn't 
18 figure out when they were incurred, for example. 
19 Exhibit 13 shows when they were paid. 
20 Q. And the incurred demonstrate:;, for example, 
21 if we look at 2003, B and A Engineers, this was incurred 
22 December of 2002, in the amount of$2,143.25? 
23 A. Right. 
2 4 Q. SO this is to help the Court understand when 




1 when it was actually being paid?
 
2 A. That's true.
 




5 A. Yeah. It's a business record of our
 
6 QuickBooks program that we use. It's labeled, it's
 
7 printed 2/02/05. But it's a transaction history, and up
 




10 Q. Yes? 
11 A. So this Exhibit 13 was our internal 
12 bookkeeping, to try to show what items went into 
13 Fairfield Estates. And they also include payments. For 
14 example, on 6/1/2003, Theodore L. Johnson Trust was paid 
15 $32,357. That was a combination of interest and 
1 6 principle on the note. 
1 7 Q. Do you believe that that's fairly included in 
1 8 the unjust enrichment claim, since] think it's an agreed 
19 upon, between the parties, that you will get the $400,000 
2 0 for the initial purchase price of the lot? 
21 MR. CHARNEY: Actually, before I ask that 
22 question, is that an agreed upon, that prot of the order 
23 in this case? We're not disputing the $400,000, his 
2 4 entitlement to the $400,000? 
25 MS. TAYLOR: We'renot. But we're asserting an 
Page 8 9 .~ 
1 offset for attorney fees.)
 
2 MR. CHARNEY: All right.
 
3 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: But for purposes of this,
 
4 we're assuming that we're talking about funds above
 
5 $400,000. So, as far as that entry, 6/1/03, for 32,357,
 
6 is that really included in the $400,000 that the parties
 
7 have already agreed to?
 
8 A. Well, no. Because we have, before the Court,
 
9 A request for prejudgment interest on that $400,000. So
 
1 0 some of that -- well, excluding the prejudgment interest,
 
11 just back out the $32,000, because I know that there will
 






15 A. I don't know if that answers the question.
 
16 Q. In other words, on the second page we have a
 
1 7 total amount of costs associated with Fairfield Estates
 
18 of$210,120.77. My question is, should that be reduced
 
19 downward by the Court by $32,357, since the $400,000 is
 
2 0 already accounted for?
 
21 A. Yes. In that sense, yeah. But, there's one
 















4 A. And that was mislabeled, and I know
 
5 Joe Corlett didn't catch that. It's employees' fees for
 
6 construction of remodel. That's not true.
 
7 Hope Development is a construction company
 
8 that -- that I -- that is a family-run construction
 
9 company. And in this case, in developing Fairfield
 
10 Estates, we had -- Hope Development was retained, by 
11 Berkshire Investments, to handle certain portions of the 
1 2 construction. 
13 So Hope Development hires its employees, and 
14 they did work out on Berkshire property for the -- a 
15 portion of it, certainly, was related to grading, 
1 6 excavating, and also the installation of pipe, for 
1 7 example. 
1 8 If I can just back up to the plat and I 
19 subdivision -­
2 0 Q. Exhibit 10? 
21 A. Right. I can explain. On Exhibit 10 -- I I,
22 alluded to it a little bit before, but Exhibit 10 has 
23 this circular plat. And in the middle of the platted 
2 4 area is an irrigation lake or pond. 
25 The irrigation system used to be flood 
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1 irrigation out on this property, as agricultural land.
 
2 In order to do lots, and make them commercially
 
3 reasonable for resale, nobody has time, that lives on a
 
4 5-acre parcel, to irrigate land by flood irrigation. So
 
5 you have to have pressurized systems.
 
6 So Hope Development, in addition to doing
 
7 grading with backhoes, bulldozers, they also were
 
8 commissioned to install gate pipe, buried pipe, that was
 
9 up from the northeast corner.
 
10 Water came down the northeast corner of 
11 Lot 10, down a cement irrigation line. And from that 
12 point, which is between Lots 3 and 4, there is buried 
13 pipe that goes to service this irrigation area in the 
14 center of the subdivision. 
15 So the entry, for example, Hope Development 
16 on 10/22/04, each year, historically, my company in this 
17 case, Thomas Maile Real Estate Company, pays Hope 
18 Development, typically annually, for its contract 
19 services for any development that I might do. 
20 So this $23,000 was done for the installation 
21 of the irrigation system and other item8. 
22 So that-­
23 Q. Can I -- was this money paid to you, or paid
 
24 to the actual people that did the work?
 
25 A. Well, Hope Development is my family company,
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1 but -- so one ann of my family paid, in essence, another
 
2 ann ofmy family business. But, as a lawyer, I don't
 
3 hire construction workers. So Hope D(~velopment hires
 
4 construction workers to do construction work. I think
 
5 Joe Corlett missed that in his analysis.
 
6 But here, again, when -- this was for
 
7 internal bookkeeping. If this was done by a private
 
8 contractor, the fees would be quite a bit higher than
 
9 what Hope Development charged our f1IIlily.
 
10 Q. Okay. So you think that that's a valid 
11 charge?
 
12 A. Oh, absolutely.
 
13 Q. Okay. It all -­
14 A. That -- the entry says 5811 Airport Road,
 
15 because Hope Development also did work out there. But
 
16 it had the line item for -- the secretary didn't delete
 
17 5811 Airport Road. It should have been deleted.
 
18 Q. All right. So there's that error. And your 
19 belief, as far as the unjust enrichment portion of this, 
20 is that the 210,120.77 should be reduced by the 32,357? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 A. And there might be some -- a different 
24 reduction, too. 
25 Q. And that's, at least, as far as your hard ...._. 
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1 costs invested into this property? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Let's, then, move to Exhibit No. 14. Do you 
4 recognize Exhibit 14? 
5 A. Exhibit 14 is basically the same scenario, as 
6 far as our internal accounting system, that shows what 
7 was done on Lot 1, where the barn -- where our home was 
8 to be built and the barn is back built. 
9 Q. Is it a fact there's a barn that's partially 
10 built on the property right now? 
11 A. I would like to think it's 90 percent done. 
12 The barn was started in October of'03. We had 
13 excavation work done in October of'03. We had footings 
14 formed in '03 and poured. 
15 And then, in November, the framing crew went 
16 out, and they started to actually put the sticks up on 
17 the barn, through November and December. Then the bad 
18 weather hit, so the sticks, depicted in the pictures, 
19 were in the -- just up in the air. 
20 The lawsuit hits. We have quite a bit 
21 invested in materials. So, here again, if you don't 
22 cover up what you've done in construction, the wood is 
23 going to warp and a variety ofproblem8. 
24 So I felt that it was prudent to finish the 
25 barn, at least to the point where it's up and shingled, 
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1 the siding is up and painted, the concrete is poured. 
2 We didn't put on the exterior doors, because it just -­
3 it just didn't -- at that point in time, we 8aid okay. 
4 I intended to enclose to keep the trespassers out, but we 
5 got some doors done. But the big overhead doors at both 
6 ends, we haven't -- we haven't gotten those done. 
7 Q. Is it fair to say, then, that Exhibit 14 
8 reflects that you spent $31,111.24 on the barn, to date? 
9 A. Yes. Well, you have to back out -- the 
10 barn -- the Classic Cottage Company, any entry with 
11 Classic Cottage Company relates to the home design that 
12 we had out there. 
13 Q. Oh. 
14 A. So you have to back those out. 
15 Q. Okay. So, I see the first entry and the 
16 third entry -­
17 A. Right. 
18 Q. -- should be backed out? 
19 A. Right. Because that relates to a. house that 
20 we have plans for, but isn't being built right now. 
21 Q. Let's move to Exhibit 15. Do you recognize 
22 Exhibit IS? 
23 A. This shows a -- as ofFebruary 8, 2006, that 
24 there is a total due of$I,476 on irrigation. 
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1 prejudgment interest. And the following year would yield1 A. I thought $637 was paid, but] didn't -- we 
2 $28,781.76.2 had paid, in the years 2003, 2004 -- it works out to be 
3 The next bold item is for the next year, 3 $80 I a year. Anyway, we have not paid the last, 2006. 
4 from January 8,2005 through January 7,2006. That4 Q. SO how much have you paid for irrigation, 
5 amounts to $38,715.37. 5 then? 
6 The next entry is going from January 8,2006.6 A. I would say three years at $80 I a year. 
7 The per diem rate on that dollar amount is $118.80 per7 Q. All right. And the Trust would have had to 
8 day. Going to October 19,2006 equals $33,382.80, for a 8 pay that-­
9 total $156,717.68 for prejudgment interest on the9 A. Yes. 
10 purchase price paid, in the increments when they were10 Q. -- if they were in possession of the 
11 paid, in three different installments, because there11 property? 
12 were, basically, three different payments, at three 12 A. Yes. 
13 different dates, that the trust was finally paid off.13 Q. SO three years at $801 -- is it S801.60 
14 Q. You initially had to borrow money to purchase14 actually? 
15 this property; is that fair to say? 15 A. That's what I think, yes. 
16 Q. Okay. Finally, let's move to Exhibit No. 16. 16 A. Yeah. We had a line of credit, yes. 
17 Q. And had you paid interest on that line of17 Do you recognize Exhibit 16? 
18 credit?18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. What is Exhibit 16? 19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Do you still owe any money on it, at this20 A. It's a calculation relating to prl~judgment 
21 point?21 interest on monies paid to the Trust. 
22 Q. If you can, walk the Judge through items I, 22 A. No. On that line of credit, we've paid it 
23 2, and 3 on Exhibit 16. 23 off. 
24 A. Okay. We paid -- Berkshire Investments, my 24 Q. Did it roll into something else that you have 
25 wife and I, paid $100,000 on September 17,2002. That 25 been paying interest on in the interim, or is that paid 
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1 off and, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, 1 was the date of closing. 
2 would you own this property free and clear right now? 2 So, everything related to Paragraph I shows 
3 A. I would own it free and clear now. 3 what prejudgment interest is, on that dollar amount, for 
4 Q. Okay.4 the three years following, including a per diem for this 
5 MR. CHARNEY: Usually, before any ofmy questions,5 last year. I have assumed that a decision may not be 
6 I consult with my client and he is usually over there, 6 rendered until October 19th, but I just I~hose that date 
7 Judge. Can I just approach Mr. Maile, just briefly, make 7 somewhat arbitrarily. That equals $1,478.08 on the per 
8 sure we have covered everything? 8 diem of that $100,000 paid, for that portion of this 
9 THE COURT: Yes. 9 third year. 
1010 On line item 2, we have paid the Trust 
11 (Discussion between Counsel and Mr. Maile.) 11 thirty-two -- we paid the Trust $32,357 on May 19,2003. 
1212 So on that dollar amount paid to the Trust, 
13 prejudgment interest, it's a liquidated undisputed 13 MR.. CHARNEY: Your Honor, I don't have further 
14 questions.14 amount, and a 12 percent interest applies for that 
15 THE COURT: Very well. 15 following year, to take you to May 18,2004. That totals 
16 $3,882.84. 16 Are you ready to cross-examine, Ms. Taylor? 
17 MS. TAYLOR: lam, Your Honor. [fIcouldhave17 And so, too, with the second year, shows a 
18 just a moment. 18 $4,348.78 amount. And the third year shows $4,870.63. 
1919 And the per diem, from May 19th, is fourteen -- excuse 
20 me, May 19, 2006, is $14.95. Taking that to October 19th 20 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
21 BY MS. TAYLOR:: 21 equals $2,242.50. 
22 Q. Mr. Maile? 22 And then, finally, Paragraph 3 shows, on 
23 A. Yes?23 January 8th, when Idaho Independent Bank paid off the 
24 Q. Are you ready to proceed? 24 Trust, $2,390 -- 848.03 was paid as a -- and we assert 
25 A. Ifyou would give me a second, I seem to have 25 that that's a liquidated amount that's subject to 
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1 made a mess out of this exhibit binder that I have. 1 (Exhibits No. 101 through 134 are admitted.) II 
2 Okay. 2 
3 Q. I would like to start with the year 2002. At 3 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Maile, you -- this is a 
4 that time, you had been an attorney for about 25 years; 4 copy ofMr. Johnson's Last Will and T{:stament; correct? 
5 is that right? 5 A. Yes. 
6 A. 24, 25, yes. 6 Q. And you prepared that? 
7 Q. And in the course of your representation, you 7 A. Yes. 
8 had handled a considerable number of lawsuits? 8 Q. Would you look at Paragraph 402, on page 2. 
9 A. At times, yes. 9 A. Yes. 
1 0 Q. You appealed a number of cases to the 1 0 Q. Is that what is known as a pour over 
11 Supreme Court? 11 provision? 
12 A. I have appealed cases to the Supreme Court. 12 A. Yes, it is. 
13 Q. And you are aware, as an attomey, that 13 Q. Under the terms of that, ifMr. Johnson had 
1 4 there's never a guarantee on what will happen in 14 any assets that hadn't been transferred into the Trust, 
15 litigation? 15 upon his death, they would be transferred into the trust? 
1 6 A. I think some cases are, yeah. 1 6 A. That's what the intent is yes. 
1 7 Q. You have lost cases you thought you should 1 7 Q. The intent is to avoid the necessary -­
18 have won? I 8 necessity of probate? 
19 A. Yes. 19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. You have lost cases, on appeal, you thought 20 Q. Can you turn to page 106 -- or Exhibit 106, 
21 you should have won? 21 please. 
22 A. Yes. 22 A. Okay. 
23 Q. SO, in this case, you knew that there was 23 Q. Is that a copy of the revokable trust 
24 never a guarantee that you would prevail? 24 agreement that you prepared for Mr. Johnson? 
25 A. That's true. 25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. And you, in fact, did not prevail? 1 Q. And you were aware of the fact that 
2 A. Not currently. 2 Beth Rogers was one of the beneficiaries under that 
3 Q. And in 2002, you handled real estate matters? 3 trust, were you not? 
4 A. For clients? 4 A. At the time I drafted this, sure. 
5 Q. For clients. 5 Q. And throughout all of the dealings with the 
6 A. Yes. .6 Trust, you knew that she remained a beneficiary under the 
7 Q. And you also had handled estate planning? 7 trust? 
8 A. Yes. 8 A. We -- say that again. 
9 Q. Can you turn to Exhibit No. 105 in the 9 Q. That situation didn't change? 
1 0 Plaintiffs Exhibit folder? lOA. I assume it didn't change. 
11 THE COURT: Is there any estimation among the 11 Q. Okay. And you knew that undl~r the Trust, as 
12 parties -- we may have covered this early -- is there a 12 you had drafted it, there were different classes of 
13 stipulation with respect to these exhibits? 13 beneficiaries? 
1 4 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. They have all been stipulated 14 A. I did at the time, yes. 
15 as admitted. 1 5 Q. There were direct beneficiaries, which would 
16 THE COURT: Is that correct? 16 be the children ofTed Johnson's siblings, if the sibling 
17 MR. CHARNEY: That is correct, yes. The 1 7 had already died? 
18 Plaintiffs binder can be offered and admitted. 18 A. Okay. That's true. 
19 THE COURT: For the record, then, Plaintiffs 19 Q. And did you know what class of beneficiaries 
20 Exhibits -- let's see, how are they numbered again? 20 Beth Rogers fell into? 
2 1 MS. TAYLOR: 101 through, I believe, 134. 21 A. For what period of time? 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 22 Q. At the time this was drafted. 
23 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, 134. 23 A. At the time it was drafted, sure. 
24 THE COURT: 101 through 134, vrithout objection, 24 Q. And which category was she in? I 
25 are all admitted then. 25 A. Beth Rogers? •• 
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A. I have to look and see. 
THE COURT: Can you point him to the provision to 
answer the question? 
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, I can. It's Roman numeral 4, 
Subparagraph, A on page 4. 
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Well, I may be able to ask a 
question that would be a little more clear. 
Were you aware that Beth Johnson's father was 
Ted Johnson's brother, that she was Mr. Johnson's niece? 
A. I knew that, yes. 
Q. Were you aware that her father had died? 
A. When? 
Q. At the time this was prepared. 
A. Back in '97? 
Q. Um-hmm. Just to assist you, Ithe second 
paragraph, under Number A, talks abO'llt an immediate 
distribution to the surviving issue ofRichard Johnson. 
A. Okay. I see that. 
Q. Were you aware that Beth Johnson was 
Richard Johnson's daughter? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever ask who her father was? 



























A. I don't believe so, no. 
Q. And you - you were aware, prior to this 
transaction being closed, that Ted Johnson had died? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You received a telephone call informing you 
of that fact? 
A. I remember -- I can't remember if I called 
because I saw it in The Statesman, or whether I received ,I 
a call. But I knew he had passed away. ...... 
MS. TAYLOR: May I have a moment, Your Honor? I' 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Can you turn to Exhibit 114, 
please. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Is that a copy ofa message record, from your 
office, that you printed out and provided in discovery? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in looking at this, on the third entry 
down, you were informed on August 2nd of 2002 that 
Ted Rogers had had a heart attack? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had never had any contact -- I said 
Ted Rogers. I meant Ted Johnson. You had never had any 
contact with Mr. Johnson after the signing of the earnest 
money agreement on July 25, 2002? 



























Q. Did you ever ask Ted Johnson who the children 
of Richard Johnson were? 
A. In '97? 
Q. In '97. 
A. I don't believe so. 
Q. Okay. And as this transaction was -- with 
the Linder Road property was being developed, at that 
time did you ask what class ofbeneficiaries Beth Rogers 
would have fallen into? 
A. At the time the Linder Road was being 
developed? 
Q. When you were buying the Linder Road 
property? 
A. In July of2002? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't ask? 
A. No. 
Q. After Ted Johnson died, you were informed 
that he had died; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At that point, did you make any effort to 



























A. I don't think so. 
Q. SO after Ted Johnson died, YOUl knew that 
Beth Rogers and her husband, Andy, were co-trustees of 
the Trust? 
A. No. I knew that they were exercising the 
capacities as co-trustees in August, because they I 
signed -- or Beth signed an assignment as co-trustees of 
the Trust. 
Q. Okay. Let's go back and look at that 
assignment. I believe it was your Exhibit No.1 O. I'm 
not sure on the number. Il 
Actually, that is Defendant's Exhibit No.2. 
And looking at page 3 of that assignment, Beth Rogers 
didn't sign as a co-trustee, did she? 
A. No, she didn't. 
Q. She signed as a power ofattorney? 
A. That's true. 
Q. But there's no question that by the time this I 
transaction closed, she and her husband were the !J 
co-trustees? .. 
A. That's true. 
Q. And the Supreme Court has ruled that that 
created a conflict of interest; correct? 
A. That's the way you read it. I don't read it 
that way. 
25 (Pages 103 to 106) 
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1 Q. This Court has ruled that it created a 1 as the new trustees, they had an independent duty to look 
2 conflict of interest; correct? 2 into this transaction?
 
3 A. I would have to look at that decision. You
 3 A. By that, you mean look into the transaction
 
4 know, I read that Supreme Court decision probably eight
 4 of the fair market value of the property, or the real
 
5 times, I've read Judge Wilper's opinion a couple of
 5 estate contract itself?
 
6 times. [would have to read it again.
 6 Q. The entire propriety of the transaction,
 
7 Q. Would you like to take the time to do that
 7 after Mr. Johnson's death.
 
8 now?
 8 A. No. I didn't advise them.
 
9 A. Ifyou want.
 9 Q. Okay. And after the sale was dosed, you
 
lOmE COURT: Well, maybe you can make your point in
 1 0 proceeded to take possession of the property?
 
11 a quicker manner.
 11 A. Yes.
 
12 MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
 12 Q. And you have had possession of the property
 
13 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: The written decision issued
 13 from that date until -- fonnally, until the court ruling
 
14 by the Supreme Court, and Judge Wilper, both have
 14 on July 21 st of 2006; correct?
 
15 indicated that her dual role as a trustee and beneficiary
 15 A. Yes.
 
16 created a conflict of interest. I'm not asking whether
 16 Q. You have made use of the property during that
 




 18 A. Well, I -- I haven't been able to use it
 
19 Q. I'm just asking you to confirm that that's
 1 9 entirely. I have done things on the property. I haven't
 
2 0 the decisions.
 20 been able to build a home there, because I can't get
 
2 1 A. I don't think it is. I think -- I think they
 2 1 financing. The title is clouded.
 
22 were saying that court approval was necessary.
 22 Q. But you've had access to the property?
 
23 Q. And you drafted the real estate documents for
 23 A. That is true.
 
2 4 the closing?
 2 4 Q. You have had hay cut from the property?
 
25 A. Yes.
 25 A. That's true.
1------------------------+-------------------------- ­
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1 Q. You knew that Mr. Johnson had died? 1 Q. You have hay stored on the property?
 
2 A. Yes.
 2 A. Yes.
 
3 Q. You had a duty, at that time, to draft those
 3 Q. You, to this day, have hay stored on the
 
4 documents in a way that complied with Idaho law?
 4 property?
 
5 A. After his death?
 5 A. It's no longer hay. It's something. You
 
6 Q. At the time you drafted the documents.
 6. can't feed it to anything, but there's something there. I 
7 A. Okay. Yeah. I had a duty to draft proper 7 Q. There's a big pile of something there? 
I8 documents, yes. 8 A. That's true.
 
9 Q. You knew that the sale had not been approved
 9 Q. That you placed there?
 
1 0 by a court?
 10 A. That's true. I' 
11 A. When? Well, it hasn't. Not to this day it 11 Q. There's also some equipment there, at this
 
1 2 hasn't, sure.
 12 time?
 
13 Q. And you knew that?
 13 A. Yes. There's probably -- there's a tank
 
14 A. When?
 14 there that needs to be removed, and also a tractor part,
 
15 Q. You have always known that.
 15 yes.
 
1 6 A. Yes, that's true.
 16 Q. Prior to the Court's decision July 21st of 
, 
1 7 Q. You knew that David Wishney's review of these 17 2006, the -- none of the Plaintiffs had access to this
 
18 documents had occurred prior to Ted Johnson's death?
 18 property; did they?
 
1 9 A. I knew, at least, he met with him one time
 19 A. Well, I think, ofcourse, they did, like
 
20 prior to death. I don't know ifhe was in contact with
 20 anybody, the public. There was no trespassing signs.
 
21 Beth Rogers after that. I don't know.
 21 But they couldn't plow a field out there, if that's what
 
22 Q. You haven't received anything to indicate
 22 you mean.
 
23 that he was?
 23 Q. Right. And they couldn't rent the property
 
2 4 A. That's true.
 24 out?
 
25 Q. You didn't advise either of the Rogers that,
 25 A. That's true. 
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1 Q. At the time you bought the property, there
 




4 Q. And the Trust has not been able to obtain the
 




7 A. Well, I think he paid the Trust for the year
 




10 Q. And that was the term you negotiated between 
11 you; right? 
12 A. Between me? 
13 Q. Between you and -- at the time of -- the 
14 earnest money agreement was signed, you talked about the 
15 problem with the onion seeds? 
16 A. Right. 
17 Q. But other than that, this is not property 
18 that the Trust, or the individual Plaintiffs, could take 
19 any action regarding? 
20 A. Not until there has been a court resolution, 
21 that's true. 
22 Q. You've already stated that undt:r the Idaho 
23 Independent Bank loan, there wasn't a requirement that 
24 you build a barn on the property? 
25 A. That's true. 
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1 Q. You were building that for your own purposes?
 
2 A. That's true.
 
3 Q. All right. Exhibits number 13 and 14, those
 
4 are just a summary of your costs; correct?
 
5 A. They represent payments that [have made to
 




8 Q. And you were developing this property for
 
9 yourself, for your family; correct?
 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And the purpose of making tht: improvements, 
12 and getting the plat approved was so you could sell the 
13 other lots at a profit? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. SO the development was done for your purposes 
16 and for the financial gain of Berkshire Investments? 
17 A. And it was a necessity to payoff the Trust. 
18 Q. Certainly, yes. But your plan was to keep 
19 two lots and sell off five lots? 
20 A. Sometimes it was to keep two or three. Yeah, 
21 we would sell the balance. 
22 Q. And the plan was to sell the lOIS for between 
23 $185,000 and $215,000 each? 
24 A. I would say that -- without looking at the 
25 documentation, that seems like the right range. ....•.. 
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1 Q. And that is a profit that you could not have
 
2 made without doing the development?
 
3 A. I couldn't sell them unless I did the
 
4 development, that's true.
 
5 Q. Now, one of the conditions of the Idaho
 
6 Independent Bank loan was that you get a deed of
 




9 Q. Without that, you would not have been able to
 
10 draw on the loan to make any improvements? 
11 A. No. Without that, they wouldn't have loaned. 
12 It was simultaneous. i 












19 Q. Can you tell the Court what this is.
 
20 A. Well, it appears to be a request for full
 
21 reconveyance, signed by the Rogers, as trustees, on or
 
22 about September 16, 2002.
 
23 Q. And that was addressed to Alliance Title and
 
24 Escrow Company as the trustee?
 
25 A. Yes, it is.
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1 Q. September 16, 2002 is the date of the closing
 




4 Q. Can you turn to -- actually, it would be
 
5 easier to me if I could have you tum to our Exhibit 116,
 
6 .which is a copy of the earnest money agreement. I know
 




,I9 A. Sure, sure. 
10 Q. And that earnest money agreement indicated } 




14 Q. And the deed of trust that was to be entered
 








19 Q. That fonn indicated that Alliance Title would
 
20 be the trustee?
 




23 Q. And this would have been the document that
 
24 was reviewed by Dave Wishney?
 I:25 A. Well, I assume so. I mean, it appears that 
.@W . 
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1 Beth Rogers and Andy Rogers took documents, the appraisal
 
2 and this, among other things, to David Wishney.
 
3 Q. And Wishney reviewed the documents at some
 
4 point in time; correct? You don't know l:he date of the
 
5 office meeting; is that right?
 
6 A. Well, in discovery I think it was known to be
 
7 sometime in late August, 2002.
 
8 Q. And in your Exhibit No.7, there's a copy
 
9 ofa letter from Mr. Wishney, dated, I believe,
 




12 Q. And did you receive a copy of this letter
 




15 Q. You received it in discovery?
 
16 A. Yes. Well, Beth might have given it to me,
 
17 but it was during litigation.
 
18 Q. But you did receive a telephone call, did you
 
19 not, indicating that Mr. Wishney wanted a standard deed
 
20 of trust fonn substituted for the one you drew?
 
21 A. Dave Wishney and I spoke, and we talked about
 
22 a new provision being added that would protect the
 
23 beneficiaries, under the deed of trust, for any
 
24 delinquent taxes that weren't being paid by my wife and
 
25 I. I think he approved of the fonn, he just wanted extra
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1 protection as to delinquent taxes.
 
2 Q. Can you turn, again, to page -- or Exhibit
 
3 No. 114 in the Plaintiffs book?
 
4 A. I'm there.
 
5 Q. Again, this is a message ledger. from your
 




8 Q. All right. Do you see the entry on
 






12 Q. On that date, you received a tdephone call,
 
13 from Beth Rogers, indicating needs a stlmdard deed of
 
14 trust fonn added to the real estate agreements?
 




17 Q. And you never made the reque~,ted changes to
 
18 the deed of trust, did you?
 
19 A. I spoke with Dave Wishney, and I just
 
20 indicated what him and I talked about. And I don't know
 
21 how it happened, but another form was used that was, in
 
22 essence, the same form, except Steve Shearer's name was
 
23 added, instead of Alliance Title.
 
24 So, in answer to that, no. I didn't put any
 
25 language in about protecting the beneficiaries from tax
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1 deficiencies or delinquencies.
 
2 Q. And you indicate that, at the time of the
 
3 closing, the deed of trust you provided listed
 
4 Steve Shearer as the trustee.
 
5 A. I did. I sent that into the title company
 
6 sometime prior to closing.
 
7 Q. A copy of that deed of trust is at
 




10 Q. You had never discussed, with Beth Rogers, 
11 substituting a different deed of trust -- or a different 
12 trustee on the deed of trust, did you? 
13 A. No. I did not. 
14 Q. You say that was just another mistake that 
15 was made? 
16 A. I'm saying that my office -- I knew that I 
17 wanted to modify the deed of trust to include a 
18 beneficiary -- for protection for the beneficiary on tax 
19 delinquency. Either I did this, or my office staff did 
20 this. In the search of trying to find another form, I 
21 think that's how it was substituted with Steve Shearer. 
22 But I'm not sure. 
23 Q. And I believe my question was, you never 
24 informed Beth Rogers that you were substituting a 
25 different trustee? 
Page 118 
1 A. I say no. I already answered that no.
 
2 Q. And Mr. Shearer is a friend ofyours?
 
3 A. He has been, yes.
 
4 Q. You have socialized in the past?
 
5 A. Many years ago, yes.
 
6 Q. You have shared calendars?
 
7 A. We have shared calendars.
 
8 Q. And you were present during Beth Rogers'
 
9 second deposition, weren't you?
 
10 A. I think so.
 
11 Q. Do you recall, at that deposition, when she
 
12 was shown this second deed of trust and she said that she
 
13 had never seen it before?
 
14 A. I don't recall that.
 
15 MS. TAYLOR: IfI could have a moment, Your Honor?
 
16 THE COURT: All right.
 
17 MS. TAYLOR: I think we may be short one copy.
 
18 I have submitted this to the clerk under the requirements
 ! 
19 of the Rule that we just submit the portions of the 
r::20 depositions we're planning to use. 
21 Would it be okay with the Court ifI approach 
22 and Mr. Maile and I read offof this together? I don't 
23 have an extra copy for him. 
24 THE COURT: I don't have any objecltion. What you ! 
25 are attempting to establish, I take it, is that 
28 (Pages 115 to 118) 
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1 Beth Rogers testified, during her testimony, that she had 
2 not seen the second deed of trust; correct? 
3 MS. TAYLOR: Correct, Your Honor. And if it would 
4 be acceptable to the Court, I can just read from this and 
5 cite-­
6 TIIE COURT: Well, let me ask you this question. 
7 Perhaps you could ask your witness, here, questions that 
8 would -- I take it that it's not that you're attempting 
9 to elicit testimony from Mr. Maile, hen:, that 
1 0 Beth Rogers did or did not ever see thi~. second deed of 
11 trust, but his knowledge about whether or not she had 
12 made that representation. Do you see what I mean? 
13 MS. TAYLOR: Correct, yes. 
14 TIIE COURT: Could you ask your witness a question 
1 5 like this, I will represent to you that Beth Rogers 
1 6 testified at her deposition that she never saw it. 
1 7 Something like that. 
18 MS. TAYLOR: That could be -­
19 TIIE COURT: If you believe the evidence would bear 
20 you out. 
21 MS. TAYLOR: Certainly. All right. 
22 TIlE COURT: I'mjust trying to save a little time 
23 here, because we don't have a jury, and I get where 
2 4 you're going. But I want to be fair to Mrr. Maile, too. 
25 And if he has a -- ifhe contends that that was not the 
Page 121 
1 Q. All right. And you have no idea whether
 
2 Alliance Title showed her the one with Steven Shearer,
 












9 Q. At the time you took that deposition, you
 
10 knew that Plaintiffs didn't have any cotmsel available?
 
11 A. No. I had correspondence with a Mr. Hally,
 
1 2 or Hileigh, from the Lewiston area, indicating that his
 




15 Q. They asked you to continue that deposition
 
1 6 because I was not available?
 
1 7 A. I think you filed a motion with the Court.
 
1 8 I may be confused on another date, but....
 
19 Q. No. You're absolutely correct. We filed a
 
20 motion with the Court, asking for protective order and
 
21 moving to quash the subpoena, so that the deposition
 
22 would not go forward.
 
23 A. For Beth Rogers' deposition?
 
24 Q. Yes. For Beth Rogers. You knew that that
 




1 testimony, feel free to show it to him. 
2 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
3 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Maile, I'll represent to 
4 you that when Mr. Clark took Beth Rogers' deposition, the 
5 second deposition, he provided her with a copy of the 
6 deed of trust with Mr. Shearer as the tmstee, and asked 
7 her if she had seen it before. She said, I don't think I 
8 recognize this, sir. 
9 He explained what it was, and a.sked if anyone 
10 had discussed it with her. And she said, no, sir. 
11 Do you agree that you had not discussed that 
12 or shown it to her? 
13 A. Well, I know I didn't discuss it with her, 
1 4 but I -­ I will not agree to that. Because I -- I'm 
15 101 percent certain that I faxed over, or provided the 
16 title company with what documentation I was going to 
17 sign. 
18 And I don't know if they didn't !;how it to 
19 her. I know I didn't show it to her. But the purpose of 
20 a closing is to provide this material, and the title 
21 company signed off on -- or not signed off, but they 
22 received our deed of trust dated September 16, 2002. 
23 Q. You weren't present when the Rogers signed? 
24 A. No, no. I'm 101 percent certain I wasn't, 
25 because normally closings~.~~.'t.~"~~~~.~~.~~at.. ~~~:.'""'. 
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1 A. I'll take your word for it, based on memory.
 
2 I know there was a lot of discovery depositions that I
 
3 was trying to do at that point in time, yes.
 
4 Q. Okay. But you knew a motion had been filed
 
5 to prevent you from going forward with those?
 
6 A. I knew, yes, there was a motion.
 
7 Q. You know it was scheduled for hearing?
 
8 A. I -- I can't say that. I think -- I would
 
9 have to see the documents. But I can't say that it
 
1 0 was -- that I remembered, today, that it was scheduled 
11 for a hearing. This was in, probably, 2004, August of 
12 2004. I know that we had a hearing. 
1 3 MS. TAYLOR: I'll ask the Court to just take 
14 judicial notice, from the court record, that our motion 
:1 
15 to quash the subpoena was, indeed, scheduled for a Iiii 
16 hearing in August of 2004. Ifwe can take a little 
1 7 break, I could come up with a date on it, or we can 
1 8 backfill on that. Ii 
1 9 THE COURT: Okay. I'm hesitant to take judicial 
2 0 notice of that point right now. Your contention may be 
21 true, Ms. Taylor, that there was a hearing scheduled on a 
22 motion to quash a subpoena on a particular date. 
23 I don't have any independent recollection of 
2 4 that, myself, so I'm hesitate to say well, yes, I'll take 
25 judicial notice. The record is what it is, and you may 
~~::ld4igE::::m::l:::':~J&h,-,- ',-:,:_,_,_,._,_.,:': 
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1 deposition? .~1 be able to establish, at an appropriate time, that such 
2 A. Probably not. Steven Shearer didn't sign the2 was the case. 
3 deed of trust.3 But, for the purposes -­
4 Q. You had received a letter from my office,4 MS. TAYLOR: Rather than stop now and search for 
5 from me, in early July of2003, infonning you that I 5 the record, Your Honor, I will just come back to that, if 
6 represented the beneficiaries and the tmstees of the6 that's okay? 
7 Johnson Trust? 7 THE COURT: Yes. It seems to me, for purposes of 
8 A. In 2003? 8 your cross-exam questions of Mr. Maile, that -- I don't 
9 Q. Yes, 2003. 9 know ifyou need to establish that fact in order to lay a 
lOA. Yes.1 0 foundation for further questioning along this same line 
11 Q. And that is at Exhibit 124 for the 11 ornot. 
12 Plaintiffs?12 MS. TAYLOR: I don't believe I do. 
13 A. Yes.13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MS. TAYLOR: If it's obvious I do, then we need to 14 Q. And in that letter, we infonned. you, first, 
15 that we felt the property -- or the price you paid for 15 take a break. 
16 the property was not fair market value. Also infonned16 THE COURT: Okay. 
1 7 MS. TAYLOR: And I hope not. 1 7 you that we believed that your purchas{: constituted 
18 THE COURT: Okay. And, at this point, I just 1 8 professional negligence, didn't we? 
1 9 A. Yes, you did.19 can't tell. And absent an objection from Mr. Charney, 
20 you know, on the question of foundation for subsequent 20 Q. Can you turn to Exhibit No. 125, please. 
21 A. Yes.21 questions, I just won't do anything. 
22 But you've asked me to take judicial notice 22 Q. This is your response to the letter that you 
23 of this fact. And, as you can see from my bench here, 23 received from my office? 
2 4 A. Yes, it is.24 I have numerous files and many thousands of pages of 
25 Q. It's dated July 10th of 2003?25 documents that I would rather not go through right now.--"'--"-------1---..........;..........;----"'----------------­
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1 A. Yes.1 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Maile, you took 
2 Q. And in that letter, you do not, at any point 2 Beth Rogers' deposition prior to the hearing objecting to 
3 in time, state that you advised anyone relating to the 3 you taking it in Plaintiffs absence? 
4 Johnson Trust to -- that there was a conflict of4 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; relevance. 
5 interest, do you? 5 THE COURT: What is the relevance? 
6 . A. Well, I thought -- that's not true. I6 MS. TAYLOR: It goes to the unclean hands 
7 argument, Your Honor. 7 thought I addressed it on the last sentence of the first 
8 paragraph. Finally, your clients sought independent 8 THE COURT: Restate your question again. 
9 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: I -- I want him to confinn 9 legal counsel prior to closing and your cJlient chose to i1 0 close the transaction, even after consulting an attorney. 10 the fact he took an ex-parte deposition of Beth Rogers 
;11 Q. But you don't say that you advised the client 11 without Plaintiffs counsel being present. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. I will oveml1e the objection. 12 that there was a conflict of interest? 
1 3 A. It was inferred in the fact that they had 13 The witness can answer the question. 
1 4 legal counsel, independent, prior to closing. I didn't 14 TIlE WITNESS: I provided notice:, pursuant to the 
15 Rules of Civil Procedure, to the respective parties 15 go into the detail, that's true. 
16 Q. Yes. You didn't say, I told them there was a 1 6 involved in the litigation. 
1 7 conflict of interest?17 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Actually, Mr. Maile, I think 
1 8 you're trying to start back at the beginnling. My 18 A. I didn't believe it was a position that I 
1 9 needed to explain to you, other than the elements that I 19 question was simply, you took her deposition without 
2 0 explained in the first paragraph. 20 Plaintiffs counsel being present? 
21 Q. You didn't say, I advise.d them of the need 21 A. Yes. You were not there. 
22 for independent counsel? 22 Q. And you had 49 exhibits at that deposition? 
23 A. I didn't say that in my letter.23 A. Could be, that's true. 
24 Q. And, in fact, David Wishney wa.s -- was seen 24 Q. And you did not submit the deed of trust that 
25 Steven Shearer had signed as an exhibit at that 2 5 after the earnest IUUllt:y had closed, or had been 
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3 Q. He was seen after the assignment to
 
4 Berkshire Investments had been signed?
 
5 A. That's true.
 
6 Q. David Wishney's letter to you indicates -­
7 or the letter that we have seen from David Wishney,
 
8 your Exhibit No.7, last page, indicates, because the
 
9 agreements have already been executed by the respective
 
10 parties, it is really too late for me to provide any
 
11 substantive input, doesn't it?
 
12 A. That's what it says.
 




15 A. Now, as far as I'm concerned, what is that?
 




18 Q. Actually, I had moved on. As far as you were
 
19 concerned, as soon as Ted Johnson signed the earnest
 
20 money agreement, there was a binding contract?
 
21 A. I believe there was, yeah.
 
22 Q. And as soon as Beth Rogers had signed the
 
23 assignment, that was also binding?
 
24 A. I believe it was, yes.
 





2 A. It seems, though, I mailed it to her.
 




5 Q. That is a copy of a letter from you, dated
 




8 Q. And it is addressed to Theodore Johnson, but
 




11 Q. And this was after the time that Beth Rogers
 
12 had told you that Ted had had a heart attack, was in a
 
13 nursing home, and you needed to have all your dealings
 
14 with her; correct?
 
15 A. Yeah. On my -- on Exhibit 114, I was advised
 
16 of that on August 2nd, that he had a heart attack.
 
17 Q. In the letter of August 15th, you don't go
 
18 into any detailed explanations about the assignment?
 
19 A. I don't go into detail, that's truf~.
 
20 Q. You don't point out the fact that this
 
21 assignment would relieve you and your wife of any
 




24 A. That's true. I don't say it in the letter.
 




1 A. As I explained to Ted, when I met with him,
 
2 that we would be assigning this -- that it would
 
3 accomplished that. So he was fully advised of that.
 
4 That the letter -­
5 Q. SO only Berkshire Investments would be
 
6 responsible for payment of the deed of trust?
 
7 A. That's true.
 
8 Q. Berkshire Investments had -- had just barely
 
9 been formed at that time?
 
10 A. That's true. 
11 Q. It had virtually no assets, other than 
12 perhaps a little cash and a line of credit it could draw 
13 on to make the down payment? 
14 A. It had a line -- it had the resources for a 
15 line of credit, and my wife and I were standing behind 
16 it, so sure. 
17 Q. You didn't advise either Mr. Johnson, or 
18 Beth, that they should have that assigmnent reviewed by 
19 an attorney, did you? 
20 A. No. I felt I covered that in a meeting with 
21 Ted. 
22 Q. I would like to go back to thos4~ meetings. 
23 You indicate that there were two different times that you 
24 talked to Ted, in detail, about the conflict of interest 




2 A. Well, I think there were three, but...
 
3 Q. Okay. Well, let's focus just on the
 




6 A. Okay. There would be two.
 
7 Q. There were two. One was a few days before
 
8 the earnest money agreement was prepared and signed by
 
9 you and your wife?
 
10 A. That's true. 
11 Q. And the other one was when you say that you 
12 took the earnest money agreement out to Mr. Johnson's 
13 home for him to sign? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And you indicated that just you and 
16 Mr. Johnson were present at both of those meetings? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And I will represent to you that Beth Johnson 
19 testified in her deposition, her second d'::lposition, that 
20 she was present at both of those meetings, that the 
21 signing occurred in your office, not at Mr. Johnson's 
22 home, and that you did not, at any point, say that there 
23 was a conflict of interest or a need for independent 
24 counsel. 
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1 said she was present at one of the meetings. She told me
 
2 to go to her house -- to go to Ted's house, so she knew
 
3 she wasn't present then. But she is mistaken about where
 
4 it was executed. She was not there.
 
5 Q. SO you acknowledge that in her deposition she
 
6 stated that she was present, it was signed in your
 
7 office, and that you didn't make those explanations?
 
8 A. She asserts that, yes. That's true.
 
9 Q. She also said she was present when he came in
 
1 0 and offered to sell you the land, and you didn't make 
11 those explanations? 
12 A. I don't know about that. I don't think she 
1 3 said that, because he was by himself again. 
14 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, may I approach the 
15 witness? 
16 TIIE COURT: Yes. 
1 7 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Mai1t:, I'm showing you a 
1 8 copy of the transcript of Beth Rogers' second deposition. 
1 9 It is under Tab I-C of the submission of transcripts -­
20 submission of deposition transcripts we've submitted to 
2 1 the Court. 
22 Can you just read this along with me and tell 
23 me if I read it correctly? 
24 MR. CHARNEY: What page are you on? 
25 MS. TAYLOR: I'm on page 25, starting at line 7,
-'-----::.-.---'----1---------------:.."------.--':....--------1'1 
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1 on Tab I-C.
 
2 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: The question was:
 
3 Question: So when is the next meeting you
 
4 remember with Mr. Maile?
 
5 Answer: It was sometime after that when
 




8 Question: Did you go in at that time?
 
9 Answer: Yes, sir.
 
10 Is that what her testimony was? Or did I 
11 read that correctly? 
12 A. I think you're reading this out of context.
 
13 I think she recalled -- this is regarding the Witte sale.
 
14 But she -- she wasn't there.
 
15 Q. But her testimony was that she went in when
 
16 he came in to tell you he would like to sell?
 




19 A. That's not the meeting where he came with the
 
20 appraisal, if that's what you're asking. 
21 Q. All right. He came with the appraisal and 
22 said, I would like to sell this to you? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. She indicates that she was present. 
25 A. That transcript doesn't say that. It says 
"" .... ".........
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1 the second meeting.
 
2 Q. Okay. And it was -- and she says it was just
 
3 prior -- it was when he came in to tell you he wanted to
 
4 sell the land; correct?
 
5 A. That's what she says.
 
6 Q. And was there any other meeting when
 




9 A. Well, we had a second meeting, back in May,
 
10 when Ted came back to my office after receiving the 
11 correspondence from Imogen, and we discussed the attempt 
12 to solicit a higher offer from Mr. Witte. 'That was our 
13 second meeting. She wasn't there for that either. 
14 Q. Okay. This one, she is talking about a 
15 meeting that happened about three weeks before the 
1 6 exhibit -- or the earnest money agreement was signed. 
1 7 You're saying that that was not the one where 
1 8 he came in with the appraisal? 
1 9 A. No. It would -- the appraisal -- he came in 
2 0 with the appraisal six weeks after having his second 
21 meeting about the Witte offer. 
22 Q. But you -- you just disagree that she was 
23 present at the signing and that it happened in your 
2 4 office, rather than at his home? 
25 A. I know that it didn't happen that way. I'd 
1 never been to Ted's house before. 
2 Q. And she also asserted that when she was 
3 present at the signing, you just gave them the earnest 
4 money agreement -­
5 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; hearsay. All the stuff 
6 Beth Rogers said -­
7 THE COURT: Well, I -- do you want to respond? 
8 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. I do want to «:spond. I am 
9 using this to impeach. 
10 THE COURT: I understand. The objection is 
11 overruled. 
12 You are -- as I understand it, this I:.:ntire 






14 impeach Mr. Maile's testimony regarding what he says he h 
15 told Ted Johnson about, at two different meetings, in I,
16 connection with the sale; correct? 
17 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. II
18 THE COURT: You're attempting to impeach that by 
19 showing that another witness, at another time, said that 
20 these meetings occurred at a different location and no II 
21 such thing was -- was discussed; right? 
22 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. 
23 THE COURT: Have you made your point? 
24 MR. CHARNEY: That is not a proper manner in which 
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1 come in and say he's not being truthful about that. 
2 THE COURT: Well, essentially though, as I see it, 
3 Ms. Taylor is making these assertions to the witness, to 
4 Mr. Maile, and has said, look, this other witness said 
5 that, how do you explain it, essentially. 
6 MR. CHARNEY: That's different. 
7 THE COURT: Right. She's not offering this 
8 Beth Rogers transcript testimony, the deposition 
9 testimony, for the truth of the matter that's asserted or 
1 0 as substantive proof of where these meetings took place 
11 and what was discussed, but just attempting to knock 
12 Mr. Maile off his pins, with respect to his prior 
13 testimony in court today; right? 
14 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. I'm with you. I -- now, when 
1 6 I say I'm with you, what I mean is, I understand the 
1 7 reasons for this line of questioning. 
18 The objection that this is improper 
1 9 impeachment is overruled. The reason I explained my take 
2 0 on what you're doing here, on this line of questioning, 
2 1 is to demonstrate that I'm not confused about how this is 
2 2 being used. 
2 3 I think it would be problematic in a jury 
24 trial; you know what I mean? But I think that I 
2 5 understand what you're doing here. And I understand that 
Page 136 
1 you must know, Ms. Taylor, the limitations of what you're 
2 doing here. 
3 If you want to get Beth Rogers in, in front 
4 of me to testify in the trial, you're certainly free to 
5 do so. And I understand that you're just using her 
6 testimony for the limited purpose of making an assertion, 
7 to this witness, that on another occasion somebody who 
8 might know has said something different than what you're 
9 saymg. 
1 0 And he has answered those questions; right. 
11 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MS. TAYLOR: I have a couple more questions in the 
1 4 same line. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. you may pfOl:eed. 
16 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Maile:, you have testified 
1 7 that you went over the earnest money agreement with 
18 Mr. Johnson and explained it to him? 
19 A. Yeah. 
20 Q. I will represent to you that Beth Rogers 
2 1 said, when they came into the office, you handed it to 
22 them, asked them to read it, and asked if there were any 
2 3 questions. 
2 4 She was asked if anything else was said, she 
25 says, not that I can remember. 
1 THE COURT: Is that a question?
 
2 MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
 
3 THE COURT: What is the question?
 
4 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: How to you square her
 
5 testimony with what you have said?
 
6 A. Well, I'm the one that drove the car to his
 
7 house. She wasn't there. I just don't think she
 
8 remembers it accurately.
 
9 Q. Let's go to your Exhibit No.1, the earnest
 
1 0 money agreement. You indicate that you recognized there 
11 was a potential conflict of interest on two counts; you 
12 had expressed an interest in buying this property, 
13 yourself, for years, and you also had represented the 
14 Trust in regard to the Witte offer; correc:t? 
15 A. No. I advised Ted. I said, in that first 
1 6 conference concerning the Witte offer, that I could have 
1 7 a conflict here, because we had express(~d a willingness 
18 for you to sell and me to buy, if you ever decide to sell 
1 9 it. And do you have a problem with me representing you 
20 with the Witte offer, and he said no. I; 
21 So that's the issue there. 
22 Q. Okay. Was that the only conversation you had 
2 3 about there being a potential conflict of interest? 
2 4 A. No. When I explained on the t",{O other 
2 5 occasions that he had the right to seek independent 
Page 138 
1 counsel, it was -- I can't remember if I used the word
 
2 conflict of interest on the second time. I certainly
 
3 used it on the first time, saying that I ha.d represented
 
4 him in the past. And his current offer deals with
 
5 property that we had talked about buying and selling, so
 
6 there's.a conflict there.
 
7 And on the other occasions, spedfically told
 
8 him that he had the right to seek independent counsel, if
 
9 he chose to.
 






13 Q. At the time you entered into your earnest
 





1 6 Q. And you agree that under the ethical rules, 
1 7 you had an obligation to only enter into an agreement ,I
1 8 that was fair and reasonable?
 
1 9 A. That's true.
 
20 Q. If you'll turn to page 2 of the earnest money
 
2 1 agreement. 
I
 
22 THE COURT: Defense Exhibit 1; correct?
 
23 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. Defense Exhibit 1. I'm sorry,
 
2 4 Your Honor.
 
25 THE WITNESS: Okay.
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1 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: You elected to include a
 
2 provision wherein the parties would waive a trial by
 
3 jury, didn't you?
 
4 A. I didn't elect to include this. This was a
 
5 form that I had used on a number of times, for both
 
6 buyers and sellers. So there was nothing intetjected
 
7 here. This was one ofmy standard real estate forms.
 








12 Q. You also included a provision that the
 
13 parties would submit to the jurisdiction and venue in
 
14 Canyon County, didn't you?
 
1 5 A. Yes. It says that in there.
 
1 6 Q. And is that fair and reasonable, when all
 
1 7 the parties live in Ada County and the property is
 
1 8 Ada County?
 
1 9 A. It was included and not corrected. It has
 








24 Q. That you did not catch?
 





2 Q. But you agree that that would have been
 
3 inappropriate, to try to have any procet:dings in
 
4 Canyon County, under the circumstances?
 
5 A. I suspect you can have an agreement that
 
6 people agree to litigate their issues in any county.
 




9 A. In Canyon County, no.
 
1 0 Q. After the Trust filed the lawsUllt, you filed
 




13 A. Sam Hoagland and I did that, that's true.
 
1 4 Q. And you also included, in your pleadings,
 
1 5 that Ada County wasn't the appropriate venue under the
 
16 terms of the earnest money agreement?
 
17 A. We did initially, that's true.
 




2 0 A. That's true.
 
21 Q. Going on -- and these provisions, by the way,
 
22 are all included in the paragraph entitled Attorneys Fees
 
23 and Costs, aren't they?
 
2 4 A. Yeah, they are. Yep.
 
2 5 Q. Then, beginning at the bottom of page 2, and
 
1 going on to page 3, you included a provision in this
 




4 A. That's right.
 
5 Q. Regardless of whether damages were otherwise,
 
6 as of said date, calculatable, didn't you?
 
7 A. Yes. That was included, yes.
 
g Q. And as an attorney, at the time 25-some years
 
9 of practice, you knew that the statute of limitations on
 
1 0 a written agreement was five years?
 
11 A. Yeah. That's true.
 




14 A. Well, I think it cuts both ways. It was a
 
15 form that I had -- that I had used a number of times,
 
16 and -- both for buyers and sellers, and I think it cut
 
1 7 both ways. So I didn't -- I really didn't have a problem
 
18 with it as being unfair or unreasonable.
 
19 Q. Okay. Can you name a single Gause of action,
 




22 A. Not off the top ofmy head, no.
 
23 Q. And when you were initially contacted, the
 
2 4 attorney for the trustees and the beneficiaries had to
 






2 A. And I agreed to do that, yes.
 
3 Q. You also included a provision requiring that
 




6 A. .That's included in the agreement.
 
7 Q. And you also asserted that in th,e motion you
 
8 filed, when the beneficiaries first filed their suit,
 
9 said the Court doesn't have the right to hear this?
 
lOA. It was never noticed for hearing. It was
 
11 filed, that's true.
 




14 A. Part of the filing, yes.
 
15 Q. And you were aware of the fact that
 
16 Mr. Johnson had not had this reviewed by an attorney
 
1 7 prior to the time he signed it?
 
1 8 A. He declined, that's true.
 
19 MS. TAYLOR: Could I -- how are you doing on time,
 
20 Your Honor? Are you wanting a break? I'm not sure what i'
 
2 1 the timing is. I'
 
22 THE COURT: Oh, you know, we'n: going until 2:00
 
2 3 today, and we're going to take, probably, just one more
 
I24 break. How are you doing, in terms ofhow much longer 
2 5 you intend to do your cross? I: 
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1 MS. TAYLOR: I have quite a bit. 1 A. I graduated from the University of Idaho in 
2 1HE COURT: Quite a bit left? Well, let's just 2 1973, and there began a career in Boise, jin 1974, in the 
3 take a little break. Let's take 10, and we'll reconvene 3 appraisal business. So that's 32 years ofpractice in 
4 at noon by that clock, so 10 minutes from now. 4 the appraisal business. I'm a commercial appraiser. I'm 
5 5 an MAl, an SRA. Those are professional designations from 
6 (Recess taken 11:49 a.m. to 12:04 p.m.) 6 the Appraisal Institute. 
7 7 I've had, actually, hundreds of hours of 
8 1HE COURT: Please be seated. 8 continuing education and basic education to achieve those 
9 MR. CHARNEY: We have an agrl;lement to take 9 designations. I've been an MAl designee since 1981, so 
10 Mr. Corlett out of tum, since he's here ~md just as -­ 10 that's about 25 years there. 
11 1HE COURT: Okay. And is Mr. Corlett 11 We do appraisals in Idaho. And I'm also 
12 Ms. Taylor's or your witness? 12 certified by the State ofIdaho as a CJA-I', and I'm also 
13 MR. CHARNEY: My witness. 13 certified in the state of Oregon. 
14 1HE COURT: Okay. No problem. 14 Q. And so that we're clear, are you a real 
15 MS. TAYLOR: No problem, Your Honor. 15 estate appraiser? 
16 1HE COURT: Okay. Then you may call your second 1 6 A. That is true. I'm a real estate appraiser. 
17 witness, with there being no objection from the other 1 7 Q. How long have you had your current business, 
18 side. 18 Mountain States? 
19 MR. CHARNEY: We'll call Joe Corlett. 1 9 A. Mountain States was incorporated, I believe, 
20 TIm COURT: Mr. Charney, are you going to need the 20 in 1976. And prior to that, it was Corlett Associates, 
21 exhibits for this witness? 21 in 1974. 
22 MR. CHARNEY: No. I may just need our exhibit 22 Q. Have you been called upon, in the recent 
23 number -­ 2 3 months, to provide some analysis, for the Court's 
24 MS. TAYLOR: 117 2 4 consideration, regarding the value of the improvements 
25 MR. CHARNEY: -- 13. 25 made on the Linder Road property that is the subject of 
Page 144 Page 146 
1 THE COURT: That's in the packet; right? 1 this particular action? 
2 MR. CHARNEY: That's in the pack;lt. 2 A. Yes, I have. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 3 Q. Describe, if you will, first, the property 
4 THE CLERK: Did you want this marked? 4 address that you have had an opportunity to look at. 
5 MR. CHARNEY: Please. 5 A. Okay. The property in question is located 
6 THE CLERK: As? 6 in the Eagle District, and it's known as the 
7 MR. CHARNEY: As 17. 7 Fairfield Estates Subdivision, which is accessed by 
8 THE COURT: Okay. You may inquire whenever you're 8 West Cornerstone Lane. 
9 ready, Mr. Charney. 9 It is on the east side of Linder Road, and I 
10 10 believe it's northerly of Beacon Light Road. 
11 JOE CORLETT, 11 The site includes approximately 38.72 acres, 
12 called as a witness by and on behalfof the defense, 12 and has been effectively subdivided into seven 
13 having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified 13 single-family lots, and has a partially finished barn' 
14 as follows: 1 4 improvement on one of the lots. 
15 15 Q. All right. Did you, prior to coming to 
16 DIRECT EXAMINATION 16 court, summarize your findings and conclusions in a 
17 BY MR. CHARNEY: 17 report? 
18 Q. Will you please state your name and spell 1 8 A. Yes, I did. 
19 your last for the Judge. 19 MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Bailiff? 
20 A. Yes. My name is Joe Corlett, C-O-R-L-E-T-T. 20 
21 Q. Mr. Corlett, how are you presently employed? 21 (Exhibit No. 17 is handed to the witness.) 
22 A. I'm a principal in Mountain States Appraisal 22 
23 and Consulting, here in Boise. 23 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: The bailiff is handing you 
24 Q. Tell Judge Wilper a little bit about your 24 what has been previously marked as Exhibit 17. Do you 
25 background and training in the appraisal business. 25 Exhibit 117 
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1 So I'm going to sustain the objection. And 1 A. Yes, I do. 
2 ifyou want to renew your motion for the admission of2 Q. JVhat is Exhibit 17? 
3 that exhibit at a later time, you can do so. 3 A. It is the analysis of the contributory 
4 But, I mean, from what you're telling me, 4 improvement value for the subdivision improvements on the 
5 this entire exhibit, Exhibit 17, is his appraisal report; 5 Fairfield Estates Subdivision, on West Cornerstone Lane. 
6 right?6 Q. Did you prepare that yourself? 
! 
7 MR. CHARNEY: That's true. 7 A. Yes, I did. 
8 THE COURT: It's not components of it or 8 MR. CHARNEY: At this time, I would offer 
9 photographs. But I mean what I'm saying is, this is -­9 Exhibit 17, Your Honor. 
10 I'm familiar, somewhat, with real estate appraisal 10 THE COURT: Is there any objection? 
11 reports.11 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm inclined to object, 
12 MR. CHARNEY: Right. 12 because what this basically is is the opinion of an 
13 THE COURT: And so, what you're representing to me Il13 expert, who is here to testify to it. 
14 then, Mr. Charney, is that this report is the report that 14 I believe the appraisal is cumulative. 
15 an appraiser would do when doing his work and conducting 15 Obviously, it would be of more concern if we had a jury 
1 6 an appraisal of real property, and he would like to 16 present. But I do object to the report, itself, being 
1 7 submit the entire thing as an exhibit. 17 admitted. 
18 MR. CHARNEY: Yes, sir. 18 THE COURT: It is hearsay, Mr. Charney. How do 
19 THE COURT: The objection is hearsay, and 19 you respond to the objection? 
20 cumulative; right -­20 MR. CHARNEY: As far as it being hearsay, 
2 1 MS. TAYLOR: Right. 2 1 Your Honor, I can certainly ask another I;ouple of 
22 THE COURT: -- as I've heard it from Ms. Taylor. 22 follow-up questions regarding if it's produced in the 
23 I'm going to sustain the objection, at this time, because 23 ordinary course of his business, at which, certainly the 
24 it is hearsay. 2 4 obvious answer. 
2 5 You can elicit whatever opinions you can from 25 But if the real problem is cumulative, I 
PagePage 148 
1 the witness. If, then, you want to have it come in, it 1 think that, realistically, Your Honor, it may come a 
2 may just be objectionable because it is cumulative; do 2 point, while you're doing your own dehberations, where 
3 you see what I mean? 3 instead of referring to, necessarily, notes or testimony, 
4 MR. CHARNEY: All right. If I establish the 4 there might be something that comes up that is -- would 
5 hearsay exception, as far as the business records 5 ease the finder of fact in rendering its decision. 
6 exception, is there going to be an issue, at that point, 6 THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, is your primary objection, 
7 on the hearsay? I mean, that's cleared up with two 7 or is your only objection, that it's cumulative? 
8 questions. II8 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. If we -- if we had 
9 THE COURT: Ms. Taylor? I,9 a jury here, I would be objecting a lot more strongly, 
10 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I have no question but Ii1 0 because I think there's a chance that they will misread 'I
11 documents. And in my experience, expert reports don't go 11 that they can establish that this was prepared in the I 
12 to the jury. 12 ordinary course of business. 1 
13 THE COURT: And that it would, thc::refore, satisfy1 3 But as far as in a court trial -­
14 the hearsay exception? 14 THE COURT: It can. It just depends on whether or 
15 MS. TAYLOR: The hearsay exception. The problem I15 not they're admitted as exhibits. 
1 6 The issue, in a situation like this, is that 1 6 we run into is, if they submit the exhibit, his testimony II 
17 is cumulative on direct. I would get to cross-examine. 17 the -- when an expert compiles a report, that report 
18 If they question him first, and then submit the exhibit, 18 is -- by definition it's hearsay. 
1 9 the exhibit is cumulative. :19 It is an out-of-court written stat{:ment that 
20 THE COURT: Well, go ahead and lay your foundation Ii2 0 is offered for the truth of the martel' assl~rted there in. 
2 1 to overcome the hearsay objection, if you care to. 21 It might be an efficient way to get things 
22 MR. CHARNEY: All right. And the point -- a lot 22 in. But, on the other hand, the witness iis here and is 
2 3 of the questions that I'm going to ask are going to be 23 subject to cross-examination. And I think it's fair 
2 4 discussion about explaining some of the things that are 24 enough to allow the opponent to have a crack at the 
2 5 witness on cross. 2 5 found in the exhibit~ Your Honor. I 
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1 For example, there's an indication in here 
2 about Marshall Evaluation, which is soli of the 
3 appraiser's Blue Book, if you will. So it's not going to 
4 be entirely cumulative. But I'll cover the hearsay 
5 issue. 
6 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Corlett, with respect to 
7 Exhibit No. 17, is this a document that is prepared in 
8 the ordinary course of -- is this the type of document 
9 that is prepared in the ordinary course of your business 
1 0 as a real estate appraiser? 
11 A. Yes, it is. 
12 Q. In fact, can you even really do your job 
13 without preparing a report such as this? 
14 A. Actually, I can. 
15 Q. Okay. How often is that accomplished? 
16 A. Actually, portions of this assignment have 
1 7 been oral, up to this point. So I have not prepared a 
18 written document. So, I would say that maybe in a small 
1 9 fraction of my assignments, that they would be oral with 
2 0 no written report. But then reduced to a file memorandum 
21 upon completion. 
22 Q. Nevertheless, is this a true and accurate 
23 copy of the document that is in your O\\'ll original file, 
2 4 if you will, that has been created in the ordinary course 
25 of your business? 
Page 152 
1 A. Yes, it is.
 
2 Q. And is it the regular practice of your
 
3 business to put appraisal reports in writing and to
 






7 MR. CHARNEY: At this time, I would reoffer
 
8 Exhibit 17, Your Honor.
 
9 THE COURT: All right. Is there any further
 
10 objection? 
11 MS. TAYLOR: Not at this point, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to admit 
13 Exhibit 17. 
14 
15 (Exhibit No. 17 is admitted.) 
16 
17 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Turning to page 1 of your 
18 report, you have identified in your report several, I 
19 guess, highlighted paragraphs as we go through it; 
20 correct? 
21 A. Yes, I have. 
22 Q. We have talked about identification of the 
23 property. And then we talk about the sl~ction entitled 
2 4 Property Rights Appraised. What does that cover? 
25 A. It's a requirement, under the Imf,..,rrn 
1 Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, to defme
 
2 the value that you're seeking to attain. Sometimes you
 
3 may be asked to do a lease fee value, which would
 
4 represent the lessor's interest in real prop,erty, or you
 
5 may do the fee simple, which is the unencumbered property
 
6 title, subject to the governmental restrictions. In
 
7 other words, all the sticks in the bundle of rights.
 
8 Q. And in this case, we're analyzing only the
 
9 improvements that were placed by Mr. Maile; correct?
 
10 A. Yes, sir. 
11 Q. Moving to the dates of value estimate, what 
12 does that section cover? 
13 A. I did a retrospective analysis that goes 
14 back to October, 2005, and then, subsequently, to 
15 June 1, 2006. 
1 6 Q. Why did you use that time frame:? 
1 7 A. I was requested to complete the analysis 
18 effectively as of that date. 
19 Q. Turning to page 2, we have Purpose of the 
2 0 Appraisal section. What is the purpose of this 
21 particular appraisal? 
22 A. Again, it informs the reader ofwhat I'm 
23 doing, as far as why am I doing this. Is it to estimate 
2 4 market value, rental value, reproduction cost? And it 
25 more or less gives you an idea of what I'm doing. 
Page 154 




3 A. To estimate the contributory value of the
 
4 improvements placed by Mr. Maile.
 
5 Q. Okay. We have Function and Intended Use of
 




8 A. Yes, ir.;
 
9 Q. Moving to Appraisal Development and Reporting'
 
1 0 Process. What is that section supposed to cover? 
11 A. This is the scope of work. And it more or 
12 less outlines what has transpired since being initially 
13 contacted by the client, and subsequentlly, the -- the 
14 acts that I went through to get to the value conclusions. 
15 Q. Moving, we're going to skip one, going to the 
16 Market Value Defined section, what dOles that typically 
17 cover? 
1 8 A. That tells you, if you're seeking market Ii 
19 value for a fee simple title type of property, that's a 
20 standard definition offered by the Appraisal Institute in 
2 1 their Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal. 
22 Q. Moving to page 3, Exposure Time Defined. 
23 What does that cover? 
2 4 A. Again, this is another requirem,ent from use 
25 path. What it does is it ,.. :the reader of the time 
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effectively preceding the date of appraisal, whereas 
marketing time is differentiated by saying that's the 
amount of time, from the date ofappraisal forward, that 
it would take to market the property. 
Exposure time effectively says, if this 
property was offered, or appraised as of this date, which 
would be June or October as I previou81y stated, that it 
should take one year or less to market [he property. 
Q. Property Data section, it just describes the 
property? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, in this case, if you could provide a 
description of the property for Judge Wilper? 
A. Okay. It's 38.72 acres. It's a sectional 
shaped parcel. It has been subdivided into seven 
single-family lots. 
The lots are accessed by a cul-d.e-sac known 
as Cornerstone Lane. This cul-de-sac has a 24 foot width 
and approximately 1,300 lineal feet of asphalted concrete 
paving. The subject also has power boxes, gas stubs, and 
telephone to each of the sites. 
I was unable, during my inspection, to 
determine whether there was, in fact, an irrigation 
system in the property, and I assumed that there was not. 


























And that addresses the structure of the 
valuation analysis. 
It tells the reader what the appraiser has 
considered, based on market evidence, to be the highest 
and best use. In other words, would this be better 
served as a farm field, or would it be bdter served as a 
subdivision. 
And that is analyzed in the high,est and best 
use section of the report. 
Q. With respect to this particular property, is 
the highest and best use agriculture, or is the highest 
and best use subdivision? 
A. It's clearly subdivision. 
Q. Could it be subdivided into ewn smaller 
lots, for example, to get even more money out of it? 
A. Possibly it could have been. 
Q. All right. But that would be up to an 
individual who is doing the development? 
A. It would be not only up to the individual, 
but it would be up to the zoning authorities or the 
police power, so to speak, evident. 
I believe the property zoned Rmal Urban 
Transitional, which is a 5-acre density. It also would 
depend on the proximity of central utilities, such as 



























that there is? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. All right. Keep going. 
A. Lot I is also improved with a free-standing 
frame structure. It's what I would call a clear story 
type ofbarn. I estimated the square footage in the 
structure about 2,000 square feet, based on aerial 
photography. 
The structure is not quite finishl~d. The 
doors are not placed on the ends, and it would be 
considered more or less a farm building at this point. 
Q. You have a prop -- I'm sorry. Go ahead. I 
cut you off. 
A. Other than that, that pretty well describes 
the subdivision. The average site size is approximately 
5.33 acres, or somewhere in there. 
Q. You have a Property History section 
indicating it was purchased in August of '02 for 
$400,000; correct? 
A. Yes; that's correct. 
Q. What is the Highest and Best Use section 
supposed to cover? 
A. The highest and best use is initially defined 
as that use that is most profitable, economically 






























You used something called Marshall Valuation 
Handbook. Can you describe for Judge Wilper what the 
Marshall Valuation Handbook is. 
A. Yes, I will. The Marshall Valuation Handbook 
is -- comes in two fonos, one is residential and the 
otherisconunercial. 
And the conunercial manual includes everything 
from subdivision costs, paving, component costs for every 
Page 158 ~i 
whatever, of the soils with regard to maybe an on-site 
type of system, and the relative size of the property, 
whether that would be feasible. 
Q. In your experience, would it have been more 
difficult to get even smaller lots out of this 40 acres, 
or are the 5.33-acre lots pretty consistent with what 
we're seeing in that particular area at this time? 
A. I believe the 5-acre site dimension is a 
proper and normal type ofdevelopment in that area. 
Q. We're seeing other divisions with large lots 
in that area, as well? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Moving to the page 4 Analysis 
Section, you talked about analyzing the value of the i 
improvements Mr. Maile has made. And we've talked about 
the value of the property and the value of the bam 
itself 
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1 type ofbuilding imaginable. It also includes yard
 
2 subdivision type of costs. And it's very detailed.
 
3 You can do either a calculator method or a
 
4 segregated cost method. So you can quite -- you can
 




7 A. Also, it's updated, I believe, monthly or
 
8 quarterly, and you'll see the adjustment factors in my
 
9 report. And they do that as a basis of surveying.
 
10 MR. CHARNEY: If we could -- NfT. Bailiff, if you 
11 could hand Exhibit 17 to Judge Wilper. 
12 
13 (Bailiff complied.) 
14 
15 THE BAILIFF: The whole packet? 
16 MR. CHARNEY: Just the report. And, then, this 
17 one to the witness. Oh, you've got it. Okay. We're 
18 good.
 
19 THE COURT: I have, now, what has been admitted as
 
20 Defense Exhibit 17. This is the Court's original now.
 
21 MR. CHARNEY: Ifwe could go to page 4, 
22 Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: And the witness has one, too? 
24 THE WIlNESS: I do. 
25 MR. CHARNEY: He does. 
Page 160 
1 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: I would like to go to the 
2 section that says, following are the subdivision costs 
3 estimated in section 66, on page 1 of the manual; all 
4 right? 
5 You've got one, two, three -- looks like 
6 seven different items there. And I'm curious to know how 
7 you arrived at the values for each of those items by 
8 utilizing the Marshall Valuation Handbook? 
9 A. The Handbook segregates these costs. And 
10 what we're looking at is, the initial cost is 26 cents. 
11 That's based on a square foot cost estimate. The rock 
12 base is on top of that.
 
13 Q. Grading is 26 cents a square foot?
 
14 A. That's correct.
 
15 Q. And that you have at 31,200 square feet?
 
16 A. Yes, sir. 
17 Q. For a total value of$8,112? 
18 A. That's correct. 
19 Q. How does that actually campOli, though, with 
20 Mr. Maile's actual costs? 
21 A. His actual costs are actually contained in 
22 this exhibit. And I saw some land costs, I thought that 
23 were in there, as well as one that had a different 
24 address, and I backed those off. 
25 So I estimated that those costs were about 
Page 161 
1 $114,147. And those were aggregate costs, according to I
2 his QuickBooks program.
 




5 Q. Talk about that, if you would.
 
6 A. That's the substructure for future paving.
 
7 It's compacted. That would also include 31,200 square
 I 
8 feet. I
9 Q. How did you come to the conclusion that 
10 31,200 square feet would be what you used? 
11 A. I believe if I took 24 feet in width, for the 
12 right-of-way, and an extended distance of 1,300 lineal II13 feet, you will come up with about that number. 
14 Q. Moving to paving. Talk about that, if you I
15 would. 
16 A. Paving is the asphalt concrete type ofpaving 
17 that is rolled and placed, as the surface, over the rock 
18 base. And that also is 31,200 square feet. 
19 Q. Gas main? 
20 A. The gas main was calculated based on the 
21 lineal footage of the cul-de-sac. And the cul-de-sac is 
22 actually a round type ofcul-de-sac, so there's a void in 
23 the center. 
24 And it's pretty much grown over, when I last 




2 Q. Okay. Electrical main line underground?
 
3 A. That was estimated, based on the Marshall
 




6 Q. Is that for digging the trenching, putting in
 
7 the power line, all that stuff?
 
8 A. Yes, sir. That's the composite cost.
 
9 Q. Electrical lateral lines?
 
10 A. Yes. These are the individual stubs into the 
11 lots, the seven lots. And I estimated that based on 
12 about 20 feet per lot. 
13 Q. And, finally, we have telephone. 
14 A. And that's about an $8.30 cost for 1,300 
15 lineal feet. 
16 Q. Now, I note one thing that is not included in I, 
I17 here would be a pressurized irrigation system. If that, 
18 in fact, were included, what would be the estimate as to 
19 the expenses associated with that per foot? II20 A. I really don't have that information in front 
21 of me. And I believe it -- and I'm not exactly sure of 
22 the number, but approximately $56,000,. or something, 
23 dollars were spent in that component by Mr. Maile. 
24 Q. And is that included in your calculations 
25 here, where you come to the total? 
'" 
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1 A. No, it is not.
 
2 Q. SO that would be exclusive ofthat, then?
 
3 A. Yes, it would.
 
4 Q. All right. Now, you have a total here of
 
5 129,302. And maybe, if! can analogize this to you,
 
6 Marshall Valuation, is that to you what Blue Book might
 
7 be to a used car dealer?
 




10 Q. But still, this would be your book to tum to
 
11 to figure out values, whereas the Blue Book would be
 
12 where a car dealer would tum to?
 
13 A. It is the book of choice.
 
14 Q. All right. So you've come to the 129,302,
 




17 A. That effectively updates the pages that come
 
18 in the Marshall, so they don't have to r l'1'lace thern on
 
19 every update. And they just say, if you're in the
 
20 western U.S., it's this section, 66, page 1, you multiply
 
21 the answer you got from the manual by 1.06.
 
22 Q. How often is the actual book, itself, updated
 
23 where you don't have the supplement, iif you will?
 
24 A. I believe it's on a quarterly basis.
 
25 Q. You, then, have included a 30 percent
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1 developer's incentive. What is that? 
2 A. That is the entrepreneurial return, or the 
3 profit, garnered on a component of a su'bdivision. In 
4 other words, in a subdivision, when you sell a lot, you 
5 have a percentage of that going to the land cost 
6 underneath the lot, and the development costs, in other 
7 words the roads, the water, sewer, all that, and then a 
8 component for the entrepreneurial retum, which is, in 
9 this market, generally measured between 25 and 35 percent 
10 of the fmished lot value.
 
11 So what I've done here is, I've brought this
 
12 hard cost component into the mix, and Ive added the
 
13 incentives on top of that, because -- because we're not
 
14 doing the actual developed sites.
 
15 Q. Right. And you come to a total of $178, 178?
 
16 A. Yes, that's correct.
 
17 Q. SO that's what somebody, in today's market,
 
18 would have to pay to get the property into that shape?
 
19 A. I believe that they would, yes.
 
20 Q. Turning to page 5 -- and with the one
 




23 Q. SO this underrepresents the value?
 
24 A. It would, yes.
 
25 Q. Moving, then, to page 5, we have barn costs.
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1 It appears you have also used Marshall Valuation, as
 




4 A. Well, as you can see, it's not section 66
 




7 And on page 31 of that, I believe the bam
 
8 was estimated based on an average quality, frame
 
9 structure. And I believe I modified it a little bit for
 
10 the lack of finish. And so the estimate there was $26.02
 
11 per square foot.
 
12 Q. And, then, you have a modifier again?
 
13 A. Yes, sir. I do.
 
14 Q. And that is also to compensate for the
 
15 difference between the manuals as they get updated?
 
16 A. Yes, that's true?
 
17 Q. For a total barn value ofhow much?
 
18 A. The total barn is $55,683.
 
19 Q. And so, then, when we add the two together,
 
20 we come to $235,000?
 
21 A. Yes, that's correct.
 
22 Q. And why did you round it up?
 
23 A. I generally round to the closest $5,000.
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I1 A. The retrospective more or less takes the
 
2 value I estimated as of October 18,2005, and I took it
 
3 back to, I believe, June of2005. And so, all you do is,
 
4 you take your adjustment factor and go backwards with it.
 
5 Q. In other words, you're basically taking
 
6 inflation out of the equation, if you will?
 I7 A. Yes, sir. I am.
 
8 Q. You come to exactly $220,0007
 
9 A. Yes, that's correct.
 !10 Q. In that case, you actually round down a 
I
11 little? 
12 A. Yes, sir. I 
13 Q. Have you also done an analysis as to the 
14 current value of the 40-acre parcel if it were still raw I! 
15 land? II 
16 A. I have done a preliminary analysis, yes. 
17 MS. TAYLOR: I would like to obj,ect, at this 
18 point. This witness has only provided a proposal. We've 
19 not been given any documentation to support him, haven't 
20 seen an appraisal of the underlying land. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Charney? 
22 MR. CHARNEY: I don't think I was required to 
23 provide them documentation on every bit ofhis potential 
[I24 testimony. And clearly, in the witness disclosure that 
25 we made, this type of was going to come up. 
II11I '',I,'' 
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11 
1 salable price in its current condition. And I think 1 THE COURT: Well, I'm sure that my pretrial order 
2 said that any expert testimony, any expmt opinion, would 2 we've disclosed that. 
3 THE COURT: And, Ms. Taylor, you disagree? 3 have to be disclosed pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4), did I 
4 MS. TAYLOR: I sure do, Your Honor. All this says 4 not? I usually do. 
5 is that he is going to adopt an opinion from a different 5 MR. CHARNEY: I need to look alt it, because we've 
6 expert, Joe Williams, who has -- we sat here, in this 6 had, as you know, a series of orders in lhe case. 
7 THE COURT: What I want to fmel out is whether or 7 courtroom, and talked about who would be called as 
8 witnesses. Joe Williams is not going to be called as a 8 not this witness' anticipated -- well, thaI his opinion 
9 witness, his appraisal has not been submitted as an 9 was given to the opponents, when they asked for it in 
10 exhibit, and would clearly be hearsay if it were. 1 0 discovery. And he'll be limited to the opinions that 
11 were disclosed in discovery. 11 I was afraid this would come up, so I have 
12 MR. CHARNEY: Well, let me read to the Court what 12 prepared a bench briefon this subject, Your Honor. If I 
13 has been disclosed, and you can make your call. 13 may come forward? 
14 THE COURT: Sure. 14 TIlE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. CHARNEY: Substance of testimony. In addition 15 MS. TAYLOR: I researched this issue, and one 
1 6 to previous disclosures of Mr. Corlett's testimony, he 16 expert may not be called to simply adopt the opinion of 
1 7 other experts. Even if they were going to be here to 1 7 will provide an opinion regarding the value of 
1 8 improvements and enhancements of the real property 1 8 testify, that would be improper. It would be based on 
19 hearsay.1 9 provided by the Defendants/Counter-Claimants after 
20 This expert has not provided us with an 2 0 acquiring title to the real property, procuring 
2 1 improvements on the property, and fmal platting of the 2 1 appraisal that has any background, any facts, any 
22 property, based on his review of the Multiple Listing 22 documentation of any opinion he would have as to the 
23 Service data and market analysis, based on comparables of 23 underlying value of the real property. This disclosure 
2 4 similar improvements and lots throughout the Treasure 2 4 was made before we got the appraisal. The appraisal we 
25 Valley. 2 5 have, that you have submitted, is only as to the 
Page 168 Page 
1 improvements.1 The witness will render an opinion that the 
2 And it's improper to try to sandbag us and 2 improvements created a market value of $1.4 million for 
3 get in three experts for the price ofone, when he would 3 the real property, as opined by Joe Williams in his 
4 be relying on the opinions of two others who aren't here. 'i4 appraisal. That additional opinion will be provided. 
5 It deprives me of the opportunity to cross examine. 5 However, to date, the expert has not finalized his report 
6 MR. CHARNEY: I think she -- Ms. Taylor's missing 6 and the same will be provided once the same has been 
7 the point. I'm not asking this witness a single question 7 completed. 
8 Now I'll make the offer of prooj~ What I 8 about the Williams appraisal or the Knip~: appraisal. 
9 THE COURT: In your disclosure, I think you -- the 9 want to demonstrate for the Court is, what the value of 
10 fmal sentence, or final paragraph ofyour disclosure, 10 the land would be in -- today, ifit was raw land that 
11 you mentioned something about a Williarns disclosure. Did 11 had not been touched by Mr. Maile because, obviously, 
12 you mention an amount? 'l;i12 $400,000 is no longer a valid price for this property. 
13 MR. CHARNEY: I did. 13 And, then, to compare that to the value of the individual 
14 THE COURT: What did that say, again? 1 4 lots and what the property could tum around and sell for 
15 right now. 15 MR. CHARNEY: Well, the disclosure says, the 
1 6 witness will also render an opinion that the improvements 1 6 And I think that that's clearly be:en 
1 7 created a market value of$1.4 million for the real 1 7 disclosed, as a basis for his opinion, and if they wanted 
18 property, as opined by Joe Williarns in his appraisal. 18 to depose him, I suppose they could. But I think that 
1 9 that's another way for the Court to analyze the unjust 19 I'm actually not going to do that. Where I'm 
2 0 going with this is, Mr. Williams providing an opinion 20 enrichment to the Plaintiffs in this case -- oh, yeah. 
2 1 regarding the value of improvements and enhancements of21 To the Plaintiffs. 
22 I think to simply say right now lhe lots 22 the real property. And this squarely fits within that 
23 disclosure.23 would sell for a particular sum, and to compare that to 
24 I would agree with their motion in limine. 24 the old price, would be unfair to them, actually. I 
25 I don't think he can bootstrap in others that -- well, if2 5 think we need to compare the current raw price to the 
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1 he is an expert, he probably can. But I'm not intending
 
2 to go there.
 
3 In fact, previously, the Plaintiffs in this
 
4 case had agreed that the affidavit of Tim Williams, which
 
5 had the $410,000 appraisal, could be admitted as an
 
6 appraisal and there's an affidavit with it. And we may
 
7 wind up offering that at some later poinr.
 
8 THE COURT: All right.
 
9 Well, Ms. Taylor, I'm going to overrule the
 
10 objection for this reason. 
11 I think that the disclosure that's been made 
12 is adequate. I think that your side was on notice that 
13 this witness would be asked questions regarding the 
14 increase -- his opinion on the increase in the fair 
15 market value of the property due to the improvements that 
1 6 were allegedly done by Maile. 
1 7 And I'm going to allow him to testify with 
18 respect to that. 
19 Now, Mr. Charney, you may go ahead and 
20 restate your question for the convenienoe of the witness. 
21 MR. CHARNEY: All right. 
22 Q. BY MR CHARNEY: Mr. Corlett, have you had an 
23 opportunity to come to an opinion with respect to the 
24 value of the 40 acres in question, if it was simply raw 
25 land, as of today's date? 
Page 172 
1 A. Yes, sir, I have. 
2 Q. What types of information did you consider in 
3 coming to that opinion? 
4 A. I considered the sales in that Eagle Bench 
5 area, running towards Middleton and Star, raw land sales 
6 without utilities, such as the sewer and water. 
7 I've also analyzed some sales ofdeveloped 
8 5-acre sites for the purpose ofdoing a subdivision type 
9 of analysis on the property, much as other experts have 
10 done. 
11 Q. All right. With respect to the raw land 
12 analysis, sitting there today, what is your opinion as to 
13 a potential range of values for the raw parcel, as it 
14 sits there today? 
15 A. Well, my most probable estimate would be in 
16 the $35,000 per acre range. But there are sales out in 
1 7 that district that range up to, actually, over $100,000. 
18 But I think, in this market as we speak today, fifty -­
1 9 $50,000 per acre would probably be a cap for the lack of 
20 utilities. 
21 Q. Which would equate to a total sum of how much 
22 for the 38.22 acres? 
23 A. Well, it would be based on about a $1.3 
24 million, as what I think is probably the most realistic. 
25 And perhaps if it were offered, like I say in the $50,000 
1 per acre, that would be about a million 900,000.
 
2 Q. But you think that $1.3 is the dosest?
 
3 A. I can support that better through subdivision
 
4 analysis, which analyzes the gross sell out, selling
 
5 expenses, profits, and infrastmcture cost.
 
6 Q. Now, with the improvements that Mr. Maile has
 
7 made to the property, and recognizing that you haven't
 
8 thought about the irrigation so we'll exclude that for
 
9 the moment -- not through any fault of your own, it's
 
10 buried -- but with that in mind, what would be the value 
11 of each individual lot, of the seven lots right now, if 
12 they were sold on the open market? And I also want you 
13 to exclude the barn on Lot 1. 
14 A. Yes. And I didn't really include that in the 
15 subdivision analysis. That would be about $347,700 per 
16 lot, based on an average price per acre of $66,963. 
1 7 Q. $66,900? 
18 A. $63 per acre for each of the sites. 
1 9 Q. SO, then, what is the difference between the 
2 0 1.3 million, if it was raw land, versus if all seven of 
2 1 these parcels were sold right now? 
22 A. That would be the gross aggregate retail 
23 sales amount, the 2.4 million. And the 1.3 would be a 
24 residual land value, without improvements. 
2 5 Q. SO is that -- the difference, then, is 
Page 174 
1 1.1 million? 
2 A. That would be about right. 
3 Q. SO without putting words in your mouth, is it 
4 fair to say, though, that the value of the improvements 
5 that Mr. Maile has made to the property have increased it Ii 
6 from a current raw land price of 1.3 million, to a 
7 current salable price of2.4 million? 
8 A. That would be the end result, yes. 
9 MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Corlett, I don't have further 
1 0 questions, but Ms. Taylor will.
 






I14 BY MS. TAYLOR::
 
15 Q. Mr. Corlett, you didn't do any written
 I 




18 A. No, I have not.
 
19 Q. You haven't provided us with a listing of the
 
20 comparables you looked at?
 
21 A. I don't believe that -- I don't know whether
 
22 counsel has given you the sales that I have sent them.
 
23 Q. You sent them documentation on how you
 
24 reached the underlying values of the land itself?
 
25 A. I believe that I have done that,iust in the
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1 course of the past few days. 
2 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I would like to move, 
3 again, to strike any of this witness' testimony about the 
4 value of the underlying land. They, obviously, had 
5 information they did not disclose to us. 
6 And, in addition, the disclosure indicated 
7 he would be testifying to a value of 1.4 million after 
8 improvements. His testimony differed significantly. 
9 He talked about 2.4 million. The disclosure did not 
1 0 adequately alert us as to what this witness would be 
11 testifying to. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Charney, how to you respond to the 
1 3 motion to strike this witness' testimony regarding this 
14 $1.1 million increase in value that he has just opined 
15 about? 
1 6 And that's your motion, isn't it, Ms. Taylor, 
1 7 is to strike that part? 
18 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. 
1 9 MR. CHARNEY: The 1.1 million increase, 
2 0 Your Honor, the request to strike that, is still not 
2 1 inconsistent with the disclosure that had been previously 
22 made. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. As I undersumd this witness' 
2 4 testimony on cross, he has testified that he provided 
2 5 your side with data from which he would be rendering the 
Page 176 
1 opinion that he testified to today. And ]\18. Taylor's
 
2 request for discovery would have included, as I
 
3 understand it, and the court order, would have required
 
4 all expert testimony to be backed up wilh that raw data;
 
5 do you see what I mean? Let me tell you what I mean.
 
6 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. I have -- I do have some
 
7 E-mail that transpired back and forth between this
 
8 individual and I three days ago. I believe that's what
 
9 Mr. Corlett is referring to.
 
10 THE COURT: Okay. And I take ilt what you're
 
11 saying is, in the E-mail, the testimony that he has just
 
1 2 given today, that he did provide some -- it sounds like
 
13 he provided some values ofcomparable properties or some
 
1 4 that he used for comparison.
 
15 MR. CHARNEY: That's correct.
 
1 6 THE COURT: And that hasn't been disclosed to
 
1 7 Taylors' side.
 
18 MR. CHARNEY: Not since -- let's see,
 
1 9 October 10th. No. That would not have been disclosed.
 




22 MR. CHARNEY: Yes. I received this yesterday.
 
2 3 I'm sorry.
 
24 THE COURT: Okay. I want to look at Rule 26(b)(4)
 
2 5 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Idaho Rules of
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1 Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) deals with trial preparation and 
2 experts, and it reads, in relevant part: Discovery of 
3 facts known and opinions held by experts expected to 
4 testify, otherwise discoverable under thf: provision of 
5 Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule, and acquired or 
6 developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may 
7 be obtained by interrogatory and/or deposition. 
8 Now, I take it that there was an 
9 interrogatory that was propounded by your side, 
1 0 Ms. Taylor, to the Maile side, requesting opinions of 
11 experts? 
12 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. We have a standard 
1 3 interrogatory asking for the underlying data. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. The disclosure should include a 
15 complete statement of all opinions to be expressed, and 
1 6 the basis and the reasons therefore, the data or other 
1 7 information considered by the witness in forming the 
1 8 opinions. 
1 9 So it looks to me like the data or other 
2 0 information considered by the witness in forming the 
2 1 opinions was discoverable and should have been disclosed 
22 to Taylors when it was received by the Mailes. I mean, 
2 3 I don't know how I can read that rule any other way. 
24 Mr. Charney, what you have represented to me 
2 5 is that you have received some information from this 
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1 witness, upon which he based his opinion as to the 
2 1.1 million in increased value, and that that has not 
3 been disclosed to the Taylors. 
4 MR. CHARNEY: It was information received to me 
5 late. I met with Mr. Corlett Monday, and asked him for a 
6 little bit of follow-up information, because I was 
7 interested in a different way to analyze this. 
8 And I did advise Ms. Taylor, prior to court 
9 this morning, that I would be attempting to offer this 
1 0 type of information. And she indicated she would be 
11 objecting to it. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. CHARNEY: So yes. I've had this information 
1 4 for less than 48 hours. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
1 6 Let me ask you, Mr. Corlett, did you -- you 
1 7 have supplied some information to Mr. Charney within the 
1 8 last few days? 
1 9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I did. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Now, did you supply him that 
2 1 information because that was the information that you 
22 were using to make your calculations on the value? 
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
24 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. The second portion of his 
2 5 testimony, Your Honor. Not-­
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THE COURT: Understood. And I understand the 
motion is to strike this witness' -- not the witness' 
entire testimony, but only the testimony with respect to 
the opinion that the 38-plus acres has increased in value 
by roughly $1.1 million because of the work done by 
Maile; right? 
MR. CHARNEY: Correct. 
MS. TAYLOR: And, Your Honor, another basis for 
this I may not have made clear, his testimony does not 
comply with the information we were given in the 
disclosure. 
They said that he would testify that the 
improvements created a market value of 1.4 million for 
the real property. The numbers he had -- he has given 
are significantly different. 
THE COURT: 2.4 million, didn't he? 
MS. TAYLOR: Pardon? Yeah. He said -­
MR. CHARNEY: Yeah. He didn't say the 
improvements made it worth 2.4 million. He said that the 
improvements increased the difference by 1.1 million. 
THE COURT: My understanding of the witness' 
testimony that is the subject of this motion to strike, 
is that, had this ground just sat there, from the time it 
was purchased until when the appraisal was done, was it 



























And if the issue is they don't have time to 
meet this evidence, let's see if their appraiser, after 
reviewing this evidence, has the ability to do so. And, 
then, ifhe doesn't have the ability to do so, that's 
when this becomes unfair. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this -- and this is a 
question for you, Ms. Taylor -- you're telling me that 
the response to your discovery request about expert -­
about this expert's opinion addressed orily the 
information contained in Exhibit 17, the appraisal 
report; right? 
MS. TAYLOR: No. They did also include a sentence 
saying, the witness will render 1m opinion that the 
improvements created a market value of 1.4 million for 
the real property. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Well, let me ask you that, then, Mr. Charney. 
If that's a fact, if you said that tills witness was going 
to opine that the fair market value of the property was 
1.4 million, and he comes in today and says one point -­
or 2.4 million, how is that fair to the othl~r side? 
MR. CHARNEY: Well, it's the witness will also 
render an opinion that the improvements created the 
market value. That's -- I guess, maybe, it wasn't worded 



























But, now, because of the improvements which 
have been made, it's worth about 2.4 million, according 
to the method that he used in calculating it, which is a 
difference of about 1.1 million. 
Your motion is to strike that p011ion of the 
testimony because it was not revealed pursuant to your 
discovery requests? 
MS. TAYLOR: Correct. And it's inconsistent with 
the opinion they said he would be holding, which we 
relied on in determining not to -­
THE COURT: Get your own appraiser -­
MS. TAYLOR: -- take the -- this deposition. 
THE COURT: -- right? 
MS. TAYLOR: Our appraiser will be here tomorrow. 
He will not be testifying as to the value of the 
underlying land after the improvement~" however. 
MR. CHARNEY: Well, your Honor, if -- I would 
suggest, then, is you hold back on the motion to strike. 
Let them present this information to th~:ir appraiser, and 
he can either agree or disagree. 
What I would point out is that I asked 
Mr. Corlett for this analysis and he was able to come up 
with it just by -- just pull comps in the local area. 




























turns out to be 1.1, as opposed to lA. 
But, we also said, as opined by Joe Williams 
in his appraisal. 
Now, that's not an area that we wanted to 
go -- that's not a path that I wanted to go down with 
respect to this. But, instead, I have just wanted to 
have him provide an opinion regarding the value of 
improvements and enhancements of the real property 
provided by them -- by the DefendanUCounter-Claimants, 
and that's where his testimony went. 
So, once again, I don't think his restimony 
is at all inconsistent with the disclosure, nor is it 
inconsistent with his affidavits that have been 
previously submitted. And I would, once again, point out 
that the Plaintiffs in this case have a full and fair 
opportunity to meet this evidence. And if they don't, 
then maybe the motion to strike should be reconsidered at 
that point. 
THE COURT: Well, it concerns m~ that you didn't 
supply the material that you just received from 
Mr. Corlett within the last 48 hours or so. 
MR. CHARNEY: I will point out that I did attempt 
to contact Ms. Taylor's office on Monday. It was closed. 
I got an answering service, and they had no forwarding 
number for her. Yesterday, quite I was deer 
" '", 
44 (Pages 179 to 182) 


















'S  losed., 
~~~ : ~:~:~nf ::t;~:~ a;:;~;~;~;;:!~~{;:;~~~~~gi 
·
Taylor v. Maile ~~ 10/11/2006 
Page 183 Page 185 
1 hunting. I mean, I was out. 1 different developer is going to buy this and have the 
2 TIIE COURT: All right. 2 property replatted, and the road and the barn will be 
3 Let me ask you this question thl~n, 3 removed, would you agree that they have no value to the 
4 Ms. Taylor. You have an appraiser who is coming 4 Plaintiffs? 
5 tomorrow. Is that appraiser prepared -­ if you called 5 A. They would probably have no value to a future 
6 him right now, is that appraiser to address the opinion 6 investor, but they would probably still hold value to the 
7 that this witness has just testified to, and the opinion 7 owner. 
8 is on the precise issue of how much the: ground is worth 8 Q. If they were going to remain in place? 
9 now, versus how much the same ground would have been 9 A. Yes. 
1 0 worth had none of the improvements been made? 10 Q. And you have only done an estimate of the 
11 Is he ready to testify about that or she 11 cost approach for putting these in place; correct? 
12 ready to testify? 12 A. Yes. 
13 MS. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. None of this has 13 Q. You haven't attempted to place a value on the 
14 been disclosed to him. We gave him a copy of the 14 actual benefit that any individual would receive from the 
1 5 appraisal of the underlying improvements. We have 15 improvements? . 
1 6 prepared for trial based on what had been disclosed to 16 A. That's kind of hard to do from a sales 
17 us. 17 comparison approach, because when -- improvements just 
18 I don't think it's fair to say, well, we 18 don't sell by themselves. They sell with the underlying 
19 sprung this on you. Now you have to stop the preparation 19 land, the creation of the subdivision. 
20 for the rest of your trail and -- and start over. 20 And so I can -- I looked at the subdivision 
21 TIIE COURT: Right. 21 analysis, and these numbers that we w{:re just talking 
22 Here's the problem I see. I hate to -- I 22 about, that's the macro analysis of the wbdivision. 
23 mean, the two competing issues here are, on the one hand, 23 Q. Right. So it's based on theoretical 
24 you know, the Court wants as much rd~vant information as 24 analysis? 
25 it can get. And on the other hand, I have to insist that 25 A. Yes. 
Page 184 Page 186 
1 the parties comply with the rules of discovery, you know, 1 Q. The actual value improvements would have -­
2 in order to be fair. 2 could vary, according to the potential buyer, couldn't 
3 The disclosure that was made by your side, 3 it? 
4 Mr. Charney, didn't -- I didn't ever hear it say that 4 A. They could, sure. 
5 this witness will testify that the fair market value of 5 Q. If someone wanted to put onions, to plant 
6 these seven lots on this ground is going to be about 6 onions on the land, they're not going to want a barn, 
7 2.4 million, as compared to 1.3 million. I just never 7 they're not going to want a pond, they won't want a road? 
8 heard that opinion rendered in response to the discovery 8 A. They probably wouldn't want that property, 
9 requests. 9 because it would be too expensive to bl~ a farm. 
1 0 And so, the -- this witness' testimony, with 1 0 Q. That's true. But let's say you already owned 
11 regard to that issue only, is going to be stricken, 11 the property and you just wanted to go back to farming 
1 2 because it is beyond the scope of that which was 12 it. Would there be any benefit to the improvements that 
13 disclosed in discovery. 13 you have analyzed here? 
1 4 So the motion to strike is granted. And you 1 4 A. As a farm, probably not. 
15 may move on with the next question. 15 Q. All right. For example, if a -- if someone 
16 MS. TAYLOR: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 6 is looking at a piece of property, and they don't have 
17 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Corlett, was your 1 7 horses, they don't want horses, they don't want a barn, 
1 8 appraisal based on an assumption that these improvements 1 8 is having a barn on the property going to be of any 
1 9 will remain in place? 19 benefit to that person? 
2 0 A. Yes. It would be. 20 A. Not to a particular person perhaps. 
2 1 Q. If that assumption isn't correct, would the 21 Q. And you haven't attempted to talk to the 
22 value of the improvements change? 22 current owners of the property? 
23 A. I haven't made that analysis, so I'm not 23 A. I wasn't exactly sure who the owners of the 
24 sure. 24 property were when I got involved. 
25 Q. Let me give you a hypothetical. If a 25 Q. You haven't talked to anyone from the Johnson 
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1 Trust? 1 $2,631. Is it fair to assume that that would have been I; 
2 A. I don't believe so. 2 for the home that was never built? 
3 Q. Did the defense disclose to you 1hat there's 3 A. It appears to be, yes, ma'am. 
4 a perspective purchaser for this property? 4 Q. Looking down further, to the second line that 
5 A. I -- I have a vague recollection ofthat, 5 is drawn by item number 14, if you can review those 
6 saying something like that. I don't think [ have it in 6 items, is it correct to say that, at that point, the only 
7 my notes. 7 physical improvements that had been made on the property 
8 Q. But you didn't attempt to talk to that 8 was putting in a foundation? 
9 person? 9 A. That would appear to be correct, but it also 
1 0 A. No. 1 0 includes the soft costs of the bam permit certification. 
11 Q. SO you don't know, at this point, whether 11 Q. And that takes us to the date that a lawsuit 
12 these improvements will be left in place at all? 12 was filed against Mr. Maile. 
13 A. That's true. 13 At that point in time, would the work that 
14 MS. TAYLOR: If I could have a moment, Your Honor? 1 4 had been done on the property constitutf: a benefit, in 
15 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Corlett, as part ofyour 15 and of itself? 
16 placing a cost value on these improvements, you were 1 6 A. I haven't really made that analysis. What 
1 7 provided with a list ofpayments that Mr. Maile made; 1 7 you're asking is if somebody would purchase this, based 
18 correct? 18 on him having done this. Possibly yes, it could have I 
1 9 A. Yes, I was. 1 9 some value. 
20 Q. And I have made a blowup of that, that is -­ 20 Q. If nothing further was done, if work had been 
2 1 MS. TAYLOR: If I can approach, Your Honor? 21 stopped at that point, would we be looking simply at the 
22 MR. CHARNEY: Is this your 101? 22 value ofa foundation with nothing on it? 
23 MS. TAYLOR: It's -- I actually thought I would 23 A. And the ability, perhaps, to build a home. 
24 jump straight to 103. 24 Q. Okay. But the home was never built? 
25 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 25 A. Okay. 1
1-----------------1--------'-----------.-- 11 
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1 (Exhibit No. 103 handed to the witness.) 1 Q. In placing a value on this bam, you have 
2 2 used the Marshall's Valuation? 
3 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Corlett, I'm handing you 3 A. Yes, I did. 
4 what has been marked and admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 Q. Does that assume that the building was 
5 No. 103. And I will represent to you that that's a 5 actually completed? r 
6 document we received in disclosure. Does it look 6 A. Made some modifications there, through some 
7 familiar to you? 7 adjustments in my calculations, saying that, you know, it':' 
8 A. Yes, it does. 8 wasn't quite finished yet. And that's where that $26 per 
9 Q. And I would like to focus, specifically, on 9 square foot figure comes from. 
1 0 the -- as I understand it, the first two pages are the 10 Q. And you have seen this bam?
 
11 costs expended on the bam; is that com~ct? 11 A. Yes.
 
12 A. Yes. That appears to be correct. 12 Q. It -- it isn't done, is it?
 
13 Q. And in looking at -- I would like you to look 1 3 A. No, it is not.
 
14 at the first six items. I'll represent to you that those 14 Q. There are parts of it that siding has never
 
15 were incurred prior to the time that Mr. Maile received a 15 been put on?
 
1 6 letter telling him the sale was being challenged. 1 6 A. Correct.
 
1 7 Can you look at those six items and tell me 1 7 Q. It has been left open to the elements?
 
1 8 whether any physical improvements had been made to the 1 8 A. The two bam doors were missing, yes.
 
19 property at that time? 19 Q. Has birds roosting in it?
 
20 A. It looks like these were primarily permitting 20 A. Right.
 
21 and plan costs. 21 Q. You haven't included any deduction for
 
22 Q. Some of those were relating to a prospective 22 depreciation or deterioration of the bam, have you?
 
2 3 home that was never built? 23 A. No, I didn't. Other than through the
 
,i24 A. Yes. 2 4 adjustment of the reproduction cost.
 
2 5 Q. Item number 6 is a building permit fee for 25 Q. You said that -- in your report, rhat the I:
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1 reason you used the Marshall's Valuation for the barn was 
2 because it did not appear that Mr. Maile had paid himself 
3 for labor? 
4 A. That's -- that's true. 
5 Q. Did you -- in looking through these 
6 summaries, did you see reference to labor paid to 
7 Hope Development Company? 
8 A. I did, and I think I excluded that. 
9 Q. Are you aware that Hope Development Company 
10 is a corporation, a family-owned corporation, with
 
11 Mr. Maile and his wife?
 
12 A. I believe so, yes.
 
13 Q. SO under the analysis you received, he did
 




16 Q. If you would like to turn to tht: third page
 
17 of Exhibit 103. Starting with Item No. 49, an
 
18 expenditure for pipe at Silver Creek. Did you, by
 
1 9 chance, notice that that expense was incurred months
 
2 0 before the property was actually purchased?
 
21 A. Yes. I believe I saw that.
 
22 Q. Did you, I presume, deduct the $2,500 in
 
23 earnest money payment?
 
24 A. Yes, I did.
 
25 Q. Okay. And also the other payments that
 . ::..-:..._-------+-----'---------"-----"---'-------- ­
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1 Q. Okay. And if they have elected not to
 
2 develop it, or it's developed in a completely different
 
3 way, you need to redo the engineering, don't you?
 
4 A. If it were redone, yes.
 
5 Q. And in looking at these expenditures, would
 
6 you agree that the primary improvement on the land
 
7 itself, as opposed to the barn, would be the construction
 
8 of the road?
 
9 A. The road and subdivision infrastructure are
 
1 0 probably the most prominent improvements, yes. 
11 Q. And would you agree, by looking at the last 
12 page ofExhibit 103 that you have there, that the 
13 payments to Capital Paving weren't made until July 28th 
14 of2004? 
15 A. That's what the exhibit indicattlS, yes. 
16 MS. TAYLOR: May I have a moment, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: You may. 
18 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: You talked about the 
1 9 developer's incentive -­
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. -- that you added in. That -- bt:cause 
22 Mr. Maile was the developer in this case, that 
23 essentially would be profit to him? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. You have no knowledge, do you, about the 
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1 clearly were just for acquisition of the property?
 
2 A. Yes, ma'am.
 
3 Q. In looking at this page, page number 3, if we
 
4 go down to Item No. 59 -- and I'll repn:sent to you that
 
5 those are the items that fall before the time Mr. Maile
 
6 was provided with the letter telling him that the sale
 
7 was being challenged.
 
8 Looking at those expenditures, were any
 
9 improvements made to the real property prior to that
 
10 time? 
11 A. There were, in fact, engineering services 
12 provided. And so, if you talk about physical 
13 improvements, I can say no. But there -- there were 
14 infrastructure, or soft costs, expended, based on 
15 engineering and planning. 
1 6 Q. And that was all planning for the work that 
1 7 was eventually put into place? 
18 A. I believe so. 
19 Q. If the work had been stopped at that point, 
20 would the engineering that had been done be ofbenefit to 
21 anyone? 
22 A. I believe so. 
23 Q. If they developed it in the sam,~ way as had 
24 been planned? 
,
25 A. As legally yes. 
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1 expenses that the Plaintiffs have incurred in getting
 
2 this property back?
 
3 A. I have no knowledge.
 
4 MS. TAYLOR: If I can have a moment, Your Honor.
 
5 We have no further questions.
 
6 THE COURT: No.further questions, you say?
 
7 MS. TAYLOR: No further questions.
 
8 THE COURT: Very well. All right.
 
9 Mr. Charney, do you have any n~direct?
 
10 MR. CHARNEY: I do not have redirect. 
11 THE COURT: Very well. May the witness be 
12 excused? 
13 MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All right, sir. You are excused. 
15 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
16 THE COURT: Is that 103? 
1 7 THE WITNESS: 103, Judge. 
18 THE COURT: Just stick that back in the sleeve. 
1 9 That'll be good. Okay. Thank you, sir. 
20 
21 (The witness left the stand at 1: 12 p.m.) 
22 
23 THE COURT: And, Mr. Maile, I suppose it's time 
24 for you to retake the stand, and you were under cross; 
25 correct? 
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1 THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
2 THE COURT: So, at this time, we will resume the 
3 cross-examination of the Defendant/Counter-Claimants' 
4 first witness, Mr. Maile. 
5 Do you need a minute to set up? 
6 MS. TAYLOR: I do, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Let's take about five minutes, and 
8 then we'll reconvene. And, hopefully, we'll finish with 
9 Mr. Maile today, direct and cross. We have to end at 
10 2:00, and I have court in here again at 3:00; okay? All 
11 right. 
12 
13 (Recess taken 1: 13 p.m. to I :20 p.m.) 
14 
15 THE COURT: Please be seated. 
16 Ms. Taylor, when you're ready, you may 
17 continue with your cross-examination of Mr. Maile. 
18 
19 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Cont'd) 
20 BY MS. TAYLOR: 
21 Q. Mr. Maile, we were talking earlier about the 
22 fact that getting a deed of reconveyance to -- from the 
23 Johnson Trust was an absolute requirement to your loan 
24 with Idaho Independent Bank. 
25 A. That's true, yes. 
1 Q. And this is a release and reconveyance that ,f 
2 you drafted for Mr. Shearer's signature? ',; 
3 A. Yes.
 
4 Q. This release and reconveyance does
 ililil 
5 considerably more than the standard del~d of reconveyance ~
 
6 that the Rogers had signed at the closing, doesn't it? *
 
7 A. It's a point of contention. This is a form
 
8 that I -­
9 Q. My question was, it does considerably more
 
1 0 than that one, does it not?
 
11 A. I'm not sure it does.
 
12 Q. Does this release and reconveyance purport to
 
13 release you and your wife from any and all liability, any
 
14 claim, liability, demand, andjudgment of an kind or
 




17 A. Well, let me explain.
 
18 Q. Well, does -- is that the correct language?
 
19 A. I want to explain that this was ~m error. My
 
2 0 wife and I weren't the grantors of the Trust. So as soon
 
21 as I figured that out, I had made a mistake on this. I
 









1 Q. And the trustees had signed a standard form 
2 deed of reconveyance at the time of th(~ closing, we have 
3 looked at that. 
4 At the time that you were getting the 
5 construction loan from Idaho Independent Bank, you were 
6 still aware of the fact that there were some 
7 beneficiaries who were disgruntled over the sale, weren't 
8 you? 
9 A. I would have on say no, became that letter 
10 in July of 2003 had represented that Beth Rogers was 
11 spearheading this -- this contention. And, then, of 
1 2 course Beth Rogers reaffirmed to me that that was not the 
13 case. 
1 4 Q. You had Steven Shearer sign a release and 
15 reconveyance? 
1 6 A. Yes, I did. 
1 7 Q. At the time you had him sign that, you told 
1 8 him there were some disgruntled benefi ciaries, didn't 
19 you? 
2 0 A. I had said to him there had been some in the 
21 past, that's for sure. 
22 Q. That was January 9, 2004? 
23 A. I don't know the date. I don't know. 
24 Q. Would you turn to Exhibit No. 126, please. 
2 5 A. Okay. I'm there. 
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1 Q. The language in this one purpolis to release 
2 you and your wife from any claim, of any kind whatsoever, 
3 relating to the purchase of this property, does it not? 
4 A. As it relates to the deed of trust, yes. 
5 Q. Only as to the deed of trust? 
6 A. I was -- I started.using this larger release 
7 and reconveyance about two or three years prior to this 
8 being executed, because I felt that it better -- it 
9 better explained the circumstance of an accord and 
1 0 satisfaction. 
11 And that, to me, is the essence of what a 
12 deed of reconveyance does. It is an accord and 
1 3 satisfaction. And I -- and this is a form that I had 
1 4 seen over the years used by deeds of trusts, or related 
15 to deeds of trust. And I started using this at least two 
1 6 or three years before Steve Shearer signf~d this one. 
1 7 And this one is in error as to the names of 
1 8 the parties. 
19 Q. But this purported to release you from any 
20 liability relating to claims, as to the real property, as 
21 well, doesn't it? 
22 MR. CHARNEY: I'm going to object at this point on 
2 3 grounds of relevance? 
24 THE COURT: Does it go to unclean hands? 
25 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. 
, ,","" 
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1 THE COURT: I'll -- no. I'm going to ovenule it. 
2 I think that that's in the mix, quite frankly. 
3 MR. CHARNEY: Would you entertain more argument on 
4 that point? 
5 THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead. 
6 MR. CHARNEY: My point is that the contract, and 
7 the deed of trust, no matter whether or not they were 
8 defective or contained some terms that seem 
9 unconventional, like the demanding litigation on one hand 
1 0 and arbitration in the same paragraph, isn't a relevant 
11 inquiry any more because the Trust was paid its full 
12 $400,000, on time, as it was suppose to have been paid. 
13 THE COURT: I think the point is, though, 
1 4 Mr. Maile, and the Mailes as a group -- and I'm lumping 
1 5 them all together -- are seeking damages under a theory 
16 of unjust enrichment, which is an equitable theory. 
17 MR. CHARNEY: Yes. 
18 THE COURT: And the doctrine ofunc1ean hands has 
1 9 been raised as a defense to an equitable remedy. And, 
2 0 therefore, any evidence that has some rekvance to the 
21 issue of unclean hands, it seems to me, is coming in. 
22 MR. CHARNEY: But if -- I guess I would agree with 
23 the Court to the point that, if there was a demonstration 
2 4 that he got the property in an improper manner. But 
2 5 whether or not the documents are sound, or defective, or 
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1 what have you, doesn't really answer that question. 
2 I would agree that unclean hands, ifTom had 
3 gone to Ted in a nursing home on his deathbed and said, 
4 just sign right here -­
5 THE COURT: Oh, sure. 
6 MR. CHARNEY: -- that clearly would be a relevant 
7 inquiry. But that's not the evidence in this case. 
8 THE COURT: What I'm doing, here, in ovenuling 
9 the objection as to relevance is just telling you that 
1 0 I'm taking a look at the entire transaction, really, from 
11 beginning to end. 
12 And I understand what Ms. Taylor is 
1 3 attempting to elicit. She's attempting to elicit 
1 4 evidence, present evidence to me, that demonstrates that 
15 Mr. Maile was just doing too much self-·dealing and that 
1 6 he wasn't looking -- that he was drafting: documents that 
17 protected himself and his interests, to the detriment, 
18 perhaps, ofhis former client or to the TIUSt. 
19 And -­
2 0 MR. CHARNEY: The argument in response to that is, 
21 he was equally bound by the exact same terms. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Right. And all that is 
2 3 perfectly good argument -­
24 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 
25 THE COURT: -- with respect to the effect of all 
1 of this. But right now, it's just a simple relevance 
2 issue, and relevance is pretty easy. And I'm explaining 
3 why I think it's relevant, and why I'm ruling it is. 
4 So I'll allow you to go ahead and continue, 
5 Ms. Taylor. 
6 MS. TAYLOR: Thank you, Your Honor. 
7 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Maile, I'm going to try 
8 to reconstruct my question so I don't have to ask the 
9 court reporter to read it back. 
10 Isn't it true that this release and 
11 reconveyance purported to release you and your wife from 
12 any liability, whatsoever, regarding any claim relating 
1 3 to the real property, not just to the deed of trust? 
14 A. No. Because why -- if that was my intention, 
15 to have such a global release, why would I, as your 
16 exhibit packet shows, February 16,2004, propose a mutual 
1 7 release to be signed by the Trust? 
1 8 I knew that this release and reconveyance 
1 9 form was not a global resolution for our family to pay 
2 0 off the deed of trust. And it ha'l been a form that I had 
21 used on other transactions. 
22 
23 
Q. Okay. So you didn't show it to Beth Rogers? 
A. I sent it to Steven Shearer as trustee. 
I' 
24 Q. Did you advise Steven Shearer that he needed 
25 to show it to Beth Rogers? 
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1 A. No. I'm sure I didn't. 
2 Q. And you're aware that he did not ever show it 
3 to Beth Rogers? 
4 A. I don't think he did. 
5 Q. And as you stated, this one was incorrect, 
6 wasn't it? You drafted it incon~ectly, wlth the wrong 
7 parties; right? 
8 A. My staffput my wife's name and my name in, 
9 and it was corrected in Exhibit 130 and sent out again. 
1 0 It took us a month to figure out we had the wrong names 
11 on the form. 
12 Q. Okay. So let's go to Exhibit No. 130. You 
13 prepared that as well? 
1 4 A. Yes. The staff did, under my direction, yes. 
15 Q. It also included all of this release 
1 6 language? 
1 7 A. Included what? 
1 8 Q. The release language -­ II' 
19 A. Yes, it did. 
2 0 Q. -- that we had talked about previously? And 
2 1 you agreed that that release language is not in a 
22 standard deed of reconveyance? 
2 3 A. It's not -- I don't know what a sltandard is, 
24 because I had received this type of form from other 
25 attorneys related to a deed of trust. It is not like the 
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lone used at Alliance Title.
 




4 A. I don't know if they signed it. When they do
 
5 closings, they break the buyers and sellers up into
 
6 different rooms, and at different times, So I don't know
 
7 what she got.
 




10 Q. Do you recognize that to be the request for 
11 full reconveyance that the Rogerses signed at the time of 
12 the closing? 
13 A. I've seen this in discovery. I -- it is my 
14 belief that Alliance Title and Escrow rletained the 
15 original in their files. I never saw it until discovery 
1 6 in this case. 
1 7 Q. Okay. But you'll agree that the release you 
18 drafted is far more broad than the one rhey signed? 
1 9 A. It had been my practice to use this type of 
2 0 release and reconveyance for a couple years prior to 
21 doing it here. 
22 Q. Okay. So the suit by the beneficiaries was 
23 filed on January 23rd of2004? 
2 4 A. Sounds right. 
25 Q. You knew that that suit had bc:en filed?
Page 205 Ii 
Ii 
1 Bart Harwood, as her attorney, on February 16th of 2004? ~
 
2 A. Yes. If
 
3 Q. That letter encloses a mutual rdease that
 
4 you're asking that they sign; correct?
 
5 A. I was asking Bart Harwood to have his client,
 
6 Beth Rogers, to sign the mutual release, yes.
 
7 Q. And that release would have released you -­

8 you, doing business as your real estate company and
 
9 Berkshire Investments, from any liability relating to
 
1 0 your purchase of this property; correct?
 
11 A. This was intended to be a global release from
 




14 Q. And you didn't provide Mr. Harwood with a
 
15 copy of the release and reconveyance that you had
 
1 6 Mr. Shearer sign over a month earlier?
 
1 7 A. I don't think I did. And it's the one that
 
18 had my name and my wife's name incorrectly on it. Is
 
1 9 that the one you mean?
 
20 Q. After this letter ofFebruary 16th, you
 
2 1 talked to Mr. Harwood and he told you that the Trust was
 
22 not going to sign your mutual release, didn't he?
 
23 A. At some point in time, he madl~ it clear that
 
2 4 he didn't -- he was walking a tight rope and he didn't
 
2 5 want Beth and Andy to get sued.
 
----------i----------"----::-----,-------1ill 
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1 A. Yes.
 




4 A. By the Taylors, yes.
 
5 Q. And you knew that the lis pendens constituted
 
6 a breach of the terms of your bank loart, and that payoff
 
7 was the only alternative?
 
8 A. That was -- that was part of the conditions
 
9 of the bank loan, that I keep it free ofliens.
 
10 Q. And by this time, you knew thlt Beth Rogers
 
11 had an attorney?
 
12 A. In January?
 
13 Q. No. We're in February now.
 




1 6 Q. You're right. I'm going to the date of the
 
17 release and reconveyance, which was February 18,2004.
 
18 A. Exhibit 130, okay.
 




2 1 A. I'm pretty sure, yes. I think she told me,
 
22 in this period of time, that she was with Bart Harwood.
 
23 Q. Can you tum to Exhibit No. 128, please.
 
2 4 A. Yep, I'm there.
 
2 5 Q. Is that a copy of the letter you wrote to
 
~::;:~;~&h,) -,~",",illh",,*:, ;.;, 
1 Q. That release was never signed?
 
2 A. That's true.
 
3 Q. But you prepared a new release and
 
4 reconveyance, releasing Berkshire, for Steven Shearer's
 
5 signature two days later, on February 18th?
 
6 A. Two days later? Yeah about this point in
 
7 time, I realized that I had put the wrong names on the
 ! 




10 Now, I don't know when I heard that the
 I 
11 mutual release wouldn't be signed. I was trying to get a
 
12 meeting with everybody.
 
13 So I don't know when it was actually
 




1 6 Q. Okay. But this Exhibit No. 30, that release
 
1 7 and reconveyance you never provided to Beth Rogers?
 
I
18 A. I'm pretty sure I didn't. I thought it was
 
1 9 the trustees' obligation to clear the title. What I was
 
I20 trying to do was clear the title, even though, as I 
2 1 recall, the bank didn't catch the error that I put my 
22 name and my wife's name on it. 
2 3 It took me 30 days to figure out, wait a 
2 4 second, we put the wrong name on there" So I tried to I 
"~~,,,,~e sU::L~,~rks~: In,~:~~ents w~¥~:,~ecause they were 11 
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1 the titled owners.
 
2 Q. You didn't provide a copy of this second
 
3 release and reconveyance to Bart Hanvood, even though you
 
4 knew he was the Trust attorney by that time?
 
5 A. I don't think I did.
 
6 Q. When you provided this second release and
 
7 reconveyance to Steven Shearer, you didn't tell him that
 
8 you had been sued?
 
9 A. I can't remember.
 
1 0 Q. You didn't tell him that the Tru3t had an 
11 attorney?
 
12 A. Probably not. I can't remember.
 
13 Q. Then, ifyou can tum to Exhibit No. 131. 
1 4 On February 24, 2004, you wrote to Bart Hanvood, again, 
1 5 telling -- urging him to get the mutual release signed 
1 6 and back to you; correct? 
17 A. Where -- what paragraph is it in? 
18 Q. I'm just summarizing the entire document. 
1 9 A. It says, I would also appreciate your input 
2 0 regarding the proposed mutual release. 
2 1 Q. Okay. So you didn't have a signed release at 
22 that point in time? 
2 3 A. That's true. 





2 Q. -- the release and reconveyance, the
 
3 recording stamp indicates that you recorded it -- it was
 
4 recorded, at your request, the day after your letter to
 
5 Bart Hanvood; correct, on February 25th of2004?
 
6 A. Well, that's what the recorder stamp said.
 
7 But it would be highly -- it could have been sent back to
 
8 my office. But I can't remember if Steve Shearer signed
 
9 it and filed it, or whether -- most times, the -­
10 Q. The document says -­




13 Q. Doesn't it say right on it, at the top on the
 
1 4 stamp, recorded, request of Thomas Maile Real Estate?
 
15 A. Well, that's only because I could have
 
16 enclosed a check for the $6, knowing it's $3 a page. It
 
1 7 could have been my check that accompanied the runner to
 
1 8 the Ada County Recorder's Office with the release of
 
1 9 reconveyance. It doesn't mean I was standing there, 
2 0 physically filing it. 
2 1 Q. But you intended that it be filed? 
22 A. Sure. It had to be. 
2 3 Q. And, at this point in time, you knew that 
2 4 there was a good chance that the beneficiary Plaintiffs 
25 would be substituting in as trustees, and suing you, as a 
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1 Trust, didn't you?
 
2 A. Now, I don't think that really developed -­
3 there was some issues, even in April, from what I can
 
4 recall, that the taxes had to be filed by Ithe Trust in
 




7 And Beth appeared at the motion to dismiss,
 
8 with us, when the Taylors were dismissed in the first
 
9 complaint, and that was in April.
 
1 0 And -- no. So even in April, Beth and Andy
 
11 were very friendly with my wife and I. And, you know,
 
1 2 they were act -- they were the trustees of the Trust.
 
13 Q. SO in the middle of February, you didn't have
 
1 4 any inkling there was a risk that the Taylors would be
 
1 5 replacing the trustees?
 
1 6 A. I didn't see it -- I didn't see it that way
 
1 7 in February. Certainly developed that happened.
 




20 Q. This is a letter that you authored, dated
 




2 3 Q. Talking about your opinion of what may happen
 
2 4 in this lawsuit?
 
25 A. (No verbal response.)
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3 A. Yeah. Go on.
 
4 Q. I'll direct your attention to page 2, the
 








9 February 16th of2004, you stated, the risk,
 
1 0 from my perspective, is the Trust has been paid in full} 
11 in January 2004, relative to the dead of trust on the 1 
12 subject propertY, the money is believed to have remained! 
1 3 in the Trust account. Bart Harwood has indicated that 
14 Trust may be liquidated, and the current trustees will be 
15 discharged or resign. The plaintiffs may creatively pick 
1 6 up the pieces and become the successor trustees and have, 
1 7 arguably, a more colorable claim. 
18 A. Okay. That's probably accurately recites my II 
19 thinking on or about February 16th. 
20 Q. And on or about February 16th, you had not 
21 put very much money, at all, into the development of this 
22 property, had you? Ilii 
23 A. I don't know what the percentage would be, 
24 but there was, in my estimation, a considerable amount. 
25 Q. Well, will you tum to Plaintiffs Exhibit 
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2 A. You bet. Okay.
 
3 Q. If you look at the first page, through item
 
4 number 14, those would have been the expenses you
 
5 incurred prior to this February 16th letter acknowledging
 
6 the risks of the Plaintiffs becoming the: trustees.
 
7 I'll represent to you that I have added these
 
8 and re-added them, and that the total amount incurred at
 




11 Q. That is not excluding the items that
 
12 Mr. Corlett said had been excluded because they related
 




15 Q. And the answer and counterclaim you filed in
 
16 this case asserted that there was an absolute bar to a
 
17 lawsuit against you because of the releases and
 
18 reconveyances that Steven Shearer had signed, didn't it?
 
19 A. Now, say that again.
 
20 Q. I'm sorry. That was a very long question.
 




23 Q. In that answer and counterclaim, you raised
 
24 the fact that Mr. Shearer had signed these releases and
 





2 Q. And you claimed, in the lawsuit, that they
 
3 were a bar to any lawsuit against you or your
 
4 corporation -- or your LLC, didn't you?
 
5 A. My position is, and has been, lhat when
 
6 somebody is paid in full for an obligation it's an accord
 
7 and satisfaction. So I couldn't see where you folks were
 
8 coming from, asking for a recision of the contract when
 
9 it's a year and a half, two years after the contract and
 
10 you have been paid in full on it.
 




13 Q. And you asserted that defense vigorously?
 
14 A. I don't know.
 
15 Q. We filed a motion for summary judgment, you
 
16 opposed the motion for summary judgment?
 
17 A. I would say I contested this case.
 
18 Q. Yes. And you continued to pursue a claim
 
19 that these releases were a bar against any type of
 
20 lawsuit against you?
 
21 A. No. I think in my briefing for summary
 
22 judgment, it doesn't say that. It still argues accord
 
23 and satisfaction in relation to those releases.
 
24 Q. There's been a lis pendens in place in this
 












5 Q. You have been aware, from thl~ beginning, that
 
6 the Plaintiffs were seeking a return of the property?
 
7 A. Because the property was purchased for a
 




10 Q. And also negligence in preparation of the
 
11 documents and self-dealing in the transaction; correct?
 
12 A. The negligence, if any, in creating documents
 
13 was no damage to you folks.
 
14 Q. I'm not asking you for your legal opinion.
 
15 I'm just saying, you were aware that thf: Plaintiffs
 
16 wanted the property back.
 
17 A. Yes. And then the Court entered an order, at
 




20 Q. You never informed any of the: Plaintiffs that
 
21 you expected them to pay for improvements you were
 
22 making, as they were being made, did you?
 
23 A. No. I relied on the title.
 











4 A. No, I did not.
 
5 Q. And the road wasn't put in until after the
 
6 Trust had filed against you; cOlTect?
 




9 A. The road doesn't come in overnight. There
 
10 was a lot of bidding, there's preparation. Trust filed
 




13 Q. Well, let's look at Exhibit number 103.
 





16 Q. Which item? I'm sorry?
 
17 A. It's 101. Your handwritten notation, 101,
 
18 dated July 28,2004, the last page of Exhibit 103,
 
19 Capital Paving was paid $20,000.
 
20 Q. Okay. And that didn't happen until
 




23 A. I don't know. It was in July that the Trust
 
24 filed a lawsuit.
 
25 Q. And I'll represent to you that it was on
 II 
,'w , ,"',,"'", 
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1 court order denying your motion to remove the lis pendens i1 July 15th. 
2 was entered on June 21 st of 2004. 
3 Q. And you knew, when we were in court on the 
2 A. It could have been. 
3 A. That was based solely on the fact that the 
4 motion to dismiss on April 12th, that flle trustees were 4 beneficiaries' lis pendens was the only thing of record,
 
5 resigning and that the Trust would be filing?
 5 and the case had been dismissed, and you folks were
 
6 A. That's what you had said.
 6 talking about appealing the case. So it was a very -­
7 Q. Well, the trustee was present, as well, and
 7 there was really no evidence before this Court, but it
 
8 confirmed that; correct?
 8 was denied.
 
9 A. On which hearing is that, ma'2m?
 9 Q. Thank you. That was my question, it was 
1 0 Q. On your motion to dismiss the: beneficiaries. 10 denied on June 21st. At that point in time, you had put 
11 A. I think my wife and I attended that hearing. 11 approximately $60,000 into improvements; correct? 
12 And there wasn't any statement made by Beth Rogers, in 12 A. Well, I'll qualify that by saying" the 
1 3 court, that she was going to be resigning. 13 Exhibit 103 shows the date ofpayment, not necessarily 
14 Q. You don't remember us talking about how long 14 the date of when it was incurred. But for sake of 
15 it would take to get the signatures, and Beth Rogers 15 argument, it would have been approximately $60,000. il 
16 being in the gallery and discussing it? 1 6 Q. And following that first dismissal, you 
1 7 A. I remember you discussing it. It could very 1 7 continued to make improvements? 
18 well be. The transcript would speak for itself. I -- I 1 8 A. Let me clarify that, actually, thll paving was 
1 9 don't recall if she volunteered that. 1 9 on a 30-day account. So that probably was started, as I 
2 0 Q. But in any event, you didn't seek or receive 2 0 recall, sometime in May. I didn't have to pay for it 
21 improvement from the Trust -- I'm sony. 21 until July 28th. 
2 2 You didn't seek approval of making these 22 So maybe $60,000 is a little light on your I 
23 improvements, from the Trust, before you made them? 23 last series of questions, because I think somewhere in 
2 4 A. No. I did not. 24 there is that Capital Paving charge that was being 
25 Q. And you didn't expect that they would be 2 5 incurred.
,----'---------If--------------------------f'" 
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1 paying you for what you did, at the time that you did it? 1 But, yes. I continued, as the bank required,
 
2 A. At the time, we were the titled owners. I
 2 that the subdivision be completed.
 
3 had no expectation of anything from the Trust.
 3 Q. Okay. You knew that the lawsuit had been
 
4 Q. Okay. And during the course of this case,
 4 filed very quickly after you had gotten the loan from
 
5 you have, on three different occasions, tried to get the
 5 Idaho Independent Bank?
 
6 lis pendens removed?
 6 A. Yep. The beneficiaries filed a lawsuit. I 
7 A. A number of times, two or three. 7 Q. Yep. And, at that point, all Idaho I] 
8 Q. And each time it was left in pllce? 8 Independent Bank had done was payoff the balance owing
 
9 A. When I was filing the motions to remove the
 9 on the deed of trust; correct? 
1 0 lis pendens, I had the bank loan. And] kept telling lOA. That was enough. 
11 the -- I kept talking to the bank, telling them we were 11 Q. Okay. And one of the options you had, at 
12 trying our best to get the cloud removed. I was 12 that point in time, was to seek different financing which 
13 obligated to the bank to clean up the title. 13 wouldn't have had a six month requireml~t for 
14 Q. You continued to make improvements after each 14 development, didn't you? 
15 of your unsuccessful attempts to get the lis pendens 15 A. Impossible. You can't go to a knding 
16 removed? 1 6 institution with a lis pendens and get fmancing on 
17 A. (No verbal response.) 1 7 property. 
18 Q. I'll represent to you -­ 18 Q. Well, you refinanced the loan, after making 
1 9 A. I -- I don't think many improvements. I know 19 all the draws for improvements, in December of 2004, 
2 0 that there was a lot done in September of '04, and the 2 0 didn't you? I 
21 Court, with all due respect, denied our motion to remove 2 1 A. I refi -- no, no. I beggen, borrowed, and 
22 the lis pendens. And the subdivision, at that point in 22 stealed -- and stole from various assets to payoff the 
23 time, was substantially constructed. 2 3 Trust. Remortgaging our home, doing a variety of things, 
24 Q. Let's look at Exhibit No. 103. If you'll 24 just any way I could do to payoff the Trust. So it I, 
25 look at line item 94, I'll represent to Y011 that the 25 wasn't a refmance, no. 
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1 Q. SO those are all things you could have done 
2 rather than drawing on the line of credit with 
3 Idaho Independent Bank? 
4 A. No. And I'll tell you why. A good majority 
5 of the money that was used in December of '04 to payoff 
6 Idaho Independent Bank came from properties that were 
7 listed for a year prior to that, that just were not 
8 selling. 
9 And I would have to say that, just out of the 
10 blue, that those properties, fortunately" sold to free up 
11 enough equity to move from one piece of property to pay 
12 off the Trust. 
13 So, it wasn't as if I wasn't trying to raise 
14 money, because I certainly needed to raise money to pay 
15 for improvements on Fairfield Estates. It just was -- it 
16 was a good timing that things sold whm they did, to pay 
17 off the bank. 
18 Q. You didn't make any effort to refinance 
19 before you put the improvements in, dld you? 
20 A. Refinance the Linder Road property? 
21 Q. Find another way to payoff Idaho Independent 
22 Bank? 
23 A. I couldn't find -- I had tried. I couldn't 
24 find -- but the property having a claim clouding the 
25 title, no bank would loan on it. And we were leveraged 
Page 220 
1 with everything else.
 
2 MS. TAYLOR: May I have a mom~nt, Your Honor?
 










8 A. Yes, it is.
 
9 Q. Do I understand correctly that il's your
 
















18 A. Or under the real estate contract. The fIrst
 




21 Q. There was not an order, or any other
 
22 requirement, that the Trust repay you this money until
 
23 July 21st of 2006, was there?
 
24 A. No, no. There wasn't.
 
25 Q. Your calculations, here, are actually
 
Page 221 
1 compounding interest at 12 percent, arc~n't they?
 
2 A. Well, I added the interest rate from one year
 
3 to the next, and figured a new 12 percent rate. So I
 
4 guess it could be called compounded annually. It's not
 
5 compound daily, that's true.
 
6 Q. It's compound annually?
 
7 A. It appears that's what [ did.
 
8 THE COURT: It's 2:00 o'clock. Ms. Taylor, are
 
9 you about finished? If you're not, that's fme. If you
 
10 have any more than a minute or two, we'll just recess now 
11 and come back tomorrow morning. 
12 MS. TAYLOR: No. I can do it in two minutes. 
,013 THE COURT: Okay. Go.
 
14 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: I would like to go back to
 
15 the beginning of this transaction.
 
16 A. You would like to go back whl~re?
 
17 Q. To the beginning of the transaction, when
 








22 MR. CHARNEY: Which one?
 
23 MS. TAYLOR: 111.
 
24 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: 1hat is a letter that you
 
25 received from Mr. Johnson's accountant?
 
Page 222 
1 A. Yes. Both Ted and I received it.
 
2 Q. And in that letter, she raised a concern.
 
3 She said, I believe the sales offer for $400,000 is too
 
4 low; correct?
 II5 A. She says that, yes.
 




8 Q. That is a letter that you sent to Mr. Witte's
 
9 attorney, Eric Haff, on June 4, 2002?
 
10 A. Yes. Ii 
11 Q. And in that letter, you state that based upon
 




14 A. That's what it says.
 
15 Q. And you bought the land for the same price
 
16 about six weeks later?
 




19 MS. TAYLOR: I have no other qUI~stions,
 
,
20 Your Honor. 
I21 THE COURT: Thank you. 
22 Mr. Charney, do you have any redirect? If 
23 you have some extensive redirect, I don't want to push 
24 you into jumping into it right now because, frankly, 
25 we're over time. 
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1 MR. CHARNEY: Right. I probably have five minutes 
2 of redirect, so it's your call. We can do it first thing 
3 in the morning. I know you have a huge calendar. 
4 TIIE COURT: I do, at 3:00. If you can do it in 
5 five minutes, I'll give you five. 
6 MR. CHARNEY: Are you sure, Iuga? I'm asking the 
7 real boss. 
8 
9 REDIRECT EXAMINAnON 
10 BY MR. CHARNEY:
 
11 Q. Mr. Maile, a couple of points that have been
 
12 raised in about the last half an hour.
 
13 First off, with respect to the lawsuits that
 
14 had been filed by the Taylors, the one that had initially
 
15 been dismissed and the follow-up one that exists today,
 




18 A. Not in my opinion.
 
19 Q. We had negligence claims; correct?
 
20 A. Oh, yes.
 




23 A. Oh, yes.
 
24 Q. We had claims that you had paid less than
 
25 fair market value for the property?
 
Page 225 
1 A. Okay. Ted wasn't sure what he' wanted to do
 
2 in our second conference, May 29, 2002. It was our
 
3 attempt to flush out, to see if we could get a rise in
 
4 price by Mr. Witte, without committing to a counteroffer.
 
5 I had conversation with Imogen, the
 
6 accountant, in addition to receiving the letter. And she
 
7 did talk about a 40-acre parcel. And it was -- come to
 




10 Q. SO not really a true comp, if you will? 
11 MS. TAYLOR: Objection; leading.:]: 
12 TIIE COURT: Sustained. 
13 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Was it a true comp, 
1 4 comparing the property in the high-density area to the 
15 rural area that this property wa",? 
1 6 A. I didn't feel that it was. I guess the 
1 7 argument could always be made, as we'll see -- an 
18 argument can always be made that comparables are in the 
19 eye of the beholder. 
20 Q. And so, fmally, when the Franz Witte offer 
21 sort of died on the vine, if you will, you then paid the 
22 same amount of money that you had previously reflected as 
2 3 extremely low. 
24 What changed to lead you to the conclusion 
2 5 that that was, in fact, fair?
I-------------=--=----"-----------t------------------------... 
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1 A. Oh, yes.
 
2 Q. It was not, in fact, until December of 2005
 
3 that the Supreme Court offered a theory that eventually
 
4 led to the Trust recovering the property?
 
5 A. That's true.
 
6 Q. And as ofDecember 2005, had you completed
 
7 the improvements that we're talking about in this trial?
 
8 A. I had to, for the bank.
 
9 Q. Ms. Taylor also asked you questions about,
 
1 0 did you ever ask the Trust for pennission to improve -­
11 make the improvements on the property. The question to 
12 you is, why would you ask the Trust to improve property 
13 that you owned? 
14 A. Well, that's what I had indicated. We were 
15 the titled owners on the property, and we, were proceeding 
16 on what both Ted and Beth knew we were going to do since 
17 2002. 
18 Q. Okay. Then, finally, the Plaintiffs have 
1 9 shown you the letter from the accountanl, Ms. 
20 Hetherington, and then your follow-up ktter, which 
21 somewhat parroted Ms. Hetherington's ktter, back to 
22 Mr. Witte's attorney, where you indicated that the 
23 property -- that you thought the value, or the offer, 
2 4 was extremely low. 
25 Upon what did you base that decision? 
1 A. Well, there was a licensed real estate
 
2 appraisal that was done, that was qualified, had a good
 
3 reputation, and it was truly the fair market value in
 
4 2002. Things have changed.
 
5 Q. Did Ted try to get more money than the 400?
 
6 A. He never -- not to my knowledge.
 
7 Q. From you. In other words, did he ever say,
 






11 Q. Did you say, I see an appraisal at four.
 
12 I'll pay you three?
 
13 A. No. 
1 4 Q. You both agreed, buyer and seIler came 
15 together and agreed on the appraised value? 
16 A. We did. 
1 7 MR. CHARNEY: No further questions. 
18 TIIE COURT: Thank you. 
1 9 All right. You may step down, then, 
20 Mr. Maile. 
21 MR. CHARNEY: Oh, I have -­
22 TIIE COURT: Listen, do you need to confer? Go 
23 ahead and confer, and then, if you have another question 
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3 THE COURT: Go ahead.
 
4 MR. CHARNEY: As far as Exhibit 16 goes -- I don't
 
5 know if the Plaintiffs will have an obje~tion -- he would
 
6 like an opportunity to rework that was simple interest,
 
7 instead of the compounding. I don't think he did that on
 
8 purpose, so he would like to probably offer a revised
 
9 l6-A, if you will, that removes that annual compounding,
 
10 because that would not be appropriate Imder the statute.
 








15 THE WITNESS: No. I'm shaking my head.
 
16 MR. CHARNEY: That's true.
 
17 Can I rest in the morning, after we've had a
 
18 chance to confer? I would say that there's a high
 
19 likelihood that we would be resting, but I need to rework
 
20 the exhibit. And if they're not going to stipulate to
 
21 it, then I may need a little bit more testimony.
 
22 THE COURT: I'll give you a little bit of -­
23 MR. CHARNEY: Okay.
 
24 THE COURT: I'll give you a little bit ofleeway.
 




2 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. We will be in 
3 recess, now, until 9:00 o'clock tomorrow morning. I have 
4 just been told we're not certain that we'll be in this 
5 room, but you'll be packing up anyway, because we have a 
6 room full coming in at 3:00. But we may be in this room, 
7 hopefully; okay? 
8 All right. We'll see you folks tomorrow 
9 morning at 9:00. 
10 

















1 BOISE, IDAHO 
2 Thursday, October 12,2006,8:59 a.m. 
3 
4 THE COURT: Good morning. 
5 MR. CHARNEY: Good morning. 
6 THE COURT: When we finished yesterday, 
7 Mr. Charney, the question was whether or not the 
8 Plaintiff was going to rest. And you indicated that you 
9 might want to get one other exhibit in, to substitute 
lil'i 
10 for the -- I think it was Exhibit 16, wasn't it? 
11 MR. CHARNEY: It was. 
12 THE COURT: So, what do you want to do this 
13 morning? H 
14 
15 
MR. CHARNEY: Well, we have at couple matters to 
bring up. 
II 
16 THE COURT: All right. 
17 MR. CHARNEY: I guess we can talk about exhibits 
18 and things like that, first. 
19 The first one is, as far as some additional 
20 exhibits, 16-A, which is a refiguring of the calculation 
21 of the interest. And I don't believe there's an 
22 objection from the Plaintiffs on that. 
23 MS. TAYLOR: There is not. 
24 THE COURT: No objection? 
25 MS. TAYLOR: We're not agreeing it's owing, but we 
Page 230 
1 stipulate -­
2 THE COURT: No objection to the admissibility? 
3 MR. CHARNEY: Correct. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. l6-A is admitted. 
5 
6 (Exhibit No. l6-A is admitted.) 
7 
8 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. As far as other exhibits we 
9 have an agreement on, I believe we will stipulate to the 
10 admissibility of Defendant's 18, which is the appraisal 
11 prepared by Mr. Knipe. 
12 MS. TAYLOR: Based on the understanding that 
13 Mr. Knipe is not going to be a "litness, there won't be 
14 any testimony. We're just agreeing they could meet the 
15 business records exception to the hearsay rule. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. So that Exhibit 18 would come 
17 in, and it is a written appraisal. 
18 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. 
19 THE COURT: Offered by the Cowlter-Claimants, 
20 essentially. 
21 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Offered by Maile against Taylor, and 
23 no objection to the admissibility of 18; is that right, 
24 Ms. Taylor? 
25 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. Based on our understanding. 
,M:,0i%:,,:, ~::';'ii;:~.:!@?-lm,"~ ,::::"",:,:"',, 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. Then Exhibit 18 is admitted. 1 THE COURT: You will not be. Okay, very good. 
2 2 I'm not going to admit those right now, then. You're 
3 (Exhibit No. 18 is admitted.) 3 going to have to put Mr. Maile on -­
4 4 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 
5 MR. CHARNEY: We'll come back to 19. 5 THE COURT: -- to lay a foundation for admission 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 6 of those and, then, that will subject him to some 
7 MR. CHARNEY: We have Exhibits 20 and 21, 7 cross-examination. Okay. :~ 
8 Your Honor, which we have agreement on. And these are 8 MR. CHARNEY: Exhibit 22, which is the last one 
9 other examples of the release and reconveyance form that 9 we have a stipulation on, that is the letter from 
10 was offered previously, other times when Mr. Maile has 1 0 Franz Witte, with a cover letter from Mr. Maile to 
11 used the identical form in other situations. 11 Mr. Johnson. 
12 THE COURT: All right. 12 THE COURT: Is there a stipulation for the 
1 3 MR. CHARNEY: I'll make argument about that, and 13 admission of Plaintiffs 22? 
14 I believe the Plaintiffs stipulate to the admissibility 1 4 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, there is. 
15 of those documents. 15 THE COURT: There is. Okay. TIlen No. 22 is 
16 THE COURT: Is that right, Ms. Taylor? 1 6 admitted. 
1 7 MS. TAYLOR: Well, it's my understanding there 17 
1 8 will be testimony to go along with thern. They are not 18 (Exhibit No. 22 admitted.) 
19 just being entered in a vacuum; is that correct. 19 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess that would be the 20 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. Now, I want to also offer, 
21 question. 21 Your Honor, Defendant's Exhibit 19, which is an affidavit 
2 2 Did you intend to call Mr. Maile back and lay 22 of Tim Williams and the Tim Williams appraisal that was 
2 3 some groundwork, lay some foundation for the 23 done in December of '03, the one that n~ferenced 
2 4 admissibility and relevance of these? 2 4 yesterday, appraising the property -­
25 MR. CHARNEY: Well, I didn't know the 2 5 THE COURT: Hang on just a minute. 
Page 232 Page 234 
1 admissibility was this big of a deal, but I can certainly 1 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 
2 have Mr. Maile talk about the representations I just 2 THE COURT: I have to catch up. 
3 made, very briefly. I don't want to belabor the issue, 3 MR. CHARNEY: No problem. 
4 but a couple moments of testimony on that point. 4 THE COURT: Okay. I'm ready to go, now, with your 
5 THE COURT: So your offer of proof is that -- to 5 argument on No. 19. What is No. 19? 
6 rebut a suggestion, or an inference, that Mr. Maile had 6 MR. CHARNEY: No. 19 is the Tim Williams appraisal 
7 made up a new reconveyance form for this case only -­ 7 that was done about 18 months after the purchase. I'm 
8 MR. CHARNEY: Exactly. 8 sorry, 18 months after the Knipe appraisal, appraising 
9 THE COURT: -- and to bolster his testimony that 9 the property of $41 0,000. 
I 0 he has used that same form in the past, you want to put I 0 Late in October of last year, I sent 
11 him back on the stand, to lay foundation for Exhibits 20 11 Ms. Taylor an E-mail-- or I'm sorry -- a letter, with an 
12 and 21, which you contend -- or which he will contend are 12 affidavit of Mr. Williams, that was an authenticating 
13 reconveyance forms similar to the one that was used in 13 affidavit ofbusiness records, under Rule '902. 
1 4 this case, that he has used in the past? 14 I received a letter from Ms. Taylor, dated 
15 MR. CHARNEY: That's perfectly correct. 15 November 4,2005, which reads: Dear D~s, thank you 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 16 for your October 28, 2005 regarding the appraisal of 
17 
18 
And, Ms. Taylor, is that your understanding, 
as well? You're not -- well, I guess, then, my question 
17 
18 
Timothy Williams. We will stipulate to allow 
Mr. Williams' appraisal to be admitted as an exhibit at 
I 
19 would be, what is the stipulation with respect to these 19 trial. There was also other commentary about another 
20 documents, to these exhibits? 20 unrelated matter. 
21 MS. TAYLOR: I won't be objecting to them being 21 This is that affidavit and that appraisal. 
22 admitted, but I will have some limited cross-examination. 22 Based on that letter, I did not subpoena Ivlr. Williams, 
23 THE COURT: Okay. All right. You will not be or 23 and we believe, given the Court's comments yesterday 
24 you will be objecting to their admission? 24 about wanting to understand the entirety of the 
L...2,5 Mi7S;m'm::T:mAT:YL~0:7:R=: :;:1:;:W1:::!i'ii:ll;i:niii0i;rti;rbeii:i._T'!!m. !!"lIIh,2r5~tr;mans~a..mc"lllti0i;rn!lri,"lIIIrni:b:melii;ie:irv:i:erni:thrniiai:7tciithmiem-a.,J"p+,p...;ra,is;,i;ai;rl hmi:as!=r:mel;mern;van~c.;;.e. __......J. . 1'. 
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1 So I'm going to offer this appraisal, at tIlis point. 1 know, that just has any tendency to establish a fact at 
2 I don't think that she's disputing that this 2 issue has -- is relevant. 
3 is not, in fact, a copy of the appraisal. But I'm 3 Now, there's -- you know, there's certainly a 
4 offering it based on the previous stipulation entered 4 question about whether or not relevant evidence should be 
5 into between the parties. 5 excluded, because it tends to muddy the water, it tends 
6 TIIE COURT: Thank you. 6 to confuse things, or waste time, or inappropriately 
7 And, Ms. Taylor, do you object to the 7 focus on something that is not really the contested issue 
8 admission ofExhibit 19? 8 offact. 
9 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. After the issues 9 I think, in the context of this court trial, 
1 0 were narrowed down, we knew we were only coming in on 10 I would overrule the relevance objection. But you also 
11 unjust enrichment. I informed Counsel that we were no 11 suggested that there was another objection, and that is 
12 longer willing to stipulate to the admission of this. 12 foundation. 
13 This is not an authenticating affidavit. 13 MS. TAYLOR: Foundation-­
14 TIIE COURT: Hang on. You -- when did you inform 14 TIIE COURT: You said that there was an affidavit 
15 Counsel that you were no longer stipulating to the 15 attached to the exhibit, that Mr. Charney contends is an 
16 admissibility of the Williams appraisal? 1 6 authenticating affidavit under Rule 902 of the Rules of 
1 7 MS. TAYLOR: In our pretrial memorandum, which 1 7 Evidence, and you dispute that contention, Ms. Taylor. 
18 was-­ 18 MS. TAYLOR: It doesn't contain the necessary 
19 TIIE COURT: When was that submitted? 19 elements. It just says, I'm an appraiser and attached is 
20 MS. TAYLOR: I don't know that I still have it 2 0 my appraisal. 
2 1 in my notebook. Let me see. 21 TIIE COURT: Okay. Now, it doesn't contain the 
22 TIIE COURT: Well-­ 2 2 language about, this is a true and correct copy of the 
23 MS. TAYLOR: I have it right here, Your Honor. 23 appraisal that I did, and I keep it in the ordinary 
24 TIIE COURT: Okay. 24 course ofbusiness, and this is the kind of stuff that we 
25 MS. TAYLOR: But I don't have the date it was 25 rely on, the professionals in my profession rely on in 
Page 236 Page 238 
1 signed. I have my yellow copy. It was in early 1 making these -- in rendering these opinions, that sort of 
2 September. 2 thing; right? 
3 MR. CHARNEY: I don't know -- what's the relevant 3 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. And Mr. Williams will not 
4 portion, because I don't think there was anything in 4 be here as a witness. 
5 there that said that we're no longer going to abide by 5 TIIE COURT: Okay. I guess, then, it boils back 
6 the stipulation they entered into November of last year. 6 down to whether or not you should be sort of estopped 
7 THE COURT: But your objection would be relevance; 7 from challenging the fundamental requirements of this c 
8 right? 8 exhibit, because of your letter fi'om last year where you 
9 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, exactly. My objection is 9 said, we will not be objecting to the admission of this 
10 relevance. The affidavit did not authentio;ate it as a 1 0 particular appraisal report. 
11 business record. I don't think it's relevant. He was 11 Is there any contention that this is not the 
12 appraising it for purposes of the development costs, for 12 same appraisal report? 
13 the bank. It was done long after the tram.action was 13 MS. TAYLOR: No. There isn't, Your Honor. But, 
14 entered into, about a year and a half after the initial 14 at that time, I assumed that Mr. Williams would be here 
1 5 transaction. So I don't think it's relevant. 15 as a witness to testify, and I would be able to 
1 6 The Knipe appraisal, I don't think I can make 1 6 cross-exanline him. Now that I know he won't be here as a 
17 that argwnent because it's valuing it at the time it was 1 7 witness, I think that -- that just introducing it in a 
18 purchased, and our appraiser will give his value at the 1 8 vacuum, in light of my questions on relevance, makes this 
19 time it was purchased. 1 9 very different from the Knipe appraisal. 
20 But this was done in December of 2003. It's 2 0 And I have located the l.mguage from my 
21 an appraisal value as of March of 2004. i<\nd I just don't 2 1 pretrial memorandum, under -- at the bottom of page 4, 
22 see its relevance to a transaction that happened in 2002. 22 Mr. Charney. Under stipulated facts, what I stated was, 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Well, relevance is not a 23 prior to this Court's ruling on the beneficiaries's 
2 4 difficult standard to overcome. I mean, maybe standard 2 4 motion for summaryjudgment, the parties had agreed that .j 
2 5 is the wrong word. But even something that is -- you 25 the report ofTim Williams would be admitted as 
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1 an exhibit. It is the Plaintiffs position that the 
2 appraisal is not relevant to the sole deJense issue 
3 remaining, which is the value of the improvements, nor 
4 the value of the underlying real property. So, I believe 
5 that gave him notice that we were not longer stipulating. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. How difficult would it be to 
7 get Williams in here? 
8 MR. CHARNEY: To establish the -- well, actually, 
9 a couple points first. 
10 The letter that I sent Ms. Taylor last year 
11 clearly stated that we were not going to be calling 
12 Mr. Williams, and because we had the authenticating 
13 affidavit. 
14 The affidavit that's appended to Exhibit 19 
15 is not the authenticating affidavit. Thf: authenticating 
1 6 affidavit, I believe, is in the Court file, which does 
1 7 contain that 902 language that is required. And we can 
1 8 spend some time, later on, digging that out instead of 
1 9 wasting time, here at this point. 
2 0 I don't know how difficult it would be to get 
21 Mr. Williams here or not, because I hadn't anticipated 
22 the objection. 
23 And it appears that the objection, from the 
2 4 memorandum, to the extent that there is one, is on 
25 relevance grounds, not on hearsay grounds, that this is _. 
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1 not what it purports to be. So, if that is the 
2 objection, and now she's just sort ofbootstrapping and 
3 saying, well, it's hearsay and just trying to find 
4 another way, I don't think that's reasonable, given the 
5 tenor of this case. And I would ask you to accept the 
6 exhibit. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 And, Ms. Taylor, if! allowed in No. 19, 
9 admitting a particular piece of evidencle is -- you know, 
10 speaks to its admissibility, obviously, and not 
11 necessarily to its weight. 
12 You would still be able to make the argument 
13 that the Court should give, perhaps, no weight at all to 
14 that particular exhibit, because it's so marginally 
15 relevant. 
16 Do you see what I mean? 
1 7 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. I do see what you mean, 
18 Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: I want to find out too, Ms. Taylor, 
2 0 did you -- you actually did receive the Williams 
21 appraisal report some time ago, so you've had an 
22 opportunity to look it over; right? 
23 MS. TAYLOR: Oh, yes. DefiniteIy. 
24 TIlE COURT: Okay. 
25 MS. TAYLOR: But, Your Honor ][ do not recall 
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1 Mr. Charney's letter saying that he would not be there as 
2 a witness. I only recall a request that we stipulate to 
3 admission. Ifhe can pull that letter out, I'm perfectly 
4 willing to be proven wrong on that, but that is not my 
5 recollection. 
6 THE COURT: Well, let's hold off on 19, for now 
7 then. And maybe during the next break you can see if you 
8 can get Williams down here to testify. But I'm keeping 
9 all of my options open and all of my considerations. 
1 0 This trial is only going to go for three 
11 days. We have to fmish with our evidence tomorrow 
12 because -- well, I suppose I could consider, you know, 
1 3 bifurcating the trial or something, if we had to. But I 
1 4 don't want to do that because we have attorneys from out 
15 of town. 
1 6 And I am not able to spill into next week, I 
1 7 just can't. I've got a big med mal case going, and I 
1 8 have to be out of town for half a day. It's not going to 
19 work. 
20 So the time consideration is terribly 
21 important in this case, and I want the parties to know 
22 I'm taking that into account, too. If bringing 
23 Mr. Williams in to lay some foundation and subject him to 
24 cross-examination would, in my view, unreasonably extend 
25 the length of the trial, I'll take that into 
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1 consideration in ruling on the admissibility of what may 
2 be -- or at least what is arguably a marginally relevant 
3 document, for purposes of the issues confronting this 
4 Court. 
5 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 
6 THE COURT: So let's hold off on 19, for now. And 
7 during the next break, you can see if you can get ahold 
8 of Williams, see ifhe might be available to come down 
9 and lay some foundation for the admiss,ibility. 
10 But as far as the relevance objection, I've 
11 ruled on that one. I find that it's relevant. How much 
12 weight I am going to put on that appraisal, that opinion, 
13 is -- I suppose that's subject to argument later. 
14 MR. CHARNEY: All right. One other -­
15 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
1 6 MR. CHARNEY: -- matter very briefly. Exhibit 
17 No. 129, from the Plaintiffs, was a lettf~r from 
18 Mr. Maile to Mr. Hoagland. It clearly stated, on the top 
1 9 of it, that it was a privileged communication. I had not 
20 seen that, and I mistakenly stipulated to its 
21 admissibility yesterday. 
22 Mr. Maile -- and as the Court is aware, I 
23 stepped into this case kind of late, given the whole 
2 4 
25 
tenor of the case. And I did not know that that letter 
had ever been disclosed. And Mr. Maile testified about I 
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1 it yesterday, but we spoke immediately aftetwards and 
2 were troubled by, how did they get their hands on this 
3 letter? 
4 Nevertheless, we do claim privilege with 
5 respect to that letter, and are going to ask the Court to 
6 strike the letter from the exhibit binder and to strike 
7 any testimony relating to Mr. Maile's discussion about 
8 that letter. 
9 And I don't know -­
10 THE COURT: Has there been testimony already about 
11 the letter? 
12 MR. CHARNEY: There was. 
13 THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion, to the 
14 extent that the cat's out of the bag. It \\'ould be -- I 
15 think it would be too difficult for me to, you know, 
1 6 purge from my own mind any testimony, and so forth, any 
1 7 notes that I have taken and that kind of thing. 
1 8 So, like it or not, you stipulated to the 
1 9 admissibility of certain exhibits. This particular one, 
2 0 that you now claim is privileged, was among those 
21 exhibits. It's in. 
22 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 
23 THE COURT: The motion is denied. 
24 MR. CHARNEY: For the record, it wasn't an 
2 5 inadvertent stip. 
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1 THOMAS MAILE, • 
2 the witness at the time of the evening recess herein, was :I, 
3 examined and further testified as follows: 
4 
5 RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
 
6 BY MR. CHARNEY::
 
7 Q. Mr. Maile, the bailiffhas handed you
 
8 Exhibits 20 and 21. Do you recognize those exhibits?
 
9 A. Yes, I do.
 
10 Q. What are those exhibits? 
11 A. Well, as -- as discussed yesterday, my fonn 
12 file had changed a few years prior to the release and 
13 reconveyances that Steve Shearer ultimately signed in 
14 this case, which he signed in January and February of 
15 '04. 
16 So Exhibit 21 is an example of that release 
17 and reconveyance fonn that I had started using, as I 
18 indicated, a few years before. And it is one that I was 
19 able to locate, because it also had Steve Shearer as 
20 signing that document, on March 28, 2001, in a 
21 transaction that was involving my wife and I granting a 
22 deed of trust to Hope Land and Livestock Company. 
23 And that related back to a 1992 deed of trust 
24 that was ultimately, as I recall, paid off earlier, but 
25 we never got the release and reconveyance done. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. CHARNEY: So, I will recall Mr. Maile to 
3 discuss Exhibits 20 and 21. 
4 THE COURT: Now, before you do that, Ms. Taylor, 
5 do you have anything else, preliminarily, before we wrap 
6 up Mr. Maile's case in chief? 
7 MS. TAYLOR: I do not, Your Honor. I was planning 
8 to let Mr. Charney know -- we got busy -- I believe that 
9 I can narrow my case down to only calling three witnesses 
10 today. 
11 TIfE COURT: Okay. 
12 MS. TAYLOR: I planned on, perhaps, five. So as 
1 3 far as planning our time frames, I can never anticipate 
1 4 how long cross-examination may be. But I -- in my mind, 
1 5 I think we could be done before 2:00 o'clock today. 
1 6 THE COURT: Okay, great. We'll :,ee what we can do 
1 7 then. Okay. 
1 8 Now, go ahead and call -- Mr. Maile, you're 
1 9 still under oath. You may retake the stand. 
2 0 And you may inquire of your wimess whenever 
21 you're ready, Mr. Charney. 
22 




1 And then, we went to refinance our home, in
 
2 ninety -- in 2001, and I think the title company said,
 
3 hey, you've got to get a release and reconveyance for
 
4 that. So that's what 21 is representing. It has Exhibit
 
5 A on the bottom, which was created because it was
 




8 Exhibit 20 is the same form as 2: 1, which is
 
9 also the same fonn of the other releases and
 
10 reconveyances. And it related to a deed of trust from my 
11 wife and I, again, where Steve Shearer was a trustee, and 
12 it's a 1997 document. But this deed and reconveyance,
 
1 3 again, was needed to be filed for, I think, refinancing
 
1 4 on a piece of property back in 2003.
 
15 So that form continued to be uSf:d by my
 




1 8 Q. Had you used that same fonn £~r other,
 
1 9 unrelated clients, as well?
 
2 0 A. I believe I have. 
21 Q. All right. In other words, you didn't create 
22 that particular fonn for this case? 
2 3 A. No. 
24 Q. All right. 
25 MR. CHARNEY: No further questions. 
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1 THE WITNESS: Nor the other rell:ases that were 1 A. No, I really didn't. No. Our family is very Ii 
2 talked about yesterday. 2 close. I 
3 Q. All right. So these wt:re not entered into in3 MR. CHARNEY: All right. 
4 THE WIlNESS: Obviously, this is unrelated to this 4 the same situation that the ones in this transaction were 
5 entered into, were they? 5 case. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. So you're moving the admission? 6 A. Now say that again? I'm sorry. 
7 MR. CHARNEY: Oh, yes. I will offer 20 and 21. 7 Q. The situation on these releases was not 
8 Is that right? 8 comparable to the situation in this case, were they? 
9 THE COURT: Yes, 20 and 21. 9 A. Well, it involved a deed of trust. In 
10 Ms. Taylor, do you have any objections? 10 both -- all these examples involved reconveyances on a 
11 MS. TAYLOR: I do not. 11 deed of trust, so they are similar. Not the same 
12 THE COURT: All right. Then 20 and 21 are 12 entities, of course. Not the same individuals, of 
13 admitted. 13 course. 
14 1 4 Q. Right. And you have never provided -- or you 
15 (Exhibits No. 20 and 21 admitted.) 15 have not provided a release and reconveyance with this 
16 1 6 type of language where anyone other than Steve Shearer 
17 THE COURT: Anything else? 1 7 was the trustee? 
18 MR. CHARNEY: No, Your Honor. 1 8 A. I had not provided anything else to you, and 
19 THE COURT: Would you like to cross-examine the 1 9 I had tried to explain that these are easier for me to 
20 witness on this small point? 2 0 locate because Steve Shearer was involved on these. But 
21 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. Very briefly, Your Honor. 2 1 I know that I have used some forms similar to this for 
22 THE COURT: Go ahead. 22 other clients, involving other trustees. 
23 III 23 Q. And at the time these exhibits, No. 20 and 21 
24 III 24 were prepared, you hadn't received a letter from your 
25 III 25 daughter, or your development company, saying that the\--,---------------------+-----=-_-:---:._---..:.._----=-_.:.-'---"--=-----­
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1 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 1 transaction was being challenged, had you? 
2 A. No.2 BY MS. TAYLOR:: 
3 MS. TAYLOR: No other questions. 3 Q. Mr. Maile, in both of these exhibits, No. 20 
4 TIIE COURT: All right. 4 and 21, you and your wife are the grantors? 
5 Any redirect at all? 5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And in the release and reconveyance you 6 MR. CHARNEY: No redirect. 
7 prepared in relation to this matter, you and your wife, 7 TIIE COURT: Very well. You may step down, then, 
8 or your LLC, were the grantors? 8 Mr. Maile. 
9 TIIE WITNESS: Thank you.9 A. Just the LLC was the grantor. We 
1 0 THE COURT: And I'll take those from the bailiff. 
I 
1 0 inadvertently -- our office inadvertently put Tom and 
1111 Colleen on the first release. 
12 Q. Okay. So you have not provided the Court 12 (The witness left the stand at 9:28 a.m.) 
1313 with any documents like this that don't relate to a 
14 transaction in which you were the grantor? 14 TIIE COURT: Does the Counter-Claimant have any 
15 A. That's true. I testified there probably are 15 additional evidence or testimony, Mr. Charney? 
1 6 others, I just couldn't locate them. 16 MR. CHARNEY: As long as we c~Ul reserve ruling on I 
17 Q. Youjust couldn't find them? Okay. And in 17 Exhibit 19. 
18 TIIE COURT: Yeah. Fair enough.:18 each of these cases, the beneficiary of Ihe deed of trust 
19 was an entity that you were very close to; correct? 19 Ms. Taylor, any problem with doing it that II 
20 A. Well, one entity was our daughter. And the 20 way? 
21 MS. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. If I can talk to my'·'21 other entity was our construction company. 
22 Q. Right. And you hadn't -- you didn't have any 22 client a little, I -- we may be able to work something 
" 
j 
23 out.23 reason to think that either your daughtt:r or your 
24 TIIE COURT: Okay. 24 construction company would be bringing a lawsuit against 
2 5 you, did you? 25 MS. TAYLOR: Mayl? 
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1 DAN GROBER,1 THE COURT: Sure. 
2 2 called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
3 having been first duly swom, was examined and testified3 (Conference between Plaintiffs and Counsel.) 
4 4 as follows: 
55 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, we don't want to take a 
6 DIRECT EXAMINATION.6 chance of delaying the trial. We will stipulate that 
7 BY MS. TAYLOR:: 7 Mr. Williams would be able to lay the foundation to meet 
8 Q. Would you state your name, pJlease.8 the business records exception to the hearsay rule and 
9 A. Dan Grober. 9 agree to admissibility, subject to the Court advising us 
10 Q. Spell your last name for the record. 1 0 that we obviously have the ability to argue, either in 
11 A. G-R-O-B, as in boy, E-R. 11 verbal closing or written closing, as to the relevance. 
12 Q. Mr. Grober, we have retained you as an expert12 THE COURT: All right. And that is the ruling. 
13 witness in this case; is that correct? 13 The Court will admit, then, counter -- Defendant's 
14 A. That's correct. 14 Exhibit 19. As I say, I do find that it has some 
15 Q. And what opinions are you here to testify to?1 5 relevance. 
16 A. I'm here to testify to opinions as to 1 6 And in reviewing the matter, and in taking 
17 attomey standard ofcare, ethics implications of1 7 the entire thing in context, which obviously, 
18 Ms. Taylor, you'll have an opportunity to do in your 18 attomey conduct, those sorts of things. 
19 Q. Can you give the Court a little bit about1 9 argument and by presentation of other evidence -- I mean, 
20 you just have that -- you are aware of your right to do 20 your educational background. 
21 that, that admitting this does not mean, necessarily, 21 A. I have a bachelor's degree in English and 
22 joumalism, from Eastem Illinois Unive:rsity. I have a 22 that the Court is swallowing it whole, or putting too 
23 Master of Arts Degree from Boise State University. And23 much reliance on it. 
24 Now, Mr. Chamey is certainly free to argue 24 my Jurist Doctorate from the Universi~yof Idaho. 
25 Q. What has been your professional work2 5 that this is the Holy Grail, in this case, and that this 
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1 experience?1 document proves a lot. And both of you have the 
2 A. When I initially began practice:, I was 2 opportunity to do that. 
3 involved in general practice in the Twin Falls/Magic 3 But it just seems to me that, in a court 
4 trial, the Court can exercise, you know,just a little 4 Valley area for a time. I also spent some time as the 
5 Jerome County Public Defender. 5 bit more leeway, especially on the relevance issue, 
6 because the likelihood of it causing confusion for the 6 Thereafter, in October, early to mid-October 
7 trier of fact is less; okay? 7 of 1989, I became Assistant Bar Counsel for the Idaho 
8 MS. TAYLOR: We don't want to delay, Your Honor. 8 State Bar, and I held that position until, I believe, 
9 THE COURT: Fair enough. Okay. Based on all 9 October 31 of 1996. Whereupon, I left Bar Counsel's .~ 
10 those considerations, Exhibit 19 is admitted. 10 Office, moved to Homedale, where I have since that time ; 
11 11 been engaged pretty much in a general practice oflaw, 
12 locally. 1/12 (Exhibit No. 19 admitted.) 
13 13 Q. What were your duties when you were Assistant 
14 Bar Counsel?14 THE COURT: Okay. With that, Mr. Charney? 
15 MR. CHARNEY: With that, the Defendants will rest. 15 A. Essentially, my duties as Assistant Bar 
16 THE COURT: Very well. 1 6 Counsel involved investigating complaints of alleged 
17 Are you ready to call your first witness, 1 7 attomey misconduct, prosecuting many of those 
18 Ms. Taylor? 1 8 complaints, if it was determined that rules of 
19 MS. TAYLOR: I am, Your Honor. I will need to go 1 9 professional conduct were breached. 
20 get him. 20 I was also -- shared responsibilities with 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 21 Chief Bar Counsel for providing ethics advice to Idaho 
22 III 22 attomeys, and was -- also shared responsibility for 
23 III 2 3 traveling around the state, giving ethics seminars, so 
24 III 2 4 that attomeys in the state could meet their CLE 
25 III 25 requirements. I" 
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1 Q. Okay. After leaving the Idaho State Bar, has
 
2 your practice continued to have any component involving
 
3 attorney disciplinary matters?
 
4 A. Yes. I -- a rather significant part of my
 
5 practice, since going back into private practice in
 




8 Q. As part of your professional practice, to you
 
9 handle real estate transactions?
 
lOA. I do on a regular basis.
 
11 Q. And what documents, in general, have you
 
12 reviewed in forming your opinions in tbjs case?
 
13 A. I have reviewed at least some of the
 
1 4 pleadings. I have reviewed at least excerpts of
 
15 depositions. I have reviewed various correspondence and
 
1 6 various exhibits provided to me.
 
1 7 I think I've detailed the majority of those
 
1 8 in an affidavit that I have submitted in this case.
 
1 9 Q. And as a result of your investigation, did
 
2 0 you reach an opinion as to whether Mr. Maile met the
 
21 standard ofcare required for attorneys in the state of
 
22 Idaho in relationship to the Johnson transaction?
 
23 A. Yes. I have reached an opinion.
 
24 Q. What is that opinion?
 
25 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; foundation.
 
Page 256 
1 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to sustain the
 
2 objection. I believe that the -- well, I'm just going to
 
3 leave it at that.
 
4 MS. TAYLOR: Okay.
 
5 THE COURT: I'm going to give you leave to lay
 
6 additional foundation -­
7 MS. TAYLOR: All right.
 
8 THE COURT: -- if you're able to do so.
 
9 MS. TAYLOR: I am able to do so.
 
1 0 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Grobl~r, let's talk more 
11 in detail about the items you looked at in reaching your 
12 opinions in this matter. 
13 First ofall, what concerns did you have when 
14 looking at the initial purchase between Mr. Johnson and 
15 Mr. Maile? 
1 6 A. My concerns, when I looked at the initial 
1 7 purchase agreement were, first and foremost, conflict of 
18 interest issues and whether or not those conflicts were 
19 properly dealt with. 
2 0 I also had other concerns with the contract, 
21 because I found language in -- and I believe -- excuse 
22 me. I've been fighting a cold. I found language in a 
2 3 paragraph, as I recall, which was captioned attorney 
2 4 fees, but had all kinds of other -- other provisions in 
25 there. 
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1 Q. Okay. Are there any special considerations
 
2 you look at when it's a business transaction between an
 
3 attorney and someone they have represented?
 
4 A. Yes. And those concerns, again, I hinted at
 
5 those as being conflicts of interest because, clearly,
 
6 conflicts of interest exist when an attorney begins doing
 
7 business with a client, and most especiailly when the
 
8 attorney has been involved with the matters, representing
 
9 that client, that lead to the business transaction.
 
10 Q. And your investigation showed that that had, 
11 in fact, occurred in this case? 
12 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; leading. 
13 THE COURT: Sustained. 
1 4 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Did your investigation 
15 indicate that there had been a previous transaction in 
1 6 this case? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Can you explain that to the Court. 
19 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; hearsay and foundation. 
20 THE COURT: Well, I'll sustain the objection on 
21 the ground of lack of foundation. 
22 You can lay some additional foundation, if 
2 3 you care to. 
24 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Grobe:r, as part of your 
25 investigation in this matter, did you review documents
----11 
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1 from Franz Witte?
 
2 A. From -- I'm sorry?
 
3 Q. From a Franz Witte, relating to a purchase
 
4 offer on the Linder Road real property?
 
5 A. Yes. I believe I did. He, through his
 
6 counsel, as I recall.
 
7 Q. Were you done with the answer?
 
8 A. You asked me if I had reviewed documents.
 
9 Yes, I had.
 
1 0 Q. And what knowledge did you have, from your 
11 review of the documents provided, as far as the prior 
12 transaction on the Witte property -- or on the 
13 Linder Road property? 
14 A. As to the Linder Road property, I reviewed 
15 documents that indicated, as I recall, that Mr. Johnson 
1 6 had received an offer to purchase the Linder Road 
1 7 property, as I recall, for a figure of $400,000. I think 
18 that offer came through Mr. Witte's counsel. I believe 
1 9 that was Eric Haff. 
20 And I recall a letter from Mr. Maile, I 
21 believe, back to Mr. Haff, indicating that the $400,000 
22 purchase price was -- I think the language was extremely 
23 low or very low. 
24 Q. But what concern does that raise in your 
25 mind? 
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1 A. Well, the concern in my mind arose when the 
2 materials I reviewed subsequently told me that Mr. Maile, 
3 in fact, offered to purchase, and ultimately purchased, 
4 the property for that same amount. 
5 Q. Does that raise ethical implications, in your 
6 mind? 
7 A. Well, yes, it does. Would you like me to 
8 elaborate on -­
9 Q. Yes. 
lOA. Any time an attorney begins to do business 
11 with a client, significant ethical red flags are raised. 
12 Conflict of interest red flags, clearly. 
13 And that is one of the -- one of the reasons 
14 why, if attorneys are going to do business with a client, 
15 such as this, they need to make absolmely certain that 
16 they have properly dealt with the conflicts, such that 
17 the client, if the client chooses to go ahead with the 
18 transaction, has had all of the implicatJ:ons fully 
19 explained and has waived any conflict, so that the client 
2 0 is fully aware of all of the implicatiom: and aspects of 
21 that transaction. 
22 Q. As part of your review in this matter, did 
23 you see a letter from Mr. Johnson's accountant, 
24 Imogen Hetherington, to Mr. Maile, dated May 24, 2002? 


























to Mr. Johnson on how to detennine a purchase price on 
the property? 
A. If there's -- I'm sorry? 
Q. Do you recall the advice Mr. Maile has 
indicated he gave to Mr. Johnson on how to determine a 
fair price on the property? 
A. I believe that there was correspondence, or 
communication, to -- to Mr. Johnson regarding maybe 
having -- looking at comparables or having the property 
appraised. 
Q. Do you recall Mr. Maile saying that he should 
get three comparables and some appraisals and average 
them? 
A. Yes. I -- that's what I alluded to in my 
previous answer. 
Q. Is it a concern, in your mind, ifan attorney 
gives different advice on valuation, ifhe is buying the 
property, than he did when a third party was looking at 
buying it? 
MR CHARNEY: Objection; leading. The question 
should be, what are his concerns based on the evidence 
that he has reviewed? 
THE COURT: All right. I'll sustain the 
objection. 
Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: What are your concerns, based 


























Q. Did that letter raise any concems or ethical 
implications? 
A. Again, as I recall the letter -- and 
certainly the letter will speak for itself. But as I 
recall the letter, the letter informed Mr. Maile that the 
property in question was worth $1 million, based upon 
comparable sales to developers. 
Q. And that letter has been admitted as 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. Ill. 
What concern does that letter mise? 
A. Well, to me, the concerns are somewhat 
obvious. Looking at that letter in the context of the 
things [ have already testified to, we have a situation 
where Mr. Maile, on the one hand, informs Mr. Haff, with 
respect to the Witte offer, that $400,000 is very low or 
extremely low. 
Mr. Maile appeared to have that letter from 
Imogen Hetherington, I believe was her name, that tended 
to substantiate the fact that that offer was very low. 
But then, as I recall, within a manner ofjust a few 
weeks, maybe six weeks or so, Mr. Made ended up as a 
party to a purchase agreement for the same property for 
that very price. 
Q. In reviewing the documents provided to you, 


























on the evidence you have reviewed? 
A. My -- my concerns are that it seems highly -­
the transaction, to me, appears highly suspect when the 
attorney advises the client of the wisdom of obtaining 
appraisals and averaging, and then the attorney, himself, 
in this case, ends up purchasing the property without 
those -- those safeguards. I saw nothing that those 
safeguards had been done, that the appraisals had been 
given and averaged. 
Q. And you mentioned before concerns that you 
had, as far as the terms in the earnest money agreement. 
Can you elaborate on those? That is Plaintiffs Exhibit 
No. 116. 
A. Excuse me. If I could take a minute and get 
a drink of water. 
Thank you. Could you repeat the question, 
please. 
Q. Yes. I was going back to something you had 
mentioned earlier, about terms in the earnest money 
agreement that you may have had some concerns on. Can 
you elaborate on that? 
A. As I recall, I recall a provision in the 
earnest money agreement which -- I'll tJy to recall each 
of these -- which again, it was under, as I recall, a 
.1. titled A Fees. 
I 
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1 And yet, within that paragraph, there was a 1 have cited, did you make a determination as to whether 
2 provision that purported to waive jury trial if there was 2 this transaction was fair and reasonable? 
3 any ultimate litigation involving the transaction. It 3 A. I did. 
4 purported to shorten the statute of limitations to one 4 Q. What is your opinion on that fact? 
5 year. It indicated that, I think, arbitration would have 5 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; foundation. 
6 to be sought rather than, or prior to, litigation. 6 TIIE COURT: Can you articulate that objection in a 
7 And I think it also -- there was language in 7 little more detail, Mr. Charney? 
8 that same paragraph, as I recall, that indicated that 8 MR. CHARNEY: The question as to whether or not -­
9 venue for any litigation would be proper in -- in 9 well, actually foundation and relevance. As far as 
1 0 Canyon County, I recall. 1 0 foundation goes, this individual isn't caned as a 
11 And my -- my concerns, when I read those 11 witness to testify as to whether or not th,e transaction 
12 provisions, were several. First ofall, each of those 12 was fair or reasonable. That's ultimately, I think, for 
13 terms appeared, to me, to be greatly disadvantageous, or 1 3 the Court to determine. 
14 at least potentially, greatly disadvantagf:ous, to the 14 But as far as the foundation goes, he -- his 
15 sellers. 15 expertise isn't in whether or not this was fair and 
1 6 I was also concerned that each of those 16 reasonable. We understood he was being called to testify 
1 7 provisions again, as I recall, were -- were lumped into a 17 that there were Rules ofProfessional Responsibility that 
18 paragraph captioned Attorney Fees, and were positioned in 18 were violated by Mr. Maile, and that that somehow bears 
1 9 the contract such that absent extreme, and very cautious, 1 9 on the question ofunclean hands. 
2 0 and careful explanation about those terrns, and pointing 2 0 But the question of whether it's fair and 
21 those terms out to the sellers, that -- thaI: they could 2 1 reasonable is the ultimate question for you to decide, 
22 be totally unaware that those provisions were in the 22 and not for this witness to opine on. 
2 3 contract. 23 TIIE COURT: Any response to that argument, 
24 Q. Is there a particular Rule of Professional 2 4 Ms. Taylor? 
2 5 Conduct that this raises concerns about? 2 5 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. The affidavit of 
Page 264 Page 266 
1 A. Primarily Rule 1.8. And I -- I think it's 1 Mr. Grober that was submitted goes into this in great 
2 Section A. That rule, I think, delineates specific 2 detail as the whether the transaction was fair and 
3 conflicts of interest for an attorney. And, in fact, I 3 reliable. We believe it's relevant, to show the issue of 
4 think the caption refers to them as prohibited 4 clean hands, whether Mr. Maile entered into this 
5 transactions. 5 transaction initially with clean hands, as well as the 
6 If a lawyer is going to engage in -- in this 6 conduct following the transaction. 
7 type ofbusiness arrangement with a client, that rule 7 And expert witnesses are allowed to give 
8 clearly requires that, among other things -- and it would 8 opinions on the ultimate questions of fact. 
9 be helpful if I looked at the Rule -- but among things, 9 THE COURT: Okay. Well, here's what I'm going to 
1 0 that the terms and conditions ofthe deal be -- be, you 1 0 rule on on this issue. I'm going to overrule the 
11 know, fair to the client on their face, that they all be 11 objection, but I want to let you know why. 
12 explained to the client any -- any -- the issues of the 12 Any expert witness is called, in a trial, to 
13 conflict between the lawyer doing business -- the lawyer 13 assist the finder of fact in determining a question that 
14 doing business with the client in that tnillsaction be 14 is technical and so forth. It may be difficult for the 
15 fully explained, and that the client consent to the 15 trier of fact to figure out without some expert 
16 transaction in writing. 16 testimony. 
1 7 I found nothing, in the materials that I 1 7 And I want to point out that it's important, 




Q. And in looking at whether a transaction with 
1 9 
20 
the Court, without -- without the benefit of a jury. 
And because the subject matter is -- the subject matter i 
21 a client meets the standards in Rule 1.8, what time frame 2 1 that Mr. Grober is testifying to happened to be the 
2 2 do you look at? 22 Idaho Rules ofProfessional Responsibility, that require 
23 A. The transaction is to be objectively viewed, 23 attorneys to deal fairly with their clients, in all of 
2 4 at the time of the transaction. 2 4 their proceedings, I think that Mr. Grober -­
25 Q. SO, based on your review and the rules you 2 5 Mr. GrOlJ", " that has been •• thus 
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1 far, makes him the kind of expert witness whose opinions 
2 can assist the trier of fact in this regard. 
3 Now, certainly, the Court is not bound by any 
4 opinion that the Defendant may render today. 
5 MR. CHARNEY: The witness, you mean? 
6 THE COURT: I'm sorry, the witness. I meant the 
7 witness. I misspoke, sorry. 
8 No. Obviously, the Court is not bound by the 
9 witness' opinion. But the question is whether or not 
1 0 it's relevant, within the meaning of Idaho Rules of 
11 Evidence, and specifically Rule 702, the expert witness 
12 rule. 
13 Because of the nature of the issues in this 
14 case, I do think that it's relevant. And keep this in 
15 mind. Mr. Charney, your argument is well understood, in 
16 that if I believed that this witness was being asked a 
17 question just to determine, hey, what do you think is-­
18 do you think this was fair or not, if it were not already 
19 in the context of the Rule that he has talked about, 
20 which says hey, look, there's a specific rule for 
21 attorneys which absolutely requires thf:m to deal fairly 
22 with their clients, his -- I think his testimony, or the 
23 question that is being asked, is properly coached in 
24 terms of a connection to that very specific rule. 
25 So I'm going to overrule the obj ection and
1 allow him to answer the question. And you'll certainly 
2 have an opportunity to cross-examine him. 
3 Hang on just a second. Hang on for just 
4 about 30 seconds. We're going to grab a book here. 
5 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, we were just confmning 
6 that there were witnesses present in the room, and we 
7 don't have any objection to that. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. I noticed that there are people 
9 in the room who I thought might be called and witnesses, 
10 and there has never been a motion in this case to exclude
 
11 witnesses. And I suppose what you're telling me,
 
12 Ms. Taylor, is that's because the parties have agreed
 
13 that they're not going to make any such motions?
 
1 4 MS. TAYLOR: It hadn't become an issue until now,
 
15 but we've agreed we're not making the motion.
 
16 THE COURT: Very good. Okay. ll1ank you. Give me
 
1 7 just one more second here.
 
18 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, may I approach the
 




21 THE COURT: Uh-huh.
 
22 MR. CHARNEY: Your Honor, as you're looking at
 
2 3 that, I want to note for the record -- I want to make
 
24 sure that the Court is looking at the same rule that was
 
25 in effect at the time ofthis transaction.
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1 THE COURT: Oh, good point. Good point.
 
2 MR. CHARNEY: Some of them had changed. I don't
 
3 know if the one we're talking about now had changed or
 
4 not. But I think you're looking at the cun~ent book, and
 
5 that mayor may not apply. I know that the Rule, with
 
6 respect to the disclosure being required to be in
 
7 writing, or not, has definitely changed.
 
8 THE COURT: Okay. That's a real good point. I
 
9 was -- I'm just being looking at the official publication
 
10 of the Idaho State Bar Association, which is the desk 
11 book directory. And I was -- I had that in front ofme, 
12 open to the Idaho Rules ofProfessional Conduct, which 
13 were adopted in 2003. 
14 I think that the Idaho Supreme Court adopted 
15 the ABA Model Code ofResponsibility, probably with a few 
1 6 little tweaks here and there, sometime after the 
1 7 transaction in question here. So it may be necessary to 
1 8 take a look at that. 
19 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm sorry to intenrupt, 
20 but both versions of the Rules are in the book, they're 
21 in back-to-back. The old version is what we will refer 
2 2 to, but they are both contained in there. 
23 THE COURT: Fair enough. Okay. Well, your 
2 4 comment is noted, and the record will reflect that the 
2 5 Court does have, in front of the Court, you know, that _....:_-------+------------_._-;._._-----_.)[ 
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1 particular Code of Professional Responsibility, which 
2 apparently contains both versions, and I'll allow both of 
3 you folks to flesh that out for the Court; okay? 
4 You may continue, Ms. Taylor. 
5 MS. TAYLOR: I would ask the Court reporter to 
6 read the question back. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Court reporter? 
8 







12 THE COURT: Okay. You may answer the question. 
13 Did you understand it? I; 
14 THE WITNESS: My opinion is that the transaction 
15 was not fair and reasonable. 
16 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Can you just briefly 
17 summarize the basis of that opinion? 
18 A. Okay. Again, it goes back to the things to 
19 which I have testified. Rejecting an offi;:r of $400,000 
20 for the property, on the one hand, as being very low, and 
21 turning around and buying the property, or entering into 
22 a sales agreement, within just a matter of weeks, to 
23 purchase the property, from your client, at that same 
24 amount. 
25 The provisions that I testified to, that 
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1 appeared in the attorney fee paragraph of the fee
 
2 agreement, did not appear to be fair and reasonable for
 
3 the client, were certainly disadvantageous to the client,
 
4 or potentially disadvantageous to the client.
 
5 Q. Mr. Grober, I would like to turn your
 
6 attention to an assignment that was entered into this
 
7 case. It is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 117.
 
8 In forming your opinions in thi:, case, did
 
9 you have an opportunity to review that assignment of the
 
10 earnest money agreement?
 
11 THE COURT: I don't think the witness has that
 
12 exhibit in front of him.
 
13 THE WITNESS: It would help -- if you're going to
 
14 refer to it, it would help if! could look at it.
 
15 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'm not sure what
 
16 happened to our exhibits. May I approach, Your Honor?
 








21 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: The record should reflect I'm
 
22 handing this witness Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 117. Would
 
23 you like a few moments to look it over, Mr. Grober?
 
24 A. Yes. Just a moment, please. Okay.
 





2 A. It is.
 
3 Q. What concerns, if any, did it raise?
 
4 A. My concerns were these, in order to explain
 
5 those. Throughout this transaction, Mr. Maile was
 
6 required to -- to meet his obligations, his fiduciary
 
7 obligations, to his client, who in this case was the
 
8 seller. Part of that fiduciary obligation is full and
 
9 complete disclosure of all elements of the transaction.
 
10 So, one of the concerns that I had was that 
11 I found nothing, in the information I reviewed, to 
12 suggest that Mr. Maile ever disclosed to the trustees 
13 that everything would be assigned to Berkshire 
14 Investments. He had a duty, in my opinion, to do that. 
15 And then, secondly, my concern was, somewhere 
16 in the materials I reviewed, I believe I learned that 
17 Berkshire Investments had no -- no assets at this time, 
18 which was another concern to me. I do understand, 
19 ultimately, that the purchase price was paid. But in 
20 viewing the conduct at the time it OCCUlTed, it's not a 
21 no harm, no foul. 
22 The fact that the purchase price was 
23 ultimately paid, in my opinion, did not relieve Mr. Maile 
24 of his obligation to disclose that he was going to make 
25 this assignment. And secondly, the concern that 
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1 Berkshire had no assets, from the materials I reviewed,
 
2 gave me further concern about the fairness, or the
 
3 reasonableness, of the transaction and potential
 
4 disadvantage to the seller.
 
5 Q. Turning your attention to the se:cond page of
 
6 that assignment, what, if any, concerns did you have
 
7 about the fact that it included a novation of the Mailes
 
8 from personal responsibility for the debt?
 
9 A. Well, that was -- that was my concern, not
 
10 only that the fact of this assignment was not disclosed 
11 to the seller, but that the transaction was entered into 
12 by the Mailes and then was assigned to ;ill LLC which, as I 
13 understand it, had no assets and raises the issue of 
14 ability to pay for the property. 
15 Q. Now, I will represent to you that Mr. Maile 
16 has testified he did not discuss this assignment with 
17 Beth Rogers. What, if any, concerns does that raise? 
18 A. Again, in any kind ofbusiness Itransaction 
19 with a client, the attorney maintains the fiduciary 
20 relationship with his client, such that it requires 
21 absolute and complete disclosure and -- and candor, with 
22 the client, as to every aspect of the transaction. 
23 Q. In reviewing the documents provided to you, 
24 were you able to reach any conclusions as to whether, in 
25 your opinion, Mr. Maile met the duty to advise the client 
Page 274 
1 ofconflict of interest and give reasonable opportunity
 
2 to seek independent counsel?
 




5 A. Is that your question? Yes.
 




8 A. I looked at two -- two or three specific
 
9 factors come to mind. As I reviewed the portions of the
 
10 record that I was provided, it seems that I recall that
 
11 Beth Rogers, who was one of the trustec~s of the Trust,
 
12 testified that she was present, with Mr. Johnson, during,
 
13 I think, two meetings at Mr. Maile's office.
 
14 MR. CHARNEY: Your Honor, I'm going to object to
 
15 this, upon assuming facts not in evidence. They were
 
16 trying to get this in yesterday, through Mr. Maile's
 




19 THE COURT: Well, the question of the witness was
 
20 what facts he took into account in rende:ring an opinion,
 
21 and he is explaining what he believed to be the case. Do
 
22 you see what I mean?
 
23 MR. CHARNEY: I do.
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1 MS. TAYLOR: If the Court has concerns, I do have 1 paperwork for the real estate transaction, to which he 
2 the deposition of Beth Rogers. I could open it up and 2 replied he trusted me with the drafting of the agreement. 
3 represent to him that this is what she said. It's the 3 Can you comment on whether that language 
4 same passage -­ 4 meets the required standard of care? 
5 THE COURT: Well, I think the witness has just 5 A. No, it doesn't. And that's the very reason, 
6 testified that he reviewed Beth Rogers' testimony, and I 6 for example, that Rule 1.8, you know, requires an 
7 assume that means he reviewed her deposition testimony; 7 explanation of the conflict, and a reasonable opportunity 
8 right? 8 for the client to seek independent -- the: advice of 
9 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. 9 independent counseLl 
10 THE COURT: Okay. You can go ahead and continue. 1 0 Simply saying, I've told him there may be a 
11 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: You can lffiswer. 11 conflict and he said, that's okay, I trust you, does not 
12 A. Thank you. I believe that Beth Rogers 12 meet the requirement and discharge th~: responsibility, as 
13 testified, in her deposition, that there w;:re two 1 3 a fiduciary, to fully explain. 
14 meetings involving she, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Maile, at 14 You have to say, okay, I understand that. 
1 5 Mr. Maile's office. And I believe she said the second 15 But here are the things I need to disclose to you. 
1 6 meeting was the meeting where the documents were signed. 1 6 Q. Does the fact that the client, later, did 
1 7 And she testified that at neither of those meetings were 1 7 have an independent attorney look at the documents make 
18 the terms of the sales agreement, or anything relating to 1 8 any difference on these duties? 
1 9 the agreement, detailed or explained by Mr. Maile. 1 9 A. It doesn't cure the problem of nondisclosure 
20 My recollection of the deposition testimony 20 and explanation. That was still required. And as J 
21 of Mr. Maile, at least that I reviewed, indicated that he 21 recall, independent counsel was sought after the fact of 
2 2 said something to the effect that there may be a conflict 22 the earnest money agreement, or the sales agreement, 
2 3 of interest here, so you, you know, havt: the right, or 23 being signed, which was at a point where independent 
2 4 you can seek the advice of independent counsel. 24 counsel's advice regarding the transaction was pretty 
25 That does not go nearly far enough to -- he 25 much too late. 
Page 276 Page 278 
1 was obligated to fully explain the conflicts, what those 1 Q. Do you recall reviewing a copy of the letter 
2 conflicts were. If he was going to seek waiver of those 2 from Davis Wishney, to Andy Rogers, that has been 
3 conflicts, he needed to provide a meaningful, thorough 3 admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 7-A? 
4 explanation of what all the conflicts were. 4 A. Jrecall reviewing the letter, yes. 
5 And then, something tells me that the sales 5 Q. Did that letter raise any concerns to you? 
6 agreement itself, or an addendum thereto, was -- was only 6 A. It would help if I could review the letter. 
7 good -- the offer was good to a specific date. I 7 MS. TAYLOR: Let the record reflect I'm handing 
8 understand that to be the very date that the agreement 8 7-A to Mr. Grober. 
9 was signed. And I believe Mr. Maile testified that it 9 
1 0 was during that meeting, that the signatures were 10 (Exhibit No. 7-A handed to the witness.) 
11 obtained, that he advised his client that there may be a 11 
12 conflict and you may need to seek independent counsel. 12 THE COURT: 7-A? 
13 The timing is, it doesn't -- it doesn't -- if 13 MS. TAYLOR: 7-A, yes. 
1 4 the offer is only good until the very day it is signed, 14 MR. CHARNEY: What is that? Oh, Defendant's 
15 and on that day you give that tersery (sic) advice, there 15 Exhibit. 
1 6 may be a conflict, you may want to seek independent 16 THE COURT: Yes. It's the third page of that 
1 7 counsel, it's not really a reasonable time for the client 17 Exhibit 7. 
18 to decide whether or not they want to seek, or should 18 THE WITNESS: Okay. Would you repeat the 
1 9 seek, independent counsel. 19 question, please? 
2 0 Q. Mr. Grober, I would like to read to you from 20 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Did that letter raise any 
21 the affidavit ofThomas Maile, dated October 20,2004, 21 concerns, in your mind, as far as the advice that the 
22 that was filed with this Court, the follm:ving language: 22 Johnsons had been given? 
2 3 When your affiant was approached by 23 A. Well, yes, it did. And those concerns were 
24 Ted Johnson, your affiant advised Ted Johnson that if he 24 in part, significant part, the very concerns that 
25 wanted, he could have an independent attorney ~1<;;~."o;; the 25 Mr. Wishney expresses in the letter. His concern about 
oJ 
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1 the agreement has already been entered into, so, you 1 Exhibit No. 126 and 130. I would like to talk, first, 
2 know, to a large -- to a great extent it's too late. 2 about the release and reconveyance that was signed by 
3 And then his additional concems about 3 Mr. Shearer on January 9, 2004. 
4 substituting a more standard form deed of trust. 4 What concerns do you have relating to that? 
5 But yes, those were my concems. 5 MR. CHARNEY: Which exhibit is that? 
6 Q. I will represent to you that Mr. Maile 6 MS. TAYLOR: That is 126. 
7 received a message, a telephone message, indicating he 7 THE WIlNESS: Could I view the exhibit? 
8 needed to substitute a standard deed of trust, and that 8 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. 
9 was not done. 9 
1 0 Does that raise any issues in your mind? 10 (Exhibit No. 126 handed to the witness.) 
11 A. Well, yes. And, again, it's -- it's the same 11 
12 concern, as I've said, that I shared, that was apparently 12 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: The record will reflect I 
13 Mr. Wishney's concern. 13 am now handing the witness deposition Exhibits 126 and 
14 Q. In reviewing the earnest money agreement, 14 130. Not deposition exhibits, I'm sorry, Plaintiff 
15 did you note who was named as the trustee on the deed 15 exhibits. 
16 of trust that was attached as an exhibit to that? 16 THE COURT: All right. 126 and 130? 
17 A. I did. 17 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. 
18 Q. Who was that? 18 THE COURT: Let me give the witness an opportunity 
19 A. As I recall, it was Alliance Title. 19 to review those. We'll take a lO-minute recess. 
20 Q. In reviewing the documents that were signed 20 MS. TAYLOR: All right. 
21 later, did you see anything that caused you concern? 21 
22 A. Yes, I did. 22 (Recess taken 10:28 a.m. to 10:45 a.m.) 
23 Q. What was that? 23 
24 A. I reviewed -- I recall seeing and reviewing 24 THE COURT: Please be seated. We are back on the 
25 releases and reconveyances of the property, which were 25 record. And you may continue with your questioning of 
Page 280 Page 282 
1 signed by Steve Shearer as the substitute trustee -- as a 1 Mr. Grober. 
2 substitute trustee, who was substituted in as trustee for 2 MS. TAYLOR: Thank you, Your Honor. 
3 Alliance. 3 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Grober, when we recessed, 
4 And I believe I saw, or through the 4 you were looking at the releases and recollveyances. Have 
5 deposition -- depositions that I review~:d, became aware 5 you had an opportunity to review those? 
6 that Mr. Shearer had, in fact, been substituted in as the 6 A. I have. 
7 trustee. 7 Q. What, ifany, concerns do they raise in your 
8 Q. What, if any, concerns does that raise? 8 mind? 
9 A. My concerns were essentially these. I found 9 A. A number ofconcerns. First -- the first 
10 nothing, in anything that I reviewed, to suggest that the 1 0 concern being that I -- in my experience, ] fmd the 
11 trustees were made aware of the substimtion of the 11 virtual absolute release language unusual and somewhat 
12 trustee. And, again, it's my opinion that Mr. Maile's 12 troubling, particularly when viewed in light of the 
13 fiduciary obligations of, you know, complete candor and 13 provisions in the sales agreement, the attorney fee -- in 
14 disclosure in doing business with his c1 ient, would have 14 that attorney fee paragraph that I've talked about. 
15 required him to have informed them of his intention to 15 Secondly, as I stated, I found nothing in my 
16 substitute the trustee. 1 6 review to suggest any reason for the -- for Mr. Shearer 
1 7 And then, I found nothing, in anything that I 1 7 having been substituted in and asked to sign these, and 
18 reviewed, to suggest any particular reason for the 18 that was certainly not, in anything I reviewed, disclosed 
1 9 substitute trustee. And then, the documents themselves, 1 9 to the trustees. 
2 0 I found -- the releases and reconveyances I found 2 0 And then, thirdly, I guess it is, the timing 
2 1 somewhat unusual. 21 issue of these somewhat disturbed me. And I think I need 
22 Q. You reviewed those releases and 22 to -- we'll need to explain that a bit. 
2 3 reconveyances? 23 Q. Okay. Just to back up a little bit, what is 
24 A. I did. 24 your understanding as to whether these releases and 
25 Q. Those have been admitted as Plaintiffs 25 reconveyances, Exhibits 126 and 130, had been shown to or 
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1 discussed with Beth Rogers before the time they were 
2 signed? 
3 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; foundation and relevance. 
4 THE COURT: Overruled in both cases. The witness 
5 may answer the question, ifhe knows. 
6 THE WIlNESS: I'm sony. Could you repeat the 
7 question, please? 
8 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: In your wview of the 
9 documents, did you come to an understanding whether 
10 Beth Rogers was given an opportunity to review these
 
11 releases and reconveyances before they were signed?
 
12 A. My recollection of the deposition, her
 




15 Q. What, about the timing of thesl~, was of
 
16 concern to you?
 
17 A. Okay. As I recall the timing of these, again
 
18 based upon my review, these were submitted -- and I mean
 
19 by these, the release and reconveyance documents -- were
 
20 submitted to ~. Shearer following Beth Rogers' refusal
 




23 And I recall nothing, in my review, that
 
24 suggests that ~. Shearer was made aware of the refusal
 
25 to sign these.
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1 Q. In your review, did you see documentation 
2 where Mr. Maile had sent a mutual release to ~. Harwood? 
3 A. Yeah. I recall seeing a -- what ['11 call a 
4 transmittal letter from~. Maile, where the document was 
5 sent to Mr. Harwood, and he was asked whether or not his 
6 client would sign. 
7 I would need to actually see -- I did review 
8 that letter, but I would need to see it to go any further 
9 with it. 
10 Q. All right. 
11 MS. TAYLOR: May I approach, Your Honor? 
12 THE COURT: All right. 
13 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: I will be mmding the witness 
14 Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 128. 
15 
16 (Exhibit No. 128 handed to the witness.) 
17 
18 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Grober, if it would help, 
19 I believe I'm only going to focus on the two paragraphs 
20 of the letter and then the release that was attached. 
21 A. Okay. Okay. 
22 Q. Is it correct that the release attached to 
23 Exhibit 128 was scheduled -- it had been prepared for 
24 Beth Rogers and Andy Rogers to sign? 
25 A. I'm sony. I didn't hear. 
'm,,,,,,",, ""'" .'." ....,'" 
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1 Q. Well, I just --looking at the mutual release
 
2 that was attached to the back of that letter -­
3 A. Yes.
 
4 Q. -- can you comment on any concerns you have
 
5 about that release, as compared to the releases that
 
6 ~. Shearer signed?
 
7 A. I'm not sure, as I read this, I see any
 
8 difference. Maybe I don't understand the question.
 




11 What about the timing of submitting this
 
12 release, and the executing of the releases by
 
13 ~. Shearer, was of concern to you?
 
14 A. I think, if we look at the dates of all this,
 
15 I believe that ~. Shearer may have already signed one of
 
16 the releases. And it may have already been recorded at
 
17 the time this letter was sent, I believe.
 




20 A. 128, it looks like.
 
21 Q. I just want to make sure we have our exhibits
 
22 straight. Can you tell me the date of signature on the
 
23 one you're looking at?
 
24 A. The date of the one I'm looking at, well,
 
25 it's sent under cover letter dated February 16th of 2004.
 
Page 286 
1 Q. Okay. And then, the other one was dated
 








6 A. My concern, at the time, was that ~. Maile
 
7 was asking for Beth Rogers, or Beth Rogers and her
 
8 husband, as co-trustees, to sign a release and
 
9 reconveyance, when it appeared to me that he already had '1
 
10 one signed by Mr. Shearer. I;
 
11 Q. Did you see anything in the record to
 
12 indicate that ~. Maile ever disclosed to Beth Rogers';
 




15 A. I saw nothing to indicate that.
 
16 Q. In your opinion, does that violate any
 
17 standards or ethical rules?
 
18 A. Well, I -- I believe that it suggests conduct
 
Ii19 which is dishonest or, perhaps, otherwise deceitful.
 




22 A. 8.1 (c), I believe.
 
23 Q. Do you have an opinion on whether this
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1 MR. CHARNEY: Exactly. 
2 THE COURT: I get the distinction, and I 
3 understand that the tenor of the question has to do with 
4 his opinion regarding whether or not Mr. Maile violated 
5 the quote unquote standard ofcare required of all 
6 attorneys at the relevant time. 
7 And when we say standard of care, you might 
8 want to rephrase your question or something like that. 
9 I understand that this is not a professional 
1 0 negligence case. The question is not whether or not he 
11 breached, or did not breach, the standard of care 
12 required of attorneys practicing this type: of law, in the 
13 relevant community, at the relevant time. 
14 The question is whether or not, in this 
15 witness' opinion, Mr. Maile -- Mr. Maik's conduct 
16 conformed with the Rules of Professional Responsibility 
1 7 or not. That's where you're going, isn't it? 
18 MS. TAYLOR: That is where I was going. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. And that's thl~ understanding of 
2 a the Court. 
21 Now, if you have any objection to the witness 
22 answering the question as clarified, I'll h~ar -­
23 MR. CHARNEY: Not as clarified. I just don't want 
2 4 the issues to get confused and this suddenly tum into a 
25 negligence action, because negligence would have nothing 
1 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; foundation.
 
2 THE COURT: Sustained.
 
3 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: In looking at this
 
4 transaction, did you fonn opinions on whether different
 






8 Q. As a result ofyour work experience, are you
 
9 familiar with the standard of care for attorneys?
 
lOA. In my -- I'm sorry. Would you repeat the 
11 question? I'm having trouble hearing you. 
12 Q. In your work experience, are you familiar 
13 with the standard of care required for attorneys dealing 
14 with this type of transaction within this time frame? 
15 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; relevance. 
16 THE COURT: Overruled. 
1 7 MR. CHARNEY: Can I make a little argument on 
18 that? 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
2 a MR. CHARNEY: The point here is, Your Honor, the 
2 1 standard ofcare seems to be issues relating to 
22 negligence, as opposed to deception. 
23 THE COURT: Professional malpractice, you're 
2 4 saying, as opposed to violations, or alleged violations, 
25 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility? 
1 to do with unclean hands.
 
2 THE COURT: Right. And have I adequately -- well,
 
3 negligence could have something to do with unclean hands,
 
4 in a certain context. I mean, competence is an ethical
 








9 THE COURT: Oh. 
laMS. TAYLOR: I am intending to dicit testimony 
11 that this was an extreme deviation, which we think 
12 implies-­
13 THE COURT: A violation? 
14 MS. TAYLOR: -- brings the ethical rules into 
15 play. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. Which violates 1.1. So you're 
1 7 not saying dishonest, you're just saying c~xtremely 
18 negligent now? 
19 MS. TAYLOR: Saying both. 
2 a THE COURT: Right. Okay. I'll Sllstain the 
21 objection if the question is being asked to elicit 
22 evidence about that issue, because I don't think there 
23 has been an adequate foundation laid for this witness to 
2 4 testify about the standard of care required for an 
2 5 attorney practicing in Boise, Idaho, at the relevant 
Page 290 
1 time, with respect to this type of transaction. 
2 So -- because now we've gone from getting 
3 away from Mr. Grober's expertise on -- as being an expert 
4 on the Rules ofProfessional Responsibility, and now 
5 we're getting into asking him to render an opinion about 
6 the professional competency ofa real estate lawyer, a 
7 trust lawyer, in Boise, during the relevant time. 
8 You can lay some additional foundation, if 
9 you like, but I'm not sure if your expert disclosure got 
10 into that. Do you see what I mt:an? 
11 MS. TAYLOR: Well, it did from a negligence 
12 standpoint. I will acknowledge that that was the way we 
13 were looking at it at that time frame. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. I, 
15 Mr.Chamey? 
16 MR. CHARNEY: I don't believe that there has been 
1 7 an appropriate disclosure that this witness would come to 
18 court and testify that he has expertise in this 
1 9 particular area, real estate transactions in this time 
2 a frame, and that Mr. Maile's conduct was violative of that 
21 practice. 
22 I don't think that there has ever h~en a 
23 disclosure along those lines. Mr. Grober has always been 
24 called as a witness to testify about the Rules of 
25 Professional Responsibility. 
.;","'~,'·:·:·,,(~~~'<:i~,~<%"';"'bP ,~"_·_.;'*i(;;,""',.:;:;Qil;;L";;;.,,'"""#..!;""~~A:,,,,:,'''':L,. _.:.:,.~,;;;;>;;.;(:;1tZ~;:...:;::;,,~~";>:~>:;>@~~ 
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1 TIIE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. CHARNEY: These are very separate. 
3 THE COURT: I understand. And I'm going to -­
4 well, keep in mind, I appreciate and I understand the 
5 fact that, to the extent that the Rules of Professional 
6 Responsibility also require professional competence, 
7 failure to be competent is -- can implkate the Rilles of 
8 Professional Responsibility. 
9 Now that having been said, I don't believe 
10 that this witness has been qualified to testify, as an 
11 expert, on the issue of standard of car(: in these types 
12 of transactions. Do you see what I mean? 
13 And Mr. Charney is also saying that he 
14 doesn't believe that he was adequately notified that this 
15 witness would be called upon to testify about his 
1 6 expertise on these -- on, you know, larld sales 
1 7 transactions during this period. 
18 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I think he is right on 
1 9 that count. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MS. TAYLOR: I to believe he is right on that 
2 2 count. I did not supplement -- I did do a supplemental 
23 disclosure, but I did not get into that. rjust sort of, 
2 4 you know, got that direction as part of the questioning. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
1 testimony, did you become aware of the fact that 
2 Mr. Maile had asserted these releases and reconveyances 
3 were a total bar to any action against h:im? 
4 A I'm sorry. What was your -- what was your 
5 question? 
6 Q. Did you become aware of the fact that 
7 Mr. Maile asserted that the Shearer releases and 
8 reconveyances were a total bar to any action against him? 
9 A I did. I think I saw that in -- in the 
1 0 answers that included affirmative defenses. 
11 Q. Does that raise any concern in your mind? 
12 A Well, yes. And that concern is that, if, as 
13 I believe, the obtaining of the releases from Mr. Shearer 
14 was, you know, motivated by the intent to deceive and get 
15 this transaction completed behind him, to that extent it 
1 6 seems dishonest, to me, to assert those releases as an 
1 7 affirmative defense, if they weren't appropriately 
1 8 obtained. 
1 9 MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions, 
2 0 Your Honor. 
21 TIIE COURT: Thank you. 
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1 MS. TAYLOR: So I won't pursue the line of 
2 questioning about negligence. 
3 THE COURT: Very good. Thank you. 
4 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Grober, can you elaborate 
5 on the statement you made previously about your belief 
6 that this conduct, in your opinion, constillltes 
7 misconduct or dishonesty? 
8 A I think, viewing the scenario as a whole, 
9 which encompasses virtually everything ][ have testified 
1 0 to to this point, starting with the provisions in the 
11 earnest money agreement, and going forward with no 
1 2 evidence that I've seen that there was the required full 
13 and candid disclosure to anyone, the lack of evidence 
14 that I've seen for any -- for any legitimate reason, for 
15 example, to substitute Mr. Shearer as the trustee, the 
1 6 fact that there was no -- nothing that I've,een to 
1 7 indicate that this was ever disclosed, that -- that 
18 entire scenario of events to which I've testified, leads 
1 9 me to believe that it could not have all been an 
2 0 unfortunate series of mistaken events. 
2 1 And, therefore, leads me to the conclusion 
22 that, in order to accomplish what Mr. Maile intended to 
23 accomplish, these acts were more motivated by dishonesty. 
2 4 Q. Does the fact -- well, let me ask you this. 





3 BY MR. CHARNEY::
 
4 Q. Good morning, Mr. Grober. How are you?
 
5 A I'm fine. Thank you.
 
6 Q. Can you hear me okay at this kvel?
 
7 A Yes, I can.
 
8 Q. You would agree with me that che Rules of
 
9 Professional Responsibility that were in place at the
 
10 time of this transaction did not require written 
11 disclosure of a conflict of interest; correct? 
12 A That's correct. 
13 Q. That Rule has since changed? 
14 A Yes, it has. 
15 Q. You testified, at your deposition, that you 
16 do not have any particular expertise in real estate law; 
17 is that fair to say? 
18 A I do work in real estate, but I wouldn't 
19 consider myself a real estate expert, no. 
20 Q. In arriving at the opinion that you have 
21 arrived at, have you had a full and fair opportunity to 
22 review Mr. Johnson's medical records? 
23 A No, I have not. 
24 Q. Did you interview family members to discuss 
25 with them how Ted's mental faculties were at the time 
. 
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1 that this transaction was entered into? 1 Do you see that? 
2 A. No, I have not. 2 A. Yes. Just a moment. Yes, I do. 
3 Q. SO you don't know ifhe signed documents on 3 Q. It is this provision that has caused you some 
4 his deathbed or ifhe was perfectly aleJ1 and capable of 4 measure of consternation, with respect to whether or not 
5 making decisions, do you? 5 this was fair and reasonable to Mr. Johnson; is that fair 
6 A. No. You're correct. 6 to say? 
7 Q. You would agree that somebody who is 7 A. Yes. That's one of my concerns. 
8 perfectly alert and capable of making decisions -­ 8 Q. There is nothing else in this contract that 
9 that the situation would be different if Mr. Maile had 9 you have ever said was unfair or unreasonable to 
10 approached Mr. Johnson on his deathbed, when he was in a 10 Mr. Johnson; is that fair to say? 
11 weary state, and obtained signatures in that manner; 11 A. I think that's correct. 
12 correct? 12 Q. As we look, then, in paragraph 8 now, since 
13 A. I'm not sure I understand your question. 13 we can isolate that as your target, we st:e parties I 
14 Q. There would be a difference in those two 14 waiving a trial by jury and agreeing to submit to the 
15 situations, wouldn't there? One would demonstrate he was 15 personal jurisdiction and venue in a court in 
1 6 taking advantage of somebody at a point in time when he 1 6 Canyon County, Idaho; correct? 
1 7 might just sign off on anything, and the: other 1 7 A. That's correct. 
1 8 demonstrates that he may have thoroughly had the 18 Q. The tenn that I just read to you was binding 
1 9 opportunity to review what he signed. 19 on both Mr. Maile and Mrs. Maile, and Mr. Johnson; 
2 0 A. Yes. I would agree, by your question, 20 correct? 
2 1 there's a distinction there. 21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And you took no steps, whatsoever, to check 22 Q. SO if Mr. Maile wanted to sue for a specific 
23 on what Mr. Johnson's mental state was at the time of 23 perfonnance in this case, he would hav,e been equally 
24 this transaction, did you? 2 4 obligated to have a trial by the Court, instead of a 
2 5 A. No. I did not. 2 5 trial by jury? 
Page 296 Page 298 
1 Q. You indicated, in your testimony, that some 1 A. Assuming the provision is, you know, is 
2 of the clauses contained in the agreements appeared to 2 upheld, yes. 
3 you to be negligent; is that fair to say? 3 Q. Okay. There is another provision in there Iii 
4 A. Yes. I think that's fair to say. 4 that indicates that the prevailing party should reimburse 
5 Q. You were particularly concerned about the 5 the prevailing party's -- I'm sony -- that the 
6 attorneys fees paragraph in Plaintiffs Exhibit -- let me 6 nonprevailing party would pay the other party's fees, 
7 just refer -­ 7 expenses, and costs. 
8 MR CHARNEY: Could he be handed the Defense and 8 Is that particularly unusual? 
9 Plaintiffs exhibits? 9 A. No. 
10 THE COURT: I believe he has them both. 1 0 Q. There is another provision that says that 
11 MR CHARNEY: All right. 11 there is a one year limitation on the statute of I, 
12 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Let's look at Defendant's 12 limitations; correct?: 
1 3 Exhibit No.1. 13 A. Yes.! 
14 THE COURT: Okay. That's the smaller one. Could 14 Q. That tenn also equally applied to Mr. and: 
15 you give him a hand? That's the -- yeah. That's that 15 Mrs. Maile; correct? 
16 packet. 1 6 A. That's correct. 
17 1 7 Q. SO ifMr. Johnson refused to perfonn on the 
18 (Bailiff complied.) 1 8 contract, within one year they would be equally out of 
19 19 luck as Mr. Johnson would be out of luck ifhe didn't 
20 THE WITNESS: Okay. 2 0 file his action in one year; correct? 
21 THE COURT: Those are all of the Defense exhibits, 21 A. Assuming the validity of the provision, sure. 
22 Mr. Grober. 22 Q. And now we have the last sentence, which 
23 Q. BY MR CHARNEY: And the attorneys fees 2 3 obviously has some inconsistency, requiring the parties 
24 paragraph that I'm referring to starts at the bottom of 24 to submit to binding arbitration in lieu of court 
25 page 2, and rolls over on to page 3. 2 5 proceedings; correct? 
,,", «, --:;­
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1 A. Yes.
 
2 Q. SO we clearly have some drafting issues, with
 
3 respect to whether or not you're going to go to court or
 




6 Q. Let's assume that the arbitration clause here
 
7 is the binding clause. You have opined that that was
 
8 fair and unreasonable to Mr. Johnson; true?
 
9 THE COURT: Can you reinstate your question.
 
10 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Is it tme that you have 
11 rendered the opinion, in court today, that the 
12 arbitration provision was unfair and unreasonable to 
13 Mr. Johnson? 
14 A. It certainly was, to the extent it was not 
i 5 disclosed. 
16 Q. Does page 4 bear Mr. Johnson's signature? 
17 A. Yes, it does. 
18 Q. How can you, then, testify that it was not 
1 9 disclosed if the contract is, in fact, signed? 
20 A. Because signing of a document, under these 
21 circumstances, does not relieve Mr. Maile from the 
22 obligation to have specifically explained all of the 
23 terms in here. And I found no evidence, in anything I 
2 4 have reviewed, to suggest that he did that. 
25 Q. And in everything I have revifwed, 
Page 300 
1 particularly Rule 1.8, I can fmd no support for your 
2 assertion, in court today, that Mr. Maile had an 
3 obligation to fully and thoroughly explain the terms of 
4 this contract to Mr. Johnson. 
5 Can you point -­
6 MS. TAYLOR: Objection. 
7 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Can you turn to Rule 1.8 and 
8 tell us where that language is? 
9 A No. That specific language is not in the 
10 Rule. 
11 Q. Nor is it in any of the comments to the Rule, 
12 is it? 
13 A. It stems from his fiduciary duties to his 
14 client. 
15 Q. Nor is it in any of the comments following 
16 Rule 1.8, is it? 
17 A. That's correct. 
18 Q. This is your intetpretation ofthe Rule that
 




2 1 A. That's correct.
 
22 Q. All right. And when we talk about an
 
23 arbitration provision, in fact, the public policy is to
 




1 Q. In fact, the Idaho Legislature has adopted a
 




4 A. That's correct.
 
5 Q. And the case law that has devdoped,
 
6 regarding dispute resolution, clearly indicates that
 
7 there is a preference in the judicial system for people
 
8 to resort to alternative dispute resolution, if that can
 
9 be accomplished; true?
 
lOA. That's correct. 
11 Q. SO there is, in fact, nothing that is 
12 particularly problematic about submitting this to ADR in 
13 lieu of court process; correct? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. In fact ADR might have been eheaper for 
16 Mr. Johnson, as opposed to long, drawn out litigation? 
17 A. That's correct. 
18 Q. And that could, in fact, have been 
19 advantageous for Mr. Johnson, ifhe was required to seek 
20 some form ofdispute resolution? 
21 A It could have been. 
22 Q. Turning to the addendum, whieh is following 
2 3 the signature page. 
24 THE COURT: Which exhibit? 
25 MR. CHARNEY: fm sorry. 
Page 302 
1 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Still in exhibit number -­
2 Defendant's Exhibit I, which would be the fifth page in.
 
3 A. Okay. Give me just a moment.
 
4 Q. Sure, take your time.
 
5 So that we're sure we're looking at the same
 
6 page, does the page you're looking at have some
 
7 handwriting and some initials on it?
 
8 A I don't -­
9 Q. In the middle.
 
lOA. I don't see that. Yes. 
11 Q. I'll represent to you that the testimony was 
I12 that Mr. Johnson, after reviewing the contract, wrote in 
13 this term so that his tenant, if you will, the farmer 
1 4 tenant, could get another year of onion seed from this 
15 piece ofproperty. All right? 
16 Now, with that in mind, it certainly would 
1 7 appear to you that Mr. Johnson was carefully looking over 
1 8 this contract, in making the appropriate changes; true? 
1 9 A. It would certainly appear that he did that 
2 0 provision, yes. 
21 Q. And it was signed offby both Mr. Maile and 
22 Mr. Johnson; true? 
23 A Yes, it was. 
24 Q. You indicated that you had reviewed documents 
25 from Franz Witte; is that fair to say? 
o ,,',' 000 
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1 A. Reviewed a letter, as I recall. 1 A Yes. 
2 Q. The substance of that letter was that 2 Q. And Mr. Maile advises, I have completed the 
3 Mr. Witte wanted to purchase this parcel ofproperty for 3 review of the real estate contract. I also discussed 
4 $400,000; correct? 4 your finances with your accountant, Imogen Hetherington, 
5 A. Yes. 5 last week. He says he is enclosing a copy of her letter. 
6 Q. And, then, the history of the case was that 6 And then he says, I deem it prudent that you contact our 
I
7 Mr. Johnson brought that offer to Mr. Maile; correct? 7 office to discuss the possibility of providing a 
8 A. Yes. 8 counteroffer to the potential purchaser to detennine the 
9 Q. Mr. Maile, then, didn't immediately tell 9 fair market value for the real estate. 
10 Mr. Johnson to reject the offer, did he? 10 Fair to say? 
11 A. I don't know about immediately. 11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Well, why don't you turn to Plaintiffs 12 Q. Would this be consistent or inconsistent with 
13 Exhibit 111. 13 his obligation to his client? 
14 A. I'm sorry. I might have some difficulty 14 MS. TAYLOR: YourHonor-­
15 finding that. But I will be -­ 15 THE WITNESS: That would be consistent. 
16 MR. CHARNEY: It should be tabbed. 16 MS. TAYLOR: -- I would like to object to 
17 THE BAILIFF: 111, Plaintiffs Ill? 1 7 relevance and beyond the scope of direct We didn't 
18 MR. CHARNEY: 111, yes. 18 delve into the duties to the client in the Witte offer. 
19 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Now, 111 is the one from 1 9 THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. 
20 Ms. Hetherington, addressed to ToMr. Maile, on 20 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: And he further advised 
21 May 24, 2002; is that fair to say? 21 Mr. Johnson that they needed to do somt: due relative to 
22 A. Yes, it is. 2 2 the buyer's potential and fiscal responsibility; correct? 
23 Q. And the first line says, as discussed, I have 23 A Yes. 
24 reviewed the tax implications ofMr. Johnson selling his 24 Q. In other words, he didn't want Mr. Johnson to 
2 5 40 acres of land in Eagle versus holding it indefinitely 25 get into a contract with somebody that couldn't, in the 
Page 304 Page 306 
1 for disposition in his estate; is that fair?' 1 end, pay; correct? 
2 A. Yes. 2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. SO, clearly, Mr. Maile had referred the 3 Q. SO this was consistent with his duties as an 
4 matter to an accountant to see if this would be a good 4 attorney; correct? 
5 deal for Mr. Johnson; true? 5 A Yes. I6 A It would appear so. 6 Q. SO let's move to Exhibit 113. 113 is the 
7 Q. Would this be inconsistent or consistent with 7 letter sent by Mr. Maile, to Mr. Haff, who is Mr. Witte's 
8 his obligation to his client? 8 attorney; true. 
9 A It would be consistent with his obligation. 9 A I'm sorry. I have skipped. 
1 0 Q. And we get into the next sentence, which 10 THE COURT: Is this 113? This is Exhibit 113. 
11 says, before I get into those specifics, I believe the 11 THE WITNESS: I've skipped 113. 
12 sales offer for $400,000 is too low. And then she bases 12 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Have you had a chance to 
1 3 that on another sale from another client. 13 look over 113? 
1 4 Do you see that? 14 A I'm doing that right now. 
15 A Yes. 15 Q. Okay. 
16 Q. Okay. So, then, she goes on to provide 16 A. Yes. 
1 7 Mr. Maile with some scenarios, regarding taxes and things 17 Q. All right. In that letter, Mr. Maile 
18 like that, to discuss with Mr. Johnson; is that fair to 18 represented that Mr. Johnson would be willing to sell his 
19 say? 19 real property. However, based on comparable values in 
20 A. Yes. 20 the area, we feel your offer is extremely Ilow; correct? 
21 Q. SO let's turn to Exhibit 112. Have you 21 A That's correct. 
22 reviewed 112 before coming to court today? 22 Q. And that nearly parrots the information that 
23 A. Let me look at it again and makl~ sure. Yes. 23 Mr. Maile had received from Mrs. Hetherington -­
24 Q. I'll paraphrase a little bit, but this is a 24 Ms. Hetherington about a week ,md a halfprior; correct? 
25 A. That's ('(lITPpJ25 letter, from Tom, to Ted; correct? 
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1 Q. Now, I would like you to take a look at
 
2 Defendant's Exhibit 22, which will be the last, and
 
3 there's two page, so it would be the second page.
 
4 THE COURT: You know, I'm not sure if that form is
 
5 in that packet.
 
6 THE WIlNESS: The last one I see: here-­
7 THE COURT: Here. I'm going to give you this one.
 
8 THE WIlNESS: -- is 16.
 
9 
10 (Exhibit No. 22 handed to the witness.) 
11 
12 THE COURT: We need to make sure I get that one-­
13 make sure I get 22 back. 
14 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Actually, look at the second 
15 page ofExhibit 22, please. 
16 A. Okay. The print is somewhat small. 
1 7 Q. Do you want me to read it, SinCI~ you're -­
18 A. Would you, please. 
19 Q. I will. This is a letter dated June 7,2002, 
20 which follows the June 4, 2002 letter, 113, from 
21 Franz Witte to Mr. Maile. 
22 Thank you for your reply to my offer on the 
2 3 Theodore L. Johnson property. In response to your 
24 comments on values, my research shows like properties 
25 selling for 10 percent less than this offer. 
Page 308 
1 I also have concerns over high water tables 
2 and City of Eagle issues that make deve] opment costs 
3 higher. As for my fmancial strength, I believe that is 
4 shown by the $100,000 down payment and the terms of the 
5 loan. 
6 I will extend the terms of this offer until 
7 June 20th. 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. SO, by this letter, Mr. Witte was saying that 
1 0 he had actually offered more than he thought the property 
11 was worth and was not going to increase his offer; 
12 correct? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. You know, from the history ofdhis case, that 
15 Mr. Johnson decided not to sell his propt:rty to Mr. Witte 
1 6 at that price; correct? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. You also know, from the history of this case, 
1 9 that Mr. Johnson, sometime after this, showed up at 
20 Mr. Maile's office, unannounced; correct? 
2 1 A. I'm not certain that I specifically recall 
22 that. 
23 Q. All right. 
24 MR. CHARNEY: Could he be handed Defendant's 
25 Exhibit 18? 
.... ... . 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Let me have 22 back. 18
 
2 is the -- defense Exhibit 18 is the appraisal.
 
3 MR. CHARNEY: Correct.
 








8 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Mr. Grober, you had
 
9 indicated that you had reviewed Mr. Maile's deposition,
 
1 a and you must know that in Mr. Maile's deposition, he
 
11 testified that sometime after the Franz Witte transaction
 
12 died on the vine, that Mr. Johnson showed up at his
 
13 office one day, unannounced, with an appraisal in mind.
 
1 4 Do recall that now?
 
15 A. I believe I do, yes.
 
16 Q. Now, looking at the first page of 18 -- and I
 
1 7 recognize that the print is small -- but where it -- no,
 




20 Q. Where it says client, it doesn't say
 
21 Thomas Maile, does it?
 
22 A. No, it does not.
 
23 Q. It says Mr. Theodore Johnson; correct?
 
24 A. Yes, it does.
 
25 Q. The amount of the appraisal, the appraised
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3 A. I'm sorry. Page 5.
 




6 Q. All right. You were aware that J\1r. Johnson
 
7 showed up with the appraisal, and told Tom that he would
 






11 Q. You were also aware that, over the course of
 
12 their relationship, the years that led up to this, that
 
13 Mr. Maile and Mr. Johnson had talked about Mr. Johnson "
 








18 Q. And, in fact, when the Franz Witte offer came
 




2 1 A. No. I don't believe he did.
 
22 Q. In fact, what he tried to do was, he tried to
 
2 3 extract more money from Mr. Witte, to increase the money
 
24 that would be paid to Mr. Johnson; correct?
 
25 A. That's correct.
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1 Q. And even though he failed at that effort, 1 Mailes' interest in the contract to Berkshire
 
2 that wasn't negligence on his part, was it? 2 Investments; true? Ii
 
3 A. No. I don't believe so. 3 A. Yes.
 
4 Q. SO Mr. Johnson came and said, I'd like to 4 Q. At the time the assignment was signed, I;
 
5 sell you this property. Will you pay appraised value? 5 Ted Johnson still owned the property, didn't he?
 
6 And Mr. Maile says yes, I will. Nothing wrong with that; 6 A. Yes.
 
7 correct? 7 Q. SO the obligations that you say the Mailes
 
8 A. No. 8 relieved themselves of were -- was the obligation to pay
 
9 Q. There's no indication, in this record or 9 for the property; correct?
 
10 anything you have seen, that indicates Mr. Maile tried to 10 A. Yes. 
11 get less for the property than the -- tried to get 11 Q. If the Mailes didn't pay, Mr. Johnson would 
12 Mr. Johnson to sell the property for less than the 12 still have the full benefit of his property, because he 
13 appraised value; correct? 13 hadn't yet transferred it; correct? 
14 A. That's correct. 14 A. That's correct. 
15 Q. He said, that looks like a fair appraisal, 15 Q. In other words, it wasn't like they paid 
1 6 and I will pay you the appraised price; correct? 1 6 $400,000 for a car that they had first transferred title 
1 7 A. That's correct. 1 7 to and then were waiting for payment, then an assignment 
1 8 Q. And you find no problems with that; true? 18 came relieving them ofpersonalliabiliW; correct? 
19 A. No. 19 A. Yeab. That's my understanding of the time 
2 a Q. And you were also aware that Mr. Maile had no 2 a frame. 
21 input, whatsoever, with respect to Exhibit 18? That's 21 Q. In fact, Beth Rogers signed, on behalf of 
22 the appraisal. 22 Mr. Johnson, as the power of attorney; true? 
23 A. Well, I'm not sure I'm aware of that. I 23 A. Yes. 
24 mean, I have no reason to think that's not true, I guess. 24 Q. And we also know, by a review ofExhibit 118, 
25 Q. Now, we have the contract that you have some 25 if you can take a look at that, looking at the last 
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1 criticisms about paragraph 8. But the bottom line is, 1 sentence in the first paragraph, it says, tlle real estate
 
2 the contract said that Mr. Johnson would sell the 2 contract indicates we can assign our interest.
 
3 property to the Mailes for $400,000; true? 3 Consequently, we are requesting your notarized signature
 
4 A. That's true. 4 on the document and are asking that you return the
 
5 Q. Did the Trust receive the $400,000 that was 5 original to our office.
 
6 agreed on? 6 Do you see that?
 
7 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes. 7 A. Yes.
 
8 Q. Was the $400,000 received in a timely manner? 8 Q. SO, Mr. Maile wasn't there, with the
 
9 A. My recollection is that it was. 9 document, saying sign, sign, sign, was he?
 
1 0 Q. You have criticized the use of an assignment 10 A. No. 
11 in this case, which is Plaintiffs Exhibit 117. So 11 Q. He sent it to them, gave them an opportunity 
12 please tum to that. 12 to look it over, and asked them to mail it back? 
13 A. Yes. I'm looking at it. 13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. All right. First, the contract itsdf 1 4 Q. Nothing problematic with that, is there? 
15 provided that the term -- that it could be assigned; 15 A. No. 
16 correct? 1 6 Q. And, in fact, they did just that, didn't 
17 A. Yes. 17 they? 
18 Q. And that was something that w~.s clearly 18 A. Yes. I believe so. 
1 9 disclosed to Mr. Johnson, after he had an opportunity to 1 9 Q. Mr. Maile also testified that he advised Ted 
2 a review the contract; correct? 2 a that he could seek the advice of an indep,;:mdent attorney Ii 
21 A. Assuming he read the contract, yes. 21 with respect to this transaction; correct? 
22 Q. And you have no evidence to dispute that he 22 A. Yes. He did say that he told him that. 
23 didn't read it, do you? 23 Q. There is no evidence, that you're aware of, 
24 A. No. 24 that proves anything to the contrary, is there? 
25 Q. SO the assignment, then, transfers the 25 A. No. 
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1 Q. SO it's clear that Mr. Johnson simply chose 
2 not to seek independent counsel prior to signing the 
3 contract, and prior to Ms. Rogers signing the assignment; 
4 correct? 
5 A. I'm sorry. I misspoke, I believe, on the 
6 last question. 
7 Q. Please correct your answer. ][ don't want 
8 anything to be confused. 
9 A. It's my understanding, from reading portions 
1 0 of the deposition, at least of Beth Rogers, that she 
11 indicates that nothing was explained. 
12 Q. That's what Ms. Rogers said? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. True. And, once again, if we go back to the 
1 5 Rule, we know that there is no support for your 
1 6 contention that there is an explanation required; 
17 correct? 
1 8 A. I'm sorry? 
19 Q. The Rule does not support your contention 
2 0 that an explanation of the document is required; correct? 
21 A. In the black-and-white language of the Rule, 
22 correct. 
23 Q. The black-and-white languag(: of the Rule says 
24 that they should be advised of the opportunity to consult 
2 5 with an independent attorney; correct? 
Page 316 
1 A. That's correct. 
2 Q. And there is no indication here that those 
3 people did or did not do just that? 
4 A. I'm sorry? 
5 Q. Let me back -- let me ask that a different 
.6 way. 
7 A. Okay. 
8 Q. The indication, here, is that these people, 
9 knowing that, elected to go ahead and sign the documents 
10 without rITst consulting a lawyer? 
11 A. Yes. 
1 2 Q. Later on, they went and saw Mr. Wishney, but 
13 prior to that, they had not? 
1 4 A. That's correct. 
15 Q. Mr. Maile didn't have to put a collar on them 
1 6 and drag them to a lawyer's office, did he? 
1 7 A. No. He did not. 
18 Q. And, additionally, Beth Rogers could have 
1 9 refused to sign the assignment, couldn't she have? 
20 MS. TAYLOR: Objection; calls for speculation. 
21 MR. CHARNEY: I don't think that does. 
22 THE COURT: Overruled. 
23 THE WITNESS: Yes. She could have. 
2 4 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: You are not alleging that 
25 it was unreasonable for Mr. Maile to pav $400,000 for 




3 Q. You next cast aspersion at the substitution
 




6 Q. You do recognize that under Idaho law, and I
 
7 can't think of the statute off of the top of my head, but
 




lOA. Yes, I do. 
11 Q. In other words, the marshal, here, couldn't 
12 be a trustee, but you and I could because we're lawyers; 
13 right? 
1 4 A. That's correct. 
15 Q. A bank could be a trustee and a title company 
1 6 can be a trustee? 
1 7 A. That's correct. 
18 Q. But nevertheless, across the board, the 
19 statute requires the same obligations of any person who 
2 0 is a trustee, whether they be a bank or a lawyer or a 
21 title company; correct? 
2 2 A. That's correct. 
23 Q. SO the substitution of Mr. Shearer as a 
24 trustee, versus Alliance Title, didn't change the 
25 trustee's statutory obligations pursuant to Idaho law, 





3 Q. Looking at, then, Exhibits 126 and 130.
 
4 THE COURT: And will you hand me back the
 
5 appraisal? That's number 22, isn't it? Ob, it's 18.
 




8 THE WITNESS: What exhibit were you looking for?
 
9 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: 126, to stlrt with. Do you
 
10 have 126 there? 
11 A. I do. 
12 Q. You're aware that the difference between 126 
13 and 130 is that 126 contained Thomas and Colleen Maile's 
14 name, and 130 had the name Berkshire Investments, because 
15 there was an oversight; correct? 
16 A. I'm aware of that difference. 
1 7 Q. Other than that difference, there is no 
18 difference between the two documents? 
1 9 A. There does not appear to be, no. 
20 Q. All right. Now, the release and n:conveyance 
21 does not operate as a release between the Trust and 
22 Mr. and Mrs. Maile or Berkshire lnvestments, does it? 
23 A. I'm sorry? 
24 Q. The release and reconveyance is not a 
25 document that, in any way, operates as a rdease between 
. ........ . 
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1 the Trust and the MaiIes; does it? 
2 In fact, Mr. Grober, the release and 
3 reconveyance is the trustee obtaining a release from both 
4 parties, because the trustee is holding money and 
5 property during certain periods, and that's the point of 
6 having a trustee; correct? 
7 A. Right. 
S Q. SO when the trustee was paid, and then 
9 simultaneously transferred title to the property, the 
1 0 trustee wants, basically, to bailout of the transaction
 
11 and not be held liable any longer; correct?
 
1 2 A. That's true.
 
13 Q. He doesn't want to be sued to either convey
 
14 title or to be required to pay over money to the party
 
15 transferring title; right?
 
1 6 A. That's correct?
 
1 7 Q. SO the releases that are set f0l1h in 126 and
 
1 S 130 are simply an indication, by the trustee, that he is
 






22 Q. That is entirely different than the mutual
 









2 Q. The release that Mr. Maile was seeking to
 
3 have signed, by way of Exhibit 128, was, there's this
 




6 A. That's correct.
 
7 Q. SO he prepares a release and sends it to
 
S Bart Harwood; correct?
 
9 A. That's correct.
 
10 Q. You know that Bart Harwood is a lawyer; 
11 correct? 
12 A. Yes, I do. 
13 Q. He didn't go straight to Beth Rogers and 
14 Andy Rogers and ask them to sign the release, did he? 
15 A. I'm not sure I understand the question in -­
16 in the chronology of events. 
17 Q. I'm not asking about chronology of events. 
18 Mr. Maile wanted to be released from liability with 
19 respect to this transaction? 
20 A. Yes, he did. 
21 Q. There's nothing unreasonable about somebody 
22 wanting to be released from liability, is there? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. It happens all the time; correct? 
25 A. Absolutely. 
1 Q. And rather than approach the Rogerses
 




4 A. He did.
 
5 Q. And, additionally, he explained in the letter
 
6 why he wanted the release signed, didn't he?
 
7 A. That's correct.
 
S Q. The trustees, through their counsel, did not
 
9 sign the mutual release, did they?
 
lOA. They did not. 
11 Q. There was nothing unethical, at all, about 
12 Mr. Maile attempting to be released from a lawsuit, was 
13 there? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Particularly one that alleged that he paid 
16 less than fair market value for the property, when, in 
1 7 fact, you have opined that he did exactly that; correct? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 MR. CHARNEY: No further questions. 
20 THE COURT: You may redirect, Ms. Taylor. 
21 
22 REDIRECT EXAM:INATION 
23 BY MS. TAYLOR:: 
24 Q. Mr. Grober, is the ethical requirement to 
25 disclose conflicts of interest and advice to get 
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4 Q. Does the fact that Ted Johnson mayor may not
 




7 A. Changed them?
 
8 Q. Changed the opinions you have stated, as far
 
9 as Mr. Maile's duties?
 
lOA. Ifhe mayor may not have had his faculties, 
11 yes, that's a concern. 
12 Q. Do you recall reading deposition testimony 
13 wherein Beth Rogers disclosed that Mr. Johnson had lung 
14 cancer, and was being treated with radiation, at the time 
15 of this transaction? 
1 6 A. Yes. I recall that. 
17 Q. Does the fact that the provisions and 
18 agreement are binding on both parties change the inquiry 
19 into whether they're fair and reasonable? 
20 A. No. I don't believe it does. 
21 Q. Can you explain the distinction between a 
22 fiduciary duty and ethical duties? 
23 A. Yes. Some-­
24 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; scope. 
25 THE COURT: Beyond the scope? Well, I'll overrule 
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1 the objection. I'll go ahead and let you make your 1 MS. TAYLOR: No. I would represent that that is ~ 
2 point. 2 the Rule he cited in his affidavit, that has been filed 
3 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Could you repeat the 3 with the Court. 
4 question? 4 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Counsel talked to you about 
5 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: I asked you to explain the 5 the fact that Mr. Johnson agreed to enter into this 
6 distinction between fiduciary duties and ethical duties. 6 transaction. 
7 A. Yes. And there is a differenc'~. All -- all 7 A. Vb-huh. 
8 fiduciary duties are not delineated, enumerated, spelled 8 Q. I would like to turn your attention to the 
9 out or expressed in the Idaho Rules of Professional 9 letter that Mr. Maile wrote to me, dated July 10th of 
1 a Conduct. And, in fact, lawyers can violate a specific 10 2003, and that is Plaintiff's Exhibit No. l25. 
11 Rule of Professional Conduct, and mayor may not have -- 11 A. 125? 
12 how do I want to explain that? 12 Q. If it's okay, I'll just read a portion of 
13 Simply saying, I -- I abided by the 13 that letter to you. 
14 black-and-white letter of all the Idaho Rules of 14 A. That would be fme with me. 
15 Professional Conduct does not mean that the attorney has 15 Q. The quote I'm interested in is, Mr. Johnson 
1 6 met all their fiduciary duties. 16 honored his verbal commitment to me, made years ago, that 
1 7 Q. And, in your opinion, did Mr. Maile meet his 1 7 ifhe ever decided to sale his land, he would afford me 
18 fiduciary duties? 18 first option to purchase the same. 
1 9 A. No. He did not. 19 Does that raise any concerns to you? 
2 a Q. Which of those categories would the duty to 2 a A. I'm sorry. What was your question? 
21 fully explain the provisions of a contract, to which he 21 Q. Does that statement, as regarding Mr. Johnson 
22 is a party, fall under? 22 honoring a verbal commitment to give a fIrst option to 
23 A. Clearly, he has a fiduciary duty of absolute 23 Mr. Maile, raise any concerns to you, as far as ethical 
2 4 candor, forthrightness, absolute disclm.ure of 2 4 standards? 
2 5 everything. And it's an affirmative -- it's an 25 A. Yes, it does. 
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1 affirmative duty. 1 Q. What would those be? 
2 Q. Is it enough to just meet the ethical rules? 2 A. I think, at that juncture, Mr. Ma.ile was -­
3 A. Oftentimes, it's not. The ethical rules and 3 was under an obligation to explain to Mr. Johnson, and to 
4 fiduciary duties are, in fact, often two different 4 the trustees, that a promise to sell -- a verbal promise 
5 things. 5 to sell that land wasn't binding. And, thl~refore, you 
6. Q. Did Mr. Maile have an obligation to meet 6 know, he was not legally obligated to go ahead with the
 
7 ~M 7 deal on those terms.
 
8 A. Yes, clearly. 8 Q. Did you see anything in the record to
 
9 Q. Looking at the letter that Mr. Maile wrote to 9 indicate that he ever advised tht~m of tha.t?
 
10 Eric Haff, saying that the $400,000 pur,;hase price was 10 A. No. 
11 extremely low, does that raise any ethical rules, in your 11 MS. TAYLOR: No further questions. 
12 mind? 12 THE COURT: Thank you. 
13 A. Does Eric Haft's letter? 13 You may redirect. 
14 Q. No. The letter that Mr. Maile v,Tote to 14 MR.. CHARNEY: Very brief. 
1 5 Eric Haff, is there any duty to third parties? 15 
16 A. There -- yes. If that were Mr. Maile's 16 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
17 opinion, he clearly needed to -- to make certain that 17 BY MR.. CHARNEY: 
18 Mr. Johnson and the trustees were awarl~ of that opinion. 18 Q. What indication is there, in the documents 
19 Q. Okay. Is there a duty ofhonesty to third 19 you reviewed, that Tom knew Mr. Johnson was suffering 
2 a parties? 2 a from cancer? 
21 A. Well, there's a duty not to affirmatively 21 A. I don't recall, specifically. 
22 misrepresent anything to third parties. That's clear. 22 Q. In fact, the documents that you reviewed 
23 Q. Which Rule is that under? 23 indicated that Mr. Johnson was pretty vital and healthy, 
24 A. Might be 4.1, I'm guessing. 24 almost right up to the point ofhis death; correct? 
Z~.. < THE COURT: Is that important?,= .••*.•• _ ...www ......w.~.:......*..<..w~;...E..--Iho~~.~gtdon.t n~.~all, spe.~i~lcall~:h 
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1 that issue in the documents. 
2 Q. And Beth Rogers even testifil~d that he was a 
3 private person and kept those types of things to himself, 
4 didn't she? 
5 A. Yeah. I do recall that. 
6 Q. Okay. You then talked about a fiduciary duty 
7 to the client. So let's cover this, just in brief. 
8 When the Witte offer came in, the view of the 
9 documents in question reveals that Mr. Maile tried to get 
10 Mr. Witte to pay more than the $400,000; correct? 
11 A. That's correct. 
12 Q. This would be consistent with his fiduciary 
13 duty; correct? 
14 A. That's correct. 
15 Q. And, at that point in time, we did not have 
16 the benefit of the appraisal that was Exhibit 18, did we? 
17 A. I don't believe so. 
18 Q. SO it was also consistent, with Mr. Maile's 
19 fiduciary duty, to pay Mr. Johnson the appraised value 
20 for the property, wasn't it? 
21 A. I have to assume something to answer that yes 
22 or no. 
23 Q. Assume away. 
24 A. I have to assume the -- the, you know, the 
25 validity of the appraisal, that the appraisal was done at 
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1 his fiduciary duty?
 
2 A. I believe so.
 
3 Q. The letter that was sent to Eric Haff was
 
4 copied to the clients, wasn't it?
 
5 A. To Mr. Haffs client?
 
6 Q. No. The letter that Mr. Maile sent to
 
7 Mr. Haff, had a CC on the bottom that said -­

8 A. Yes, it did.
 
9 Q. SO his client was fully advised of what he
 
10 was doing; correct? 
11 A. Assuming he got the letter. 
12 Q. You saw no evidence in this record to 
13 indicate that Mr. Johnson said wow, wait a sec. That's 
14 not what I want you to do; correct? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Even though the letter that Ms. Taylor 
17 directed you to indicated that there was a verbal 
18 commitment, from Mr. Johnson, to give Mr. Maile the first 
19 option to purchase the property, it's clear, from the 
20 evidence in this case, that Mr. Maile did not try to 
21 enforce that, did he? 
22 A. He purchased the property for that amount. 
23 I'm not sure what you mean by didn't try to enforce it. 
24 Q. The Franz Witte offer came in before the 
25 appraisal; correct? 
Page 328
 
1 the highest value, and use value, and those sorts of
 1 
2 things. I don't know. 2 
3 Q. You have no indication to suppose that -- or 3 
4 to come to the conclusion that the appraisal was not a 4 
5 good appraisal, to you? 5 
6 A. I have never seen the appraisal until today. 6 
7 Q. You're also aware that banks, when loaning on 7 
8 property, usually only will require one appraisal; 8 
9 correct? 9 
10 A. Yes. 1 0 
11 Q. Okay. You next pointed out -- well, so let's 11 
12 back up then. If, in fact, the appraisal is good, and 12 
13 there's no evidence to the contrary, then he was -- he 13 
14 met his fiduciary duty to his client to pay the appraised 14 
15 value, didn't he? 15 
16 A. That part ofhis duty, yes. 16 
1 7 Q. He didn't have to pay him more to meet that 17 
18 duty, did he? 18 
19 A. No. 19 
20 Q. Would you argue that, ifhe had tried to 20 
21 negotiate something less with Ted, he would violate that 21 
22 duty? 22 
23 A. Yeah. 23 
24 Q. SO, in other words, ifhe said, 400 -- I'll 24 
25 pay you 390, but I won't pay you 400, that would violate 25 
Page 330 
A. Yes. 
Q. There is no indication, in the record, that 
Mr. Maile said, wait Ted, you told me you would sell me 
this property. So I want to purchase the property, and 
you shouldn't sell it to Franz Witte? I, 
A. No. I don't recall reading anything like 
that. 
Q. SO, in fact, the evidence would tend to 
support the claim that he did not try to enforce the 
verbal discussion that they had had; correct? 
A. I assume so.
 
MR. CHARNEY: No further questions.
 
THE COURT: All right. May the vritness be
 
excused? 
MS. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Grober. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you, Judge. 
(The witness left the stand at 11 :54 a.m.) 
THE COURT: Are you ready to call your next 
witness? We can take a five-minute break, if you like. 
MS. TAYLOR: A break would be great. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's take five, and then you 
c, c U'_Cc', ", "" '" 'c 
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1 can call your next witness. Are we still on track to end
 




4 MS. TAYLOR: Pardon?
 
5 THE COURT: Do you think we're still on track to
 
6 finish by 2:00?
 
7 MS. TAYLOR: I believe so, yes.
 




10 MR. CHARNEY: Currently, yes. We'll discuss it. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. CHARNEY: Thanks. 
13 
14 (Recess taken 11 :54 a.m. to. 12,:02 p.m.) 
15 
16 THE COURT: Please be seated. 
1 7 Ms. Taylor, are you ready to call your next 
18 witness? 
19 MS. TAYLOR: We are, Your Honor. We call 
20 John Wood. 
21 
22 JOHN WOOD, 
23 called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiffs, 
2 4 having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified 






3 BY MS. TAYLOR::
 
4 Q. Would you please state your name.
 
S A. John Wood.
 




8 Q. Mr. Wood, where do you residl:?
 
9 A. At 3390 Flint Drive, Eagle, Idaho.
 
10 Q. And how are you employed? 
11 A. I work for a corporation called .Park Hampton 
12 LLe. 
13 Q. What position do you hold with Park Hampton? 
1 4 A. Land acquisition and developm~nt services, in 
15 bringing the projects through the cities. 
1 6 Q. And What, specifically, are your duties at 
1 7 Park Hampton LLC? 
18 A. Coordinating with the engineers, the surveys, 
1 9 the applications to the City, and also pre:,enting to the 
20 City, and getting the properties ready for development, 
2 1 to be sold to the open market. 
22 Q. And does Park Hampton own ar..y properties in 
23 the Eagle area? 
2 4 A. It owns approximately -- about E. hundred 
25 and -- just shy of 100 acres. 
1 Q. What stage ofdevelopment is this land in? 
2 A. All of them are in fmal plat. Some of them 
3 have been sold over the last year, which was 
4 Covenant Hill, offofEagle. It was ajoint effort with 
5 Hillview Development. 
6 Q. How does the property Park Hampton already 
7 owns compare geographically to the Linder Road property? 
8 A. It's all within the -- as the City would call 
9 it, is the mile -- the expansion mile property. il 
10 We have -- currently we have the property -- II 
11 16 acres of commercial, right across from the new Eagle Il 
12 Island State Park, that we've been working with the Parks Ii 
13 Department and the State ofldallO, with the Governor's 
14 office, for the new entrance for Eagle Island State Park. 
15 lbis land continues, goes up. lhi~re's about 
16 350 homes behind Eagle High School that is -- some has 
17 already been through preliminary plat, some is through I~ 
18 fmal plat. I, 
19 And it's probably about less than a half mile II 
2 0 away, this property. I ! 
21 Q. Mr. Wood, has your LiC made an offer to 11 
22 purchase the Linder Road property from the Johnson Trust?
 
2 3 A. We've -- we've asked to -- to put in an
 
24 offer. But we have not put in an offer, be:::ause of the
 
25 litigation, and where it stands with the lis pendens and
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1 the timing of the market of this property.
 
2 Q. Okay. Had you previously submitted an offer,
 
3 through Doug Crandall's office?
 
4 A. Yes, we have.
 
S Q. What was the amount offered?
 
6 A. 1.8 million.
 
7 Q. And that offer did not disclose Park Hampton
 
8 as the purchaser, did it?
 
9 A. Normally, none of the properties that we buy
 
10 will ever disclose Park Hampton from its initial buying.
 
11 Q. Why is that?
 
12 A. Because of the price of the land. When we
 
13 bought it -- Flynn Estates, we had to buy ten 5-acre
 
1 4 parcels in order to own the CC and Rs. There was 14
 
15 pieces ofproperty. And as people know who is buying it,
 
16 or actively looking at that, a lot of times the price
 
17 will change. Whether it's a Wal-Mart coming to town -­

18 you'll never know it is a Wal-Mart until the property has
 
1 9 already been bought.
 




22 A. Alot of times. It's always done through I)
 
23 attorneys, as a client, attorney-client privilege to -- '
 
24 to be able to make the offer.
 J, 
25 Q. If you acquire this property, what would your 
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1 plan be to do with it? 1 likely will not use any of those improvements, as -- so 
2 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; relevance. 2 that we can know how to maximize our dollars and be able 
3 THE COURT: Well, no. I think it is relevant, 3 to improve the best value for the land. 
4 under this -- under the context. Go ahead. I'll 4 Q. SO does the offer, as it sits, include 
5 overrule the objection. 5 additional value because of the improvements? ;1 
6 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: You can go ahead and answer. 6 A. No. It does not. 
7 A. The plans with this property would be to -- 7 Q. Is this offer any more than you would pay if 
8 fIrst, to go ahead and get it resurveyed, get the -- fInd 8 it were just raw land? 
9 out the water rights and the land use. Right now, in the 9 A. No. It would not. 
10 City of Eagle and the county, this property is dedicated 10 Q. I would like to have you tum to the
 
11 to fIve acres and above. It's on what they call -- north 11 photographs that are at Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 133.
 
12 of Beacon Light and East of Linder, which will all be 12 To lay a foundation, have you b~:en to this
 
13 staying 5-acre parcels. 13 property recently?
 
14 Then, what we would do is, we would go in and 14 A. Yes, I have.
 ,I15 redesign the property. We would -- rig1:t now, the 15 Q. Can you just look through thOS(l photos and
 
16 current plat is long, pinwheel, narrow lots. 16 tell me if they're a true and accurate depi.ction of the . 
Ii
 
17 Q. Okay. And there's a copy of that in the 17 condition of the property?
 
18 notebook up there by you, if you would turn to Exhibit 18 A. Yes, they are.
 
19 No. 122. 19 Q. SpecifIcally, does the barn that's on the
 
20 20 property now add any value to it, for your purposes?
 
21 (Witness complied.) 21 A. No. The preliminary look of the barn,
 
22 22 there's no value to it, nor would it be the type of
 
23 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Can you explain to the Court 23 subdivision that would allow that type of barn there.
 
24 what you mean by your reference to pinwheel lots. 24 Q. What is the problem with the bam, as you see
 
25 A. Ifyou look the way the lots are designed in 25 it?
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1 the front, they're very narrow in the front and very wide 1 A. The way it sits on the property imd, also, 
2 lots in the rear. And for long-term marketability, and 2 it's -- as we all can tell, it's been opened and 
3 for the properties to hold their resale value with the 3 weathered. And it's just in the vvTong placement of the 
4 market, 5-acre pieces normally are a -- have to be a 4 property. 
I5 square, long entrance. 5 Q. SO is there any value to the barn at all?
 
6 When people drive up the driveway, they like 6 A. No, there's not.
 
7 the feel -- of the marketing side is, they like to feel 7 Q. Will you have to pay to have it removed?
 
8 that they have a large piece ofland, and a -- where 8 A. Almost all -- like on Flynn Estares, on the
 
9 their home sits as a focal point of the land, and not a 9 parcels down there, that we wili put a sign out front and
 
10 narrow driveway with fences bordering each side. 10 a lot oftimes we can get people to get the stuff moved 
11 Q. Is that the reason why you would have the 11 off. They'll come in and move the stuff off for 
12 land replatted? 12 materials. 
1 3 A. I would immediately have it replatted, and I 13 Q. And would you have any objection to Mr. Maile 
1 4 would make a more of a grand entrance on the front. And 1 4 removing this barn? 
15 redesign the road, and put a loop road in there, and -- 15 A. No objection. 
1 6 except a straight road back, for marketability and for 1 6 Q. Okay. I would like to go back to the road. 
1 7 long-term value, to hold its value. 1 7 Is it Park Hamilton's intention to leave the road where 
18 Q. SO, in making a determination to offer 18 it is located? 
1 9 $1.8 million for this property, did you take into 19 A. No. We were -- had a tentative with 
20 consideration the improvements that have been placed on 20 Toothman-Orton, have done an initial sketch. It would I 
21 it up to this point? 21 be a loop road. 
22 A. Basically, the improvements that are on the 22 Q. This may be obvious, but if you're 
2 3 property right now -- anytime that we buy a piece of 23 replatting, will the existing lateral lines for power and 
24 property, or if we buy something that has already been 24 gas, telephone, things like that, be left in place? 
2 5 preplatted, we take an accountability that we more than 25 A. They will be -- try to be, on the new plat. 
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1 We'll try to keep them, if we can. But more than likely, 
2 with new lot lines drawn and new roads, that they will 
3 have to be moved, maybe 30 feet one way or 30 feet the 
4 other way. 
5 Q. Is -- is your pending offer, wi] 1it remain 
6 open indeftnitely? 
7 A. It wil1. The only thing that I am worried -­
8 and I believe that most people in this Valley, in 
9 Park Hampton, or Capital Development, or anybody, is 
1 0 that, especially in Eagle, like Correnta Bello and 
11 Covenant Hill, that the buyers are backing out faster 
12 than -- you know, the lots were reserved -- a lot of the 
13 lots in the new subdivisions that are on line were 
1 4 reserved nine months, a year ago. 
15 Now that these projects are ftnished, 
1 6 Covenant Hill's only had ftve close and Brentabello, 
1 7 I believe had about 20 more builders walk away last week. 
1 8 So, the market is changing fast. It wasn't like it was 
1 9 nine months or a year ago, when you had a piece of 
20 property and somebody would come in and buy it. 
21 Q. Is there any possibility that this offer will 
22 be withdrawn if the litigation isn't concluded so you can 
23 buy it? 
24 A. It depends on the length of the litigation 
2 5 and the -- the climate of the market. 
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1 MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions.
 






5 BY MR. CHARNEY:
 
6 . Q. Good afternoon, sir. How are you?
 
7 A. Good afternoon.
 
8 Q. How long have you worked for Park Hampton?
 
9 A. For two years.
 
1 0 Q. Where were you prior to that? 
11 A. My family owned -- we still do -- we own 
12 17 body shops in California. 
13 Q. SO you have only moved to Idaho in the past 
14 two years? 
15 A. Three years. 
1 6 Q. Three years. I'm sorry. 
1 7 When this property was sold to Mr. Maile, 
18 then, you didn't even live in this area, did you? 
1 9 A. 2003 is when we ftrst moved up, yes. 
20 Q. Since you have moved here, you have become 
21 somewhat familiar with the value of property in this 
22 particular area; correct? 
23 A. 90 percent of this area; correct. 
24 Q. The property, as it exits now, is split into 





3 Q. That is consistent with the zoning
 
4 requirements in this particular area; cOlTect?
 
5 A. That's -- yes.
 
6 Q. To tum these 40 acres -- it's a little less
 
7 than 40 acres, but let's call it 40 -- to tum these
 
8 40 acres into almost track housing, if you will, would be
 
9 next to impossible under current zoning laws?
 
1 0 A. It's -- it's totally impossible, yeah. 
11 Q. SO the best use that you could make of this 
12 parcel, in that area currently, would be 5-acre lots? 
13 A. That -- at this point in time, that's the 
14 only thing that is -- and the City of Eagle has been 
15 through two comp plan changes, and it's still there. 
16 Q. What steps have you taken to check into the 
1 7 septic requirements that are in this particular area? 
1 8 A. The septic, I have not checked into. 
19 Q. You have no idea about the septic? 
20 A. I do know that it's 1.8 acres and above, in 
21 the City of Eagle. 
22 Q. For a requirement; correct? 
23 A. For a requirement. 
24 Q. You also know that there is not sewer that 
25 has been brought out to this patticular property yet? 
Page 34211 
1 A. I'm very aware of that. 
2 Q. You don't know anything about the water table 
3 problems that currently exist on this 40 acres, do you? 
4 A. The water table that I do have,][ have 
5 actually -- the water table on State Street, which is Ii 
6 down the road from this . ­
7 Q. I'm talking about this particular area. I.: 
8 A. Right. This particular area, no. 
9 Q. Okay. You weren't aware ofth<: fact that 
1 0 Mr. Maile actually designed this pinwheel pattern because 
11 of the septic requirements and the water table in this 
12 area; correct? 
13 A. I -- from my knowledg<~, I don't believe that 
14 there is a water table problem up there. 
15 Q. But you don't know this, do you? 
1 6 A. No. But a friend ofmine owns the property 
1 7 across the street. 
18 Q. SO, you are speculating, now, on what some 
1 9 friend of yours told you about the property; correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. All right. So, your knowledge --. 
22 A. And he's a professiona1. 
23 Q. SO, your knowledge, sir, is you don't know 
24 anything about the septic requirements or the water table 
25 issues on this particular parcel of property, do you? 
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1 A. No. I do not. 
2 Q. You don't know that Mr. Maile chose the 
3 pinwheel design to accommodate the high water table and 
4 the septic requirements for this area; correct? 
5 A. No. I do not. 
6 Q. You also don't have any guar:mtee, from the 
7 City, that you, in fact, would be succe:;sful in 
8 replatting this property to fit the 5-acn: lots that you 
9 envision would be more saleable? 
lOA. That's false. I've spoken to the City many 
11 times on this property. 
12 Q. And they've guaranteed you you could replat 
13 it that way? 
1 4 A. Correct. 
15 Q. Okay. And you've got documentation to back 
16 that up? 
1 7 A. No. But I -- I'm at the City on a biweekly 
18 basis. 
1 9 Q. Okay. Once you replatted this, what would be 
2 0 the value of the lots? 
21 MS. TAYLOR: Objection; relevance, beyond the 
2 2 scope ofdirect. 
23 MR. CHARNEY: He's talking about he wants to come 
2 4 in and rip this whole thing apart and start from scratch. 
25 So, I would like to know why this individual would choose 
1 Q. But, nevertheless, you're saying current 
2 value of these lots is 250 to 275,000. And ifyou were 
3 successful in replatting, you could sell them for 350 to 
4 450? 
5 A. Correct. 
6 Q. SO, roughly about 100,000 more per lot, give 
7 or take? 
8 A. Well, the main thing here is -- I think what 
9 you're missing is, it's the resale value. You can buy 
1 0 something, but it's to have the people that can build the 
11 estate home on the property, so they could get the proper 
12 value down the road. 
13 Q. You've made no application, though, to the 
14 City, to actually have this replatted; correct? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. And you don't know where, if you were to 
1 7 replat this into these lots that you envision, the septic 
18 would have to be required on each lot; correct? 
1 9 A. The septic will be required on each lot. 
20 Q. Right. But you don't where, on each lot, the 
21 septic would wind up having to go; correct? 
22 A. Well, I've -- I've spent -- I don't want to 
23 get exact, but huge amounts ofdollars with 
24 Toothman-Orton, which is an engineering firm here in 
25 town, and all the way up to Floating Feather. 
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1 to do that as opposed to selling it in its:;urrent 
2 condition. 
3 THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. 
4 THE WIlNESS: The -- the target market would be 
5 about 350 to 450, depending on -- on the lot. The 
6 problem, now, anytime that you do a subdivision, say down 
7 Beacon Light, now Osprey or any of the others, is your 
8 resale. 
9 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 
lOA. Right now, the resale value, tht: way these 
11 are designed, would be very, very tough sales at the 
1 2 current design of it. 
13 Q. But you don't know whether or not somebody 
1 4 would or would not purchase these lots currently, do you? 
15 A. Right now it would be a very tough sale. 
1 6 Q. You're saying that once you have replatted 
1 7 it, that the lots would be worth anywhere from $350- to 
18 $450,000? 
1 9 A. Correct. 
20 Q. What's the current value of the lots? 
21 A. At the current value, we're probably looking 
22 about -- probably the 250, 275. But that is also with 
23 improvements which, if you look how long the certain 
2 4 properties are, the fencing and the buffeIing 
25 requirements would eat a ton of that to start out. 
1 And just with doing Covenant Hill, next to 
2 the middle school up there, we have had no seepage or I 
3 water issues, anything, from about the high school up 
4 north. 
5 Q. Okay. So your view is, you could replat this I 
6 into squares, as opposed to a pinwheel, and you could get 
7 a septic permit for each lot? 
8 A. Unless there was something out there that we 
9 did not know. 
10 Q. We'll talk about that later. 
11 MR. CHARNEY: Thank you. No further questions. 
12 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
13 THE COURT: Now, hang on a second sir. 
14 Do you have any redirect examination? 
15 MS. TAYLOR: I don't. 
16 THE COURT: May the witness be excused? 
17 MS. TAYLOR: He may. 
18 THE COURT: All right, sir. You are excused. 
19 Thank you. 
20 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much. 
21 THE COURT: And you can just leave those right 
22 there. Thanks. 
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
24 
25 (The witness left the stand at 12:21 p.m.) 
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1 










7 called as a witness by and on behalf af the Plaintiff,
 





11 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 BY MS. TAYLOR: 
13 Q. Would you state your name, please. 
14 A. Terry Rudd, R-U-D-D. 
15 Q. Mr. Rudd, how are you employed? 
1 6 A. A real estate appraiser. 
1 7 Q. Can you give the Court the background on your 
1 8 real estate appraisal experience. 
19 A. Well, I started in 1957 for the Forest 
20 Service. And, in 1963, I went into business with 
21 Mr. Torn Clifton, here in Boise. We bad an office here 
22 on State Street and one in Lewiston. And we started 
2 3 appraising timberlands, highways, right of ways, power 
24 lines. 
25 And, eventually, he retired and I took on 
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1 another partner and worked, in the '70s, on lands 
2 throughout the Idaho, Washington, Idaho, Montana area. 
3 Obtained an MAl designation. Kept appraising counties 
4 all across the United States; Tennessee, Nashville, 
5 Mobile, Alabama, Nebraska, Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. 
6 . Then sold that business, in 1988, and went
 
7 into appraising, with myself and my son, which I've been
 
8 doing ever since out of my home in Clarkston.
 
9 Q. And during the course of that, ha ve you had
 
1 0 continuing education? 
11 A. Oh, I've taken 15 to 20 classes. They 
12 require -- well, the initial education for the MAl 
13 designation was about 200 hours of classroom education, 
1 4 plus demonstration reports and exams. And then, since 
1 5 then, I have been obtaining about 16 to 20 hours per 
1 6 year, as required by all three states, for education. 
1 7 Q. And what states are you certified in, 
1 8 presently? 
1 9 A. Idaho, Washington, and Oregon. 
20 Q. Have you also taught continuing education 
21 classes? 
22 A. Well, I've taught three different courses; 
23 one at the University ofIdaho, another for Lewis Clark 
2 4 State College. And the other was a private course that I 
25 gave on bell curve appraising. 
1 Q. Mr. Rudd, are you familiar with the property 
2 located on Linder Road that is currently owned by the 
3 Johnson Trust? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. How did you first become familiar with that 
6 property? 
7 A. Someone from your finn, either yourself or 
8 Torn, asked me to appraise the property, which involved a 
9 trip to Boise. I went out and inspected the property, .•~ 
10 with Dallan Taylor. And I contacted realtors, went to 
11 the MLS and looked at comparable sales, and then carne up 
12 with a value determination. 
13 Q. And are -- is the contact with rc::altors and 
14 looking at comparable sales in the MLS the type of 
15 information that appraisers normally rely on in forming 
16 their opinions? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Did you prepare an appraisal report as a 
19 result of your review of the property? 
20 A. I completed the appraisal. And then I 
21 verbally relayed the information to your firm. And then 
22 it was requested that I produce a minimal report, which 
23 is a restricted use report. 





2 THE COURT: Will he be needing l:he Plaintiffs
 
3 exhibits that are in the notebook?
 
4 MS. TAYLOR: Maybe a couple of them. I'll
 
5 probably have him look at the plat and the photos.
 
6 THE COURT: Okay. As long as they're kept all
 i 
7 together, they're fme. i 
8 THE WITNESS: Do you want me to work out ofthe 
9 exhibit book or out of my file? 
10 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: No. I was just asking if you 
11 have the report with you. 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Okay. Was this report prepared in the course 
14 of your ordinary business dealings? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Was it prepared near to the time that you 
1 7 actually did the work? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I would move for 
20 exhibit -- for admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit 135. 
21 THE COURT: Any objection? 
22 MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor; foundation. The 
23 report is actually quite vague, because it doesn't even 
24 say anything about the value as to what date, nor have 
2 5 they tied it to any relevance issue in the case at this 
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1 point. 1 this opinion existed, which I don't think it even did at 
2 TIIE COURT: All right. I'll sustain the 2 the time, and that he, in violation or knowing violation 
3 objection, at this time, and give you leave to lay 3 of what this report says, engaged in conduct to the 
4 additional foundation. 4 contrary. 
5 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 5 THE COURT: Good argument. However, what I'm 
6 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Rudd, what was the 6 going to do is overrule the objection. I'm going to 
7 effective date of your appraisal? 7 allow it, for what relevance that it has. And if, as 
8 A. January 10, 2002. 8 Mr. Charney contends, the Court should discount the 
9 Q. And why was that date selecti~d? 9 exhibit because you failed to tie it in, Ms. Taylor, I'll 
lOA. I'm sorry? 1 0 take it into account as well. 
11 Q. Do you -- are you aware of why that date was 11 But I'm going to overrule the objection and 
12 selected? 12 admit, now, Plaintiffs Exhibit 135. It is admitted. 
1 3 A. Only in general terms. 13 MS. TAYLOR: All right. 
1 4 Q. And what was your understanding? 14 
15 A. That it was a date mutually agreed on between 15 (Exhibit No. 135 is admitted.) 
1 6 the parties involved in this case. 16 
17 Q. SO is this your appraisal of the value of the 17 MS. TAYLOR: ThankYOtl. 
18 Linder Road property as of July of 2002? 18 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Rudd, before we get into 
19 A. Yes. 19 detail on your appraisal I would like to ask you, have I.~ 
20 Q. Okay. 20 you viewed this property recently? 11 
21 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I believe the relevance 21 A. Yes. 
22 is clear. We're-­ 22 Q. And in addition to your appraisal report, are 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Now, this is July 10,2002; is 23 you prepared to testify as to whether there is any value 
2 4 that what you said? 24 to the improvements on the property? 
25 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. 25 A. Yes. 
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1 MR. CHARNEY: You said January, I thought. 1 MR. CHARNEY: Well, we'll object to that, because 
2 THE COURT: I wrote down January. I thought 2 that has never been disclosed. 
3 that's what he had said, as well. Is it as of July 10th 3 MS. TAYLOR: Actually, it was. 
4 or January 10th, Mr. Rudd? 4 THE COURT: Go ahead, tell me how. 
5 THE WITNESS: July. 5 MS. TAYLOR: Supplemental disclosure of witnesses 
6 THE COURT: July 10, 2002. 6 dated September 22, '06. The Court will recall that 
7 
8 
MS. TAYLOR: And that effective date is on the 
face of the appraisal that they have. 
7 
8 
they -- they got leave to extend their discJ!osure, 
THE COURT: Right. 
I: 
9 THE COURT: Okay. And it's your contention, 9 MS. TAYLOR: Specifically states, on Terry Rudd, 
10 Ms. Taylor, that you have -- that this witness -- that 10 in addition to testimony from prior affidavits and his 
11 the property that we're talking about is the Linder Road 11 deposition, Mr. Rudd would be called to rebut the 
12 40 acres that we -- that is the subject matter of this 12 opinions of Joe Corlett, as set forth in Defendants' 
13 litigation? 13 discovery responses and his -- Corlette's appraisal, and 
14 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. And that we have two other 14 to testify to his expert opinion as to the value or lack 
15 appraisals already admitted relating to it. 15 thereof of the Defendants' improvements to the Linder 
16 TIIE COURT: All right. 16 Road property. 
1 7 Go ahead. What's your objection, 1 7 MR. CHARNEY: That doesn't satisfy 26(b)(4) 
1 8 Mr. Charney? 1 8 disclosure. That was practically the same disclosure 
19 MR. CHARNEY: The objection would be relevance. 19 i read to the Court yesterday about Joe Corlett, and 
2 0 Unless the Plaintiffs in this case can tie knowledge of 2 0 you struck all that testimony. That does not satisfy the 
21 the information contained in this appraisal to Mr. Maile, 21 26(B)(4) disclosure, if that's what they're talk -- going 
22 it would not support their doctrine ofunclean hands 22 to start talking about is the specific dollar value. 
23 defense to the unjust enrichment claim. 23 TIIE COURT: Well, your objection was not that 
24 So, I think that there would need to be 24 it -- that -- your objection was that the quc:stion that 
25 additional foundation laid, that Mr. Maile was aware that 25 was asked this witnesses was beyond the scope of the 
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1 disclosure, not that it was too thin. 1 A. Yes. 
2 Do you see what I mean? Not that -- the 2 Q. Can you look at the photographs that are in 
3 objection that I hear you making, now, is there's not 3 the Plaintiffs Exhibit notebook, up there, under 133, 
4 enough data that was -- you know, that was disclosed. 4 and just flip through those, please. 
5 Is that your objection now? 5 A. Okay. 
6 MR. CHARNEY: Well, it depends on what they 6 Q. Do those appear to be a fair and accurate 
7 actually intend to elicit from the witness. If they're 7 depiction of the current condition ofthl~ property and 
8 going to try and elicit from the witness that the value 8 the improvements? 
9 of the raw land is X, in today's dollars, and the value 9 A. Yes. 
10 of the developed land is X, as it exists today, or 10 Q. Okay. I would like to start with the value 
11 that -- then that's exactly what you struck yesterday on 11 of the barn. In your opinion, a5 the bam sits, what 
12 nearly an identical disclosure. 12 value does it have? 
1 3 So there -- he has provided no data 13 A. It would have two values, depending upon 
1 4 supporting that, he has provided no actual figures for us 14 whether we include it with the sale of the property, in 
1 5 to come to trial and be prepared to defend against. And 15 that case it would be negligible, or whether we sold the 
1 6 maybe they're not intending to go there, but I'll make an 16 improvements separately. 
1 7 appropriate objection when they attempt to cross that 1 7 Q. Okay. I'll represent to you that the 
18 bridge. 1 8 prospective purchaser of the property was here just 
19 THE COURT: All right. I think that the 1 9 before you and testified that, as far as hc~ is concerned, 
20 disclosure that was made, on the expert witness 20 the barn has to be removed. 
21 disclosure, did properly notify DefendlmtJ 2 1 A. Well, that would be the case -- in its 
22 Counter-Claimants, the Mailes, that this witness would be 22 contribution to sale, that would most likely be the case. 
23 testifying about the -- his opinion on the value of the 23 Q. Okay. 
2 4 improvements. 24 A. It's a negligible part of the whole property 
25 Now -- but you're saying the value -- he is 25 value. It's not situated as the average person would 
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1 here to rebut Corlette's testimony. And ifMr. Charney 1 locate it. It is a typical type of barn for that 
2 is correct, and I struck all ofCorlette's lestimony, 2 neighborhood, however. I disagree with that design, but 
3 then what is there to rebut? 3 it's -- it's somewhat typical. So, in a sale, the 
4 MS. TAYLOR: We didn't strike Mfr. Corlette's 4 contribution would probably be next to nothing. 
5 testimony about the value of the improvements. S Q. All right. I will also ask you to assume 
6 THE COURT: Right. 6 that the prospective buyer has indicated that he intends 
7 MS. TAYLOR: And we were not planning on asking 7 to have this property replatted. Are you familiar with 
8 Mr. Rudd any questions on the current value of the 8 the manner in which the property is currently platted? 
9 property. We'll only question him on hi s opinion on the 9 A. Yes. 
1 0 value of improvements, to rebut Mr. Corlett, and on his 1 0 Q. I believe that is in your exhibit book under 
11 appraisal of the value as of the time thal the 11 116. 
12 transaction was entered into, and that is to rebut the 12 Oh, wrong number. 
1 3 appraisals that the Defendant has entered into evidence. 13 MS. TAYLOR: If I can have a mOffil~nt, Your Honor? 
14 MR. CHARNEY: That's okay with me. 14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 15 MS. TAYLOR: 122. 
16 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 16 THE WIlNESS: I have it. 
17 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Rudd, I would like to 1 7 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: In your -- can you tell the 
18 start with the improvements that have bt:en made to the 18 Court your opinion on this type of platting and the 
19 property, if that's okay? 1 9 impact it would have on the valU(~ of the property. 
20 A. Okay. 20 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; foundation. 
21 Q. Can you tell the Court when you visited this 21 THE COURT: If the witness understood the 
22 property. 22 question, he can answer it. I'm going to overrule the 
2 3 A. The first time was in the early fall of2004, 23 objection. 'c' 
24 September, 2004. 24 Did you want to be heard? 
25 Q. Have you been back since that time? 25 MR. CHARNEY: Just a little. 
• " .. .. ....... c. , ...... ... ,,, .....
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1 THE COURT: All right. 1 
2 MR. CHARNEY: Ifyou factor in the governmental 2 
3 requirements and the issue regarding the high water table 3 
4 and the septic, that would have to be part ofhis 4 
5 opinion. 5 
6 THE COURT: Well, I'111et him render an opinion. 6 
7 I think there has been sufficient foundation laid for his 7 
8 rendering an opinion, within the scope ofMs. Taylor's 8 
9 question. You certainly have an opportunity, on 9 
1 0 cross-examination, to attack that opinion. 10 
11 Go ahead. 11 
12 THE WITNESS: IfI could answer in this way, the 12 
13 market, today, would not accept this layout, because of 13 
14 the configuration oflots. They're narrow, triangular, 14 
15 long fencing, it would be placing the houses too close to 15 
1 6 each other. But it was an inexpensive way to develop the 1 6 
1 7 road system and then, later, to distribute the irrigation 1 7 
1 8 water. And in previous years, more back towards the date 18 
19 of the appraisal, it was more accepted than it would be 1 9 
20 today. 20 
21 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: How has the market changed? 21 
22 A. People are more desirous, they found out 22 
2 3 because-­ 23 
24 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; foundation. He's not 24 
25 talking about this market. He is not tying it to this 2 5 
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1 particular market, Your Honor. 1 
2 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to overrule the 2 
3 objection. As I understand the witness" testimony, he is 3 
4 comparing -- he is talking, specifically, about the 4 
5 market for this type oflayout in 2002; :;s that correct, 5 
6 Ms. Taylor? 6 
7 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. 7 
8 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to overrule the 8 
9 objection. 9 
10 THE WITNESS; I looked at about 10 or 15 different 10 
11 subdivisions on the west side of Eagle, and that's the 11 
12 basis of my opinions. I drove into them, looked at the 12 
13 places, and I did see some of this vintage, that were 13 
1 4 laid out similar to this. 14 
15 But the fencing and the problems that I 15 
1 6 mentioned have become apparent to the people that have 1 6 
1 7 lived there, and the homes have becom(: more valuable. 1 7 
1 8 People are building $800 to a million dollar homes on 1 8 
1 9 these properties, and they want a little more room away 19 
20 from the road. They want the estate looking -- coming up 20 
21 to their place, and they want some -- some side room to 21 
22 the adjacent homes. 22 
23 So the patterning has changed in the layout 23 
24 currently. That was what I noticed along Linder and I 24 
25 noticed west of Linder where the newer developments are 25 
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occurring. 
Q. SO, based on the assumption that this would 
be sold to someone who would completely replat it, what 
value would you put on the road as it s:its? 
A. Very little. It would only be the salvage, 
and in sale, probably no contribution. But, salvaging 
it, there would be the electrical pedestals. I don't 
know that pulling up any of the sewer line, the 
irrigation system, there may b(: a pump, there, in the 
reservoir, you know, that could be salvaged out. But it 
would be strictly a low value proposition, something no 
more than 20-, 25,000. 
Q. Mr. Corlett expressed the opinion that these 
improvements are currently worth $220,000. Would you 
agree with that assessment? 
A. He may be viewing that strictly in the cost 
approach manner. And the cost approach only applies if 
the market is going in that direction. And I don't think 
the current market is. 
It was, perhaps, a little more so at the 
time -- the appraisal, back to 2002. But even then, it 
was an in expensive way to layout the subdivision, but 
it wasn't bringing about its highest and best use or 
price. 
Q. And the developer who testified before you 
Page 362 
felt that this layout would have an adverse impact on 
resale possibilities. Would you agree with that? 
A. Well, the market is so hot that anything 
would sell there. But these lots would definitely sell 
less, you know, both today and then, as a result of that 
layout. In fact, I'm not too sure the first lot -­
well, I won't say any more. I just think one of those 
lots might be way reduced in value because of its 
location. 
Q. Well, go ahead and finish that thought. 
A. Well, I just thought it was strange that the 
barn would have been situated on that northern lot, and 
it was not -- well, I guess not much more than five 
acres. And that kind of spoils the development for 
everyone else, when all the other homes that are west of 
Eagle, like this, have the barns behind the home, and 
they're better quality, better construction, and a better 
appearance. 
It's just sort oflike having the bam in 
front of your house, the cart beD)re the horse. 
Q. Okay. In looking at the condition this bam 
,is in, can you describe it to the Court. 
A. It's a low-cost, frame pole constlUction, 
with wood siding, asphalt shingle roof. It's a broken 
Gambrel design, with hay storage above, in part, but not 
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1 all of the interior of the bam. 1 interior ponding area. I didn't Imow the lot layout at 
2 It looks like the stalls would be 2 that time. 
3 constructed. One-third of the concrete floor was in, the 3 And I took pictures of the surface, looked at 
4 other two-thirds had the rebar in and the grade, but they 4 what -- how it had been cropped before,. the lay of the 
5 weren't finished. All the siding wasn't finished. The 5 land, the level general elevations. And then I drove 
6 electrical was roughed-in, but not completed. 6 around the immediate neighborhood. I looked at the other 
7 I didn't see the main doors on. I didn't see 7 properties, what was being developed, what kind of values 
8 any side paddock doors. I didn't see any other finish, 8 were being implanted into homes. 
9 or the restrooms, or things that you would expect to find 9 Then I stopped and talked to several 
1 0 in a building like that. I don't know the status of a 10 realtors -- I'd get into more detail on that, as 
11 septic field, or a well for the water for it. 11 necessary -- asked them about what property values were 
12 I did see the road coming into it. We had to 12 in 2002. Ofcourse, what they were at the time I looked 
13 drive across the field to get to it. Willing to walk, 13 at it, in 2004. 
1 4 but I wanted to see how they were getting in there. 14 They gave me comparable sales off the MLS. 
15 Q. There is not a road to the barn, is there? 15 They gave me some listings, which subsequently sold. 
1 6 MR. CHARNEY: Objection, she's testifying. 1 6 Some I included in the appraisal, some J hadn't. I also 
17 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Is there a road to the bam? 1 7 looked at lots that had sold, what kind of prices, what 
18 A. I didn't find one. But there must have been 1 8 their sizes were. 
19 one, because there's quite a few materials there. But it 1 9 And then I drove into the field, looked at 
2 a wasn't completed; it wasn't graveled. However it's laid 20 all the comparable sales that I had. Drove to each one 
21 out was contrary to the design of the lot. 21 of them. Later called and talked at least one or two of 
22 The roof was in good condition, though. The 2 2 the owners, the buyers or sellers, picked up fliers on 
23 roof was the best part of it. 2 3 other lots for sale, other homes that had sold, different 
24 Q. Did you notice any deterioration in the 2 4 subdivisions. 
2 5 building? 25 And then I came home -- actually, I was doing 
Page 364 Page 366 
1 A. The siding was a minimal pan,eling. And, of 1 some of -- a lot of this by phone and contact, although I 
2 course, without insulation, without haying the inside 2 did meet approximately three of the realtors in person-­
3 finished, and I didn't see Tyvex on it, il's starting to 3 and verified what the values wt:re, at the time, fori 
4 deteriorate. But nothing major, yet. 4 various properties, how hard they were to develop, where 
5 Q. Okay. In Joe Corlette's apprahal, did you 5 the water and the sewer was, what they planned to do for 
6 
7 
see any indication that he haddone any depreciation or 
accounting for the deterioration? 
6 
7 
roads, how they were going to develop and lay them out, 
and discussed even the subject property" about what its Ii 
8 A. I don't remember seeing it. It may be there, 8 value was back in 2002, what values were in 2002 in the 
9 but J didn't see any. 9 marketplace. 
10 Q. Okay. I would like to move on to your 10 And then I prepared a graph in which I 
11 appraisal now. We're looking at Plaintiffs Exhibit 11 plotted the sales that I had researched, by acre. 
12 No. 135. 12 Q. Can you give me a second to catch up? 
13 Can you describe to the Court -­ 13 Is that graph included in your appraisal 
14 A. I don't have 135. 14 report? 
15 Q. Well, that's your appraisal. 15 A. It's the last page, before the cun"iculum 
16 A. Oh, okay. 16 vitae. 
17 Q. I haven't put it in that book yet. 17 Q. Okay. I'm sorry, I interrupted you. 
18 A. Okay. Well, I've got that, of course. 18 A. No, that's okay. 
19 Q. All right. Can you describe to the Court the 19 Q. Can you explain to the Court what this graph 
20 steps you went through in determining the value for this 20 is. 
21 property as of July of 2002. 21 A. That page shows all the sales that I obtained 
22 A. I went out, I viewed the propeny. I drove 22 and investigated, to various degrees, and located on here 
23 around the edge of it. Drove down the canal on the north 23 by size and price per acre. And then I drew a median 
24 and the east sides. I walked in part of it. And then I 24 line through the sales, and I prepared a sale analysis, 
25 met DaHan Taylor, and he showed me the road and the 25 which was based on six sales. 
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1 I then abstracted three, that I discussed. 
2 No. I discussed all six in the appraisal. And I had 
3 adjusted them in a grid, which I don't see a copy of in 
4 the appraisal, but that I described, in narrative, in the 
5 appraisal, percentage adjustments of 1hose sales back to 
6 the subject property. 
7 And the range that I arrived at was from 
8 $19,000 to $23,000 per acre for the subject property, as 
9 of September of 2002. 
10 Q. Well, the cover page says it's July of 2002; 
11 is that -­
12 A. Yes, I'm sorry. Right, July of 2002. 
13 Q. All right. So, in your report, using the 
14 value by acreage sale, what value did you reach for this 
15 property, as of July of 2002? 
1 6 A. $20,600 an acre. 
1 7 Q. And that would be how much for this parcel, 
18 how much total? 
1 9 A. Well, assuming there's 40 acrl~s -- and I know 
2 0 there's a difference of opinion. I did not personally 
21 surveyor measure it -- I came out with $820,000. 
22 Q. I note that some of the comparables you have 
23 used are for either larger or smaller parcels. How to 
2 4 you factor that into your analysis? 
2 5 A. This graph did all the work. I've made 
Page 368 
1 hundreds of them, in communities all across the 
2 United States. 
3 By plotting the size and the price, then the 
4 larger parcels, I usually have them on the right, 
5 progress to smaller parcels on the left, and the price 
6 just climbs, 
7 This graph doesn't show it, but [he one in 
8 the appraisal report shows the median line, shows how the 
9 prices climb as acreage becomes smalkr. And that's 
1 0 quite typical in almost all real estate markets. 
11 Q. Do you also enter an adjustment, depending on 
12 the availability of sewer? 
1 3 A. In general. But in most cases, the buyers 
14 were only generally aware of how far the sewer was from 
15 the property. And a lot of the properties weren't 
16 percing, so the sewer became fairly critical, in some 
1 7 people's minds. In others, septic systems and drain 
1 8 fields were acceptable and didn't really influence the 
1 9 price as much as did the particular zone, the size of the 
2 0 parcels that would be allowed at that 101;ation. 
21 The view of Bogus Basin seemed to be the 
2 2 biggest concern, the fact that they were in the Eagle zip 
23 code and within its area of impact, even back to 2002, 
2 4 seemed to be the main concern. 
25 Q. You talked about considering the zoning on 
1 the property. How does that play into valuing it? 
2 A. Most of the people it didn't, to any great 
3 degree. Because the City -- and I talked with the mayor 
4 yesterday -- they have a particular idea and a plan in 
5 mind. And they will change the zoning, because they 
6 have, within their area of impact -­
7 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; hearsay. 
8 THE COURT: Sustained. 
9 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
1 0 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Let me narrow the question 
11 down a little bit. 
12 In looking at comparable sales, is it 
13 important to look at ones that are -- that were zoned in 
1 4 the same category as this property? 
15 A. Yes and no. Generally, it's quite important. 
1 6 In this particular case, the location seemed to be as 
1 7 much, or more important, because the two general zones, 
18 RR, rural residential, and RUT, urban transitional. 
19 So, although there is a difference in the 
2 0 allowed size, the City's desire to have the properties 
21 developed in a certain manner was the most important 
22 objective. 
23 MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions. 
24 THE COURT: All right. 






3 BY MR. CHARNEY::
 
4 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Rudd. The report that
 




7 Q. This was not prepared at the request of a
 
8 bank or anybody who is not a party to litigation trying
 
9 to convince one side or another about the value of the
 
1 0 property; true? 
11 A. True. 
12 Q. You have also done other work for the Taylors I 
13 in the past; is that fair to say? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And for this law finn, their law finn, in the 
16 past? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Your primary area of work as an appraiser is 
19 not this local area; true? 
2 0 A. Incorrect. 
2 1 Q. Your primary work is the Treasure Valley? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Your primary -­
2 4 A. It's part of my primary area. 
25 Q. Right. Your primary area is northern Idaho, 
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1 MS. TAYLOR: Counsel, can you give me a page 1 Washington, and Oregon; correct? 
2 A. Montana. 2 number and line, please? 
3 MR. CHARNEY: It would be page 47, it would be3 Q. And Montana? 
4 A. Right. 4 line I to 3. 
5 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Was that the question and 5 Q. In fact, you have done only a few appraisals 
6 in the Treasure Valley area in the course of your career; 6 was that the answer? 
7 true? 7 A. Well, now you're confusing mc~. That was my 
8 A. True. But my son, who opened an office -­ 8 answer. 
9 Q. Answer my question. Is it true? 9 Q. All right. 
1 0 A. Partially. 1 0 A. And I think that was the question. 
11 Q. And later on was the question posed to you: 11 Q. All right. You used -- or you came to an 
12 opinion that the value of the property was $820,000 at 12 And does your appraisal reflect the value of that 
13 additional cost? 13 the time of the sale; correct? 
14 A. I did. 14 And your answer: In theory, through the eyes 
15 Q. However, when you appraised that property, 15 of the market it does. 
1 6 And then the question: But you can't put a1 6 and you came to that conclusion, that includes the 
1 7 development costs of the property, doesn't it? 1 7 finite dollar value on it? 
1 8 A. It includes -- it's as existing that date. 1 8 And your answer: I could have. I wasn't 
19 Q. But it included the costs ofgetting it 1 9 asked to do that; correct? 
2 0 developed into 5-acre parcels as well? 2 0 A. Correct. 
2 1 A. Absolutely not. 21 Q. Okay. Your comps that you utilized, you did 
22 Q. All right. So when you testifi,ed at your 22 not look at those comps to find out what their proximity 
23 deposition, you were questioned as follows: When you 2 3 was to the sewer and other typ($ of facilities, did you? 
2 4 appraised this Linder property -- Linde:r Road property, 24 A. Yes. 
2 5 does that appraisal include what you p1erceive the 25 Q. And that's reflected in your report, then, 
Page 374Page 372 
1 development costs would be? 1 isn't it? 
2 Your answer being, it does, but undefmed and 2 A. I did. I:3 undetermined. 3 Q. No. Is that reflected in your report? 
4 Was that the truth then, or is it the truth 4 A. Yes, it is. 
5 today, that the development costs are induded or not? 5 Q. All right. And let's take, for example, sale 
6 MS. TAYLOR: Objection; argumentative. 6 No.1. 10.5 acres, sold September 5, '02, from Below to 
7 TIm COURT: Overruled. 7 Mahaffey, for 283,500. And then you go on to talk about I 
8 Did you understand the question? 8 it, but there's no indication in there as to it's i 
9 THE WITNESS: I understood his question. But I -­ 9 proximity to sewer; is there?" 
lOin the deposition, I didn't fully understand what that 10 A. This was not required in the report. 
11 attorney was asking me. 11 Q. Okay. So, my question is, nowhere in your 
12 TIm COURT: All right. 12 report do your comps reflect their proximity to sewer, do 
13 lliE WITNESS: So. 13 they? 
14 TIm COURT: Well, I'm going to ask you to restate 14 A. It's not stated there. But that doesn't mean 
1 5 your question, Mr. Charney. 15 I didn't do it in the appraisal, which is a separate 
16 MR. CHARNEY: All right. 16 function. 
1 7 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: You were asked a question, 17 Q. No, no. It's not even found anywhere in 
1 8 when you appraised this Linder property -- Linder Road 18 you're report, is it? 
1 9 property, does that appraisal include what you perceive 19 MS. TAYLOR: Objection. 
2 0 the development costs would be? And your answer was, it 20 THE WITNESS: It doesn't matter. It's in my -- I 
21 does, but undefined and undetermined. 21 did it in my appraisal. 
22 Was that the question and was that the 22 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Sir, I'm not asking you -­
23 answer-­ 23 THE COURT: Hang on a second, Mr. Charney. 
24 MS. TAYLOR: Counsel-­ 24 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 
25 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: -- yes or no? 25 THE COURT: I have to entertain this objection. 
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1 Go ahead. 
2 MS. TAYLOR: I would like to object. He's 
3 mischaracterizing the report. If you look at sale No.2, 
4 sale No.3, they both talk about being close to sewer. 
5 MR. CHARNEY: No. He doesn't -­
6 THE COURT: They both talk about what? 
7 MS. TAYLOR: They both talk about whether it is -­
8 how close it is to sewer, whether the price has been 
9 adjusted, depending on the proximity to sewer. He's 
1 0 mischaracterizing the report. 
11 THE COURT: Well, I don't knOVI ifhe is or not, 
12 but let's do this. I'm just going to ask you to slow 
1 3 down, somewhat, Mr. Charney. 
14 MR. CHARNEY: All right. 
15 THE COURT: And if there is an objection to a 
1 6 question, Ms. Taylor, interpose the objection, and then 
1 7 I will instruct the witness not to answe:r the question 
1 8 if an objection is interposed, so I can handle that; 
19 okay? 
2 0 So, Mr. Charney, go ahead and take another 
21 run at this line ofquestioning, ifyou care to. 
22 MR. CHARNEY: I will. 
23 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: As far as your appraisals 
2 4 go, none of the comps that are reflected in there talk 
2 5 about a specific distance from sewer, do they? 
Page 376 








5 Q. A pennit to build a house there?
 
6 A. Well, maybe there is ~md maybe there isn't.
 
7 Q. SO you don't know?
 
8 A. I didn't invest -- it's not require:d to
 
9 investigate. I don't know.
 
1 0 Q. Sir, I'm not asking you what is or isn't 
11 required. I'm asking you, are these properties entitled 
12 or not? That's a fair question. So, you're saying you 
13 don't know with respect to No.1. 
14 Let's move to No.2. Was this property 
15 entitled or not? 
16 A. Well, define entitled to me-­
I 7 Q. Going through the -­
I 8 A. -- so I know for sure. 
1 9 Q. Going through the process of obtaining the 
2 0 appropriate permits, platting from government agencies, 
21 so that one can actually construct a home or some other 
2 2 structure on the property. 
2 3 A. Every single property will be able to 
2 4 construct at least one home. 
25 Q. Okay. The question being -- is, which of 
Page 378 








5 THE COURT: Exhibit 135?
 
6 MR. CHARNEY: Yes.
 
7 THE COURT: Okay.
 
8 THE WITNESS: Okay. The repOlt doesn't.
 
9 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: All right. The comps that
 
10 you have utilized are also ones that have already been 
11 split and have entitlements; correct? 
12 A. No. Many don't. 
13 Q. Which ones of the 1 through -- you have 
14 skipped 4 and 5 in your report. It goes 1, 2, 3 and then 
15 6,7,8. 
16 Which of these properties were not entitled? 
17 A. Comp No.1 was a 1O.5-acre tnmsaction. 
18 Q. Yes. Was it or was it not entitled? 
19 A. May be split once. 
20 Q. Do you know that for sure, or are you 
21 guessing? 
22 A. No. That's stated right in the MlLS report. 
23 Q. That's appended to this report somewhere? 
24 A. No. It's right on the appraisal, light on 
25 the MLS report. 
1 these have been split in a manner that has increased
 




4 Q. All right. So, in other words, No.2, the
 





7 Q. It has no entitlements. It's raw land that
 
8 sold for $20,536 an acre?
 
9 A. Absolutely, yes.
 
10 Q. And you're convinced of that fact? 
11 A. I know for a fact. I talked to the buyer. 
12 Q. Okay. Now, I noted the absence of an 80-acre 
13 parcel, in your report, that was only four miles from the 
14 Linder property, that sold at about the same time. 
15 Are you familiar with that property? 
16 A. I have no idea what property you're talking 
17 about. 
18 Q. I would be talking about the other 80 acres 
19 that were owned by Ted Johnson at his death, that was 
20 sold to these -- one of them, these other individuals 
21 that were sitting in court. 
22 A. That's the piece that was questioned -- I was 
23 questioned about in the deposition. 
24 Q. Yes. The 80-acre parcel that sold for 
25 $425,000. Why isn't that factored into your-­
'" ...',., . ,".... 
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1 A. I never went to the transaction that you're 1 MS. TAYLOR: An 80-acre parcel that sold for what? 
2 MR. CHARNEY: For $425,000. 2 referring to. 
3 Q. No, no, no. I'm talking about your comps. 3 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: You didn't include that sale 
4 You seem to be concerned about four miles being a long 4 in your report, and I'm curious to know why? 
5 ways away, so it can't fit in. You seem to be concerned,5 A. I don't know if the parties -- I thought the 
6 well, this is four miles away, how could I know? 6 parties were a family -­
7 Comp No. I is 5 miles east, isn't it? 7 Q. And-­
8 A. Well, yes. 8 A. -- affair. Well, family transactions, in the 
9 appraisal world, are considered to be prejudiced and not 9 Q. Okay. 
lOa fair reflection of the market itself. TIley mayor may lOA. But I obtained -­
11 Q. That's my question.11 not be. 
12 Q. SO these individuals, you assumed, did not 12 A. -- the sale. 
1 3 pay fair market value for 80 acres, and so you didn't 13 Q. No.2, one mile south; correct? 
14 A. The mileage is nothing, the mileage isn't 1 4 include that in your report? 
1 5 A. At the time -­ 1 5 what my concern was. 
16 Q. Sir-­1 6 MS. TAYLOR: Judge, I will object on relevance. 
17 A. Ijust didn't happen to go by this other 1 7 THE COURT: Overruled. I think it's fair enough. 
18 property you're talking about, because it was four miles 1 8 THE WI1NESS: I'm not sure, at the time -- Dallan 
1 9 mentioned the sale to me, but he said it was a family 19 away. 
20 sale. So I didn't really investigate the terms or the 20 Q. Okay. 
21 A. If it was closer, Dallan probably would have 21 price. 
22 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: What is a family sale, in 22 taken me. 
23 your view? 23 Q. Well, let's give you some basic facts about 
24 the property. It's four miles to the west, it's twice 24 A. Well, it's a sale from a father to a son, or 
2 5 the size, and it's undeveloped .just like the 2 5 brother to his sister, or some relation where there's 
Page 382Page 380 
:1 Linder Road property. 1 often other consideration; love, affection, and some 
2 Was it worth more than $425,000, or was that 2 other consideration that goes into the sale, other than 
3 a fair price? 3 the actual price. 
4 A. I could not even offer an opinion, if -- ifI4 Q. All right. So based on your analysis here, 
5 wanted to, because I'm required, by USPAT and appraisal 5 that these 40 acres were worth $820,000, and assuming 
6 law, to view the subject property, determine its 6 that they paid $425,000 for twice that amount of 
7 condition, it's characteristics, and then, with market 7 property, 80 acres, would that have been a fair market 
8 data, which I have here, arrive at a value. 8 value price for that property? 
9 I could go out there right now and do it. 9 A. I don't know where the property was. It may 
10 But I wasn't there, I didn't see it, ,md I can't do it. 1 0 or may not have been. 
11 Q. That's for pwposes of an appraisal. I'm11 Q. 80 undeveloped acres, four miks to the west? 
12 talking about for pwposes of cOUltroom te:>timony.12 A. Well, four miles is quite a ways. 
13 A. Well, that's the same thing. 13 Q. SO this property -­
14 Q. Knowing that the property is in the same 14 A. I didn't go to it, and I don't know where 
15 general type ofarea, that it is twice the size, and that 15 it's at. 
16 it falls well within the circle of your comps, was 1 6 Q. SO you can't answer the question, if that was 
17 $425,000 a fair price for that property or not?1 7 fair market value or not -­
1 8 A. No, I can't. 18 A. Cowtroom or not, there is -- my law -- our 
19 laws are not absolved in the Courtroom. I1 9 Q. -- just four miles away? 
20 MR. CHARNEY: Your Honor, I'm going to ask you to 20 A. I can't answer it. 
21 Q. Yet, how far away are these other subject 21 direct the witness to answer the question. 
22 THE COURT: I believe he already has. 22 properties? 
23 MR. CHARNEY: I think he has, too. 23 A. Well, I just -- in other words, I didn't go 
24 THE COURT: He says he could not render an opinion 2 4 to the sale property you're referring to. 
25 Q. You never went to the Linder Road property? 25 one way or the other. 
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4 Q. Is that an acceptable form of valuing
 






8 A. It's a cost approach estimate to valuing
 
9 properties, to which depreciation needs to be added
 
10 before a value estimate can be stated.
 




13 A. Well, you estimate if it's in the right
 
14 location or not.
 




17 A. A what line?
 
18 Q. Ofunderground electric?
 
19 A. Well, the same answer.
 




22 A. Yes, you can. As a cost estimate.
 
23 Q. And is there a multiplier for particular
 
24 areas and particular times?
 
25 A. For cost estimate, yes.
 
Page 384 
1 Q. And have you used Marshal Valuation, in the
 












8 MR. CHARNEY: No furtherquesdons.
 






12 BY MS. TAYLOR::
 
13 Q. Mr. Rudd, were the comparables that you
 










19 Q. Can Marshal's book tell anything about the
 
20 benefit of improvements?
 
21 A. No. And they don't intend that.
 
22 Q. Is it fair to say that specific improvements
 
23 would have a different benefit to different people?
 
24 A. That would be in the marketplace, yes.
 
25 Q. For example, if you're planning to tear down
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1 a barn, it has no benefit whatsoever?
 
2 A. To that particular individual in the
 




5 Q. Okay. And if something has no personal
 




8 A. In the market itself?
 
9 Q. That was a horrible question. I don't even
 
10 think I could answer it. I apologize.
 
11 Ifwe are trying to detemrine the benefit of
 
12 an improvement, does the cost of it make any difference?
 
13 A. Yes, it can.
 
14 Q. Is that based on a presumption that it will
 






18 MS. TAYLOR: No further questions.
 




21 MR. CHARNEY: One moment, Your Honor. I have no
 
22 further questions of this witness.
 
23 THE COURT: All right. May the witness be excused
 
24 from the subpoena?
 
25 MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
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3 THE WITNESS: May I have a second to put my -­

4 THE COURT: Yes, you may. I think the only thing
 
5 that you had -- I think the only thing we had up there
 
6 was the binder, wasn't it? Okay. I think everything
 
7 else is the witness'.
 
8 1HE WITNESS: It'll just take me a second.
 
9 1HE COURT: Sure. Yes, I have 135 right here.
 
10 
11 (The witness left the stand at 1:13 p.m) 
12 
13 MR. CHARNEY: Your Honor, previously, I had made 
14 an objection that his testimony would not be relevant as 
15 to the value of the land at the time of the purchase, 
16 because there was no evidence tying it to Mr. Maile and 
1 7 his knowledge of that particular issue. 
18 And I think on an unjust enrichment claim, 
19 and on the unclean hands defense, his testimony should be 
20 stricken, at least as to the value of the property -- of 
21 the $820,000 estimate that he provided for the property 
22 as of the date that it was sold, because they haven't 
23 indicated that Mr. Maile knew, or should have even known 
24 that. 
25 And, therefore, I would ask the Court to 
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reconsider my objection and strike that testimony. 
THE COURT: Well, it's obvious that as of 
September 22nd, when the report was prepared and the 
opinion was arrived at, that it was sort of 
retrospective. 
This witness, as I understand it, was not 
called to establish that Mr. Maile had actual knowledge 
that, you know, after the transaction, that he would, you 
know, that he would know that later on an appraiser would 
praise the property at $820,000 at the time. That's not 
the purpose of the testimony. 
And you may very well be comect in your -­
and I'm not prejudging this particular bsue -- but you 
may be correct, Mr. Maile (sic), that without being able 
to establish that Mr. Maile was actually aware that 
another appraiser had an opinion, or IDlY have later had 
an opinion, that the thing was worth $820,000, that it's 
irrelevant and the Court shouldn't consider it. 
However, I allowed the testimony to come in, 
for what it's worth. I think that the party calling the 
witness has a right to present the evidence that she 
believes is relevant, and can tie it in sufficiently. So 
that's why I left it in and that's why, at this time at 
least, I'm not going to strike it. 


























THE COURT: You may call your first rebuttal 
witness. 
MR. CHARNEY: We'll have rebuttal. My first 
rebuttal issue, though, is a request for the Court to, if 
you will, unstrike that portion ofMr. Codette's 
testimony that you struck yesterday. The reason being 
is, I would like you to treat it now as rebuttal 
testimony, to rebut Mr. Wood's claim that the current 
value ofthe lots, in their current condition, is $250­
to $275,000. 
Mr. Corlett opined that 1hey were: much higher 
than that, and I would like to offer that as my first 
piece ofrebuttal evidence, without actually having to 
recall Mr. Corlett for that point. 
THE COURT: Interesting. 
Ms. Taylor, what's your -- do you have any 
input on that request? 
MS. TAYLOR: Yes,Ido, Your HOl1or. Mr. Wood was 
not here as an expert witness. He was just talking about 
facts he is aware ofas a developer on this land. 
It doesn't -- his testimony doesn't change 
the fact that Mr. Corlett was not disclosed as an expert 
witness on the underlying value of the land. That 

















argument in your closing argument, though. Do you see 
what I mean? 
11R. CHARNEY: I do. 
THE COURT: Now, do you have lilly additional 
evidence or testimony, Ms. Taylor. 
MS. TAYLOR: We do not. ThePlaintiffs rest. 
TIlE COURT: All right. 
Does the -- do you have any rebuttal 
testimony, Mr. Charney? 
MR. CHARNEY; Yeah. I think we do, but I need to 
consult with Mr. Maile about how to trim it down. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's take a few minutes. 
Who would you intend to call. 
11R. CHARNEY: Certainly Mr. Maile, and unless -­

















THE COURT: Luckily, 1can defer making an 
decision on that request. Ofcourse, your -- I take it 
that ifI deny that request, then you would want an 
opportunity to call another witness; right? 
11R. CHARNEY: A rebuttal witness, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I take it that what you're 
telling me is, that's the witness you would call? 
11R. CHARNEY: He is. 
THE COURT: Okay. And how do you respond to 
Ms. Taylor's contention that he was nevler--
Mr. Corlett; right? 
11R. CHARNEY: That's correct. 
THE COURT: -- that Mr. Corlett has never been 
disclosed as an expert on that issue? 
11R. CHARNEY: Well, he certainly was disclosed as 
1 
, 
16 question or two, and then I need to discuss with the 16 an expert with respect to -- that he would opine 
17 Mailes whether or not I think we need anything else. 17 regarding the value of the property. The question was 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. Now -- 18 the recent information that I had received regarding the 
1 9 11R. CHARNEY: Can we take until 1:30? 19 exact numbers. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. We'll take 10 minutes, and then 20 Now, I explored, on cross-examination, I will 
21 we'll reconvene with the rebuttal testimony. 21 agree, the question as to the value. But it was for the 
22 11R. CHARNEY: Without any doubt, we'll be done 22 sole point of establishing that this witness might not be 
23 tomorrow. 23 credible. In other words, why go in thene and rip this 
24 24 whole place up if, in fact, the lots can be sold for a 
25 (Recess taken 1:16 p.rn. to 1:28 p.rn.) 25 good profit right now, without having to rip the place 
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And so, he then offered the opinion that he 
thinks they're worth, like I said in their current shape, 
somewhere between 250- and 275,000. And that testimony, 
left unchecked, would not be appropriate. 
Now, the Court is aware that rebuttal 
evidence doesn't necessarily have to be disclosed, 
although Mr. Corlett has been previously disclosed and 
most of his testimony has been. But this, I think. 
coming in as a rebuttal testimony, would not require the 
strict compliance with 26(B)(4), that he would be 
required to -- that we would be required. to comply with 
for our case in chief. 
THE COURT: What -- remind me. I had -- and you 
can tell me this, I suppose, by way of art offer of 
proof -- ifl allowed Codette's testimony on that 
subject, Mr. Charney, what would that testimony be, 
essentially, with respect to the present value of those 
lots? 
MR. CHARNEY: About $66,963 1m acre, or $347,700 
per lot. 
THE COURT: Okay. This last witness was 
Mr. Woods; right? 
MR. CHARNEY: The second-to-the-last witness. The 
last witness was Mr. Rudd. 
up. 
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MS. TAYLOR: Rudd, yeah. 
THE COURT: I'm going to allow it, for this 
reason. There was evidence presented during the 
Plaintif£'Counter-Claimant's case in chief, wherein an 
expert rendered an opinion as to the present value of 
each lot, at roughly. 250 to 275, I think was the 
testimony, in its present status. 
The testimony that I had previously stricken 
because it was not disclosed, was sworn testimony 
nevertheless, taken lIDder oath during thi::; proceeding. 
And this fellow, Corlett, was subject to 
cross-examination as I recall; was he not? 
MS. TAYLOR: Well, not on that issue, Your Honor, 
because I moved to strike it and it was stricken. So I 
didn't cross-examine him. 
THE COURT: Well, there you go. 
MR. CHARNEY: We can bring him back, so she can 
cross-examine on that point. He'll be here at 9:00 
tomorrow. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do it. Bring him back tomorrow 
morning, and he can be cross-examined on that opinion. 
MR. CHARNEY: He will be. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CHARNEY: All right. Our next rebuttal 
witness will be Dallan Taylor. 




















































THE COURT: Okay. You may call your witness. 
DALLAN TAYLOR, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the defense, 
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHARNEY:: 
Q. Will you please state your name and spell 
your last for the Court reporter. Be careful. Pull that 
lid all the way, or it will pour all over your lap. 
There you go. 
A. Dallan Taylor, T-A-Y-L-O-R. 
Q. Mr. Taylor, were you related to Ted Johnson 
in any way? 
A. He's my uncle. 
Q. Was he your -- was he sister or brother to 
your -- in other words, describe the relation a little 
bit more. I'm sony. 
A. He's my mother's brother. 
Q. All right. That's what I was looking for. 
After Mr. Johnson passed away, were you involved in the 
purchase of the 80-acre parcel, near Star, that 
Mr. Johnson owned prior to his death? 
A. The parcel in Star was 74.6 acres. 
Page 394 
Q. Okay. With that clarification, were you 
involved in the purchase of that 74.6 acres? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How were you involved in that purchase, sir? 
A. I was a partner with my brother and his sons. 
Q. Which brother? 
A. Reed Taylor. 
Q. And where is Reed? 
A. Lewiston, Idaho. 
Q. Who did you purchase the property from? 
A. The Trust. 
Q. Uncle Ted's Trust? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On that property, was there also a home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Describe the home. 
A. It's approximately 16-, 1,700 square feet, 
two level, brick home. 
Q. Is that where Uncle Ted lived? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How much did you pay the Trust for this 
particular piece ofproperty? 
A. We paid them $425,000. 
Q. For the full 80 acres. 
A. 70-some acres. 
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1 Q. The 76 acres? Is that yes? 1 Q. Mr. Taylor, can you describe the negotiations 
2 A. That's right. 2 leading up to your eventual purchase of this property? 
3 Q. Was this property fanned in a. manner similar 3 A. Yes. The reason -- originally, the man, 
4 to the Linder Road property? 4 Sam Rosti, was trying to buy the prope11y from Ted. He 
5 A. Yes. 5 offered $325,000, the original price. 
6 Q. Was it approximately four miles away from the 6 Ted went back to him and says well, I've got 
7 Linder Road property? 7 to have more than that, because the house is worth 50 or 
8 A. I think it's a little bit more than four 8 something. So he raised it to $375,000. 
9 miles. 9 I was in Italy at the time my uncle passed 
10 Q. Not much more, though? 10 away. And my brother was down here at the funeral, and 
11 A. It's about five miles. 11 he talked to Beth -­
12 Q. In addition to the 425,000 that you talked 12 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; hearsay and scope. 
13 about, was there also a promise that you would make a 13 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to overrule the 
14 contribution to the FFA in Uncle Ted'~, name? 14 objection on -- to the extent that you are objecting as 
15 A. That's true. 15 to the scope. I think the negotiation is fine. I think 
16 Q. The promise was you would pay $50,000 to the 16 that's just exactly what you were getting after, too, was 
17 FFA, in Uncle Ted's name; correct? 17 the -- whether or not this was TIlir market value or some 
18 A. That's true. 18 other consideration, and that's okay. 
19 Q. And, in fact, you wound up only paying 10; 19 However, I would just admonish the witness 
20 correct? 20 that you're not to say what somebody else told you; okay? 
21 A. No. I paid $16,600 and some dollars. 21 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
22 Q. To the FFA? 22 THE COURT: So don't say what your sister said, or 
23 A. Right. 23 your brother, or anyone else. And I'll sustain the 
24 Q. Okay. Was the contract for th,e sale of this 24 objection on that ground. 
25 property negotiated with Beth? 25 You may ask your next question. 
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1 A. And the sisters. 1 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
2 Q. Which sisters? 2 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Was the Trust prepared to 
3 A. Other beneficiaries. 3 sell this land for less money than you paid? 
4 Q. Who had the final say, though" 4 A. Yes. 
5 A. The trustees. 5 Q. And did you, and your brother, and his 
6 Q. Which trustees? 6 children essentially outbid the other buyeT? 
7 A. Beth and Andy Rogers. 7 A. That's true. 
8 Q. They were the ones that eventually signed the 8 MS. TAYLOR: I have no other questions. 
9 real estate contract? 9 THE COURT: Any redirect? 
10 A. Yes. 10 MR. CHARNEY: No redirect. 
11 Q. Then the $425,000 that you paid went into the 11 THE COURT: All right. You may step down. Thank 
12 Trust and was distributed among the trustees; right? 12 you. 
13 A. That's right. 13 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
14 I1 4 Q. Did Beth Rogers obtain court approval to 
15 close that contract? 15 (The witness left the stand at 1:41 p.m) 
161 6 A. I'm not aware of what happened, what they did 
1 7 to -- whether they did approve it or didn't approve it. 17 THE COURT: You may call your next witness, 
1 8 I'm not aware of that. 18 Mr. Charney. 
19 MR. CHARNEY: No further questions. 19 MR. CHARNEY: We'll recall Mr. Maile. 
20 THE COURT: Would you like to cross-examine the 20 THE COURT: Mr. Maile, I would remind you, you're 
21 witness, Ms. Taylor? 21 still under oath. 
22 MS. TAYLOR: Very briefly, Your Honor. 22 
23 23 THOMAS MAILE, 
24 CROSS-EXAMINATION 2 4 recalled as a witness at the instance of the: defense, 
25 BY MS. TAYLOR:: 25 having been previously duly sworn, was examined and 
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1 further testified as follows: 1 where it's at, because of the water table. 
2 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Contd) 2 Also critical to the layout was what we 
3 BY MR. CHARNEY: 3 considered to be advantageous., that the homes could be 
4 Q. Mr. Maile, a couple ofbrief rebuttal 4 located to best take advantage of the view of 
5 questions. There has been, I guess, criticism cast at 5 Bogus Basin. This 40-acre parcel is doVlI1 in like a 
6 the manner in which you designed the lots in question, it 6 little bowl. 
7 being a pinwheel design. 7 And even though there may be surrounding 
8 Can you explain to the Court why the pinwheel 8 areas, south of us and to the west of us, and even to the 
9 design was chosen for this 40 acres? 9 east of us, that didn't have water table problems, 
10 A. All right. As I said yesterday, we did water 10 this -- this 40 acres was in a little bowl, a little dip 
11 testing in the calendar year 2003, when the irrigation 11 area. And it also was theorized that there might have 
12 system was running. And that was required by various 12 been rock obstructions that retained the ground water and I 
13 State agencies, to determine if septics would work on the 13 made it come back up on to this 40-acre: parcel. 
14 40 acres. 14 So, there were a couple ofdifferent theories 
15 And we determined, through those tests and 15 that everybody -- the professionals felt this was the way 
1 6 working with Braun Consulting, which was our water -­ 16 that we had to go, in building the road and laying out 
I 7 retained water expert that worked with the Department of 17 the lot design. 
18 Environmental Quality, that it was touch and go as to the 18 And that, combined with trying to assess -­
1 9 depth -- or to the height of the water, especially in, 19 take advantage of each lot having a view, the CCRs that 
20 perhaps, the one -- the southwest one-third of the 20 were being worked out was even -- we'n:l structuring 
21 40 acres. 21 issues in the CCRs to build homes so that the views 
22 It ranged, in a ground water level, of 22 weren't obstructed, which was another fc~ature of those 
23 three and a half feet, at its highest, down to four and a 23 longer lots, in addition to the water problems. 
24 halffeet. Engineering folks, Joe Canning, who was 24 So, it was a well thought out design. And we 
25 retained through B and A Engineering, said well, that's 25 felt that the -- because of the testing that had been I 
1-­
Page 400 Page 402 
1 going to create problems with DEQ for septic. You can't 1 done on the property, and B and A Engineering staff, who 
2 perc. You have to have perc tests for septic systems, 2 had worked in the area and felt very comfortable they had I 
3 when you're not hooked up to the sewer. 3 the expertise to do this, that yes, this was the design 
4 So, the only way that we felt we could get it 4 that was going to work best, out of necessity. So that's 
5 to work was to enlarge the southwest comer lots. And 5 why it was done that way. 
6 there were two or three that are longer, :,Q that the 6 I might add, it -- they were very marketable 
7 homes could be built somewhat away from this high water 7 lots back when I -- we still had title, because I was; 
8 table, closer to the center of the 40 acres, thereby 8 listing -- I was trying to sell the propertie$, and they 
9 alleviating the problem with berming, for example, that 9 were all very well received, very well received. 
1 0 may -- that could have been used as a solution to high 10 Q. What do you mean by that? 
11 water tables. You put your septics up higher and they're 11 A. Well, the public -- I had become: an active 
12 more costly. 12 MLS broker, again, to try to market these lots. And 
13 Also, the road was an issue with ACHD. 13 they -- I was getting numbers of calls on people. I 
14 Because of the water table, ACHD has more -- although it 14 think, as we prepared for last year's trial, I had two or 
15 has to be constructed to meet ACHD regulations and 15 three different contracts that I could not dose on 
1 6 requirements, ACHD somewhat goes beyond those 16 because of the lis pendens. 
17 requirements, if they're going to accept the road. 17 So those lots were, even though they were 
18 So, making it a private road, although it met 18 long and designed the way they were, they were still very 
1 9 ACHD requirements, the engineering staff felt that by 19 marketable. It was a very, very good response by the 
2 0 putting the road away from this high water area, would 20 general public. We could have sold them rather quickly, 
21 create less problems than having it accepted and approved 21 all of them, if we chose to. 
22 by -- excuse me -- approved by ACHD. 22 Q. There was also criticism of your placement of 
23 And if ACHD didn't have to accept it, to 23 the barn on the property. 
2 4 maintain it for perpetuity, a private road would be 24 A. Right. 
2 5 better there. So we went with a private road, located 25 Q. Can you discuss that. 
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1 A. Well, the Court has exhibits that show 1 
2 Classic Cottage. Well, we just had a professional that 2 
3 helped design the layout of where the house was to be. 3 
4 Q. Okay. And as far as the barn goes, there was 4 
5 some thought that maybe the barn was winding up in front 5 
6 of the house, as opposed to behind it; i.s that accurate? 6 
7 A. No, no. Larry Brown, with Classic Cottages, 7 
8 did a -- you know, the site plan that's required for 8 
9 Ada County Developmental Services, to just layout the 9 
1 0 conceptual layout of where the house would go and where 1 0 
11 the barn would go. And, also, we knew from Eagle City, 11 
12 that you couldn't put a barn -- Eagle City had standards 12 
13 that you couldn't put a barn in front of a house. 1 3 
14 So, it was designed to have the house out in 14 
15 front, so you would access the house off ofCornerstone 15 
1 6 Road. The bam was also designed not to interfere with 1 6 
1 7 other people's views. And it was also located next to an 1 7 
18 irrigation canal that really couldn't be used, because it 18 
1 9 had to be maintained and had to be open for use by the 1 9 
2 0 irrigation district. 2 0 
21 So all those considerations, Larry and my 21 
22 wife and I considered, in designing the barn and laying 22 
23 out the barn. 23 
24 Q. Okay. 24 
25 MR. CHARNEY: No further questions. 25 
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1 THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, do you have any cross? 1 
2 MS. TAYLOR: No cross. 2 
3 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Maile, you may step 3 
4 down. Thank you. 4 
5 5 
6 (The witness left the stand at 1:48 p.rn.) 6 
7 7 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Charney, do you have additional 8 
9 evidence or testimony to put on at this time? 9 
1 0 MR. CHARNEY: Can we recess mtil the morning? 1 0 
11 THE COURT: Is it your intention only to put on 11 
12 one additional witness, and that would b<: mister -­ 12 
13 remind me of his name. 13 
14 MR. CHARNEY: Corlett. 14 
15 THE COURT: -- Corlett, in order to give 15 
1 6 Ms. Taylor an opportunity to cross-examine him, given the 16 
1 7 Court's ruling on the now admissible evidence that the 1 7 
1 8 Court had previously stricken; correct? 1 8 
1 9 MR. CHARNEY: I may call Rory Jones on the -- to 1 9 
2 0 rebut Dan Grober, but I'm -- personally, myself, I'm 20 
21 leaning away from that. 21 
22 THE COURT: Okay. But go ahead, Ms. Taylor. 22 
23 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I have talked with my 23 
24 client. And rather than drag this out any longer, we're 24 
25 willing to waive our right to cross-examine Mr. Corlett. 25 
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We, obviously, will have argument as to how much weight 
should be put on his testimony. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you. I'll 
note that for the record. 
Having that concession, Mr. Charney, are 
you -- if you want to call Rory Jones -- I saw him in the 
courtroom today. If you wanted to call him as a rebuttal 
witness, I will certainly give you an opportunity to do 
that. But you have also indicated to me, now, that you 
are leaning against. 
MR. CHARNEY: Me personally. I need to talk to 
Tom about it. For what it's worth, Your Honor, I mean, 
when somebody gets on the stand and challenges your 
professional reputation, you want someone to stand up for 
you. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. CHARNEY: And I don't blame Mr. Maile for 
that. But I'm wondering -- you lrnow, I guess it's a 
question ofasking you, you know, when: is this case 
going in your head? You know, I guess I'd just -- not 
asking you for a ruling, but if there's something that 
you're sitting there saying, this is completely 
unimportant, I don't want to waste your time with it. 
On the other hand -­
THE COURT: Well-­
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MR. CHARNEY: You see my dilemma. 
THE COURT: I do. Maybe I should mention one 
other thing, too. I see Mr. Grober has come back into 
the Courtroom. Mr. Grober was called as an expert 
witness on the issue of the Rules of Prof<essional 
Responsibility that existed at the time this transaction 
took place. His testimony is there to assist the finder 
of fact. 
Now, I think, particularly in a case like 
this, I wonder -- and always, obviously, the Court is not 
bound by any expert opinion, the fmder of fact is never 
bound by the testimony of an expert, whatever it may be, I 
and whatever subject it may be. 
And not to, you know, use a cliche just for 
the sake of using a cliche, but this is, as they say, not 
rocket science. And I don't mean that it is, therefore, 
you know, real, real easy. 
But the expertise which Mr. Grober opined 
about was in an area that the Court and, frankly, anybody 
who is licensed to practice law, would have some 
familiarity with. And I think that the parties are 
probably aware -- and I've kind of struggled with how to 
approach this -- I have some experience in the area of 
these professional responsibility issues myself. 
When Mr. Grober was Deputy Bar Counsel, I 
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1 was on the Bar Commission. And, you know, the Bar 1 THE COURT: Have you had a full opportunity to 
2 Commissioners are the ones that ultimately -- well, not 2 consult with your clients about your decision? 
3 ultimately, ultimately it's the Supreme Court. But we're 3 MR. CHARNEY: I have. And we're going to rest at 
4 the ones who pass on these accusations and allegations of 4 this point. 
5 misconduct. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Now -- thank you. 
6 So having said that, I don't know what else 6 Ms. Taylor, do you have any sUlTebuttal? 
7 to tell you, Mr. Charney. It's up to you whether or not 7 MS. TAYLOR: Oh, my gosh, no. 
8 you want to call that rebuttal witness. We certainly 8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 have time. What we're faced with, right now, is the 9 MS. TAYLOR: No. 
1 0 possibility that we could save a day, for whatever that 10 THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. Here's what we'll 
11 is worth, but we don't have to. 11 do, then, folks. We have finished, essentially, a day 
12 MR. CHARNEY: Can we come back here about, maybe, 12 early. But we don't have time, at this point, to listen 
13 ten after 2:00, five after 2:00? I'll consuit with the 13 to closing arguments. So this is, sort of; typically 
14 Mailes and see. 14 what I do in a, what I consider, pretty complex Court 
15 THE COURT: I think that's worth it. Let's give 15 trial. 
1 6 it until five after, and I'll tell you why. 1 6 I'm going to do this. I'm going to set forth 
1 7 Judge McLaughlin is in -- on a long-awaited vacation, and 1 7 a schedule, sort of a briefing schedule. And what I'm 
18 I'm going to cover his mental health court calendar at 18 going to want from each of the parties is as follows. 
19 3:00. Staffmg is at 2:30, and that's a really important 1 9 I want the Defendant/Counter-Claimants, the 
20 part of it. So I'm absolutely -- I have to be doing that 2 0 Maile parties, to present written closing arguments and 
21 at 2:30. Inga's going to cover for Judge Wetherell. 21 proposed fmdings offact and conclusions oflaw. I'm 
22 So, let's do this. We'll come back in at 22 going to give the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants, the 
23 five after, and the only question will be whether or not 23 Taylors, the same opportunity to present written closing 
2 4 we want to come back tomorrow. Perfec tly okay ifyou 24 arguments and proposed findings offacI and conclusions 
25 want to, but -- and I've given you, I think, about as 25 oflaw. 
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1 much as I can, Mr. Charney. 1 Now, ordinarily then, what I would allow, if 
2 MR. CHARNEY: I understand. I just -- you know, I 2 this was a jury trial or, frankly, if it was a Court 
3 trial where I was taking, you know, just oral closing 3 just don't want to belabor the Court with something 
4 that's not really important for your consideration. 4 arguments, I would give the Defendant/Counter-Claimants'l 
5 That's my primary concern. 5 the Mailes, an opportunity, then, to make a rebuttal . 
6 THE COURT: Okay. But that's still your -- it's 6 closing argument, because, it seem to me, it's their 
7 burden ofproving the elements and the amounts ofdamages7 your call, and I want you to know that, that I'm giving 
8 you leave to run your case the way you want to. 8 on the unjust enrichment claim. 
9 But, in this case, I don't see where there 9 Now, we'll come back in at five after. And 
1 0 would be any harm to do it this way. I'm going to allow1 0 if we don't have any -- if we don't come back in for 
11 additional evidence and testimony tomOIrow, what I intend 11 the Counter-Defendants, PlaintiffiCounter·-Defendants, as 
12 well, to present written rebuttal closes, and they'll be 12 to do is just sort of layout for you -- because we're 
13 simultaneously due. 1 3 going to be out of time for oral closing arguments and so 
1 4 forth, and I would probably be asking the parties to 14 So, I'm going to give the parties a week, 
15 submit written fmdings of fact and conclusions oflaw 15 until a week from Friday, at close of business, which 
1 6 anyway -- I've sort of worked out a schedule that I'll 16 would be -- yeah, tomorrow's the 13th -- no later than 
17 5:00 o'clock, October 20th, which is one week from 1 7 give to you so that I can get everything under advisement 
1 8 in fairly short order, so that I can render a decision in 18 tomorrow, to present, simultaneously, the Defendant/ 
19 Counter-Claimant's written closing arguments and proposed 1 9 due course. 
20 findings of fact and conclusions of law.20 We'll come back here at five after, by that 
21 The PlaintiffiCounter-Defendant's 1Nritten2 1 clock; okay? 
22 closing arguments and proposed fllldings of fact and 22 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 
23 23 conclusions oflaw are due at the same time. 
2 4 One week after that, which will be 24 (Recess taken 1:55 p.m to 2:08 p.m.) 
25 December 27th -- I'm sorry -- October 27th, at 5:00 25 
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1 o'clock, each of the parties can give the Court a 
2 rebuttal close, just to rebut what the otb.er parties have 
3 given us, given the Court, and that's it. I'm going to 
4 limit the -- I'm going to put a page limit on the 
5 post-trial briefmg material. 
6 Do the parties believe that they can get by 
7 with just 25 pages each? 
8 MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: And that includes I~verything. So you 
1 0 can -- if you think you can cover every:hing in four or 
11 five pages, feel free. But if you need more than that, 
12 I'm going to give you up to 25 pages apiece. 
13 MS. TAYLOR: In both of our -­
14 THE COURT: Yeah. 
15 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
16 THE COURT: Yeah. Just written closing argument 
1 7 and proposed fmdings offact and conclusions oflaw, 25 
1 8 pages grand total. Then, I'm going to limit each of the 
1 9 parties to no more than 10 pages on your rebuttal close, 
2 0 and those will also be simultaneously made. 
2 1 That way, I will consider that I'll have 
22 this matter fully under advisement end ofbusiness 
23 October 27th, two weeks from tomorrow. And I will issue 
24 a written decision on all matters before the Court in due 
25 course. And, of course, I have the 30-day rule. So 
Page 412 
1 you'll have it sometime in November. 
2 I can't tell you exactly when I'll do it, 
3 because I have a big trial starting Wednesday that will, 
4 you know, take most of my time through about 
5 mid-November. But I'll do the very bel;t I can, and 
6 certainly get it out, you know, because [realize this 
7 matter is terribly important to all parties. 
8 MR. CHARNEY: Would we concl~rn ourselves with 
9 attorneys' fees in this -­
laTHE COURT: Yes, I'd like you to, because that's 
11 going to be an issue, as well. 
12 MR. CHARNEY: All the old arguments, or just as 
1 3 relates to this portion of the case? 
14 THE COURT: Well, that's a good questions. I 
15 would like to have this matter completely under 
1 6 advisement, so that -- what I've been planning to do is 
1 7 write a decision that covers absolutely everything. 
1 8 And we're aware of what's happ~med up to this 
1 9 point, up to the time the Supreme Court rendered its 
2 0 decision, then the subsequent ruling that I made, you 
21 know, after their ruling. And I really do want to take 
22 up everything, including attorneys' fees and costs 
23 issues; okay? 
24 There's also the issue of, I know, the 




to tell me what you have to tell me about that. 
Are there any other questions about what it Ii 
3 is that I'm looking for? I want to have this thing 
4 completely done, so that when I -- so that I have no more 
5 questions, so that I'm not looking around for any more 
6 factual information, not taking any mort:: argument at that 
7 point. I'mjust basing it on all of the facts, and all 
8 of the law of the case, and all of the history of this 




render a final decision which will be, obviously, an 
appealable decision at that point. 
MRC~Y:Ob~ I 
13 MS. TAYLOR: I have only one concern, Your Honor, 
14 on the attorneys' fees issue. Without disclosing any 
15 amounts, I think it's safe to say that we have made an 
16 offer ofjudgment. Obviously, your fmal decision will 
1 7 need to be looked at, and our attorneys' fee issue on the 
18 unjust enrichment will be greatly dependant on your final 
1 9 decision. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. And what you can do, then -­
21 are you telling me that you want to -- you don't want to 
22 disclose to the Court what the offer ofjudgment was; 
23 right? 
2 4 MS. TAYLOR: I don't think we're supposed to. 
25 THE COURT: I don't think you should, either. So, 
Page 414 
1 what you might do then is mention that fact in your 
2 closing arguments -­
3 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
4 THE COURT: -- in this post-trial material. 
5 MS. TAYLOR: Yeah. And we -- there would be the 
6 potential to come back with that'? 
7 THE COURT: Which would be okay, as well. 
8 MS. TAYLOR: All right. 
9 THE COURT: I'd be all right with coming back and . 
1 0 taking some additional argument and so forth on the issue 
11 of costs, and fees, and interest, and everything else, if 
12 we need to; okay? 
13 MR. CHARNEY: Are you wanting a memorandum of 
14 costs and fees at this point, or we should wait -­
IS THE COURT: Oh, we should wait. We probably 
1 6 should wait. So, I guess what I should ten you is I 
1 7 should -- we really should, I guess, leave costs and 
18 attorneys' fees off. 
19 MR. C~Y: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: Is that what both parties are sort of 
21 suggesting? 
22 MR. C~Y: I prefer just to address -­
23 THE COURT: Yeah. 
24 MR. CHARNEY: -- what the amounts on this part 
25 would be. 
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1 THE COURT: Which is exactly what you would be 1 BOISE, IDAHO 
2 doing if I just took oral argument, here, at the end of 2 April 2, 2007, 3:09 p.rn 
3 ~cu~ 3 
4 MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 4 THE COURT: The Cowt will take up Taylor vs. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. I think I'm ready to go 5 Maile, Case No. CVOC 040043 D. 
6 on this. I think the way I'll approach lhis is to sort 6 This is a hearing on a request for additional 
7 of -- just so that you know, it might be helpful in 7 records to be included in the appellate file; correct? Ii 
8 preparing your proposed findings and conclusions and 8 MR.. MAILE: Yes, Judge. That's pmi ofit.'! 
9 arguments -- I think what I'll try to do is -- what I do 9 THE COURT: Okay. And what else? Oh, sanctions? ~ 
10 sometimes, in a case like this -- and what I mean by that 10 MR.. MAILE: Yes. There is that as well.! 
11 is a case with a number of complex issues and quite a 11 THE COURT: What else? i 
12 complicated history -- I will sort of sel: up an 12 MR. MAILE: Then there's a motion to reconsider 
13 analytical grid that would be consistent with the way I 13 the memorandum decision dated November 29,2006, and a 
14 would advise a jury in post-proofjury instructions, if 14 motion to strike and objection to clerk's record. 
15 this case were going to be decided by a jury. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Maile, you have a motion to 
1 6 I'll try to frarne the questions that way and 1 6 reconsider that was filed on December 8th, a motion to I.i 
1 7 analyze them, you know, in that manner. 1 7 strike pleadings filed by the respondent on the 14th of Iii 
18 MS. TAYLOR: Kind oflike a proof chart? 18 February, and the objection to the clerk's record. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah. 19 MR. MAILE: Yes, Judge. 
20 MS. TAYLOR: The elements are -- 20 THE COURT: All right. Okay. I'll hear your 
21 THE COURT: Something like th2et. Okay. I think 21 argument, Mr. Charney -- I mearL Mr. Maile. 11 
22 that's it. I want to compliment both sides. I think it 22 MR.. MAILE: That's okay. I! 
2 3 wu a well-tried case. I'm glad -- I know that all you 23 THE COURT: Mr. Charney was just in here a few !i 
2 4 folks are somewhat relieved by the fact that we finally 24 minutes ago. i, 
25 got this case to trial. This, I understand also, is just 25 MR. MAILE: Well, he's on this case, as well, so I
1--..::.....---------'--------'--"-----+-----------'--------:...----'---- ­
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1 sort of a pause in the action, probably. But I do want 1 can understand the Court's issue.
 
2 to compliment both sides on being exceptionally 2 Judge, our notice ofhearing properly set
 
3 well-prepared, on both sides, and in handling this in a 3 forth the three items that we're asking this Court to
 
4 very professional way. And I do appreciate the 4 address today, and the Court has just indicated those
 
5 importance, to both sides, of the imp011ant decision 5 issues are on the table.
 
6 that's facing the Court. 6 One ofthe -- the first thing that we need to
 
7 So if your written material is consistent 7 have the Court address is, back in November 29, 2006,
 
8 with the professionalism with which you both presented 8 this Cowt entered its memorandum decision and order.
 
9 your cases, and conducted yourselves during the course of 9 And that was ultimately fought -- a judgment was entered,
 
1 0 this trial, I'll be real well-prepared to make a 1 0 as a result of that memorandum decision and order, on 
11 decision. 11 December 11, '06. 
12 Thank you very much. Court will be in 12 On December 8th of '06, we had filed our 
13 recess. 1 3 motion to amend that memorandum decision and order. And 
14 14 the issue that we're asking the Court -- it looks as 
1 5 (The proceedings concluded at 2: 18 p.m.) 15 though, from our reading of the memorandum decision, the 
16 16 Court did not address the issue of prejudgment interest. 
17 1 7 And if-- if the -- I don't have the ex1libit 
18 18 numbers with me, but there were two different documents 
19 1 9 provided at the hearing, the trial, that related to the 
20 20 payments made to the trust, totaling -- $400,000 worth of 
21 2 1 payments were made. 
22 22 We made a mistake in calculating the 
23 23 interest, by compounding it on the first day of tria!. 
24 24 The second day of trial, we recalculated it and the 
25 25 ,nnrmnt on simple ;ntprpct is ,II: 14? 0') 1 11. 
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1 That -- both of those exhibits were admitted
 1 
22 into evidence. And it just hasn't been -- it wasn't 
3 addressed in the memorandum decision. We're asking the 3 
44 Court to either say yeah or nay to that issue and enter 
5 the appropriate order on that. 5 
66 So that -- we think it's rather simple and 
77 straightforward. I do have a case, a recent case, cited 
88 as Michael "Doc" Holiday vs. Mark Lindsey, and that's a 
99 2006 opinion, No. 57-A, by the Court of Appeals. But 
1010 it's not a complicated issue. 
1111 The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
121 2 Supreme Court's prior decisions that simple interest is 
1313 due and owing on amounts that are reasonably calculated 
1414 as liquidated or undisputed. And the record is clear, 
1515 here, that those payments were receive:d. It's a 
161 6 liquidated amount and we think this Court should allow 
1717 prejudgment interest. 
181 8 The second issue that we have before the 
1919 Court, from our perspective, is that we initially filed 
2020 an objection to the Respondent's request for additional 
2121 records, dated February 15,2007. And upon reading the 
2222 appellate rules, we felt -- and cited thai -- cited the 
232 3 appropriate appellate rules in our motion, which was 
242 4 filed on February 21, 2007 -- that there are time limits 
Page 421 
We think that the rules are straightforward. 
I can appreciate where the Respondent is coming from, 
based on their response to the objection and request for 
sanctions. But I think -- if the Court wants me to hear It 
that now, I'll address it. Otherwise, I'll wait for II 
response, whatever the Court wants me to do. 11 
TIIE COURT: Why don't you go ahead and cover the iii 
whole field at this point. 
MR. MAILE: Sure. I can't imagine this Court 1::1 
being in a position of saying, you're sanctioned because Ii! 
you followed the Idaho Appellate Rules" It seems rather 
far-fetched, but I've been wrong before. 1::1 
And the response submitted by the Appellants IJ 
in this case, there isn't any authority cited for their Iii 
proposition that this Court is in a position, or has the ,Ii 
jurisdiction or power, to augment the record. So, we 
think it's simple and straightfon'lard. I don't want to 
belabor the point. But we think both of our motions are 
meritorious and should be granted. 
:Thank you, Your Honor.
 
TIIE COURT: Thank you, Counsel, Mr. Maile.
 
And, Ms. Taylor?
 IMS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I'll start with the 
request to augment the record, if that's okay with the [ 
2 5 imposed on augmenting the record. 25 Court.1---...:.....-----::=.---=------·-------+------------------------·-1, 
Page 420 Page 422 
1 And it's the position ofthe Respondents-­
2 excuse me, the position of the Appellants in this case, 
3 the Respondents did not timely move. Under the Idaho 
4 Appellate Rules 21 and 19, they had 14 days to request a 
5 motion -- or request to augment the record. They didn't 
6 do that. And the rules are directly on point, from our 
7 perspective, as to their failure to do the same. 
8 What's the redress for the Appellants -- or 
9 the Respondents in this case, really it's not a 
1 0 jurisdictional issue. But the Court, in our opinion, 
11 does not have the authority, now, to look at that. 
12 THE COURT: Only the Supreme Court can do that. 
13 MR. MAILE: Only the Supreme Court has that. 
14 THE COURT: I see. 
15 MR. MAILE: So that is our position, based on the 
16 rules. 
1 7 That was filed. It wasn't noticed up for 
18 hearing. And then, shortly thereafter, th~ clerks's 
1 9 record, on March Ist I believe, was created, and we had 
20 28 days to file our objection to the clerk's record. The 
21 clerk's record does, now, include those items that 
22 weren't timely requested. 
23 So we have filed an objection to the clerk's 
24 record, and that was file stamped March 20, 2007, 
25 reiterating our position as we stated on nOlJl UUl 20th. 
1 Our response does, indeed, cite Idaho 
2 Appellate Rule 29. Under that, we have 28 days from the 
3 date the clerk's record is received to request additional 
4 documents or to object to documents that are included. 
5 What happened in this case is, WI~ received a 
,6 notice of appeal that gave the impression of citing 
7 everything that could possibly be relevant to the issues 
8 raised on appeal. There were 98 different records cited. 
9 In going through them more closely, we discovered that 
10 the Appellate systematically omitted everything that the 
11 plaintiff had submitted on the issues that were relevant 
12 to the appeal. 
13 I think the issue is whether the 
14 Supreme Court will have the appropriate record as exists 
15 before it, or if we'll have to do a motion to augment. 
16 The Supreme Court will see to it that it has the '. 
17 appropriate record. I think that the Appellant has a 
18 duty to submit that, and that it is inappropriate, and 
19 unethical, and sanctionable to intentionally omit records 
20 that are required for the Court to review -- for the 
21 Supreme Court to review this Court's decisions. 
22 It, basically, was an effort to invite error, 
23 saying, this is the record, you need to malce the 
24 decision, knowing that he hadn't included very, very 
25 relevant documents. 
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1 that you agree with Mr. Maile, to the extent that he says 1 But our request was, if anything, early. 
2 it doesn't seem to have been addressed at all. 2 Under JAR 29, we had 28 days from the date we received 
3 Is that fair enough? 3 the record. It has been submitted. We ask -- and as I 
4 MS. TAYLOR: I think that's fair enough, Your 4 read 29, this is the Court that issues the order settling 
5 Honor. In my -- in my opinion, it was _., it was -- a 5 the transcript. That's why this hearing was noticed 
6 denial ofa motion for prejudgment interest was inherent 6 before you. So you have the authority, under that rule, 
7 in refusing to grant a judgment. 
[.' 
7 to say, the transcript, as it has been submitted, is or 
8 But if -- I don't want there to be a 8 is not appropriate. :.9 question. I don't want us to have to go up and come back 9 We didn't ask that anything be included that 
10 on just that one issue. I:10 should not have been included in his notice of appeal, 
I
11 THE COURT: Sure.11 and leaving it out was just improper. 
12 MS. TAYLOR: It seems to me like it's kind of a I12 THE COURT: What about the other motion, the 
13 motion to reconsider on the interest issue? 13 housekeeping measure. Ii 
14 THE COURT: And I think Mr. Maile would agree, 14 MS. TAYLOR: Well, Your Honor, our basis for 
15 sanctions on noticing that up is that the motion said 15 probably. 
16 MR. MAILE: Well, I think it's housekeeping. But 16 that oral argument was not requested. We should not have 
17 had to fly here and incur all of the expense for a 17 I do believe that -- I do believe that this Court -- the Ii 
18 hearing on a motion that they had said ~ley didn't want a 18 appeal has been involving the issue of the beneficiaries' II 
19 claim for summary judgment. And I think this Court still I!19 hearing on. 
20 has jurisdiction. Once we filed a motion to amend a Ii20 All they needed to do was bring it to the 
21 memorandum decision and order, this Court has continuing 21 Court's intention that they had not requested a hearing 
22 and hadn't gotten a decision on it. We briefed this 22 jurisdiction on that narrow issue, until it's either 
23 denied or granted or clarified; housekeeping, whatever 23 issue six different times, literally, from beginning to 
24 end, upside down, every -- every which way. They're not 24 you want to call it. So I think this Court still has 
25 entitled to prejudgment interest because they didn't get 25 jurisdiction to degree the issue raised. 
Page 426Page 424 
1 a judgment. 1 Now, granted, it was -- we listed it as a 
2 THE COURT: Do you think that I should, though -­ 2 motion that did not need oral argument, but for some 
3 I mean, obviously you don't think: that they're entitled 3 reason it never got addressed. 
4 to anything. But, procedurally, do you think I still 4 THE COURT: Well, let me just suggest this. 
5 have the jurisdiction to make a ruling on the motion to 5 Perhaps the best way to handle the interest issue is just 
6 reconsider the interest issue after the appeal has 6 simply approach it as a -- I mean, I could say one of two 
7 already been filed? 7 things. I could say, look, this Court intended to 
8 MS. TAYLOR: Well, Your Honor, they have listed 8 address that issue and intended that the court order that 
9 the failure to grant prejudgment interest in the notice 9 I issued previously covered that particular issue. And 
10 of appeal. I would like to see the Court issue an order 1 0 the fact is, I denied it, in just -- in an abundance of 
11 denying the request for prejudgment inten:st, just so we 11 caution. 
12 don't get into a situation where the Supreme Court fmds 12 But it seems to me, if I were to come back 
13 that it isn't ripe for appeal -. 13 and say, you know, I denied it, but on second thought, 
14 THE COURT: Oh, I see. 14 I'm going to grant it. Then I might not ha.ve 
15 MS. TAYLOR: _. because there isn't a decision. 15 jurisdiction to do that. That's the way I would look at 
1 6 THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. ,And it could be. 16 it. 
1 7 I mean, I suppose that the Court -- the Court has limited 17 Do you see a what I mean? 
18 jurisdiction after an appeal has been filed. There are 18 MR. MAILE: I see your -- I see your logic. 
19 certain things the Court still has the jurisdiction to do 19 THE COURT: So I think what I'll do -- is there 
2 0 and certain things that the trial court can't do, 2 0 anything else that either of the parties want to bring 
2 1 obviously. 21 up? 
22 And it sounds like both parties are :;aying, 22 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I just had one brief 
23 that from your reading of the Court's memorandum decision 23 comment on the merits. 
24 and order that Mr. Maile is referring to, that I could 24 They have only argued for prejudgment 
2 5 have, at least, been clearer, or that perhaps mister -­ 25 interest under 28-22.104. Our' '"'. cites why those 
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1 sections don't apply in this case. 
2 On the Holiday vs. Lindsey case, that's the 
3 only Idaho case in which they address prejudgment 
4 interest in an unjust enrichment claim, which is where we 
5 are at this point. And in that case, what the -- I can't 
6 remember if it was the Supreme Court or the Court of 
7 Appeals -- but the Court held that in an unjust 
8 enrichment claim, the only way you can get prejudgment 
9 interest is if you can show that the money which was 
1 0 obtained wrongfully was invested, and lhat the defendant 
11 in that case had actually received intereBt on it, ifyou 
12 see what I mean. 
13 You can't get prejudgment inten:st in an 
14 unjust enrichment unless you show that the person who had 
15 the money actually received interest the:nselves. 
16 THE COURT: Oh, I see. 
17 MS. TAYLOR: Yeah. That's whal the Holiday 
1 8 case -- and there was no testimony, no evidence of any 
1 9 kind, in this case, that that occurred. So, under that 
2 0 case, they wouldn't be entitled to prejudgment interest. 
21 THE COURT: Let me look at that again. That was 
22 Judge Sticklin's case involving a fairly recent appellate 
2 3 decision. 
2 4 Do you remember -- of course you do, 
2 5 Mr. Maile, if it was Court of Appeals or Supreme Court? 
Page 428 
1 It must have been Supreme Court.
 
2 MR. MAILE: No. It was Court of Appeals.
 
3 THE COURT: It was Court of Appeals?
 
4 MR. MAILE: Judge Lansing.
 
5 THE COURT: Okay. I'll take a look at that one
 
6 again. Okay. I'll take a look.- Let me take this under
 
7 advisement, and I'll issue a written decision on both of
 
8 the issues, on the augmentation or objection to the
 
9 record, and then the jurisdictional issue of -- on the
 
1 0 interest, prejudgment interest issue, as well. And I 
11 will issue an opinion real quickly. 
12 MR. MAILE: Thank you, Judge. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, folks. The 
1 4 Court will be in recess. 
15 
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Summary Judgement, and provides: 
1. The Extend of Pleadings in Case Cv 2004-00473d Has No Bearing in the Present 
Matter. 
The defendant Connie Taylor's affidavit of April 1,2009, has attached the Idaho 
Repository printout from case CV 2004-00473D. The attachment serves no purpose for the 
court's considerations in the pending motions. The plaintiffs can not be held responsible for the 
defendants' action in committing a fraud upon the court and criminal acts some two years into 
the prior litigation. It was the action of the defendants which led to the court entering the 
"Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims" in July 2006. It was this act which gave rise to the 
damages sustained by the plaintiffs and the claims for relief which ripened upon the entry of the 
judgment. The record if anything established the breadth of the defendants' misconduct. 
2. The Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged a Legal Malpractice Claim Against the 
Defendant Attorneys. 
The defendant attorneys have briefed the point oflaw that there can be no claim oflegal 
malpractice against Clark & Feeney and their attorneys. The plaintiffs have properly alleged a 
count of negligence against the professional defendants. 
The claim of negligence against all the defendants did not accrual until there were 
damages which only resulted upon the entry of the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim". There 
was not any objective proof of actual damage until that occurred. See Fairway Development Co. 
v. Peterson, Moss, Olsen, Meacham & Carr, 124 Idaho 866, 865 P.2d 957 (1993); Chicoine v. 
Bignall, 122 Idaho 482,487,835 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992). To hold otherwise "would foment 
future litigation initiated on sheer surmise of potential damages in order to avoid the likely 
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consequence of seeing actions barred by limitations." City of Mccall V. Buxton 
(2009-10-0126.114); Mack Financial Corp. v. Smith, 111 Idaho 8, 12, 720 P.2d 191, 195 (1986). 
There is no allegation that the plaintiffs had any attorney-client relationship. To establish 
a claim for professional negligence, a claimant must show: (1) the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part ofthe lawyer; (3) the failure to perform that 
duty; and (4) the failure to perform the duty must be a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by 
the client. Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 526, 96 P.3d 623,627 (2004) (citing 
McColm-Traska v. Baker, 139 Idaho 948, 951, 88 P.3d 767, 770 (2004). 
In the present matter the plaintiffs claim among other things, the defendants were 
negligent in misrepresenting to the court their clients' status as beneficiaries under the trust, 
when in prior sworn pleadings and prior testimony it was established that the individual Taylors' 
mother was the sole beneficiary of the trust as a result of the Disclaimer Agreement. The 
attorneys prepared the documentation containing the perjured testimony, had previously prepared 
documents containing the true facts, filed pleadings asserting facts the attorneys knew were not 
true, and had participated in court proceedings establishing the true fact that the individual 
Taylors' mother was the sale beneficiary of the trust. 
The allegations of the amended complaint, allege conduct and an agreement between the 
defendants to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in an 
unlawful manner. Such a civil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief. The essence of a 
cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil wrong committed as the objective ofthe 
conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself. Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1PO 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 











(2007). Such wrongful conduct give rise to a number of civil remedies, to wit: (1) the defendants 
and their attorneys committed wrongful acts that are prohibited under the Idaho Racketeering 
Statue (Count Eleven); (2) the defendants committed acts that constitute abuse of process (Count 
Five); (3) the defendants committed a fraud upon the court (Count One); (4) the defendants 
committed wrongful conduct in filing a verified pleading which was diametrically opposite to an 
earlier verified pleading previously submitted by the defendants before another tribunal, 
requiring an imposition of a constructive trust (Count Two); (5) the defendants committed acts 
constituting negligence and/or gross negligence (Count Six and Eight); (6) the defendants 
committed acts which constitute equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel and/or judicial estoppel, 
(Counts Nine, Ten, and Twelve). 
The elements of negligence are well established: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) causation; and 
(4) damages. Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 526, 96 P.3d 623, 627 (2004). As a 
general rule, an attorney will be held liable for negligence only to his or her client and not to 
someone with whom the attorney does not have an attorney-client relationship. Harrigfeld v. 
Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,90 P.3d 884 (2004), Wick v. Eismann, 122 Idaho 698,838 P.2d 301 
(1992). Our Supreme Court has indicated that a claim can exist between a non-client and an 
attorney for a claim of negligence. See McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,395,64 P.3d 317, 
321 (2003). 
The wrongful conduct on the part of all the defendants is actionable by acting in unison to 
perpetuate a fraud upon the court and the commission of criminal behavior to accomplish an 
unlawful objective. Without their active misrepresentation the Honorable Judge Wilper would 
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not have ordered the property restored to the trust. Judge Wilper's Memorandum Decision and 
Order, on July 28,2005 (attached to the Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 2-Exhibit K), establishes 
that the trust could not rescind the transaction since the action of the trustee, Beth Rogers 
demonstrated the trust had waived its right to rescind the sales transaction. In addition, Judge 
Wilper had previously ruled that Berkshire Investment could pursue its claims for quasi and 
equitable estoppel and its claim oftortuous interference with contract claim (Judge Wilper's 
Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, on February 13, 2006 (attached to 
the Amended Affidavit In Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 14, 2008, Exhibit "B"). The 
trust could not have had the property restored as it waived that right to restore the real property to 
the trust. The trust was estopped from rescinding the sale transaction. The unlawful objective 
was committed by the defendants in having the property restored by misrepresenting their status 
as beneficiaries before the court in January 2006. By misrepresenting their status as beneficiaries 
the court restored the property to the trust. The plaintiffs were deprived by such actions of the 
defendants in putting forth their proof of damages as allowed by Judge Wilper and defending the 
monetary claims of the trust. As can be been seen from the transcript annexed to the Affidavit of 
Thomas Maile Part 5 and the testimony contained therein, the plaintiffs had legitimate issues and 
facts surrounding the claims of quasi estoppel, equitable estoppel, and tortuous interference of 
contract claims against any claims ofthe trust. The plaintiffs sustained damages as of July 21, 
2006 as a result of the entry ofthe "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". 
3. There Has Been No Determination on the Merits of the Defendants' Criminal 
Activity or the Fraudulent Representations. 
The plaintiffs raised the issue of the Taylors' standing in the prior ligation before the 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 












Idaho Supreme Court. The contention was simple, the Taylors and their counsel of record 
committed multiple criminal acts and committed fraud in representing their status as 
beneficiaries. When an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues 
raised, but upon the party who is seeking the relief See Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 
635,641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). Scona Inc. v. Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 286, 985 
P.2d 1145, 1148 (1999). The Supreme Court did not rule on the substantive issues ofthe fraud 
and misrepresentation of the Taylors and their counsel before the district court. The Idaho 
Supreme Court did not have to consider the same on its merits, since as the Supreme Court 
determined the Taylors had standing in case CV 2004-00473D reserved by an "interest in the 
litigation" as set forth in the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement" dated July 15, 
2004. The material misrepresentations and the criminal behavior committed by the defendants 
have not been considered on the merits. As stated, there are five factors required for collateral 
estoppel to bar re-litigation of an issue decided in an earlier proceeding: (1) the party against 
whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided 
in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented 
in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior 
litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party 
against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. Ticor 
Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. There has been no determination of the issues of 
fraud and criminal behavior of the defendants. There has been no determination on the merits of 
the defendants' fraud and criminal behavior. The plaintiffs had no claim for relief until they 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 





sustained damages, (entry of "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims"). There is no bar to the 
plaintiffs' claims based upon res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
The various claims of the plaintiffs must withstand summary judgment including the 
claims of negligence against the professional defendants. The defendants' motion to dismiss 
and/or their motions for summary judgment must be denied as to all counts as neither res judicata 
nor collateral estoppel apply to the present matter. 
DATED this 6th day of April, 2009. 
~E'N
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments, LLC 
and Colleen Birch-Maile 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of April, 2009, I served the foregoing (1) 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY DEFENDANTS AND IN RESPONSE TO 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, together with (2) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE PART 5 by 
having a true and complete copy personally delivered, by facsimile and/or by depositing the same 
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed as follows: 
Mark Stephen Prusynski (X) U. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 .() Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor (X) U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY () Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
THOMAS G. MA: LE, IV, TO Se and 
. Attorney for Berks . e estments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY DEFENDANTS - Pg 8 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
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P,O. Drawer 285 
Lewistonl Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 743-9516 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants 
John Taylor, Dallan Taylor 
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and the Theodore Johnson Trust 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, 




CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CON1~IE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE 1. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
Coun~ofAda ) 
AFFIDAVII OF HELEN TAYLOR 
Case No, CV OC 0723232 
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, . 
HELEN TAnOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years and make this affidavit from personal knowledge. 
2. I make this affidavit to reiterate and clarify my intentions as to the real property on Linder 
Road, Eagle, Idaho. 
3. This property was originally ovvned by my brother~ Theodore Johnson, then transferred 
into the Johnson Trust before being purchased by Ted Johnson's attorney, Thomas Maile IV, and 
his ~fe Colle~n. It was my intent and understanding that all actions taken.by my sons ~ohn, Dal~an!. 
and Reed in relation to the lawsuits trying to recover that property were done on behalf of all the 
beneficiaries, including myself. 
When other members of the family decided they did not want to be involved in the lawsuit', 
all the beneficiaries except my children and I dtsclaimed their interest in the lawsuit against Maile, 
All of the Taylor beneficiaries reserved the right to pursue that lawsuit. My children did ask that the 
trustee's attorney include a provision which would allow my share of the cash in the trust to be 
distributed to me, as all the other sisters has already been paid. 
It has always been and remains my understanding and intentionthat the tenns ofmy brother's 
trust will be followed as to the Linder Road property. Under that Trust Agreement, I am entitled to 
inc'orne-from thai properly formyilfe, ancrupon myaeathtneproperty -wi1l1,-ass-to· my-slxcniIareii,-"-'-~--' 
in equal shares. This was the understanding at the time of the signing ofthe Disclaimer Agreement, 
and has remained my understanding and intent through all proceedings in this matter. 
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Dated this 12 day of October, 2008. 
Helen Taylor (I 
-till
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J5 day of Octo er, 2008. ,... ,.,;.,. " .. ~ 
tary Public i for the State ofIdaho. 
Residing at wdls ;;'~(J LJuJtoh therein. 
Mycommission expIres :-- '0sZ J'L!5.at y' -,'.- " , , 
." 
! " .... rh • 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 1IJ Il' ,IHEREBYCERTIFYthatonthe~_ dayof!Yt.l...L.. ,2/11)(1 I caused to 
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV o U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street o Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, ID 83616 o Overnight Mail
 
~ Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mark Prosynski o U.S. Mail
 
MOFFATT THOMAS o Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor o Overnight Mail
 




CODIlle W. Taylor 
Attorney for Defendants 
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ORIGINAL 
CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P,O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston) Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 743-9516 
ISBA No, 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants 
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor 
and the Theodore Johnson Trust 
NO. 1500 P, (i
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT OF T:AE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and mOMAS G. MAILE, IV, 




CON~NIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkJa CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLANTAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE 1. JO~HNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RlOHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants_ 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
Case No. CV OC 07 23232 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIr 
OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 
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1 
CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state ofldaho and a member of 
Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor and Theodore Johnson 
Trust in the above entitled matter. The information contained herein is of my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of R. John 
Taylor Re: Defendants' Motion to Compel Payment of judgment filed in the Taylor v. Maile case 
Ada County Case No. CV DC 04 00473D. 





SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this '7111 day of April, 2009.
 
Notary Public ~an? for the State of Idaho. 
Residing at (l.,tfJiSJn1 therein. 
My commission expires: d:5I5k /2-61;/ 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR 2 
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CLARK AND FEENEY 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the r-rMday ofApril, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addtessed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, lV o U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street o Hand Delivered
 
Eagle,ID 83616 D Overnight Mail
 
~ Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939~1001 
Mark Prnsynski o U.S. Mail
 
MOFFATT THOMAS o Hand Delivered
 
10I S Capitol Blvd., 101h Floor o Overnight Mail
 




Connie W. Taylor 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
ISB No. 4837 
IN TIm DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO~ IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLANTAYLOR, ) Case No. CV OC 0400473D 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 
YS. ) Re: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
) COMPEL PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN ) 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS ) 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, ) 
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THOMAS MAlLE, IV and COLLEEN, )
 
MAILE, husband and wife, and )
 







AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR	 1 
001262




















- -----~ - -- - - ----~)
 
 






















































STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 58. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
R. JOHN TAYLORl being fust duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years and make this Affidavit from personal knowledge. 
2, After this Court's May 15,2006 order granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, 
contacted a banker and received preliminary approval for a mortgage on the property for $400,000. 
The Trust also had a pending offer to purchase the property for $1,800,000.00 as soon as the litigation 
was finished. We would have been able to return the purchase price to him promptly ifthis matter had 
not been appealed. 
3, On May 18, 2006, Mr. Maile recorded a Lis Pendens against the Linder Road property 
with the Ada County Recorder's office. 
4. After 1v1r. Maile appealed the order returning the property to the Trust, the prospective 
purchaser ofthe property withdrew his $1,800,000.00 offer because he was not willing to wait for the 
appeal to be resolved. 
S. On March 25, 2008, Mr. Maile recorded a new Lis Pendens against the Linder Road 
property after filing a lawsuit against all the Plaintiffs and their attorneys in this matter. 
4, After receiving the Supreme Court's opinion affirming that Judgment on January 30, 2009, 
I again contacted the banker. I was advised that they are not able or willing to lend any money on the 
property \U1til the Lis Pendens is removed, We have been approached by several parties interest~' 
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Tele ! py (FAX) 
•
Conme W. Taylor 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 





















































SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J!f. day of February, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERYIC"E{ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the )~q day ofFebruary, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of this docwnent by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas Maile ~ U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law o Hand Delivered 
380W. State o 
Eagle, ill 83616 o 
'-= 
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Nok). Public ilJ~d for the State of Idaho, 
Residing at UU)/ r 1 therein. 
My commission expires: ...,;{j!!!....L.4"'7~4-J.c:..I.:.I-=F_ 
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John Taylor, Dallan Taylor
 
and the Theodore Johnson Tmst
 
NO. 1506 P.2/9 
: : FH3.M_~-'f-
APR 0·8 '2009 
J DAVID NAVARRO, 
• By DARLENE BOVIN 
~",l'Il.I'· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESlMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
Defendants Jo1m Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and the Theodore Johnson Trus4 (referred 10
 
collectively as "Taylors") by and through their attorney of record, submit this memorandwn in
 
opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' counterclaims.
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8.2009 2:47PM Cl6QK &FEENEY ATTY NO, 1506 P,3/9 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
This is a second lawsuit relating to attorney Thomas Maile's purchase of40 acres ofland on 
Linder Road in Eagle, Idaho, from his tenninally ill client for $400,000, Mr. Maile filed this action 
while an appeal was pending in the initial suit, Taylor v. Maile, Ada County Case. No. CV OC 04­
00473D. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 8, 2008, and an amended Motion to Dismiss 
and/or for Summary Judgment on October 10, 2008. The motions have two bases: first, there is 
another action pending bet\.veen these Plaintiffs and the Johnson TrustJTaylors as beneficiaries; and 
second, that the present case is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
On January 30, 2009 the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in Taylor v. Maile. The 
Supreme Court once again held that the Taylors had standing to pursue the suit against Maile, and 
affirmed the judgment which quieted title to the Linder Road land in the name ofthe Johnson Trust. 
As a result of that ruling, the Taylors and the Johnson Trust filed an Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim onFebruary 17,2009, asserting claims for slander oftitle, abuse ofprocess, intentional 
interference with a prospective economic advantage, and seeking an award of fees and costs. Mr. 
Prusynski filed a mirroring Amended Answer and Counterclaim on behalfof the defendants Clark 
and Feeney, Connie Taylor, and Paul Thomas Clark on March 12, 2009. 
lV1r, Maile fIled his Motion for Swnmary Judgment regarding the counterclaims on March 
17 l 2009, asserting that "the claims set forth in all of the defendants' counterclaim [sic] are barred 
as a matter of law, and there are no material factual issues in dispute." 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
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~-
ARGUMENT 
The Defendants' counterclaims are based on the assertion that the Mailes' claims are totally 
barred by the doctrine ofres judicata. Mr. Maile argues that it is entirely appropriate for him to file 
this second lawsuit attempting to regain title to the Linder Road property, while the Taylors claim 
that seeking to relitigate these issues is wrongful, has no basis in either law or fact, and is beillg done 
for the purposes of harassment and to delay and increase the cost of litigation. Because the 
this point for Maile to seek swnmary judgment. 
2. There are genuine issues of material fact 
The overriding issue of material fact in regard to the counterclaims is whether the current 
action is frivolous because it is barred by the doctrine oires judicata, Now that the Idaho Supreme 
Court has issued its ruling, the doctrine oflaw ofthe case also applies. There is a genuine issue of 
fact as to whether Maile has a colorable claim to o'WUership ofthe Linder Road property, or whether 
this laWSuit was fLIed merely out ofmalice and for purposes of harassment. 
A. Slander of title. The Plaintiffs argue that the filing of a lis pendens can not 
support a slander oftitle claim, because it is merely notice that a lawsuit is pending. TIlat argwnent,. 
however, is overly simplistic; a lis pendens may be found to be a slanderoftitle when there has been 
a detennination that the party who recorded it did nothave a colorable claim. to 0'"nership in the real 
property. See, for example, the follov.,ring cases: 
(1) Hewitt v. Rice, 154 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2007). There are several alternative 
avenues ofreliefin the case ofa wrongful lis pendens filing, including a claim for abuse ofprocess; 
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~--" 
the wrongful filing of a lis pendens can also be remedied through actions claiming slander of title 
and intentional intetference with contractual relationship. 
(2) Bricknerv. OneLandDeve/opmentCo., 742N.W.2d706(Minn.Ct.App. 
2007). Filing adocument concerning ovmership of real estate known to be inoperative constitutes 
a false statement for pw-poses of a slander of title claim. 
(3) PondPlace Parmers, Inc. v. Poole, 351 S,C. 1,567 S,E.2d881 (Ct. App. 
2002). The wrongfully recording ofan unfounded claim against the property ofanother generally 
is actionable as slander oftitle. 
(4) Ross v. Specialty Risk Consultants, Inc., 621 N.W.2d 669 (Wis. App. 
2000). There is a cause of action for slander oftitle if a false, sham, or frivolous lis pendens is 
filed. 
(5) Exparte Boykin, 656 So.2d 821 (Ala. App. 1994). One who places lis 
pendens notice on property without a colorable claim of right to or interest in the teal property 
subjects themselves to a claim for slander oftitle. 
(6) Coventry Homes, Inc. v. ScottscomPartnership, 745P.2d 962 (Ariz. App. 
Div.l,1987). Notice of lis pendens was sUbject to real property statute, which would render tlul 
person asserting a groundless interest in real property liable for damages. 
(7) Miceli v. Gilmac Developers, Inc., 467 So.2d 404 (Fla. App.2. 
Dist.,1985). An intentional, wrongful filing of notice of lis pendens will support an action for 
slander oftitle. 
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(8) Shenefield v. Axtell, 274 Or. 279, 545 P.2d 876 (1976). Complaint for
 
slander of title stated a cause ofaction where it alleged the defendant maintained on county records
 
claim oftitle to land he held in trust for plaintiff. The claim that plaintiffs had buyers ready, willing
 
and able to purchase the property but that they were unable to sell property to them because of
 
defendant's recorded claim. was a sufficiently specific allegation of special damages.
 
There is also a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to whether Mr. Mailes' filing ofthis lawsuit 
and the associated lis pendens was malicious. Because he is licensed as both areal estate broker and 
an attorney, he must be held to lIDderstand the impact ofplacing a cloud on the title, as well as the 
legal doctrines ofres judicata and the law ofthe case. A number of courts have taken the view that 
the malice or bad faith necessary to support an action for slander of title based upon wrongful 
recordation may be implied from the lack of fOlmdation for the claim recorded, in the absence of 
countervailing evidence affirmatively establishing the defendant's good faith. Malice merely means 
lack of legal justification and is presumed if the disparagement is false, caused damage, and is not 
privileged. Gates v. Utsey, 177 So. 2d 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1965) See also Fountain v. 
Mojo, 687 P.2d 496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (property owner's title was slandered by recording of lis 
pendens, in lawsuit agreement for breach ofpurchase where malice ofpurchaser, an attorn?)'., was 
shown by recording of lis pendens, in action for damages only, p\.lIchaser refused to release lis 
pendens until return ofearnest money and deposit offunds in escroW by owner, and where owner's 
attorney's fees in removing lis pendens constituted special damages); Contra Costa County Title Co. 
v. Waloff, 184 Cal. App. 2d 59, 7 CaL Rptr. 358 (1st Dist. 1960) (On evidence that documents
 
clouding title were filed in attempt to pressure seller into consenting to modification or rescission
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8, 2009 2: 48PM CI ~~K & FEE~IEY ATTY NO. 1506 P. 7/9 
ofcontract, where it appeared that buyer was experienced in legal and real estate matters and had 
threatened suit in attempt to coerce seller, malice was properly found.) 
There are genuine issues of material fact on the cOl.U1terclaim for slander of title which 
preclude summary judgment. 
B. Abuse of process 
The Defendants have alleged (and the Plaintiffs have denied) that the Plaintiffs have 
affinnativelyused alegal process (this second lawsuit) primarily to accomplish an improper purpose 
outside of simply gaining an advantage in the underlying litigation for which the process was not 
designed (i.e. keeping the real property tied up beyond the time of the appeal of his loss in Taylor 
v. Maile). The Affidavit of John Taylor filed in the Taylor v. Maile case (attached as an Exhibit 
to Affidavit of COlUlie W. Taylor in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Counterclaims) shows that the Taylors have lost an opportunity to sell the property for $1.8 million, 
and have lost additional opportunities to sell the property because of this litigation. There is a 
genuine issue as to whether filing this second action was a "misuse ofthe process," a fact which will 
be decided when this court rules on the Defendants' pending motions and request for sanctions under 
Rule II. 
C. Intentional Interference with a prospective economic advantage. 
There are also genuine issues of material fact as to the counterclaim for intentional 
interference with a prospective economic advantage. 
The elements of the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage 
are as follows: 1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; 2) lmowledge of the expectancy 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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on the part ofthe interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing texmination ofthe expectancy; (4) 
the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that 
the defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper means) and (5) resulting damage to 
the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted. Idaho First National Bank v, Bliss Valley 
Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 284-85,824 P.2d 841,859-60 (1991). 
The trial court rulings in Taylor v. Maile, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, establish the 
validity ofthe Taylors' ownership ofthe land, and it cannot be questioned that Mr. Maile has been 
painfully aware of these rulings and has intentionally prevented the Taylors from selling the land. 
The Defendant Clark and Feeney also has an o'Wllership interest in the land by virtue of their 
contingent fee agreement. The Affidavit of John Taylor referred to in the preceding paragraph 
shows that the Taylors have been damaged through the lost opportunities to sell the property because 
ofthis litigation. The Taylors have alleged that Mr. Maile's interference is for an improper purpose 
and through improper means - wrongfully filing a second lawsuit in an effort to relitigate issues 
which he has already raised repeatedly and lost on, repeatedly. As an attorney. he must be held to 
the highest ethical standards, and required to comply with Rule 11, which requires that pleadings be 
filed only when they are well grounded in fact. warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
fot the extension, modification, Or reversal of existing law, and not interposed for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass 01' to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost oflitigation. 
The question ofwhether there is any merit whatsoever to this lawsuit creates an issue offact 
which precludes summary judgment on this counterclaim. 
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For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and the Theodore 
Johnson Trust respectfully request that this court deny the Plaintiffs' motion for summaryjudgment 
on the Defendants' counterclaims. 
Q1~1 
DATED this...ll..- day ofApril, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
(?,tn
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -C:L- day ofApril, 2009 I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing docwnent by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV o U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street o Hand Delivered
 
Eagle,ID 83616 D Overnight Mail
 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
 ~ 
Mark Prusynski o U.S. Mail
 
MOFFATT THOMAS o Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10lb Floor o Ovem' '1
 
POBox 829 T copy (F ) (208) 385-5384
~ Boise, ID 83701
 
,( 
Co ,'e W, Taylor 
Attorney for Defendants 
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COJ'J']~IE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 743-9516 
ISBA No, 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants 
John Taylor, Dallan Taylor 
and the Theodore Jolmson Trost 
NO, 1507 P. 7/12 
NO'__-""'C:":~-rt",....,..h­
A.M ~M''---'''.:..e.4I-_ 
APR 08 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
,'3y DARLENE SOVINI" 
IJEP'/T" 
IN TIm DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF mE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE:INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAlLE, IV, 




CONNIE WRlGHT TAYLOR, flk/a CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLANTAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T, CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE 1. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RlGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County ofNez Perce ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
Case No, CV OC 07 23232 
AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR IN 
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CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1, I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state ofldaho and a member of 
Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants JOM Taylor, DaHan Taylor and Theodore Johnson 
Trust in the above entitled matter. The information contained herein is of my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of the Affidavit ofR. John 
Taylor Re: Defendants' Motion to Compel Payment ofJudgment filed in the Taylor v. Maile case 
Ada County Case No. CV DC 04 00473D. 
DATED this --.i!!:.. day ofApril, 2009. 
Co e aylor 
7
 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Lf Aday ofApril, 2009. 
.....-.,._..-...~ /"f 
! fl!)114KA ( t"all( ) 
Notary Public 'n and for the State ofIdaho. 
Residing at I therein. 
My commission expires: d3 01.1" 'Z, , 
AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR 2
 
LAW OFFICE:5 OF' 

























































































CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day ofApril, 2009J I caused to be served atrue and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile~ IV
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston~ Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
ISB No. 4837 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, ) 






THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN ) 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS ) 
MAJLEREAL ESTATE COMPANY, ) 












THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN, ) 
MAILE) husband and wife, and ) 
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AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 
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IJ,W OFf"II:E:5 OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 





































































COWlty ofNez Perce )
 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 18 years and make tms Affidavit from personal knowledge, 
2. After this Court's May 15,2006 order granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, 
contacted a banker and received preliminary approval for a mortgage on the property for $400,000. 
The Trost also had apending offer to purchase the property for $1,800,000.00 as soon as the litigation 
was finished, We would have been able to return the purchase price to him promptly ifthis matter had 
Dot been appealed. 
3. On May 18,2006, Mr. Maile recorded a Lis Pendens against the Linder Road property 
with the Ada County Recorder's office. 
4, After Mr. Maile appealed the order returning the property to the Trost, the prospective 
purchaser ofthe property withdrew his $1,800,000.00 offer because he was not willing to wait for the 
appeal to be resolved. 
S. On March 25~ 2008, Mr. Maile recorded a new Lis Pendens against the Linder Road 
property after filing a lawsuit against all the Plaintiffs and their attorneys in this matter. 
4. Afterreceiving the Supreme Court's opinion affinning that Judgment on January 30, 2009, 
I again contacted the banker. 1was advised that they are not able or willing to lend any money on the 
property until the Lis Pendens is removed. We have been approached by several parties interes4 
in making an offer on the property~ but have ~ot rec~ived any finn offers because of the pending 
litigation. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of February, 2009. 
No~ary Public iUand for the State of Idaho. 
Residing at U,IiJli[} 1 therein. 
My commission expires: u75!G&/' 2tJi '-/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the (.;Y day ofFebruary, 2009. I caused to be served a tIUe 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 743-9516 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants 
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor 
and the Theodore Johnson Trust 
1m 1507 P. 2/'2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTNIENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, andTHOMAS G. MAILE,IV, 




CONNlE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/klaCONNIE 
TA YT nR. 'all inrlhrinll'al; n~ TT ~l\TT~ YT Ill? 
i;Ul Iml1v1l1ul;Il; CLAltK lUll! rt~~Ne"r", 11 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE 1. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) S6. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
TIIIRD SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
Case No. CV OC 07 23232 
THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
CONNIE W. TAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 
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8.2009 2: 43PM CIAQK & FEENEY ATTY NO, 1507 P. 3/12 
CONNIE TAYLOR} being first dilly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney dUly licensed to practice law within the state ofIdaho and a member (If 
Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor and Theodore Johnson 
Trust in the above entitled matter. The infonnation contained herein is of my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of the Motion for Order 
Compelling Payment ofSums Due and Owing and Interest filed by Mr, Maile in the Taylor v. Maile 
case Ada County Case No. CV OC 04 00473D. 
DATED this ~ day of April, 2009. 
'onnie Taylor 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 6th day of April, 2009. 
, _-,/ ,rf 
I«tlilLi' It( Lf"'UfLU 
Notary Public' and for the State of Idaho. 
Residing at /, 
I 
therein. 
My commission expires: 
THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day ofApril, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV o U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street o Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, ID 83616 o Overnight Mail
 
~\ Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mark Prusynski o U,S, Mail 
MOFFATT THOMAS D Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor o Overnight Mail
 
PO Box 829 r Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385~5384
 
Boise) 1D 83701 
annie W. Taylor 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Telephone; (20~l939-1.O00 
Pacsimile: (20Sy'939--1001 : . 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorney for DefendiRts~Counte~,.paimants 
IN m DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR; DALLAN TAYLOR, and 
R. JOI-IN TAYLQR~ \ 
,Plaintiffs/Coun~J:'-Defendants, 
,v. 
'" .' ·':;i.': r • 'II I•• ', 
THOMAS:MA:TiEj IV and COLLEEN 
MAlLEl.hu,sband and, wife, maMAs 
MAttE ~ esTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LtC, 
• • I I " 
DcfetidiU1tS/Counter-Claima~ts , 
. .".". ., ,", , [. 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUS~ , . 
PlaintifilCouJ1ter":defett~an.t" ,
't' j ~. .' .' • 
v. 
moMAS·iMt\tu:;'tV a~d COliiEN 
MA:lLE, 'huspapd' an~ wife, and BERKSHIRE 
lNVEStMENrS; ac. 
. ~. '. ~ .;': ~ ." . .' . 
DefriiidintS/GounteI-cl,~im~l1ts. 
• • " I "., I 
Case No. CV OC 04..Q0473D 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
COMPELLING lJAVMENT OF 
SUMS DUE AND OWING AND 
INTEREST 
the i:;~fe~datJtrj&~~ter~C]aimants,Thottlas Maile, Colleen Maile, and Berkshire 
Investments, Lie., by and throll~h their attorney, Thomas G. Maile, TV, and moves this 
• ~ , , I • 
, " ..,' .~. :. . ! ,; : I ". I' 
MOTION FOR ORnER COMPELLtN'G PAYMENT OF SUMS DUE AND OWING AND 
INTEREST .:~~p.l, " . .' ' '. 
EXHIBIT 
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"" . 
HOnota~l~:Coutl: for the entry ofan Order CQtllpelling the plaintiffs to pay the sums due and 
" ., " , 
owing putsu'antl:O the'tet1ns aM '~onditions imp<?sed by th~ courl, as of July 21, 2006, together 
with interest theteon until paid if! fl111. .. "
 
This Motion is-made pUri:;ti~nt I,A.R. Rule 13(1))(10) (13), and Idaho Code 28-22-104,
 
together W'ith tne Affidavit ~f Th~~~s' Maile in support of the Motion, tbe Mem~randum Brief in 
.. ', I,. I I' 
Support of Moti,on for Order Compelling Payment of Sums Due aDd Owing and Interest, filed 
concurrently herewi.th together with' tht ,~cc:ord and 'Ji]e herein. 
OltAL AROUMENT IS REQUESTED UPON THE MOTION. 
riAtEth,his J1 day QfFebru~ry, 20 9. 
. ' 
• I '.J ;: 1 1 •' 'f • ":'~'~ 
,IV., Pro Se, 
" 
ants/Counter-Claimants. , .. 
, CERTIFICATEOFSERVICE 
" "~' .~ \ 
I Im~13r ~~pFY 111~t on, ~bis t1day of.February) 2009 t I caused a tl1le md correct 
coPy of the foregOirtg(1) ~OnON FOR O~gR COMPELLING PAYMENT OF SUMS nDE 
AND OWlNG AND INTEREST, (;Z) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOnON 
FOR ORDER' COMPELLING rAYMENT OF SUMs DTJ'E AND OWING AND INTEREST, 
(3) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAlLE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ORDER 
COMPEtt~G PAYMEm oj"",~l :rt1~ DUE AND oWiNG AND lNT.6REST and (4) NOTICE 
OF HijA:R~G, to ttc (leJivered, add;'~~:M~~!l:~ follows: . 
Connic'~:,T~YI~r' () V, S. Majl
 
CLARK and F'EBNBY' '" ;' ' (X) Facsimill; Transmission
 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery
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APR 082009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By E. HOLMES 
DEPUTY 
Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349 
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
msp@moffatt.com 
17136.0306 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka 
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH nmICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, ika CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK. and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
JOINDER 
JOINDER-l Client 1184783.1 
001284
A .. -- ----.A~~~D,-t5 ·-- -_____ 
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)4/08/2009 16:37 FAX 2083855~Q4 1 MOFFATI THOMAS 141003/004-
COMES NOW the Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark 
and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark, and join in the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion 
For Summary Judgment on Counterclaims filed by Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor and 
the Theodore Johnson Trust, on the grounds stated in said defendants' motion, memorandum of 
law and affidavits. 
DATED this 8th day of April, 2009. 
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK & 
os, CHARTERED 
arry C. Hun r - Ofthe Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright 
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of April, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing JOINDER to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 W. State St. ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ill 83616-4902 ( x ) Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Connie W. Taylor ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 ( ) Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 285 ( x ) Facsimile 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285 
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P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 743-9516 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants John Taylor 
Dallan Taylor and the Johnson Trust 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, Case No. CV OC 0723232
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CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
Defendants John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and the Theodore Johnson Trust, by and through 
their attorney of record, submit this responsive memorandum in support of their motion asking that 
this Court enter an order dismissing this action in its entirety and seeking an Order for Rule 11 
Sanctions for the filing of this frivolous lawsuit. 
I. UPDATE OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Since the Defendants filed their Memorandum in support of Motion to Dismiss and/or 
Motion for Summary Judgment in October 2008, the following events have occurred in Taylor v. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -1­
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Maile, Ada County Case CV OC 04-00473D, which is the action that has been pending since 2004
 
between these Plaintiffs and the Johnson Trust and its beneficiaries:
 
1. On January 30, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in the latest appeal
 
of Taylor v. Maile (2009-ID-0202.l67). For the sake of clarity, that opinion will be referred to as
 
Taylor II In that opinion, the Supreme Court ruled, again, that the Taylors had standing to bring
 
an action against Mr. Maile and his LLC. The Court ruled that the Disclaimer, Release and
 
Indemnity Agreement had specifically reserved the Taylors' ownership interest in the lawsuit against
 
the Mailes, and that summary judgment against the Mailes was proper. I I have attached a copy of
 
the Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement hereto as Exhibit A for convenience of the court. 
2. On February 17, 2009, Mr. Maile filed a Motion for Entry of Order Compelling 
Payment of Sums Due and Owing and Interest in Taylor v. Maile - i.e., seeking to enforce the very 
judgment that he claims in the present action should be set aside.2 That Motion was argued on 
April 6, 2009. Judge Wilper denied the motion, ruling from the bench that the Taylors have no duty 
to return the purchase price to Mailes as long as there are lis pendens which make the property 
unmarketable. Judge Wilper will be issuing a written opinion which we will forward to this court 
as soon as we receive it. 
II. ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiffs' filings in response to this motion give this Court a small taste of the last five 
years of litigation in Taylor v. Maile. 3 Fortunately, it is not necessary for this Court to determine 
I A copy of that opinion was attached to the Affidavit of Connie W. Taylor dated February 5, 2009. 
2
 A copy of that motion is filed as Exhibit A to the Third Supplemental Affidavit of Connie W. Taylor 
dated April 8,2009. 
3
 See Idaho Repository attached to Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel dated April 1,2009. 
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whether there is any merit to the multitude ofclaims filed by the Plaintiffs. Mr. Mailes' own filings 
abundantly illustrate that every fact raised in this current action either was or could have been raised 
in Taylor v. Maile. 
A.	 There is no factual basis for the claims of misrepresentation or fraud on the 
court in Taylor v. Maile 
The Mailes' lawsuit seeks an order setting aside the judgments entered by the trial court and 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Taylor II. The lawsuit is based on two allegations: 
•	 The Taylors (through their attorneys) misrepresented their status as beneficiaries 
when they filed their Amended Complaint in Taylor v. Maile on March 2, 2006.. and 
•	 The Taylors (through their attorneys) wrongfully filed an action on behalf of the
 
Trust before they had been formally appointed as trustees. 4
 
1. Amended Complaint. In support of the assertion that the Taylors misrepresented their
 
status as beneficiaries when they filed their Amended Complaint, Maile points to a single line in a
 
single document - a Petition for Appointment of Trustees in the Johnson Trust filed on November
 
15, 2004 in Ada County Case No. SP OT 0400874M. A copy of that petition (without the
 
attachments referred to therein) was attached to the Mailes' Amended Complaint filed in this case
 
on March 25, 2008. That petition contained a typographical error; it stated that Helen Taylor was
 
"the sole remaining beneficiary ofthe Theodore Johnson Trust by virtue ofthe terms ofa Disclaimer,
 
Release and Indemnity Agreement," when it should have stated that she was the sole remaining
 
direct beneficiary. As the Supreme Court ruled in Taylor II, under the language ofthe Disclaimer
 
4
 As a result of the order granting the motion for summary judgment in the beneficiaries' lawsuit, no 
judgment was ever entered in the lawsuit filed by the Johnson Trust. Any claims relating to that complaint are 
therefore moot, but will be addressed nonetheless for the sake of providing a thorough response to the Plaintiffs' 
claims. 
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Agreement, all ofthe Taylors had reserved the right to pursue the lawsuit against the Mailes and their 
LLC. 
What Mr. Maile has consistently failed to address is the fact that the typographical error was 
corrected in an Amended Petition filed with the probate court on April 19,2005.5 That document 
clarified the fact that Helen Taylor's children were beneficiaries of the Johnson Trust. The 
Amended Complaint filed nearly eleven months later in Taylor v. Maile correctly stated that the 
Taylors were beneficiaries of the Trust, a fact which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
There was no misrepresentation, no fraud on the court, no crime, no conspiracy, no theft, and no 
negligence. 
2. Johnson Trust Complaint. There was no misrepresentation or fraud on the 
court relating to that Complaint. In the Disclaimer Agreement, all of the beneficiaries agreed that 
the successor trustees would resign and the Taylors would take over as Trustees of the Johnson 
Trust. When Mr. Maile pointed out the need for court approval, the Taylors sought formal 
appointment and it was granted over Mr. Maile's objection.6 
B. Mailes unsuccessfully raised these same issues in Taylor v. Maile 
In his appeal of the trial court's order granting summary judgment, Mr. Maile has already 
unsuccessfully argued these same issues.7 
He argued that the initial petition filed in the probate court constituted a judicial admission 
5 A copy of the Amended Petition is included as part of Exhibit T to the Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 
Three dated December 3 I, 2008. 
. 6 Defendants ask that this Court take judicial notice of the court file in Ada County Case. No. SP OT 
0400874M 
7 See Appellants' briefing attached as Exhibits X and Y to the Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Four.
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that Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary of the Johnson Trust and that the Taylors had 
misrepresented their status to the lower court.8 A copy of the initial Petition was attached as an 
exhibit to that brief, which was dated November 14, 2007. In the appeal, just as in the present 
action, Mr. Maile did not acknowledge or discuss the fact that the petition had been amended long 
before the Taylor beneficiaries filed the Amended Complaint which he claims was a 
misrepresentation and fraud on the court. In his reply brief in Taylor v. Maile Il, Mr. Maile argued 
that the filing ofthe Amended Complaint constituted a violation ofthe Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct, specifically stating "The Taylors, and Mrs. Taylor as their attorney, verified statements of 
fact under oath that were misleading to the court and to this tribunal."g 
Maile also argued unsuccessfully on appeal that the trial court had erred when it allowed the 
Taylors to amend the Trust's complaint after their formal appointment as trustees, and ruled that the 
amendment related back to the time of the initial complaint. 10 
c. This action is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion 
The undisputed facts set forth above show that not only is there another action pending 
between the same parties, that action arises from the same set of operative facts and has already 
addressed the issues which the Plaintiffs claim support this lawsuit. 
As noted in our prior memorandum, the elements of claim preclusion are: (1) same parties; 
(2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 
See pages 7 - 10 of Appellants' Reply brief (Exhibit Y to Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Four). 
9 See Exhibit Y, Appellants' Reply Brief, pages 34-36. 
10 See pages 35-36 of Appellants' Opening Brief(Exhibit X to Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Four) 
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Same parties. Claim preclusion bars the presentation of the claim in a subsequent lawsuit 
between the same parties or their privies. Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir and 
Canal Co., 123 Idaho 634, 637,851 P.2d 348, 351 (1993). This suit involves the same parties as 
Taylor v. Maile, with the exception ofMr. Maile's addition of the Taylors' attorneys and their law 
firm. The law firm defendants appear by virtue of their activities as representatives of the Taylors, 
which has been held to create privity. 
The application of claim preclusion to attorneys for a party was addressed in Simpson v. 
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 693 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 2005). The Simpsons had sought a new trial 
of their products liability claim. After the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of that 
motion, they brought a second action against the tool maker, and also named the tool maker's 
attorneys as parties under the premise that the defendants had failed to produce all ofthe surveillance 
tapes that Simpson was entitled to receive via discovery. The trial court granted defendants 
summary judgment and awarded sanctions against Simpsons. The North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed both the summary judgment and the sanctions, specifically finding as follows: 
The only difference between this case and Simpson is the addition of Chicago 
Pneumatic's attorneys as defendants and the alternative theories pled to justify 
recovery... , Here, the alleged wrongful conduct of the defendants involves the 
attorneys' response on behalf of their client to discovery requests and orders. Under 
these circumstances, privity exists between Chicago Pneumatic and its attorneys in 
the underlying action for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See, e.g., 
Geringer v. Union Elec. Co., 731 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Mo.App.1987) (law firm which 
represented client in underlying action was in privity with client in the prior 
adjudication and could assert collateral estoppel as bar to relitigation of issue 
resolved in previous lawsuit); Merchants State Bank v. Light, 458 N.W.2d 792, 794 
(S.D.1990) (lawyer who prosecuted and directed prior litigation was in privity with 
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client for purposes of res judicata); 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 691 (1995), and cases 
collected therein. 
Simpson, 693 N.W.2d at 617. A similar result was reached in the following cases: 
1. Jayel Corp. v. Cochran, 234 S.W.3d 278,283 (Ark. 2006) (holding that attorney-client 
relationship is sufficient to establish privity for purposes of res judicata analysis) 
2. Chaara v. Lander, 132 N.M. 175,45 P.3d 895 (Ct.App.2002) (holding that wife's divorce 
attorney was in privity with wife, thus res judicata barred husband's subsequent suit against 
attorney). 
3. In re EI San Juan Hotel Corp., 841 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.1988) (holding that trustee's attorney 
was in privity with trustee, thus res judicata barred a subsequent action against attorney accused of 
facilitating a wrongdoing); 
4. Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1235 n. 6 (7th Cir.1986) (holding that 
res judicata barred suit against bank's attorneys for alleged misconduct in prior lawsuit) 
Same claim. As discussed in paragraph n.B above, all of the Plaintiffs' claims in this case 
stem from the allegation that the Taylors and their attorneys misrepresented the Taylors' status as 
beneficiaries and Trustees ofthe Johnson Trust. Those issues were raised unsuccessfully in Taylor 
11, and claim preclusion bars the Plaintiffs from using those same allegations as a springboard for 
their claims in this case. Other than the legal negligence allegations, the present claims are largely 
identical to their counterclaims in Taylor v. Maile. 
A. In this case, Mailes have alleged the following causes of action: 
1.	 Quiet title, seeking return of the title to the Linder Road property to 
Berkshire Investments 
2.	 Constructive Trust 
3.	 Tortiuous [sic] Interference with Contract 
4.	 Tortiuous [sic] Interference of Prospective Economic Advantage 
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5.	 Abuse of Process 
6.	 Legal negligence of Connie Taylor and Tom Clark 
7.	 Legal negligence per se of attorneys Connie Taylor and Tom Clark 
8.	 Gross Negligence of attorneys Connie Taylor and Tom Clark 
9.	 Equitable estoppel 
10.	 Quasi estoppel 
11.	 Civil Racketeering action based on allegations of a conspiracy 
between Clark and Feeney and the Taylors/Johnson trust to commit 
theft, perjury, and obtaining property by false pretense 
12.	 Judicial Estoppel 
B. In Taylor v. Maile, the Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaims dated March 
17, 2005 11 contained the following: 
1.	 Affirmative defenses: 
a.	 Failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted 
b.	 Venue proper in Canyon County (based on the Ernest [sic] Money 
agreement which was attached as an exhibit) 
c.	 Plaintiffs not real parties in interest 
d.	 Mandatory binding arbitration under the Earnest Money Agreement 
e.	 No jury trial available under terms of Eamest Money Agreement 
f.	 Lack of Consideration 
g.	 Lack of contractual privity 
h.	 "Latches" [sic] 
1.	 Equitable estoppel and/or Quasi-estoppel 
j.	 Failure to mitigate 
k.	 Unclean Hands 
II Exhibit A to Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 14, 2008 
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1.	 Release and Reconveyance 
m.	 Accord and Satisfaction 
2.	 Counterclaims as follows: 
a.	 Tortious interference with contract 
b.	 Tortious interference with prospective economic advantage 
c.	 Slander of title 
d.	 Wrongful cloud on title 
e.	 Civil conspiracy 
f.	 Breach of contract 
g.	 Equitable estoppel 
h.	 Quasi estoppel 
1.	 Breach of good faith and fair dealing 
C. On September 7,2005, the Appellants filed an Amended Answer12 which added the 
following counterclaims: 
1.	 Fraudulent conveyance 
2.	 Unjust enrichment (based on work the Mailes had done on the real property) 
3.	 "Indemnification agreement" (Referring to the Disclaimer, Release and 
Indemnity Agreement between the Trustees and all beneficiaries). 
4.	 Breach of peace and quiet enjoyment of deeded property 
5.	 Breach of warranty deed, and 
6. "Continuing tort" 
On February 13, 2006, the district court entered an order13 dismissing the Appellants' 
counterclaims for tortious interference with the purchase contract, tortious interference with 
12 Exhibit A to Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 14,2008 
13 Exhibit B to May 14,2008 Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss. 
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prospective economic advantage, slander of title, wrongful cloud of title, civil conspiracy, breach 
of contract, good faith and fair dealing, indemnification agreement, breach of peace and quiet 
enjoyment, breach ofwarranty deed, failure to join indispensable parties, and accord and satisfaction. 
In that order, the court repeatedly stated that the Mailes had failed to present even a scintilla of 
evidence to support the counterclaims. 
On March 15, 2006, the Appellants filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the Beneficiaries' 
Amended Complaint incorporating by reference all of the "affirmative defenses, requests for 
attorney fees, prayer for reliefand counterclaims contained in all ofDefendants/Counter-Claimants' 
previous answers to the various complaints and amended complaints filed in the matter ofTaylor v. 
Maile, et aI, and in the matter ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust v. Thomas Maile, et al." 
The Answer added the following affirmative defenses: 
1.	 Failure to join indispensable parties 
2.	 Plaintiffs' claims barred by the release of the successor trustee from liability [based 
on the Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement] 
3.	 Defendants were bona fide purchasers 
4. Majority of beneficiaries consented to the sale of the Linder Road Property. 
After granting summary judgment to the Taylors l 4, the court on June 27, 2006 entered a 
judgment which quieted title to the Linder Road property to the Johnson Trust and dismissed all of 
the Appellants' remaining counterclaims and affirmative defenses other than unjust enrichment. 
14 Exhibit C to May 14,2008 Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
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After a bench trial, Judge Wilper entered a Memorandum Decision's on November 29,2006 which 
denied Maile's claim for unjust enrichment, specifically ruling: 
1.	 The Trust was not unjustly enriched by Maile's expenditures after the purchase; 
2.	 Maile's expenditures conferred no benefit upon the Johnson Trust, the trustees, nor 
the beneficiaries. 
3.	 Even if the Trust had received a benefit, it "certainly did not do so under 
circumstances that would make it inequitable for it to retain the benefit without 
paying Mr. Maile." 
4.	 The fair market value of the property as of November 29, 2006, was $1,800,000, 
which is the same fair market value of the property with or without any expenditures 
or improvements made by Mr. Maile. 
5.	 In spite of Mr. Maile's testimony at trial that he had advised Mr. Johnson to seek 
independent advice about selling him the land for $400,000, "the Court is not 
persuaded that Mr. Maile so advised Mr. Johnson." 
6.	 There was ample evidence in the record to support the contention that Mr. Maile 
engaged in "sharp practices" in drafting the documents connected to the transaction. 
Mr. Maile filed a Notice ofAppeal l6 which listed 16 separate issues, including the following: 
(e) Was the Court correct in denying Appellants' Motion to 
Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment relating to the role of the 
successor trustees not obtaining judicial appointment prior to filing 
suit on behalf of the trust? 
(f) Was the Court correct in determining that the Respondents as 
beneficiaries of the trust had standing to pursue the claims which 
were ultimately granted by the Beneficiaries' Motion for Summary 
Judgment? 
(k) Did the Court err in failing to consider the effect of the 
Disclaimer and Indemnification Agreement executed by the 
Respondents and the successor trustees and the other beneficiaries of 
the trust relating [to] the claims against the Appellants? 
IS Exhibit D to May 14,2008 Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
16 Exhibit BB to Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Four. 
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(n) Did the Court err in not allowing the counterclaims of the 
Appellants to proceed to trial? 
(0) Did the Court err in determining that the Theodore L. Johnson
 
Trust was entitled to amend their complaint and relate back the
 
complaint to the date of filing, when the successor trustees had not
 




The briefs which the Mailes filed in Taylor JJ argued each of these issues in some detail. 
The fact that they were not all addressed individually in the Supreme Court's opinion does not 
change the fact that the issues were litigated in the trial court and may not be raised again. 
The prior adjudication "extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series
 
of transactions out of which the cause ofaction arose. Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119Idaho
 
146,150,804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990). A cause of action can be barred by a prior adjudication even
 
though the theory of liability and supporting evidence differ from the cause of action actually
 
litigated in the prior lawsuit. Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437-39,849
 
P.2d 107, 110-112 (1993). The new theories under which the Plaintiffs claim the Johnson Trust
 
property should be returned to them are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
 
Final Judgment. The trial court's judgments have now been affirmed by the Idaho Supreme 
Court, definitively meeting the "final judgment" requirement. 
D. Judicial estoppel. Just one week ago, the Plaintiff in this action asked Judge 
Wilper to enter an order compelling the Taylors to pay the judgment in Taylor v. Maile, which 
ordered the return of the Linder Road property to the Johnson Trust and the return of the $400,000 
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purchase money to Mailes. 17 This position is diametrically opposed to the position taken in the 
present action, which is that the judgment should be set aside. 
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and 
then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 
178 P.3d 597 (2008). The policies underlying judicial estoppel are general considerations of the 
orderly administration ofjustice and regard for the dignity ofjudicial proceedings. McKay v. Owens, 
130 Idaho 148, 152,937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 
! 94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.1996)). Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent a litigant from playing 
fast and loose with the courts. !d. 
Under the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel, these Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking to enforce 
ajudgment in one action while simultaneously insisting that the very same judgment be set aside 
in this proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and the Theodore 
' 
Johnson Trust respectfully request that this court enter an order dismissing this cause ofaction with 
prejudice and enter an Order finding this action to be a violation ofRule 11 and imposing costs and 
attorney fees as a sanction. 
17 Motion is attached to Third Supplemental Affidavit of Connie Taylor in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
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Connie W. Taylor, a member of the finn. 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
______!""""""':::::...____!L~:....::::......___­
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the E day of April, 2009 I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV ~ U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street o Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, ID 83616 o Overnight Mail
 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mark Prusynski ~/ U.S. Mail
 
MOFFATT THOMAS o Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor o Overnight Mail
 




Connie W. Taylor fAttorney for Defendants 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -15­
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 



















DISCLAIMER~ RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT 
1. Disclaimers. 
1.1 Disclaimer of Claims by Certain Beneficiaries. Except for those 
individuals identified in the last sentence of this Section Ll. each of the beneficiaries of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust, UTD November 4, 1997 (hereafter referred to as the "Trust"), 
hereby disclaims, in favor of the Trust, any ownership interest he/she may now 'or in the future 
have in any claims or causes of action by the Trust or the trustees of the Trust against attorney 
Thomas G. Maile, or his successors or affiliates, including, without limitation, Thomas 
Maile, IV, Colleen Maile, Thomas Maile Real Estate Company and Berkshire Investments, LLC, 
in connection with the purchase of real property from the Trust ("Claims"); and by this 
Disclaimer, the same individuals confirm in the Trust complete ownership and control of any' 
such Claims. No warranty or representation is made as to the existence or efficacy of such 
Claims. The following beneficiaries do not join in this disclaimer: Helen Taylor, Reed J. Taylor, 
Dallan J. Taylor, Mark J. Taylor, Gloria Rydalch, Virginia Porter and R. J~bn Taylor. 
].2 Disclaimer ofAII Other Interests. 
l.2.1 Fisher. Gordon E. Fisher, Garth J. Fisher and Judith F. Crawford, 
comprising all of the children of Hazel Fisher, hereby ~isclaim all interests whatsoever in the 
Trust, not previously disclaimed in Section 1.1 above, in favor oftheir mother, Hazel Fisher, and 
hereby approve immediate distribution to Hazel Fisher. 
1.2.2 Seely. J. David Seely, Karl J. Seely, Dorothy S. Dayton, Janet S. 
Denison and Nathan 1. Seely, comprising all of the children of Joyce Seely, hereby disclaim all 
interests whatsoever in the Trust, not previously disclaimed in Section 1.1 above, in favor of 
their mother, Joyce Seely, and hereby approve immediate distribution to Joyce Seely. ' 
1.2.3 illlQr. Reed J. Taylor, Dallan J. Taylor, Mark 1. Taylor, Gloria 
Rydalch, Virginia Porter and R. John Taylor, comprising all o(the children of Helen Taylor, 
hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever i,n the Trust, in favor of their mother, Helen Taylor, and 
hereby approve immediate distribution to Helen Taylor. AlI.of the individuals identified in 'this 
Section 1.2.3 are sometimes hereafter referred to as "Taylors". . 
I ' 
2. Receipt in Full -Income Tax. The undersigned aCknOW[dge receipt in ful.l of all 
property, money and benefits which helshe is entitled to receive fro Andrew T. Rogers and 
Beth J. Roge~s, in .their capacity as trustees of the Trust. Th.is include a full share of the fin~l 
payment recelved m 2004 from the sale to Thomas' G. Mal1elBerksh re Investments, LLC, In 
2002, of the real estate located in Ada County. (Except for the Taylors, to the extent they, are 
retaining a beneficial interest in the Claims), the undersigned have no further expectation of 
receiving anything from the Trust. The undersigned further understand that the trustees have not 
Pilid income tax on the final payment rec~jved in 2004 and that he/she will receive an IRS fonn 
K-1 indicating his/her share of such tax, which is to be included on the beneficiary's owL) federal 
and state income tax returns for 2004. . 
( 


















3. Release of Trustees - Estimated Expenses. The undersigned hereby release and 
discharge Andrew T. Rogers and Beth 1. Rogers from all claims or causes of action, whether 
known or unknown, he/she may have against them (i) in their capacity as trustees of the Trust, or 
(ii) arising in any way out of their service as trustees of the Trust. The undersigned further 
acknowledge that the trustees have distributed, and he/she has received, all of the property, 
money and benefits to which he/she IS entitled under the terms of the Trust, except an amount 
which shall not exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), which has been retained for the sole 
purpose of paying accounting, legal and other expenses associated with the Trust. Any surplus in 
such retainage will be distributed to the beneficiaries proportionately. The undersigned 
acknowledge the financial information he/she has received wi11 constitute a final accounting; and 
he/she waives any right to a court-approved formal final accounting. 
4. Resignation ofTrustees. The undersigned understand Andrew T. Rogers and Beth 
J. Rogers intend to resign as trustees of the Trust, leaving in the Trust the Claims described in 
Section l.l above; and the undersigned approve of such resignation. The lindersigned further 
understand and agree that the successor trustee, Garth Fisher, will decline to serve as trustee, and 
that Reed J. Taylor, Da:tlan J. Taylor and R. John Taylor will be nominated and appointed to 
serve as successor co-trustees of the Trust. . 
5. Indemnification. Taylors, jointly and severally, agree to defend, indemnify and 
hold harmless (i) Andrew T. Rogers 'and Beth J. Rogers, and (ii) all of the other beneficiaries of 
the Trust against all suits, claims, expenses, costs, attorney',s fees, losses or monies that they may 
incur or be required to pay as a result of any lawsuit by Taylors, or any of them, or their 
successors, 1?ased upon the Claims, including, without limitation, any third-party claim or 
counterclaim advanced by the defendants. I ' 
6. Enumeration of Beneficiaries. This will certify the twenty-five (25) individuals 
identified below as signators constitute all of the beneficiaries of the Trust. Exhibit A attached is 
a graphical depiction of the relationship ofthe signators and grantor Theodore L. Johnson. Blair 
Johnson predeceased the Grantor, Theodore Johnson, leaving no issue; and the beneficial interest 
ofBlair Johnson therefore lapsed. 
7. Binding Effect. This instrument shall be effective as of the latest signature by all, 
and not less than all, of the signators indicated below; and this instrument shall be binding upon 
the heirs and successors of the parties. ' 
8. Attorney's Fees. If any party commences legal proceedings for any relief against 
the other party(ies) arising out of this agreement, the prevailing party(ies) shall be entitled to an 
award of hislher/their legal costs and expenses, including, but not limited to, reasonable 
..	 attorney's fees as determined by the court. The prevailing party(ies) shall be that party receiving 
substantially the relief sought in the proceeding, whether brought to final judgment or not. 
9. Counteroarts and Facsimile. This instrument may be executed in several 
counterparts and all so executed shall constitute one instrument, binding on all the parties hereto, 
even though all the parties are not s~gnatories to the original or the same counterpart. A signed 
document transmitted by fax shall be the equivalent of execution and delivery of an original 
signed document. 
















10. Entire Agreement. This agreement, together with all exhibits attached hereto and 
other agreements and written materials and documents expressly referred to herein, constitutes 
the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the matters set forth herein. All prior or 
contemporaneous agreements, understandings, representations, warranties and statements, oral or 
written, are superseded. 
11. Further Assurances. The parties agree to perfonn such further acts and to execute 
and deliver such additional documents and instruments as may be reasonably required in order to 
carry out the provisions of this instrument and the intention of the parties. Each of the signators 
warrants and represents that in executing this instrument he/she is dealing with hislher sale and 
separate property. 
12. Governing Law. This agreement shall be governed, construed and enforced in 
accordance with the laws of the State ofldaho. 
13. ModificationlWaiver. No modification, waiver, amendment or discharge of this 
instrument shall be valid unless the same is in writing and signed gy all parties. 
HAZEL FISHER Dated 
r GORDON E FISHER Dated 
GARTH J. FISHER Dated 
JUDITIl FCRAWFORD D~ted 
JOYCE SEELY Dated 
DOROTIiV S DAYTON Dated 
J DAVID SEELV Dated 
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KARLJ SEELY Dated 
NATHAN L SEELY Dated 
JANET S DENISON Dated 
BRENT B JOHNSON Dated 
BETH J ROGERS Dated' 
SCOTI' B JOHNSON Dated 
D GRANT FARNWORTH Dated 
LU DAWN FARNWORTH Dated 
LAURIE DUNKLEY Dated 
REED 1. TAYLOR Dated 
c.
 






HELEN TAYLOR Dated 
DALLAN J. TAYLOR Dated 
GLORIA RYDALCH Dated 
MARKJ. TAYLOR Dated 
VIRGINIA PORTER Dated 
R. JOHN TAYLOR Dated 
/ 
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9. CQunlerpurls and E~.c,:.simile. 111is instrument mn)' be ex~cutcd in several 
counterpurL~ !tilL! [Ill so ~xecuLed shall constilute one instrument, binding on nil tho parties 
hereto, even though ull Ihe p3rties are nol signatories to the (lriglnal or lhe same 
cOllllterpart. A :ih:~ncd document Lrunsmltled by fa:< shall be the equivalellt of execution 
and delivery ()fnn original signed document. 
10. 1~l.1tirc Agreemcl\t. This agreement. {ogcth~r with nil exhihilc; uttnchcd 
hereto nnd olher ugrcemcnls find written muterials und documents expressly referred \0 
herein, cnnslillllcslhc entire llgreement hctwccnlhe pnrties with respect to the mat1crs set 
f"rlh herein. All prk1f or cunlemporaneous ElgreemenlS, underslnndings, representations, 
warranties lInd stutemenls, oral or WI'iltol1. FIre 5uper:;eded. 
: J [. v.ur~)er Assurances, 'l1lC }larties agree to perIunn such further acls nod lo 
exc~ule am.I deliver flllCh <lcJdililJnDI documents and inslruments as may be rensuoably 
required in order to carry QlIllhe pn.wisiuns: ofthis instrument·und the inlention of the 
parties. Each of\hc signator6 wnrrnnlll and represents Iha~ in executing this inslrwncnt 
he/she is deuling with hIs/ncr sole and scpamte property. 
12. O~v.~rJllnB l.&~. 'J11is agreement /lllal!' be c<)vernecJ. c()n~lrued and 
enforced in llcconhlOce with Lho lows urtbe State of Idaho. 
. 13. MOI.liOcnthm/WnJvcr. No modilication. Wlliver, amendment or discharge 
orthiB instrument shall be valid unless the same is in ~ting and signed by nil parlies. 
I .' .f.; , 
,4. I.~ .J ,•.J; r'.· 
...... ll~ ,./flJ'l L ,') - ') 'I ~ (: t.l ..~ 
J::L;;a 5-1b·~f . GO~~~'~~L) 
&ii~U"'o.:"'d :;,-:-. :1..'1'. 0 i 
. 't \. ) C?Z/UL ~J.l ~0-1) ;j 
U})ITtl F CRA~rO~~:~.~.Dated 
0." '00'" 
JOYCE SEELY Datcd 
DOROTHY S DAYTON Daled 
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9, Counterparts and FacsImile. TIlls inStrument may be executet.l in several 
oounterparts and all 80 executed shall constitute one instrument, binding on all the parties 
hereto, even though all the parties are not signatories to the original or the same 
counterpart. A signed documel1t transmitted by fax sha.ll be the equivaJent'of execution 
and deli~ery of an original signed do~ument. 
10. Entire Agreement. This agreemetlt, together with all exhibits attached 
hereto and other agreements and written materials and ~ocuments expressly :referred to 
herein
1 
constit.utes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the matters set 
forth herein. All prior or contemporaneous agreements, understandings, representations, 
wausnties end statements, oral or writt~, are superseded. 
11. Further Assurances. The 'parties olgree ~ perfo~ such further' acts and to 
execute and deliver such additional documents and instruments as may be reasonably 
:required in order to carry out the provisions of this instrument and the intention ofthe 
parties: Each of the signatorS warrants and represents that in executing this instrument 
he/she is dealing with hislher sale and separate property. 
12. Govenung Law. This agreell'!ent shall be governed, construe"d and 
enforced in accordance with the Jaws of the State ofJdaho. ; I 
13. ModificationIWaiver. No modification, widver, ainendment or dlschafge 
ofthis instrUment shall be valid unless the samo iB in wdti,ng and signed, by all parties. 
l-lAZEL FlS.HER Dated 
GORDON EFISHERDated 
GARTH J. FISHER . Dated 
JUDITH F eRAWFORp Dated 
J2 ' J

























/1)1 2-7 '?OD'1 
Dated '! 
NATHAN L SEELY Dated 
JANET SDENISON Dated 
BRENT B JOHNSON-Dated 
BErn J ROGERS Dated 
SCOTT B JOHNSONDated 
.' / 
.D GRANT FARNWORTH Dated . 
LV DAWN fARl'tWORTH Dated 
. LAURIEDUNKLEY Dated 
KARLA FARNWOR.TH 'Dated 
RUTH F SrnHENS Dated 
c 
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NO. _ -" 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
A.M. FIL~~ M Jd. :_~~ 
APR 14 ?009 
.J DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By A. LYKE 
')EPUTV 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust~ JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RELATING TO THE 
DEFENDANTS' COUNTER­
CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Plaintiffs submit their Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of their Motion for 
Summary Judgment and provide the following. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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The Memorandum Submitted by the Plaintiffs and the Affidavit of R. John Taylor 
Contain Hearsay Evidence, Conclusory Statements, and Assertions That Have No 
Proper Foundation Before the Court and must Be Stricken from the Record. 
The Affidavit ofR. John Taylor is before the court through the Affidavit of Connie 
Taylor dated April 8, 2009. The defendants' Memorandum Brief makes reference to the 
Affidavit ofR. John Taylor (p.7) as supporting the proposition that the Taylors have sustained 
damages. The Affidavit ofR. John Taylor, contain impermissible hearsay and conclusory 
statements, conjuncture or have references to facts which are not part of the record and must be 
stricken. 
Rule 12(F) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading 
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a 
party within twenty (20) days after the service of the pleading upon the party or 
upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any 
pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter. 
Rule 56 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the evidence submitted in 
opposition must be admissible evidence. There is no record before this court of any alleged 
ascertainable damages allegedly sustained by the Taylors and/or Clark & Feeney. The Affidavit 
ofR. John Taylor, contains hearsay testimony including statements allegedly made by a banker 
and/or an pending offer. The case of Homes Corp. v. R. Herr, 142 Id. 87, 123 P.3d 720 142 
(C.A. 2005), provides: 
In order to be considered 'On a summary judgment motion, affidavits must be 
based on personal knowledge, set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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at trial, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the stated matters. 
LR.C.P. 56(e). In determining the admissibility of evidence, trial courts are given 
broad discretion and will be reversed on appeal only when there has been a clear 
abuse of discretion. State, Dep't ofHealth and Welfare v. Altman, 122 Idaho 
1004,1007,842 P.2d 683, 686 (1992); Bakerv. Shavers, Inc., 117 Idaho 696, 
698, 791 P.2d 1275, 1277 (1990). 
Idaho courts exercise free review ofthe standards of the admissibility of evidence on 
summary judgment motions, and will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of 
discretion. An examination of the Affidavit ofR. John Taylor reveals a lack of foundation 
relating to the alleged feasibility of a loan and/or a pending offer. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits must be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated. Tri-State Nat. Bank v. Western Gateway Storage Co., 92 Idaho 543, 447 P.2d 409 (1968). 
There is no supporting foundation for such assertions and any such reference should be stricken 
from the record as hearsay and lack foundation under the Rule of Evidence, Rules 801, 802, 901, 
902. Likewise the Affidavit ofR. John Taylor contains statements from alleged potential buyers 
but this in and of itself does not establish a basis of damages, which constitute hearsay and must 
be stricken. 
The Defendants Have Failed to Rebut Unconverted Facts in the Record and There 
Is Nothing in the Record to Establish a Genuine Issue of Material Fact in Dispute. 
The defendants have offered no evidence by way of deposition testimony, affidavits, etc., 
which demonstrate a dispute ofmaterial fact. LR.C.P. 56(e), demonstrate that when faced with a 
motion for summary judgment the party against whom it is sought may not merely rest on 
allegations contained in his pleadings. Rather, he must come forward and produce evidence by way 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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ofdeposition or affidavit to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a genuine 
issue of material fact. Dulaneyv. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 164,45 
P.3d 816, 820 (2002). A trial court is not required to search the record looking for evidence that 
may create a genuine issue of material fact; the party opposing the summary judgment is required 
to bring that evidence to the court's attention. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of 
North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026 (l990)Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Techs., Inc., 
145 Idaho 912,917, 188 P.3d 854,859 (2008). There is nothing in the record to establish any 
genuine issue of material fact in dispute that would prevent the entry of summary judgment for the 
plaintiffs. 
The Affidavit of Helen Taylor Must Be Stricken from the Record as it Fails to 
Demonstrate Material Issues of Fact in Dispute and is Not Relevant. 
The Affidavit of Helen Taylor dated October 15,2008 has been filed with the court, 
however, it is silent as to whether it is being used by the defendants' in their motions for summary 
judgement or whether it is being offered in opposition to the plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment. I.R.C.P. Rule 56 requires that all supporting affidavits be filed 28 days prior to the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Obviously, the filing of April 8, 2009 does not 
comply with the Rules and should be stricken. In addition, the testimony of Helen Taylor has no 
relevance as to the determination of the defendants' misrepresentations to the court which 
ultimately resulted in the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". A trial court has the discretion to 
decide whether an affidavit offered in support ofor opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
is admissible under Rule 56(e), even if that issue is not raised by one of the parties. Rhodehouse v. 
Stutts, 125 Id. 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994). There must be an objection for the court to determine 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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the admissibility of the affidavit. If there is no timely objection, the trial court can grant summary 
judgment based upon an affidavit that does not comply with Rule 56(e). State, Dept. of Agric. v. 
Curry Bean Co. Inc., 139 Idaho 789, 86 P.3d 503 (2004). The plaintiffs request that such affidavit 
be stricken from the record as not relevance to the ultimate determination of the criminal activity 
and the misrepresentations of the defendants in obtaining the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' 
Claims". 
The Defendants Have Failed to Rebut the Verified Pleadings, and Other Evidence in 
the Record, consequently the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment must Be 
Granted. 
The defendants have taken the position, that since the issue of res judicata has not been 
addressed, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment cannot be entertained. We know from 
established case law in Idaho, that res judicata is not a bar to a claim for relief, premised upon an 
independent action to set aside a judgment based upon fraud. Compton v. Compton, 101 Id. 328, 
334,612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980). Rule 60(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes 
that courts have the inherent power "to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court". Rae v. 
Bunce, (S.C. 2008 Docket No. 33996). 
The defendants have failed to rebut their own judicial admissions before the probate court 
contained in the verified petition filed November 14th 2004. There is no dispute that Connie 
Taylor, notarized her husband's signature on November 14th 2004, wherein her then husband 
stated under oath in the verified petition before the probate court, at page two "the petitioner's 
88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by virtue of the 
terms ofa Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement". Immediately above the signature the 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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verification provides, ""R. John Taylor, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the foregoing 
petition are true, accurate, and complete to the best of applicant's knowledge and belief'. 
Nor have they rebutted the sworn testimony before the probate court in May 2005 ( 
Annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the reporter's transcript from the 
hearing dated May 25, 2005 before the Honorable Christopher Bieter, Judge of the Probate 
Court. 
Relevant portions of the testimony and statements before the probate court provides commencing 
at page 14, In 4: 
Q. Will you explain to the court just briefly why it is that you want to serve? 6 
A. "Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have always thought it 
was a valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the 
beneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this claim." 
page 17, In 12: MR. CLARK: "Yes. Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that, 
based upon, first, the agreement of the beneficiaries -- they have all indicated that 
the Taylors should serve as co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that same 
agreement, have a guarantee in the disclaimer. So they have some interest in the 
proceeding. Their mother stands to gain and, thereby, they have an interest in the 
proceeding." (Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part One transcript of probate court 
hearing Exhibit "A"). 
Nor have they rebutted the fact that defendant Connie Taylor, acting for the benefit of the 
Taylors in negotiating the terms of the Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement, 
drafted a letter to Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004 which stated, "The Taylors are not willing to 
give up their rights as beneficiaries of the trust unless Beth will affirm her prior factual 
statements in the form of an affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile... 
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One deposition ofBeth Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 












"   '"ERKS I .l ' rl f ''  ,'''''''', .,., ._"  
.......
 
deposition exhibit 39). 
The understanding ofHelen Taylor as set forth in her October 15,2008 affidavit has no 
bearing on the defendants' sworn testimony before the probate court. The defendants have failed 
to provide any relevant evidence by way of their own affidavits, or other sworn statements which 
would rebut their established judicial admissions which are the cornerstone of their subsequent 
perjured testimony. 
Idaho Code section 18-5410 states: 
SUBORNAnON OF PERJURY. Every person who wilfully procures another 
person to commit perjury is guilty of subornation ofperjury, and is punishable in 
the same manner as he would be if personally guilty of the perjury so procured. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants have failed to provide competent, relevant evidence in the form of 
affidavits, testimony, etc., to deny the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The filing of the 
lis pendens to protect the plaintiffs rights both as to the remedies pled and for the repayment of 
the monies that are still outstanding which are lawfully due and owing to Berkshire Investments 
is proper. The Counter-defendants are entitled to Partial Summary Judgment as to all counter­
claims raised by the defendants. 
DATED this 14th day of April, 2009. 
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Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments, LLC 
and Colleen Birch-Maile 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of April, 2009, I served the foregoing (1) 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RE: COUNTER-CLAIM & IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, by having a true and complete copy personally delivered, by facsimile and/or by 
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed as follows: 
Mark Stephen Prusynski () U. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
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Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka 
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flea CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite several supplemental memoranda and affidavits in multiple parts, 
plaintiffs still have not shown that the claims raised in this lawsuit were not raised in the earlier 
litigation between the same parties or why they could not have been raised in that litigation. 
Rather than contribute to the repetition contained in the briefing in this extensive litigation, these 
defendants defer to the briefing filed by co-defendants, who are much more knowledgeable 
concerning the facts and issues in both cases. 
These defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on October 9,2008. 
Although the case was stayed, the Supreme Court issued its decision, the stay was lifted, and 
many pounds ofpaper have been filed since October 9, none of this refutes the arguments raised 
in these defendants' memorandum in support ofmotion for summary judgment. All ofplaintiffs' 
verbiage can be condensed into three incorrect arguments: (1) plaintiffs confuse collateral 
estoppel with res judicata; (2) plaintiffs confuse their opportunity to raise an issue in the first 
litigation with the fact that they raised the issue and lost; and (3) plaintiffs' claims are not 
"independent actions for fraud" that escape res judicata. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A.	 Res Judicata Bars All Claims that Might or Should have been Litigated in the 
First Suit. 
Plaintiffs repeatedly cite the standard for collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. 
The standard is clearly different for res judicata and bars re-litigation "not only on the matters 
offered and received to defeat the claim, but also as to 'every matter which might and should 
have been litigated in the first suit.'" Ticor Title Go. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 126, 157 P.3d 
613,620 (2007). Plaintiffs apparently understand the distinction, because they seem to argue 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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that they were unable to raise the existing claims in the earlier suit. Their own briefing, however, 
shows that plaintiffs raise the issues, but those claims were rejected by the courts. Therefore, 
they not only had the opportunity to raise the issues, they raised the issues and lost. Resjudicata 
precludes a second opportunity. 
B.	 Plaintiffs' Fraud Claims Accrued During the Course of tbe Earlier 
Litigation. 
Plaintiffs make obtuse arguments concerning the accrual of a cause of action and 
whether they exercised due diligence in discovering fraud. Assuming these arguments were 
intended to explain why the fraud claim could not have been raised in the earlier litigation, they 
simply do not apply to the facts of the case. In addition, plaintiffs' argument that the cause of 
action for fraud did not occur until they were damaged by the entry of the judgment is directly 
contrary to Idaho law. 
Plaintiffs' fraud claim is based upon the alleged misrepresentation by defendants 
that Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary. Although plaintiffs struggle to explain how an 
allegation in a pleading that was later amended rises to the level ofextrinsic fraud that would 
preclude the application of res judicata, it is clear from plaintiffs' pleadings that the 
misrepresentation was known to them and argued by them in the earlier case. On Page 6 of 
plaintiffs' "Supplemental Memorandum Brief in Response to Supreme Court Opinion Filed 
February 4, 2009," plaintiffs state:
 
The Plaintiffs brought the facts surrounding the misrepresentation
 
to the Idaho Supreme Court in their briefing as they alleged that
 
the Taylors had insufficient standing as beneficiaries to rescind the
 
transaction as the Taylors acknowledged under oath that they were
 
no longer beneficiaries and that their mother was the sole
 
beneficiary. Plaintiffs had a right to have that detennined as an
 
issue of standing. Standing is an issue that can be raised at any
 
time at either the District Court level or at the appellate level. The
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Plaintiffs legitimately raised that issue and the Idaho Supreme 
Court chose not to address that issue and that issue remains 
unresolved at this date. 
The above quoted argument by plaintiffs shows that the issue not only could have 
been raised, but was raised by the plaintiffs in the earlier decision. The fact that the Idaho 
Supreme Court chose not to address the issue does not preclude the application of res judicata. 
Plaintiffs argue that the misrepresentation related to standing in the earlier case, 
but claim that it was a fraud issue in this case. This does not allow for re-litigation of the 
"misrepresentation" issue. The application of res judicata does not require that "the precise 
point or question in the present action be finally resolved in the prior proceeding." Farmers 
Nat 'i Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 70,878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994). The issue of who was the 
appropriate beneficiary was litigated extensively in the first lawsuit and was the sole subject of 
the first Idaho Supreme Court opinion. Characterizing the same issue as a fraud claim, does not 
avoid the application of res judicata. 
In spite of the fact that they raised the misrepresentation issue in the prior 
litigation, plaintiffs now claim they did not have the opportunity to raise the misrepresentation 
claim because it has not yet accrued. They argue both that the claim did not accrue until they 
were damaged by the judgment entered by Judge Wilpur, and that the claim was somehow 
suspended by the application of the discovery exception for fraud. The "some damage" rule does 
not, as contended by plaintiffs, extend the running of the statute of limitations until a judgment is 
entered. Some damage accrues once the plaintiff expends attorney fees in an attempt to correct 
the error. The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically rejected the plaintiffs' argument that there 
is no damage until an adverse judgment is entered. B & K Fabricators, Inc. v. Sutton, 126 Idaho 
934,894 P.2d 167 (1995). There is no question that plaintiffs in this case incurred substantial 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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attorney fees in attempting to correct the "misrepresentation" concerning the status of the 
beneficiaries. Therefore, their claim accrued, if at all, when they first began litigating the 
standing issue that was the subject ofthe "misrepresentation." 
Plaintiffs argue they exercised due diligence in discovering the fraud, but do not 
explain how their diligence or lack ofdiligence has anything to do with whether the fraud 
allegation could have been resolved in the first lawsuit. Mr. Maile drafted the trust agreement 
and should have understood immediately who the beneficiaries were. He should have known 
immediately whether the allegation that Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary was accurate. In 
fact, he argued against it. The discovery exception for a fraud claim has nothing to do with 
whether plaintiffs had the opportunity to raise the fraud claim in the earlier litigation. They 
discovered all of the facts upon which they based their fraud claim as soon as the relevant 
pleadings were filed. 
III.	 PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO BASIS FOR AN INDEPENDENT 
ACTION FOR FRAUD. 
Plaintiffs' argument that the claim of extrinsic fraud is not barred by res judicata 
is a complete red herring. Plaintiffs cite Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175 
(1980), in support oftheir argument that res judicata does not apply to judgments obtained by 
fraud. Plaintiffs ignore several relevant holdings of the Compton case, however. The court 
stated, ''The term 'fraud upon the court' contemplates more than interparty misconduct, and, in 
Idaho, has been held to require more than perjury or misrepresentation by a party or witness, 
even where the misrepresentation was made to establish the court's jurisdiction." Id. 101 Idaho 
at 334, 612 P.2d at 1181. Here, plaintiffs claim that the misrepresentation was made to establish 
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standing. Compton seems to say that such a misrepresentation does not rise to the level of a 
fraud upon the court. The Compton court also stated: 
Among the non-conclusory points we' can make are that the 
independent action in equity is a most unusual remedy, available 
only rarely and under the most exceptional circumstances. It is 
most certainly not its function to relitigate issues determined in 
another action between the same parties, or to remedy the 
inadvertence or oversight ofone of the parties to the original 
action. It will lie only in the presence of an extreme degree of 
fraud. 
!d., 101 Idaho at 335,612 P.2d at 1182. 
The plaintiffs here are attempting to do precisely what the court in Compton 
prohibited, relitigating issues determined in another action between the same parties. Finally, 
plaintiffs fail to note that the Compton court refused to find that the claims of fraud allowed an 
independent action for relief from the judgment. Similarly, plaintiffs' claims here do not show 
anything more than an allegation that was later remedied by an amendment. There was certainly 
no fraud, nor was there any evidence of egregious conduct that would allow an independent 
action to set aside an otherwise valid judgment. 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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Plaintiffs have failed to make any cogent arguments against the application of res 
judicata. Summary judgment should be granted in favor of all defendants. 
DATED this 15th day of April, 2009. 
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
BYM:J~~£' 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright 
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and 
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of April, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy ofthe foregoing REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 W. State St. 
Eagle, ID 83616-4902 
( }Pvemight Mail 
(-1 Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 939-100 I 
Connie W. Taylor ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 ( )})vemight Mail 
P.O. Box 285 (0'Facsimile 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 386-5055 
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TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
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TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
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On April 6, plaintiffs sent a notice ofhearing for their motion to compel. 
Plaintiffs are requesting a hearing on April 22, at 3:30 p.m., the same time as the hearings 
scheduled for defendants' motions for summary judgment that were noticed on February 24, 
2009, and March 2, 2009. On March 17, 2009, plaintiffs also scheduled their motion for 
summary judgment regarding defendants' counterclaims for the same time. Defendants ask that 
the Court defer hearing on the motion to compel until after a decision is made concerning the 
pending motions for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs' motion to compel was filed on October 20,2008. It was originally 
scheduled for hearing on November 6, 2008, and was accompanied by an affidavit and a motion 
to continue the summary judgment hearings that had been scheduled for November 6,2008. The 
parties eventually agreed to vacate the November 6 hearings and stay the case until after the 
Idaho Supreme Court decided the companion case. 
Because this Court's decision on the motions for summary judgment may resolve 
some or all of the issues in the case, thus making all ofthe discovery irrelevant or limiting the 
scope ofpermissible discovery, defendants believe that the Court's and counsels' resources 
would be saved if the Court would defer argument on the motion to compel until after a decision 
on the motions for summary judgment. 
DATED this 20th day of April, 2009. 
MOFFAIT, THOMAS, BARREIT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
BY_/!--t-'------'JA=------~-
Mark S Prusynski - Of th inn 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright 
Taylor tka Connie Taylor, Clark and 
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of April, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL to be 
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV (x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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380 W. State St. ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ill 83616-4902 ( t-fFacsimile 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Connie W. Taylor (x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 ( )9vernight Mail 
P.O. Box 285 ( 1Facsimile 
Lewiston, ill 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 
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On April 6, plaintiffs sent a notice of hearing for their motion to compel. 
Plaintiffs are requesting a hearing on April 22, at 3:30 p.m., the same time as the hearings 
scheduled for defendants' motions for summary judgment that were noticed on February 24, 
2009, and March 2, 2009. On March 17,2009, plaintiffs also scheduled their motion for 
summary judgment regarding defendants' counterclaims for the same time. Defendants ask that 
the Court defer hearing on the motion to compel until after a decision is made concerning the 
pending motions for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs' motion to compel was filed on October 20, 2008. It was originally 
scheduled for hearing on November 6, 2008, and was accompanied by an affidavit and a motion 
to continue the summary judgment hearings that had been scheduled for November 6, 2008. The 
parties eventually agreed to vacate the November 6 hearings and stay the case until after the 
Idaho Supreme Court decided the companion case. 
Because this Court's decision on the motions for summary judgment may resolve 
some or all of the issues in the case, thus making all of the discovery irrelevant or limiting the 
scope ofperrnissible discovery, defendants believe that the Court's and counsels' resources 
would be saved if the Court would defer argument on the motion to compel until after a decision 
on the motions for summary judgment. 
DATED this 20th day of April, 2009. 
MOFFAIT, THOMAS, BARREIT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By----t--'O:""--.....c...;;;=--h£ _ 
Mark S Prusynski - Of th inn 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright 
Taylor flea Connie Taylor, Clark and 
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL - 2 C~ent:1197514.1 
001346





By ____ -7 ____ ~ __ ~~~______ __ 
 
~ 004100404/20/2009 15:51 FAX 20838553RA 1 MOFFA'll' THOMAS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of April, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL to be 
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV (x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 W. State 8t. ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, 10 83616-4902 (t-{Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Connie W. Taylor (x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 ( )9vemight Mail 
P.O. Box 285 ( -{Facsimile 
Lewiston, ill 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 









THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
: g:oI'3~._
 
MAY 61 2009 





Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO TAKE 
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 
PLEADINGS 
COMES NOW, Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile and, Thomas G. 
Maile, IV, pro se and attorney of record for co-plaintiffs herein, and pursuant to the Idaho Rules 
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of Evidence, Rule 201, requests that this Honorable Court take judicial notice of the following 
pleadings from the records, and court file from the Ada County the consolidated case captioned 
Taylor v. Maile, et. aI, case No. CV OC 04-00473D, to wit: 
1.	 Verified Amended Answer and Counter-Claim and Demand for Jury Trial filed 
September 7,2005 (attached to Amended Affidavit in Support ofMotion to Dismiss 
dated May 14, 2008 and filed in this proceeding). 
2.	 Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed February 13, 2006 
(attached to Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated May 14, 2008 and 
filed in this proceedings). 
3.	 Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim (filed June 7, 2006 and attached hereto). 
4.	 Memorandum Decision and Order (filed July 21,2006 and attached hereto). 
5.	 First Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim (filed July 21,2006 and attached 
hereto). 
In addition the plaintiffs requests that this Court take judicial notice of the Registry of 
Actions relating to the probate proceeding captioned, In the Matter of the Registration of the 
Revocable Trust of Theodore L. Johnson, case number CV-TR-2004-22118 (copy attached). 
This Motion is based upon the upon the file and record in this matter and further 
pursuant to LR.E. Rule 201. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 1st day of May, 2009. 
THOMA G.MA 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments, LLC 
and Colleen Birch-Maile 
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This cause came on before the Honorable Ronald 1. Wilper for hearing on a Motion for 
ummary Judgment on the Beneficiaries' Claim. Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions 
flaw contained within this Court's May 15,2006 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
udgment on Beneficiaries' Claim, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
ollows: 
1. The July 22, 2002 Earnest Money Agreement between The Theodore L. Johnson 
evocable Trust and defendants Thomas Maile IV and Colleen Maile for the purchase ofthe Linder 
oad property which is more fully described in paragraph 3 of this Judgment, and all subsequent 
ocuments relating to that transaction, are void as a matter of law. 
2.	 The title to the property commonly referred to as "the Linder Road property" and 
ore particularly described in Paragraph 3 of this Judgment shall be quieted to the Theodore L. 
ohnson Revocable Trust, in fee simple. 
3.	 The Linder Road property is more particularly described as follows: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, 
Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho 
4.	 The Defendants' remaining counterclaims and affirmative defenses, all ofwhich were 
ased on either equitable claims or the assertion that the Plaintiffs were wrongfully interfering with 
he Defendants' right to possess the Linder Road Property, are hereby dismissed. Specifically, those 
laims are as follows: 
A.	 Counterclaim I (tortious interference with contract between Defendants and 
their lending institution) 
B. Counterclaims VII and VIII (equitable estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel) 
UDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
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C. Counterclaim X (fraudulent transfer) 
D. Counterclaim XI (unjust enrichment) 
E. Affirmative defenses of Laches, Failure to Mitigate, and Unclean Hands. 
5. The Plaintiff ~efiCiaries are the prevailing parties in this matter. 
DATED this	 day of June, 2006.
 
RC»-J ~JJ) .J W6t.PEA
 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '1 day ofJune, 2006, I caused to he served a true and 
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ollowing: 
Thomas Maile, IV u.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law o Hand Delivered 
380 West State Street o Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616 Telecopy (FAX) dConnie W. Taylor U.S. Mail 
Clark and Feeney o Hand Delivered 
PO Box 285 o Overnight Mail 
Lewiston, ID 83501 o Telecopy (FAX) 
Jack S. Gjording d U.S. Mail 
Gjording & Fouster o Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 2837 o Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83702 Telecopy (FAX) JDennis M. Charney U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law o Hand Delivered 
951 E. Plaza Drive, Suite 140 o Overnight Mail 
Eagle, 10 83616 o Telecopy (FAX) 
,t. flAVID Nb.Vl\nRn 
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, "'Al~ tA,:'j 
..~~. 
Deputy Clerk 
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JUL 21 2006 
By:,
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and R. 
JOHN TAYLOR, 
Case No. CVOC0400473D Plaintiffs/ Counter-Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER vs. 
THOMAS MAlLE, N and COLLEEN MAILE, 
husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE REAL 
ESTATE COMPANY, and BERKSHIRE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/ Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN MAlLE, 
husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE REAL 
ESTATE COMPANY, and BERKSHIRE 
INVESTMENT, LLC, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on A) Defendants' Motion to Amend Counterclaims; 
B) Defendants' Motion for Rule 54(f) Certification; and C) Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' 
Proposed Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim. The Court heard oral arguments on the 
motions on July 17, 2006 and took the matter fully under advisement at that time. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - Page 1 
001354
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On May 15, 2006, the Court entered its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim. On June 7, 2006, the Court entered its corresponding Judgment. 
On June 20, 2006, the Court entered an order denying the Defendants' motion to reconsider and 
clarifying its findings as set forth in the June 7 Judgment. Plaintiffs have submitted a proposed 
amended judgment incorporating the Court's June 20 findings. 
II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND COUNTERCLAIMS 
The Court finds that the Defendants' counterclaim for unjust enrichment, as it currently stands 
on the record, sufficiently preserves the Defendants' ability to adjudicate their claim that the Plaintiffs 
have been unjustly enriched by improvements made by the Defendants on the Linder Road property. 
As a result, Defendants' motion to amend their counterclaims is hereby denied. 
III. MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) pennits some partial judgments to be appealed earlier
 
than they otherwise could have been appealed. Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Idaho 185,189, 125 P.3d
 
1061, 1065 (2005). "Rule 54(b) was adopted to overcome the 'single judicial unit theory' which
 
seriously inconvenienced persons involved in multi-party or multiple claim actions by forcing them to
 
await the adjudication of 'the whole case and every matter in controversy in it' before being allowed
 
to appeal." Merchants, Inc. v. Intermountain Indus., Inc., 97 Idaho 890, 892, 556 P.2d 366, 368
 
(1976). The decision of whether to issue a Rule 54(b) certification is within the discretion of the trial
 
court. Willis v. Larsen, 110 Idaho 818,822, 718 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App. 1986).
 
The Court finds that a certification of final judgment at this time would not serve the interests 
contemplated by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Defendants' Motion for Rule 54(b) 
Certification is hereby denied. 

































































IV. OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED AMENDED JUDGMENT 
A. Effect of the Court's Finding that the Sale Violated I.e. § 68-108(b) 
The Court finds that the trustees' failure to obtain judicial approval in this case pursuant to 
Idaho Code section 68-1 08(b) rendered both the closing of the sale and the sales contract as a whole 
void, rather than voidable, as a matter of law. 
B. Rightful Holder of Title in the Linder Road Property 
The Court finds that the effect of the Court's imposition of a constructive trust on the Linder 
Road property is the reconveyance of the property to the Trust and the quieting of the title in favor of 
the Trust. See Klein v. Shaw, 109 Idaho 237, 240, 706 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that 
a party upon who a constructive trust is imposed "is treated as if he or she had been an express trustee 
from the date of the wrongful holding and is required to reconvey the property to the plaintiff'); see 
also I.C. § 6-410 (describing an action to quiet title as that "brought by any person against another 
who claims an estate or interest in real or personal property adverse to him, for the purpose of 
determining such adverse claim"). 
Co Unjust Enrichment Claim 
The Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs' proposed amended judgment wrongfully 
disallows Defendants' claim of unjust enrichment is well taken. Defendants' Counterclaim XI for 
unjust enrichment shall not be dismissed. 
V. CONCLUSION
 
Defendants' Motion to Amend Counterclaims is hereby denied.
 
Defendants' Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is hereby denied..
 
The Court will issue in due course an amended judgment in confonnity with both its findings 
set forth in its June 20 order as well as its findings set forth above. 





























































IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ;) /.5d:ty of ~ ( -t 2006. - I
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GJORDING & FaUSER 
PLL.G ' 
Case No. CVOC0400473D 
FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT ON 
BENEFICIARIES' CLAIM 
This cause came before the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper for hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the Beneficiaries' Claim. Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of 
































































































NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1.	 The trustees' failure to obtain judicial approval in this case pursuant to Idaho Code section 
68-108(b) rendered both the closing of the sale and the sales contract as a whole void, 
rather than voidable, as a matter of law. 
2.	 The property commonly referred to as "the Linder Road property" is more particularly 
described as follows: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 
5 North, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
3.	 The Linder Road property kcurrently being held in constructive trust by the current title 
holders for the benefit of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust. 
4.	 In relation to the interests asserted by the Defendants therein, the title to the Linder Road 
property shall be quieted in favor of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust. 
5.	 Defendant Berkshire Investments shall be entitled to repayment of the $400,000 purchase 
price paid for the Linder Road property, less any amount proven to be entitled to the 
Defendants pursuant to their counterclaim for unjust enrichment. 
6.	 With the exception of Counterclaim XI Unjust Enrichment, all of the Defendants' 
remaining counterclaims and affirmative defenses are hereby dismissed. 




























































































IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~, 
Dated this £ day of~ ( ---I 2006. 
/ 




























 ;::]"'kv . 
 
lOano KeposHory - c,ase I\lUlTIOer KeSUH .rage	 .rage 1 or L 
Case Number Result Page 
Ada 
, 1 Cases Found. , 
~""-'""'"'~~~-''~~''''''~'''"~''--~''''~''''-'~'---_'_'-'~''-''',-'"._"'-",""""""'-_.',,',","',',,',',,',','~.- ""---"~'''''''-~''-'''''-'~'---'''-''''-'''''''''1 
In The Matter Of The Registration Of Trust Of Theodore L Johnson Revokable Trust 
I CV-TR­
I 2004-22118 Trust Christopher Closed 
Case:Old Case: Magistrate Filed: 11115/2004Subtype: Re . t f Judge: Bieter Status: 05/02/2005 




Subjects:Theodore L Johnson Revokable Trust
 








11/15/2004 New Case Filed 




11/15/2004 Order For Appmt Of Trustees 
11/15/2004 Judgment 




11/17/2004 (for Colleen Maile & Berkshire Investments
 
11/17/2004 Reopen (case Previously Closed)
 
11/22/2004 Motn To Set Aside Ordr Motn To Re-consider
 
11/22/2004 Affidavit In Support Of Motion
 
11/26/2004 Calendaring Order (sched Conf 1/7/05 @11 Am)
 
01/10/2005 Scheduling Order (3/2/05 @ 9am)
 
02/03/2005 Supplmtl Affd Of T.mailln Support Of Motn
 I02/14/2005 Affidavit Of Elaine H Lee 
02/23/2005 Motion To Vacate Hearing I 
02/23/2005 Affidavit In Support I,02/23/2005 Motion Shortening Time 
02/23/2005 Affidavit Of Counsel 
, 
I 
02/23/2005 Trustee's Response To Objection To Appt 
02/25/2005 Order To Shorten Time & Notice 1 
02/28/2005 Demnd Notice & Verif Objtn To Petn For Apptmt 
02/28/2005 Amend Motn To Set Aside Order And Reconsider I 








03/29/2005 Notc Of Assoc Of Counsel (gjording W/ Maile)
 
03/29/2005 Second Affiadvit Of Elaine H Lee
 
03/29/2005 Lodged-reply Memo In Support Of Motion
 
04/06/2005 Affidavit In Support Of Memo In Opposition
 
04/06/2005 Petitioners Memo In Opposition To Set Aside
 
04/13/2005 Hearing Held - Ogjtns To Appmt
 
04/13/2005 Notc Of Additional Relevant Case Law
 
04/18/2005 Order Setting Aside Appointment Of Trustee 
04/18/2005 Notice To Appt Trustees
 
04/18/2005 Affidavit Of Mailing
 
04/19/2005 Amended Petition To Appoint Trustees
 
https:llwww.idcourts.us/repository/caseNumberResults.do	 4/3012009 001361
ra  ra OI
" "









, i  
   
 
 

























Idaho KepOSltory - Lase Number Kesutt t'age r ag,c; L. Vi L" 
.......
 
04/19/2005 Notice If Intent To Cross-exam &Evidence 
04/21/2005 Affidavit Of Mailing 
04/25/2005 Affd Of John Taylor In Support Of Appmt 
04/25/2005 Affd Of Reed Taylor In Support 
04/25/2005 Affd Of Dallan Taylor In Support 
04/25/2005 **thomas Mails Memo In Oppstn To Taylors Appt 
04/25/2005 Affd Of Counsel In Support Of Mails Memo 
04/25/2005 Affd Of Brent Johnson 
04/26/2005 Petitioners Supplemental Memo In Support 
04/28/2005 Objection To Affd 
04/29/2005 Rsps To Taylors Supplmtl Memo Re:retro Issue 
05/02/2005 (2)acceptance Of Appointment 
05/02/2005 Order Apptmt As Co-successor Trustees 
05/02/2005 Letters Of Co-successor Trusteeship 
05/09/2005 Affidavit Of Mailing 















.... ,  
JUL 02 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARFlO, Clerk 
By JENNIFER KEI\JNEDY 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
. BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 





f/k/a CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual;
 
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual;
 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK
 
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T.
 




an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I­

JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS
 












The plaintiffs Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. Maile, IV and Colleen Birch-
Maile filed this lawsuit after receiving an adverse judgment in two other consolidated cases. 1 
Thomas G. Maile, IV and Colleen Birch-Maile (collectively the Mailes) are husband and wife. 
I Ada County District Court cases CY-OC-0400473D and CY-OC-0405656D. 



















Berkshire Investments, LLC (Berkshire) is owned by the Mailes. Dallan Taylor and R. John 
Taylor are Trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. These three defendants 
were parties to one or the other of the previous cases that were consolidated. For 
convenience, these defendants will sometimes be collectively referred to as the "Trust 
defendants." The other named defendants, Connie Wright Taylor, Paul T. Clark, and Clark 
and Feeney partnership represented the other current defendants as the lawyers in the previous 
cases. For convenience, these defendants will sometimes be collectively referred to as the 
"Lawyer defendants." The original cases involved a real estate transaction between the 
current plaintiffs and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust ("the Trust"). 
Thomas Maile was Theodore L. Johnson's (Johnson's) attorney. Mr. Maile's 
representation included drafting the trust agreement for the Trust and overseeing its 
administration. After Johnson's death, Mr. Maile represented Johnson's estate. 
The underlying transaction that spawned this case and the earlier cases is a land sale 
between Johnson, then trustee and settler of the Trust, and the Mailes. Johnson, acting on 
behalf of the Trust, and the Mailes entered into an earnest money agreement for the purchase 
by the Mailes of 40 acres in Eagle, Idaho owned by the Trust. The purchasers' interest in the 
contract was later assigned to Berkshire. Mr. Maile acted as both the attorney and realtor for 
the transaction. Johnson died before the sale closed. The deal was consummated by the 
successor trustees, who were also beneficiaries of the Trust. 
When the other beneficiaries discovered the purchase price, they filed a lawsuit to set 
aside the sale. On January 23,2004, three of the beneficiaries, Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor, 
and R. John Taylor (collectively the Taylors), filed the first lawsuit, alleging three causes of 
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action seeking damages or rescission of the sale. On April 23, 2004, the district court, Judge 
Wilper presiding, dismissed the claims based upon lack of standing. The Taylors appealed. 
The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately reversed and remanded. 
While the first case went up on appeal, the original trustees purportedly transferred 
their status as trustees to the Taylors. The rest of the beneficiaries disclaimed interest in the 
property and Trust, save one group of beneficiaries who retained an interest in the claims 
against the current plaintiffs. On July 22,2004, the group of beneficiaries executed a 
Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity agreement and filed a new suit in the name of the Trust 
against Berkshire and the Mailes. Judge Wilper consolidated the two cases on September 29, 
2004. 
In November of2004, Magistrate Judge Bieter entered an order in the pending 
Johnson probate appointing the Taylors as co-successor Trustees. He later set aside the order 
on April 13, 2005. After a hearing, in May 2005, he again appointed the Taylors as Trustees. 
He did so over Mr. Maile's objection, but declined to make the appointment retroactive as 
requested by petitioners. The circumstances surrounding the petition for appointment as 
trustees filed in Judge Beiter's court plays a central role in Berkshire's claims made in this 
current case. 
On December 30, 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court decided the first appeal. Taylor v. 
Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (Idaho 2005). The Idaho Supreme Court remanded the 
case back to the district court for trial. The district court allowed the Trust and the Taylors to 
amend their consolidated complaint to conform to the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion. 




On May 15,2006, Judge Wilper granted both the Trust and the Taylors' motions for 
summary judgment that, combined with an earlier ruling granting partial summary judgment, 
gave plaintiffs in the consolidated case judgment on all of the counterclaims and affirmative 
defenses, except the counterclaim for unjust emichment. The ruling also invalidated the sale 
of the property as a matter oflaw. 
A court trial in October of 2006 determined that the Mailes and Berkshire were not 
entitled to any relief on the only remaining counter-claim, unjust enrichment. Judge Wilper's 
final judgment ordered the Trust to repay the purchase price and Berkshire convey title back 
to the Trust. This case was also appealed. The judgment was affirmed. Taylor v. Maile, 146 
Idaho 705, 201 P.3d 1282 (Idaho 2009). 
In the wake of the previous lawsuit, Berkshire and the Mailes2 filed the current action 
on December 31, 2007 asserting numerous claims against the Trust and the Taylors on a 
number of legal theories: quiet title, constructive trust, tortious interference with contract, 
tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, abuse of process, negligence, 
negligence per se, gross negligence, equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel, violation of the title 
18, chapter 78 of Idaho Code (RICO), and finally, judicial estoppel. In addition, Berkshire 
added several new parties to this action, Connie Wright Taylor, the law firm Clark and 
Feeney, Paul T. Clark, and any John Doe claiming any right to possession ofthe disputed 
property. In this case, Berkshire requests the Court to convey title to the property back to 
Berkshire, impose a constructive trust, or money damages. All defendants have 
2 For convenience, the Mailes and Berkshire will be referred to collectively as "Berkshire" for the balance of this 
opinion. 






counterclaimed for slander of title to the real estate at issue and for abuse of process. The 
Taylor defendants have also counterclaimed for intentional interference with a prospective 
economic advantage. There has been no attempt to name or serve any of the John Doe 
defendants. 
All of the current defendants moved for summary judgment on Berkshire's current 
claims because the causes of action are bared by the operation of res judicata or LR.C.P. 
l2(b)(8) (another action pending). In addition to making a motion for summary judgment, the 
current defendants asked the Court to impose Rule 11 sanctions against the Mailes and 
Berkshire. Finally, Berkshire moved for summary judgment on each of the defendants' 
counter claims. 
II. Standard of Review 
The Trust defendants originally styled their motion as a motion to dismiss. It was 
supported by an affidavit. Plaintiffs objected to this procedure and moved to strike and filed 
an amended "Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment." An amended 
affidavit was filed in support of this motion. All parties have filed extensive briefing. 
Berkshire has filed several hundred pages of affidavits in support of its motions and in 
opposition to the defendants' pending motions. 
If a trial court considers factual allegations outside the pleading on a Rule l2(b)(6) 
motion, it errs if it fails to convert the motion to one for summary judgment. Fonte v. Board 
ofManagers q[Continental Towers Condominium, 848 F.2d 24 (2nd Cir.1988); Rose v. 
Bartle. 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir.1989). Furthermore, if a court considers matters outside 
pleadings on a Rule l2(b)(6) motion to dismiss, such motion must be treated as a motion for 








summary judgment and the proceedings thereafter must comport with the hearing and notice 
requirements of Rule 56. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 (Id. Ct. 
App.1990). Since it was necessary to consider materials outside of the pleadings, the Court 
will treat this as a motion for summary judgment. 
All parties have treated the amended motion as a motion for summary judgment. All 
parties have had a full and fair opportunity to present their version of the case through the 
affidavits and briefing. The Court will decide the case as submitted on cross motions for 
summary judgment. 
"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.' "Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 
996 P.2d 303,306 (2000). 
The fact that both sides moved for summary judgment does not in itself establish that 
there is no genuine issue of fact. Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505,600 P.2d 1387 
(1979). The Court must analyze the case from the perspective of each motion, granting the 
opposing party the benefit of any inferences that may be drawn in its favor. Ifthere is a 
genuine issue of material fact, the motion must be denied. 
III. Privity 
A threshold question that must be addressed is whether the Lawyer defendants can 
raise the defenses they have put forth. Both res judicata and LR.C.P. l2(b)(8) require that the 
party raising it have been a party to a previous action with the plaintiff or in privity with a 
party to the previous action. For res judicata purposes privity exists between a party and its 
attorneys where the defendant attorneys are named as a result of their prior representation in 





the transaction that gives rise to the litigation. Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 
1228, 1235 n. 6 (7th Cir.1986). See also, Plotner v. AT & T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161 (10 Cir. 
2000). For purposes of this case, the Lawyer defendants are in privity with their clients, the 
Trust defendants. The following analysis applies to all defendants. 
IV. Analysis -- Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 
A. Rule 12(b)(8) 
All defendants suggest that Rule 12(b)(8) bars the present action. At the time this case 
was filed, the final judgment entered by Judge Wilper in the consolidated cases was pending 
on appeal. The appeal has since been remanded with Judge Wilper's decision being affinned. 
The detennination of whether to proceed with a case, when a similar case is pending 
elsewhere and has not gone to judgment, is discretionary. Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 
106 Idaho 905, 684 P.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1984), overruled on other grounds, NBC Leasing Co. 
v. R & T Farms, Inc., 112 Idaho 500, 733 P.2d 721 (1987). Once the other action has gone to 
judgment, the case should be evaluated on resjudicata grounds. Klaue v. Hem, 133 Idaho 
437,988 P.2d 211 (1999); Roberts v. Hollandsworth, 101 Idaho 522, 616 P.2d 1058 (1980). 
Since the cases before Judge Wilper went to judgment, this case will be analyzed under res 
judicata principles. Defendants' Rule 12(b)(8) motions are denied. 
B. Res Judicata 
The defendants also move to dismiss this lawsuit based on the doctrine of res judicata. 
There are three fundamental purposes served by res judicata: 
First, it preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against 
the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice 
litigated to inconsistent results. Second, it serves the public interest in 
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protecting the court against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and third, it 
advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive 
claims. Hindmarsh v Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002) (citing 
Aldape v Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 256,668 P.2d 130,132 (Ct. App. 1983)). 
Res judicata is shorthand for two distinct legal concepts - issue preclusion (collateral 
estoppel) and claim preclusion (prohibition against splitting a cause of action). Compare 
Stoddard v. Hagadone, 2009 WL 982693 (2009) with Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 
119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007). 
Both doctrines are implicated here. 
a. Issue Preclusion 
The doctrine of issue preclusion exists to prevent the re-litigation of an issue 
previously determined when: 
(l) the party against who the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; 
(2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented 
in the present action; 
(3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; 
(4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation, and 
(5) the party against who the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a 
party to the litigation. 
Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 2009 WL 982693 (2009), (citing Rodriguez v. Dept. of 
Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 403 (2001)). 
Examination of Berkshire's answer and counterclaims in the consolidated cases 
eliminates many of the claims in this case. These are the claims Berkshire brought in this 
action that were counterclaims in the previous case, i.e. the claims for quiet title, tortuous 
interference with a contract, tortuous interference with a prospective business advantage, 
equitable estoppel, and quasi estoppel. Berkshire had a full and fair opportunity to present 
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those claims before Judge Wilper. Each claim here is identical to the one pleaded in prior 
litigation. Judge Wilper decided the claims to be without merit in granting summary 
judgment. A final judgment on the merits was entered and sustained on appeal. The parties in 
this case are identical to, or in privity with, the parties in the previous lawsuit. Plaintiffs' 
claims for quiet title, tortious interference with a contract, tortious interference with a 
prospective business advantage, equitable estoppel, and quasi estoppel are dismissed. 
b. Claim Preclusion 
Claim Preclusion, "bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same 
claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action." Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 
2009 WL 982693 (2009); (citing Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 
613,617 (2007)). A claim is barred ifit could have been brought, regardless of whether it 
was brought. For claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements: 
(1) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 
119, 157 P.3d 613 (2007) (citing Hindmarsh v.l'vfock, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803 (2002); 
Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 P.2d 762 (1994)). 
In this case, the remaining claims must be dismissed based on claim preclusion. In the 
current action, the parties are identical to, or are in privity with, the parties in the prior case. 
The first element is present. 
In determining whether the claim is the same, it is not the legal theory espoused by the 
plaintiff that controls. The issue is whether the new complaint arises out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose. Ticor Title Co. v. 




Stanion, supra. See also, Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982) and the 
commentary thereto. 
Berkshire strenuously argues the new claims are not barred because the damage caused 
by the alleged fraud did not occur until the earlier cases were lost. For this proposition 
plaintiffs cite Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415,807 P.2d 633 (1991). Fuller is inapposite as it 
concerns collateral estoppel, not claim preclusion. The question presented in Fuller was 
whether certain damages had been determined in a prior case. The Court held they had not. 
In so holding, the opinion does not discuss claim preclusion. 
Plaintiffs' remaining claims are abuse ofprocess, negligence, negligence per se, gross 
negligence, and violation of the title 78, chapter 18 ofIdaho Code. A comparison of the facts 
alleged in the present case to the facts alleged in the prior consolidated cases leaves no doubt 
that these claims relate to the same transaction that gave rise to the first cases. Berkshire 
makes much of the supposed fraud perpetrated by defendants. The core fact upon which 
Berkshire's case is built is an alleged misrepresentation made to Judge Beiter in the 
application to appoint new Trustees. The Taylors filed a verified petition for appointment as 
Trustees. The petition contained a statement to the effect that "Helen Taylor is the sole 
remaining beneficiary of the Trust." The petition was later amended to reflect that she was 
not the sole beneficiary. In Berkshire's view, the first allegation was true and the second 
false. Consequently, when the Taylors later caused the Trust to file suit against Berkshire 
alleging they were beneficiaries ofthe Trust, this was a false statement under oath. Likewise, 
the amended complaint filed in the consolidated cases after the first appeal contained this 
same false statement. Not only could any issues arising from this alleged fraud have been 





raised in the earlier case, the opinion of the Supreme Court in Maile II reflects this issue was 
argued in the most recent appeal and rejected. Dressing the claim in the language of RICO 
and other new legal labels does not change the fact that this claim, the extent it was not, 
should have been presented to Judge Wilper. The second element is present. 
Finally, the earlier suit resulted in a final judgment adverse to plaintiffs here. The 
third element of claim preclusion is present. The balance of plaintiffs' claims must be 
dismissed. 
c. Plaintiffs Other Arguments 
Although the argument is not always easy to follow, Berkshire's claims presented here 
all hinge on the assertion that the Taylors and their counsel committed a fraud on Judge Beiter 
by filing a petition for appointment as Trustees that contained a false statement. This 
statement somehow led Judge Beiter to appoint the Taylors as Trustees, giving them standing 
to bring the suit which ultimately led to Judge Wilper's determination that the underlying real 
estate transaction was void. This led to the loss of the property. The loss of the property, in 
tum is what caused the damages in this case. Since those damages only arose after Judge 
Wilper's final judgment, this action could not have been brought earlier. Therefore, it is not 
barred by res judicata. In other words, the loss of the prior suit gives rise to the cause of 
action in this case. 
Berkshire does not attack the correctness ofJudge Wilper's decision. The argument 
seems to be that, but for the alleged fraud on Judge Beiter and the alleged false statements in 
the complaint filed by the Trust, the case before Judge Wilper would have been dismissed on 
standing grounds. But, Berkshire asks this Court to do what the Supreme Court declined to do 






- set aside the judgment entered in the prior case. That decision held that Berkshire was not 
entitled to the property in the first place. If this were grounds for liability, every losing 
defendant would then have a cause of action against the successful plaintiff and the winning 
plaintiffs counsel. 
Fundamentally, Berkshire misses the point. The underlying series of transactions in 
this case is the original real estate transaction between the Berkshire parties and the Trust. It 
is not whatever representations mayor may not have been true in the previous litigation. It is 
all of the claims that could have been brought arising from that transaction that are precluded. 
Berkshire straightforwardly asks this Court to set aside the judgment in the prior 
consolidated cases based upon fraud on the Court. In doing so, they rely on Compton v. 
Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175 (1980). Compton reiterates the statement in Rule 
60(b) that a court has the inherent power to entertain an independent action in equity to set 
aside a judgment. Assuming for purposes of this motion that the allegations in the complaint 
are true and the actions ofthe Taylors and their lawyers, as pled in the verified complaint, 
constituted a fraud on the Court, the conduct is not, in this case, sufficient to justify this Court 
setting aside the Judgment of Judge Wilper. 
"[T]the independent action in equity is a most unusual remedy, available only 
rarely and under the most exceptional circumstances. It is most certainly not 
its function to relitigate issues determined in another action between the same 
parties, or to remedy the inadvertence or oversight of one of the parties to the 
original action. It will lie only in the presence of an extreme degree of fraud. 
Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328,335, 612 P.2d 1175,1182 (1980). 
In this case, it is undisputed that the conduct of which Berkshire complains was known to 
Berkshire long before the judgment was entered in Judge Wilper's Court. Berkshire should 




have brought the alleged fraud to Judge Wilper's attention under IRCP 60(b), rather than 
requesting this Court to second guess Judge Wilper and the Idaho Supreme Court. 
V. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants' Counterclaims 
In the answer, the defendants filed several counterclaims against Berkshire including 
slander of title, abuse of process, and intentional interference with a prospective economic 
advantage. Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment on all these claims. Just as 
plaintiffs are entitled to have all reasonable inferences from the undisputed facts drawn in 
their favor when opposing summary judgment, so to are defendants. Plaintiffs have moved to 
strike the affidavits ofHelen Taylor and Connie Wright Taylor. The affidavit ofHelen Taylor 
is not germane to this Court's decision on these motions. It appears to be directed to 
interpretation of the Disclaimer Agreement. That is not an issue here. Her affidavit is not 
hearsay, but will not be considered because the Court does not perceive it to be relevant to the 
counterclaims. The Connie Wright Taylor affidavit incorporating the affidavit ofR. John 
Taylor is hearsay. It will not be considered in ruling on the counterclaims. 
A. Slander of Title 
It is undisputed that a lis pendens has been filed in this case. Depending on the 
circumstances, the mere filing of the lis pendens may constitute slander of title. There appear 
to be other genuine issues of fact regarding this cause of action. It is simply not possible on 
the current record to find the claim without merit. Summary judgment on this issue is denied. 
B. Abuse ofProcess 
Given the Court's ruling on defendants' motions for summary judgment, this claim 
cannot be dismissed on this record. The Court has reviewed the pleadings and Judge Wilper's 






several decisions in the prior consolidated cases. Taken together with the pleadings, briefs, 
and affidavits filed by Berkshire in this case, it cannot be said that this claim is without merit. 
There remain factual issues to be determined before this claim can be determined on its 
merits. Summary judgment on this issue is denied. 
C. Intentional Interference with Prospective Advantage 
Again, when the information set forth in Judge Wilper's decisions is taken together 
with the information found in plaintiffs' voluminous filings in this case, there are simply too 
many factual issues needing determination before the Court can determine the merit, or lack of 
the same. Summary judgment on this issue is denied. 
VI. Rule 11 Sanctions and Attorney Fees 
Given that this case had not been concluded, but remains to be tried on the 
counterclaims, the Court will reserve ruling on attorney fees, whether under Rule 11 or 
otherwise. Rule 11, in particular, is intended to grant courts the power to impose sanctions for 
discrete pleading abuses or other types oflitigative misconduct. Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 22, 
23,773 P.2d 290, 291 (Ct.App.1989). It is also this Court's opinion that Rule 11 sanction 
motions should be free standing and not combined with other motions as has been done in the 
instant case. Such practice inevitably leads, in a hotly contested case, to every motion 
containing a Rule 11 request, diverting the energy of the parties and the Court from the real 
issues in need of determination. Where the corrective power ofRule 11 is needed, a separate 
motion and hearing that clearly delineates the facts and issues is more useful. In some 
respects, the issues in a Rule 11 request are duplicative of the abuse ofprocess claims that 
remain to be litigated in this case. 




Just so there is no misunderstanding, the Court is not precluding an award of attorney 
fees in this case in the future, including fees under Rule 11 based on pleadings filed up to this 
point. The Court is simply preserving the issue for another day. 
VII. Summary. 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted. Plaintiffs' complaint is 
dismissed for the reasons set forth above. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is 
denied. The Court reserves ruling on the request for attorney fees under Rule 11. 
Counsel for the Trust defendants is requested to provide a form of Order for entry by 
the Court. The discovery motions pending at the time of the hearing on the motions decided 
here may be re-noticed for hearing by any party choosing to do so. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
Dated this 1- day ofJuly 2009.
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54(b), request that the Court enter its Judgment on the Memorandum Decision and Order filed 
July 2, 2009, containing the language, as provided, to wit: 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.c.P., that the court has 
determined that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment 
and that the court has and does hereby direct that the above judgment or order 
shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be 
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules 
That in addition, and in the alternative the plaintiffs herein request that this court enter an 
order pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 83(x) and I.A.R. Rule 12, granting the plaintiffs a permissive 
appeal of said Order. This Motion is on the grounds set fort above and the record and file herein, 
and the Affidavit of Thomas Maile and the accompanying Memorandum Brief filed concurrently 
herewith. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED ON THIS MOTION. 
DATED this 13th day of July, 2009. 
THOMAS AIL, V 
Pro Se and coun or Berkshire Investments, LLC 
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Maile, IV, pro se and attorney of record for co-plaintiffs herein, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 
54(b), request that the Court enter its Judgment on the Memorandum Decision and Order filed 
July 2,2009, and in the alternative to allow a permissive appeal pursuant to the Idaho Appellate 
Rule 12. 
1. A Central issue for appellate review consists of the application of Res 
Judicata in light of the wrongful conduct of the defendants. 
The case of Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 128,212 P.2d 1031,1034 (1949». 
Commencing at page 128 of 70 Id. Reports, the Supreme Court declared: 
One of the oldest and most universally accepted juridical principles is that 
embraced in the doctrine of res judicata. In the absence offraud or collusion a 
judgment is conclusive as between the parties and their privies on all issues which 
were (or should have been) litigated in the action.... 
Generally speaking, the fraud which will invalidate a judgment must be 
extrinsic or collateral to the issues tried, by which the aggrieved party has been 
prejudiced, or prevented from having a fair trial. It is not sufficient to charge only 
intrinsic fraud, or that which is involved in the issues tried, such as the 
presentation of perjured testimony. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 74 Cal.App.2d 391, 168 P.2d 
770; Metzger v. Vestal, 2 Cal.2d 517, 42 P.2d 67; Kasparian v. Kasparian, 132 
Cal.App. 773, 23 P.2d 802; Stout v. Derr, 171 Okl. 132,42 P.2d 136; Zounich v. 
Anderson, 35 Idaho 792, 208 P. 402; Donovan v. Miller, 12 Idaho 600,88 Pac. 
82, 9 L.R.A., N.S., 524, 10 Ann.Cas. 444; Scanlon v. McDevitt, 50 Idaho 449, 
296 P. 1016; Harkness v. Village of McCammon, 50 Idaho 569, 298 P. 676; Boise 
Payette Lumber Co. v. Idaho Gold Dredging Corp., 56 Idaho 660, 58 P.2d 786; 
Moyes v. Moyes, 60 Idaho 601, 94 P.2d 782; Keane v. Allen, 69 Idaho 53, 202 
P.2d 411; 49 C.J.S., Judgements, §§ 269, 270, pp. 486-490; 31 Am. Jur. 228-243; 
L.R.A.1917B (note) 409-512. 
Our Supreme Court has confirmed that the principle that a party committing fraud will 
not be afforded the protection of Res Judicata. Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3,896 P.2d 329 
(1995), Stoddard V. the Hagadone Corporation (2009-ID-0416.158 Docket No. 34335). There is 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
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ample evidence in the record, that the defendants committed peIjury in their verification 
surrounding the amended complaint filed in 2006. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 537, Fraud or 
Collusion provides: 
Fraud by a party will not undermine the conclusiveness of a judgment unless the 
fraud was extrinsic, that is, it deprived the opposing party of the opportunity to 
appear and present his or her case. With respect to extrinsic fraud, the doctrine of 
res judicata will not shield a blameworthy defendant from the consequences of his 
or her own misconduct. Accordingly, the principles of res judicata may not be 
invoked to sustain fraud, and a judgment obtained by fraud or collusion may not 
be used as a basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata. 
The defendants' misrepresentation under oath purportedly gave them a basis to contest 
the lack of court approval of the real estate closing pursuant to I.C. 68-106, which resulted in the 
real estate sale be voided. But for their peIjury there would not have been a voided real estate 
transaction. Once again the Honorable Judge Wilper had ruled that the trust itself could not 
rescind the transaction. 
50 c.J.S. Judgments § 532, provides: 
§ 532. Fraud, collusion, or peIjury 
A judgment may be collaterally attacked on the ground of fraud where the fraud 
goes to the jurisdiction of the court. Where the fraud alleged was inherent in the 
cause of action, or in the character or procurement of the instrument sued on, it 
does not furnish a legitimate ground for impeaching the judgment in a collateral 
proceeding; and, as a broad general rule, where the court has jurisdiction, it is not 
permissible for a party or privy to attack a judgment in a collateral proceeding 
because of fraud, such a judgment being voidable only, and not void. 
A judgment obtained by fraud may, however, be void under some circumstances, 
and subject to collateral attack, as where such fraud appears on the face of the 
record or goes to the method of acquiring jurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment 
may be attacked collaterally where fraud bas been practiced in the very act of 
obtaining the judgment, or on the party against whom the judgment was rendered, 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
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so as to prevent him from having a fair opportunity to present his case. 
Judgments obtained by extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, fraud may be attacked 
collaterally. The extrinsic fraud which is required as a basis for collateral attacks 
on judgments is defined as fraud which is collateral to the issues tried in the case 
where the judgment is rendered. 
There are substantial controlling legal issues involved in this litigation. A certification of 
the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order filed July 2,2009 and any subsequent orders 
relating to the same would promote judicial economy. 
2. Our Supreme Court has not determined the effects of allegations of 
perjury, aiding and abetting perjury, and obtaining money by false pretenses 
in the application of Res Judicata. 
There have been no reported Idaho cases involving the issues of criminal conduct and the 
application of Res Judicata relating to the Idaho Racketeering Statutes. The case of State v. 
Wolfrum; 175 P.3d 206 (C.A. 2007) provides relevant standards involving a criminal case of 
peIjury. Commencing at p. 210 of 175 P.3d Reports, the Idaho Court of Appeals provides: 
The test for materiality is whether the testimony probably would or could 
influence a tribunal or jury on the issue before it. The false statement relied upon 
need not bear directly upon the ultimate issue of fact. A statement is material if it 
is material to any proper point of inquiry, and if it is calculated and intended to 
bolster the witness' testimony on some material point or to support or attack his 
credibility. The degree of materiality is not important. Instruction No. 22, which 
quoted I.e. § 18-5406, stated: It is no defense to a prosecution for perjury that the 
accused did not know the materiality of the false statement made by him; or that it 
did not, in fact, affect the proceeding in or for which it was made. It is sufficient 
that it was material, and might have been used to affect such proceeding 
(emphasis added). 
The Taylors actively participated in the global disclaimer agreement between the 
beneficiaries of the trust and the successor trustees. The Taylors obtained control of the trust and 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
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were no longer beneficiaries of the trust. Our Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile (2) so indicated 
"In addition, the Taylors disclaimed their interest in all other Trust property in favor of their 
mother. .." (Page 3 of opinion). As a matter oflaw as determined by our Supreme Court the 
Taylors were not beneficiaries in 2006 as they verified under oath in their amended complaint. 
In addition the record establishes that defendant Connie Taylor drafted a letter to Bart 
Harwood on April 14, 2004 which stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up theft rights as 
beneficiaries of the trust unless Beth will affirm her prior factual statements in the form of an 
affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. If we aren't able to reach an 
agreement on that, they will seek a full accounting of the trust and a copy of the trust and estate 
tax returns". (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One deposition of Beth Rogers Exhibit "B" 
referencing deposition exhibit 39). 
Finally, the testimony of R. John Taylor before the probate court provided verification of 
their state of mind, " my mother is the beneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will 
eventually win on this claim." During that same hearing Mr. Clark provided in his closing 
argument before Judge Beiter on June 5, 2005 provided: page 17, In 12: MR. CLARK: "Yes. 
Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that, based upon, first, the agreement of the beneficiaries -­
they have all indicated that the Taylors should serve as co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that 
same agreement, have a guarantee in the disclaimer. So they have some interest in the 
proceeding. Their mother stands to gain and, thereby, they have an interest in the proceeding." 
(Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part One transcript of probate court hearing Exhibit "A"). 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
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The record is ample for an immediate appellate review under LR.C.P. Rule 54(b). This 
court has ruled that Res Judicata applies, which consequently defeat the claims ofthe plaintiffs 
and results in a potential trial based upon the defendants' counter-claims, which is driven by 
application of Res Judicata to the plaintiffs' claims. There could be no trial on the counter­
claims ifldaho Law precludes a party committing fraud and/or criminal activity in obtaining the 
prior judgment. A certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) would aid in the affective administrative 
ofjustice. 
The plaintiffs have now offered to the defendants to release their lis pendens. In addition 
the Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper had previously ruled that the filing of the lis pendens in the 
prior proceeding was warranted during the appeal. (Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support of 
Motion for Certification/Motion for Permissive Appeal). There can be no prejudice to the 
defendants in allowing an immediate appellate review as the defendants can do what they so 
desire relative to the real property that has been the subject ofthese proceedings. 
As stated in the case of Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Id. 185, 125 P.3d 1061 (2005): 
The purpose of Rule 54(b) was to liberalize the appeals process by permitting 
some partial judgments to be appealed earlier than they otherwise could have been 
appealed. Merchants, Inc. v. Intennountain Indus., Inc., 97 Idaho 890, 556 P.2d 
366 (1976). "Rule 54(b) was adopted to overcome the 'single judicial unit theory' 
which seriously inconvenienced persons involved in multi-party or multiple claim 
actions by forcing them to await the adjudication of 'the whole case and every 
matter in controversy in it' before being allowed to appeal." Id. at 892, 556 P.2d at 
368. 
The legal issues presented by the plaintiffs involve substantial issues involving the 
integrity of our judicial system. The certification under Rule 54(b) will produce an efficient, 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
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orderly determination ofjustice for all parties. 
3. In the Alternative the Plaintiffs Request That the Court Enter its Order 
Allowing a Permissive Appeal Pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 12. 
The plaintiffs believe that a certification pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(B) is a sensible approach 
to the litigation. The plaintiffs in the alternative request an order allowing a permissive appeal 
pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 12. 
I.A.R. Rule 12 provides: 
Permission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from an interlocutory 
order or decree of a district court in a civil or criminal action, or from an 
interlocutory order of an administrative agency, which is not otherwise appealable 
under these rules, but which involves a controlling question of law as to which 
there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate 
appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of 
the litigation. 
The parties would be best served by having the appellate court consider the issue which is 
central to this litigation, to wit: the affects of the doctrine of Res Judicata. This one legal issue 
controls the remaining claims contained in the counter-claims of the defendants. Idaho Law has 
not specifically ruled on the affects of criminal behavior under the Idaho Racketeering Statute in 
light of Res Judicata. Our appellate courts have not examined facts similar to the allegations 
raised by the plaintiffs relating to the defendants' misrepresentations to the court as to whether 
such facts are a "fraud upon the court". OUf Supreme Court can provide guidance as to whether 
the plaintiffs' allegations of perjury, obtaining money by false pretenses, and aiding and abetting 
perjury constitute such facts amounting to "tampering with the administration ofjustice' as to 
suggest 'a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public.'" Compton v. 
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Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 334, 612 P.2d 1175,1181 (1980). The facts of this case warrant an 
examination by our Supreme Court to determine the integrity of our judicial system. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs have offered to release any and all lis pendens filed which may affect the 
subject real property. The defendants are free to deal with the subject real property in any 
manner they choose. The Honorable Judge Wilper had previously ruled that the filing of the Lis 
Pendens in the prior case was warranted during the appeal process in the prior proceedings. 
There remains a controlling issue of Law, to wit: the affect of Res Judicata in light of the 
defendants' alleged wrongful behavior, that can be addressed by the Supreme Court. Our 
Supreme Court should provide their guidance as to whether the conduct of the defendants 
constitutes a "wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public." Our 
Supreme Court should determine whether Res Judicata is a bar in light of the allegations of the 
criminal behavior of the defendants. 
DATED this 13th day ofJuly, 2009. 
~"""-~J"n..,shire Investments, LLC 
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County of Ada ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.	 Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-
Maile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the information and facts set forth 
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can 
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
2.	 That the following pleadings were filed in the captioned matter known as Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, 
Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D, to wit: Exhibit "A" is a true and correct 
copy of the Motion for Appeal Bond or Order Removing Lis Pendens; Exhibit "B" is a 
true and correct copy of the Memorandum Brief in Opposition to the Plaintiffs/Counter-
Claimants' Motion for Appeal Bond or Order Removing Lis Pendens; Exhibit "C" is a 
true and correct copy of the Order entered March 1, 2007 relating to the Motion for 
Appeal Bond or Order Removing Lis Pendens, all of which are made a part hereof as if 
set forth in full herein. 
3.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy ofa letter to Connie Wright 
Taylor dated July 9,2009, together with the enclosures referenced therein and the same is 
made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER/MOTION FOR 







DATED this )jday of July, 2009. 
,I 
THOMAS G. ILE ,pro se and 
Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
.. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
/3 day of July, 2009. 
-~Cf~ .
 
Notary Public for Idaho Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC Residing at Boise, Idaho 
STATE OF IDAHO 
My Commission Expires July 30, 2014 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER/MOTION FOR 

































PAUL THOMAS CLARK 
CONNIE WRIGHT TA YLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys for PIa int iff's 
The Train Station, Suite 20 I 
13th and Main Streets 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
ISB# 1329 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND !"C)R TIlE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATI: COMPANY, 
and BERKSHIRE JNV ESTMENTS, LLC 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 




TIJOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN, 
MAILE, husband and wife, and 






























Case No. CV OC 0400473D 
MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND or 
ORDER REMOVING LIS PENDENS 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John Taylor (hereafter referred to as "the 
Beneficiary Plaintin:'l'·). by and through their attorney orrecord, Connie Wright Taylor of the tirm 
I'lOTION FOR AJ'PE.-\I BOND ur 












































of Clark & Feeney and. pursuant to LA.R. 13(b)( 14) and 13 (b)( 15), move this Court for an order 
requiring the DetCndants to either deposit with the court $1.8 million in cash or post a supersedeas 
bond in the amount of $2.448,000 as a condition or pursuing their appeal. 
This motion is made on the grounds and I'or the reasons that the Defendants have recorded 
a lis pendens (a true and correct copy of which is attached to this motion). This lis pendens was not 
filed with the Court. nor was a copy of it sent to opposing counsel. The lis pendens is the equivalent 
of a unilateral stay of this Court's order dated July 21. 2006 returning title of the real property at 
issue to the PlaintiJTs. Under the Idaho Appellate Rules, such a stay may be obtained only upon 
the posting of security. 
In the alternati ve. Plaintiffs move for an order removing the lis pendens from the Ada County 
Records and precluding the Defendants from tiling any subsequent lis pendens relating to the real 
property at issue in this maller without posting security. 
Oral argument is requested. 
C!/i , -,
 




COlllllC Wright Taylor, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-. /1': I'}
I HEREBY CERTIl"Y that on the -Li__ ~ day or.lanuary, 2007, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy oflhis document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas Maile 
Attorney at Law 
380 W. State 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Jack S. Gjording 
Gjording & Fouskr 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, ID 83702 
Dennis Charney 
Attorney at Law 
951 E. Plaza Dr. Stc. 140 
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ConnIe Wright Taylor ~
 
Attorney 1'01' Plaintiffs .
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I HEREBY CERT1J-'Y that on the ~ __ ~ day or January, 20 7, I caused to be served a true and 

























A110rney at Law 
380 . State 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Jack S. Gjording 
Gjording & Foush:;r 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, ID 83702 
Dennis Charney 
A 110rney at Law 
95 I E. Plaza Dr. Stc. 140 
Eagle, ID 83616 
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THOMAS G. MAlLE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
ADA COUNTY RECORDER J. DAVID NAVARRO AMOUNT 8.00 
BOISE IDAHO 05118106 04:10 PM 
DEPUTY Bonnie Oberbillig 
RECORDED - REQUEST OF III 1111111111111111111111111111111111 
'rhome. Malle 106078472 
Attorney for Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR ) 








THOMAS MAILE IV and COLLEEN ) 
MAILE, husband Wld wife, THOMAS ) 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY and ) 
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THOMAS MAILE IV. and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, and 










TO:	 ALL INTERESTED PARTIES 
RE:	 LITIGATION AFFECTING THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS BETWEEN AND 
AMONGST THE ABOVE-REFERENCED PARTIES 
The nature of the action supporting the above-named Defendants/Counter-Claimants' claim to 
the legal and equitable rights in the real property hereinafter described is a quiet title action, declaratory 
judgment, estoppel, filed in the above captioned matter in Ada COWlty, State ofIdaho, including a claim 
for damages, detennination of title and interests to the real property, costs and attorneys fees. 
The above Defendants/Counter-Claimants' claims an interest in said real property or properties 
described as follows: 
Lots I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, Block] of Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, 
recorded in Book 90 of Plats, at pages 10457 and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also 
known as, the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest ]/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, 
Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
DATED thisl.rf;y ofMay, 2006. 
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS - 2 
l:\AILQIMAII.E'irAYlo\t\usPENDNOT ~ 11,2006 
















V., individually, and as 
Managing member of Berkshire Investments L.L.C. 
  
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) S5. 
County of Ada ) 
On this ~day of May, 2006, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said 
state, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., known to be the managing member of Berkshire 
Investments L.L.C., and the individual, and further known to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same 
for Berkshire Invesime,lts L.L.c., and for himself individuaily. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the day and year last above 
t PUbl~raho 
Residing at , Idah 
Commission E ires: 'ZJIL9It)1 
written. 
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS - 3 
Z·IA\LOIMAII.f\TAYLORIUSPfND.NOT Moy 11.'006 
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DENNIS M. CHARNEY, ISB #4610 
JACOB D. DEATON, ISB #7470 
CHARNEY AND ASSOCIATES 
951 East Plaza Drive, Suite 140 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 938-9500 
Facsimile: (208) 938-9504 
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and 
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v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE 
REAL ESTATE COMPANY and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
) DEFENDANTS/COVNTER­
) CLAIMANTS'MEMORANDUM 
) BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
) PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
) APPEAL BOND OR ORDER 
) .REMOVING LIS PENDENS 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
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The Defendants/Counter-Claimants, by and through their attorney of record, Dennis M. 
Charney, provide their Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' 
Motion for Appeal Bond or Order Removing Lis Pendens. 
8TATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have filed their motion for an appeal bond and/or an 
order striking the Lis Pendens which was filed with the Ada County Recorder's Office on 
May 18, 2006. The Defendants/Counter~Claimants filed their Notice of Appeal on December 23, 
2006. The appellate court has retained jurisdiction of the above-captioned matter with the 
exception ofcertain post-judgment matters which are set forth in Idaho Appellate Rule 13. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
A.	 The Defendants/Counter-Claimants Are Entitled to tbe Continuation of the Lis 
Pendens Filed With the Ada County Recorder's Office, Without Any Requirement 
ora Bond 
The relevant portion ofIdaho Code Section 5-505, provides: 
5-505. LIS PENDENS. In an action affecting the title or 
the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff at the time of 
filing the complaint, and the defendant at the time of filing his 
answer, when affinnative relief is claimed in such answer, or at 
any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the 
COtUlty in which the property or some pm1 thereof is situated, a 
notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names of the 
parties, the object of the action or defense, and a description ofthe 
property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing 
such notice for record only shaH a purchaser or incumbrancer of 
the property affected thereby be deemed to have constructive 
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency 
against parties designated by their real names. 
Id (emphasis added). 
The present matter before the court requires this Court to construe the plain meaning and 
intention of Idaho Code Section 5-505. The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
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which this Court exercises free review. Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm 'n, 
113 Idaho 959, 751 P.2d 107,109·10 (1988). When interpreting a statute, the primary function 
of the court is to detennine and give effect to the legislative intent. George w: Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990). Such intent should be derived from a reading 
of the whole act at issue. Id. at 539, 797 P.2d at 1387-88. If the statutory language is 
unambiguous, "the clearly expressed intent ofthe legislative body must be given effect, and there 
is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction." Payette River Property 
O»mers Ass 'n v. Board ofCornm 'rs a/Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477, 483(1999). 
The plain meaning of a statute, therefore, will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent 
is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. George W. Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540,797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990); Driver v. Sf Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 
429,80 P.3d 1024, 1030 (2003). 
The Idaho statute relating to the right to file a lis pendens is straightforward. There is no 
additional language contained in the statute that would defeat the Defendants/Counter-
Claimants' rights to rely upon their properly recorded notice to the world that litigation is 
pending which may affect the rights of the parties to real property involved in the litigation. 
There is nothing in the statute that supports any of the contentions of the Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants in their present motion before the court that the lis pendens should be stricken or that 
a bond needs to be filed. 
As stated in the case of DeRousse v. Higginson, 95 Idaho 173, 176, 505 P.2d 321, 324 
(1973): 
In making such a statutory interpretation or construction, it is a 
"... Wliversal rule of statutory construction that a statute must be 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR APPEAL BOND OR 
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'",-.. ' 
construed in the light of its intent and purpose." Jorstad v. City of 
Lewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 125,456 P.2d 766, 769 (1969). 
The primary function of the appellate court in construing a 
statute is to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect thereto. 
Knight v. Employment Security Agency, 88 Idaho 262, 398 P.2d 
643 (1965); Messengerv. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 382P.2d 913 
(1963); Lebrecht v. Union Indemnity Co., 53 Idaho 228, 22 P.2d 
1066, 89 A.L.R. 640 (1933)." Idaho Public Utilities 
Commission v. VI Oil Co., 90 Idaho 415, 420, 412 P.2d 581, 583 
(1966). 
Furthermore, if possible, it is incumbent upon a court to 
give a statute an interpretation which will not in effect nullify it. 
Filer Mutual Telephone Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 
76 Idaho 256, 261, 281 P.2d 478 (1955)." 
"We adhere to the cardinal rules of construction which 
require that courts should not nullify a statute or deprive a law of 
potency and force unless such course is absolutely necessary; 
meaning and effect should be given to every section of a code in 
all its parts, if possible to do so." Sampson v. Layj;o..n, 86 Idaho 
453,457,387 P.2d 883 (1963). 
Id at 176-77, 505 P.2d at 324-25. 
The above authority clearly establishes that our Idaho legislators chose the wording of 
Idaho Code Section 5-505 to include the right to maintain a lis pendens throughout the judicial 
process. Idaho Code Section 5-505 demonstrates the legislative intent and clearly establishes the 
right to the continued protection of a filed lis pendens during the entire judicial proceeding. 
The case of Joseph c.L. U Ins. Assoc., Inc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 
(CLApp. 1990), provides: 
A lis pendens is a notice to the world of the existence of a 
claim affecting certain real property. See I.e. § 5-505; Suitts v. 
First Security Bank ofIdaho, NA., 100 Idaho 555, 559, 602 P.2d 
53, 57 (1979). The lis pendens does not purport, by itself, to 
establish or to change anyone's legal rights. Of course, the filing 
of a lis pendens may highlight a possible legal problem affecting 
the property, thereby inducing an extra measure of caution by 
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....... 
potential purchasers or lenders until the litigation is concluded. 
But this does not mean that any underlying legal rights have been 
altered. 
ld. at 557-58, 789 P.2d at 1148-49. 
The Joseph case authority establishes that the filing of a lis pendens does not "change the 
legal rights" of the litigants. It is simply a recorded document giving notice to the world that 
litigation has been instituted which may affect the underlying property. 
In short, Idaho Code Section 5-505 permits a plaintiff or defendant to file a lis pendens 
with the county recorder as notice of the pendency of the action. A lis pendens remains in effect 
for the duration of an action including any appeal. See Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 
100 Idaho 555, 602 P.2d 53 (1979). In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that absent a 
statutory stay, a defendant could protect himself against the "transfer of the property in question 
to a bona fide purchaser during the pendency of the appeal by filing a lis pendens." ld. at 559. 
This is so because "[t]he effect of filing a lis pendens is that a person who purchases or acquires 
rights in the subject matter of the litigation during the pendency of the action (which 
encompasses appeal) takes subject to the final disposition of the case." ld. ; see also 
Radermacher v. Daniels, 64 Idaho 376, 133 P.2d 713, 715 (1943); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 
1381, 1389-90 (Utah 1996) (holding lis pendens was proper during appeal, as outcome of case 
would be detennined after appeal). 
Other jurisdictions are in accord. See generally Blake v. Gilbert, 702 P.2d 631 (Alaska 
1985) (lis pendens remains in effect where appeal is taken, so that posting supersedeas bond or 
moving to continue lis pendens pending appeal is not necessary); Kennedy v. Dawson) 296 Mont. 
430, 989 P.2d 390 (1999) (notice of appeal and lis pendens effectively preserves the status quo 
pending appeal); Gardner v. Perry City, 994 P.2d 811 (Utah App. 2000) (ordering reinstatement 
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of the	 lis pendens because the appellant's interest in the subject property depended upon the 
outcome of the case on remand); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1389-90 (Utah 1996) 
(holding lis pendens was proper during appeal as outcome of case would be detennined after 
appeal). 
Here,	 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants argue that the lis pendens should be removed 
because it is ''the equivalent of a unilateral stay of the Court's order" and that such a stay "may 
be obtained only upon the posting of security." Both assertions are wrong. Nothing about the lis 
pendens prevents the voiding the contract between the parties or prevents the title from being 
quieted	 to the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. The lis pendens merely provides notice of the 
pending litigation. As such, the lis pendens should be left in effect until the Defendants/Counter-
Claimants' appeal has ended. 
Further, as the court noted in Suit/s, a lis pendens is available absent a statutory stay. The 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have not provided any other authority or basis for their claim that 
such an effect can only be obtained through a statutory stay. An examination of the relevant 
authorities supports the opposite conclusion. Further, there is no statutory authQrity requiring the 
lis pendens to be stricken during the appellate process. Idaho law authorizes the continuation of 
the lis pendens on appeal without the necessity of any bond. 
B.	 Idaho Appellate Rules 13(b)(l4) and (15) Require the Posting of an Appeal Bond 
Only if a Party Seeks a Stay of Execution 
During the pendency of an appeal, a district court's authority is limited to the extent set 
out in Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b). See Desfasses v. Desjosses, 120 Idaho 27, 813 P.2d 366 
(Ct.App. 1991). Rules 13(b)(l4) and (15) grant a district court the authority to stay execution or 
enforcement of any judgment "upon the posting" of an appeal bond. However, a district COUJt 
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has the authority to require the posting of a bond only if a party seeks a stay of execution. See 
Bernardv. Roby, 112 Idaho 583, 589, 733 P.2d 804, 810 (Ct.App. 1987). In Bernard, the court 
noted that the posting of an appeal bond is not a requirement for appeal and that a failure to post 
an appeal bond merely exposes an appellant to execution of the previollsjudgment. Id. at 589. 
Here, Defendants/Counter-Claimants are not seeking a stay of execution from this Court. 
The present motion is being brought by the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, the prevailing party 
on their own motion for sUIIumuy judgment. If, on one hand, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
are requesting this Court enter a stay against their own judgment in an effort to require the 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants to post an appeal bond, such a request would be nonsensical. If, 
on the other hand, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' request is not a request to stay the 
previously entered judgment, but rather a unilateral request for an appeal bond, such a request 
should be denied because an appeal bond is not a requirement for taking an appeal. It appears 
that Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' request to require a multi-million dollar appeal bond is, in 
reality, an attempt to prevent Defendants/Counter-Claimants from taking their rightful appeal. 
This Court should reject Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' request. The posting of an appeal bond 
should only be required when a stay is requested by the appealing party. Since that is not the 
case in the motion before the Court, Defendants/Counter-Claimants need not post an appeal 
bond. 
C.	 Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(lS) Is Inapplicable Because the Judgment in the Present 
Case Is Not a Money Judgment 
Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(l5) grants a district court jurisdiction to hear a request to 
"[s]tay execution or enforcement of a money judgment." LA.R 13(b)(15). Black's Law 
Dictionary defines a money judgment as "[0]ne which adjudges the payment of a sum of money, 
DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
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"~ .. ' 
as distinguished from one directing an act to be done or property to be restored or transferred." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 5th ed. p. 757 (emphasis added). Further, Idaho courts have noted 
that judgments affecting the right to property are not money judgments. See, e.g., Barnes v. 
Buffalo Pitts Co., 6 Idaho 519, 57 P. 267 (1899); Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, l38, 74 P.2d 
1289, 1326 (1986) (Bistline, 1., dissenting) (citing with approval Black's Law Dictionary's 
definition ofmoney judgment). 
Here, the judgment entered by this Court from which Defendants/Counter-Claimants' 
appeal is taken voided the contract between the parties. No award of money was granted. Thus 
the judgment was not a money judgment. As such, Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(15) does not 
apply to the present motion. Even if the Court determines that the previous judgment is in fact a 
money judgment, the analysis found in Section B precludes this Court from granting 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' request. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' request that an appeal bond be required or that the 
lis pendens be removed should be rej ected for three reasons: (1) Idaho law authorizes an 
appellant to maintain a lis pendens in effect for the duration of the appeal; (2) an appeal bond is 
not a requirement for the taking of an appeal and the Defendants/Counter-Claimants have not 
requested a stay of execution from the Court; and (3) the judgment previously entered by this 
Court is not a money judgment. As such, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' attempt to prevent 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants' rightful appeal by requiring the posting of a multi-million dollar 
appeal bond should be rejected. 
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Further, without a statutory basis or a rule that allows this Court to exercise jurisdiction 
as requested by the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, no basis exists to grant the relief sought by 
the Plaintiffs/CQunter~Defendants. 
DATED this 14th day of February, 2007. 
DENNIsdi 
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of February, 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Connie W. Taylor ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Paul Thomas Clark ( ) Hand Delivered 
Clark and Feeney ( ) Overnight Mail 
1229 Main Street (X) Facsimile 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Fax: (208) 746-9160 
Jack S. Gjording ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Gjording and Fauser ( ) Hand Delivered 
509 West Hays Street ( ) Overnight Mail 
Post Office Box 2837 eX) Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Fax: 336-9177 
Thomas G. Maile, IV ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Attorney at Law ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 West State Street ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 (X) Facsimile 
Fax: 939-1001 
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DENNIS M. CHARNEY, ISB #4610FEB 2 6 2007 
JACOB D. DEATON, ISB #7470 Ada. Cm.mtv Clerk. 
CllARNEY AND ASSOCIATES . 
951 East Plaza Drive. Suite 140 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 938-9500 
Facsimile: (208) 938-9504 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
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A.M I/r2}t~~M----, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
REED TAYLO~ DALLAN TAYLOR, and. 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
mOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAlLE, husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE 
REAL ESTATE COMPANY and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
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No.4231 p. 3/3Feb.26, 2007 11:02AM "­
The Court, having considered the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' motion to release lis 
pendens, or, alternatively, motion to require the Defendants/Counter-Claimants to post an appeal 
bond hereby denies both motions. 
SO ORDERED this111;of F-el, J ,2007. 
cz"ERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this L day of !JJl" Iff-1, 2007~ I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served ~thod indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Connie W. Taylor 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark and Feeney 
1229 Main Street 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewimon,DD 83501 
Fax: (208) 746-9160 
Thomas G. Maile, rv 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eilgle. ID 83616 
Fax: 939-1001 
Dennis M. Charney 
CHARNEY AND ASSOCIATES 
951 East Plaza Drive, Suite 140 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Fax: 938·9504 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaia. 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail
M Facsimile 
( ) u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail
\xl Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail
(yJ Facsimile 
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LAw OFFICE OF 
TJHIOMAS G. MAKlLE, IV, P.A. 
380 WEST STATE STREET, EAGLE, IDAHO 83616 
















Re:	 Johnson Trust, Taylor v, Thomas & Colleen Maile, et.al
 
Consolidated Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D
 
Our File No. M04-5109.0
 
Dear Ms. Taylor: 
Please find enclosed a proposed Satisfaction ofJudgment related to the costs outstanding on 
the above captioned matter, together with a propose Release ofLis Pendens. Berkshire Investments, 
my wife and I will execute the Release of Lis Pendens on all current Lis Pendens upon receiving a 
certified check for the balance owing from the $400,000.00 minus costs and interest awarded which 
is referenced in the enclosed Satisfaction of Judgment. If you would calculate the interest on the 
judgment and the appellate costs, please provide my office with your calculations. I see no reason 
why the exchange of monies and the appropriate release cannot be handle as a typical real estate 
closing transaction, to wit: simultaneously. 
Please make the appropriate arrangements to obtain the certified funds payable to Berkshire 
Investments, LLC along with the executed Satisfaction of Judgment. We will file, 
contemporaneously with the exchange of the same, our proposed Release of Lis Pendens. 
TOM/mp 
\·I>m'~.... lJlk';II [D'~I·\lLE"T"YU)R'c"lV1i~liJ..l"r II.... wpd 
Enclosures 















       
           
'I>m'~"flJlk'; \lLE\T"\ 1i~IiJ  I  ""I'
RELEASE OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That the undersigned, THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., on behalf of and as attorney for 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, whose address is 380 W. State Street, Eagle, Idaho, do hereby release that certain Notice 
of Lis Pendens dated and recorded on May 18,2006, as Instrument Number 106078472 at the 
offices of the Ada County Recorder, State ofIdaho, as well as that certain Notice of Lis Pendens 
dated and recorded March 25, 2008, as Instrument Number 108033598 at the office ofthe Ada 
County Recorder, State of Idaho, in and for that certain parcel of real property described as The 
Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, 
Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
DATED This __ day of July, 2009. 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., Individually and as 
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC 
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
On this day of July, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public for said 
State, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., known or acknowledged to me to be the 
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, and the 
person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he 
executed said document on behalf of said limited liability company. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day 
and year first above written. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 




   
 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
KNOW ALL THESE PRESENTS, that the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants above-named 
do hereby certify that the costs awarded in the Order entered on April 6, 2007 by the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in the amount of$12, 424.04, together with the appellate costs in the 






amount of $514.00, together with interest thereon against the above-named Defendants/Counter-
Claimants and in favor of the above-named Plaintiffs in the said District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State ofIdaho in and for the County ofAda, is fully paid, satisfied and 
discharged. 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, Taylors and Theodore L. Johnson Trust, release and 
forever discharge the Defendants/Counter-Claimants from any and all liability associated to any 
and all Judgments and Orders entered awarding costs together with interest thereon, relating to 
the above captioned matters. 
DATED this __ day ofJuly, 2009. 
CONNIE WRIGHT-TAYLOR 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 






On this __ day of July, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for 
said State, personally appeared CONNIE WRIGHT-TAYLOR, known or acknowledged to me to 
be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument and 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the 
day and year in this certificate first above written. 
























































































IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
 






CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This cause came on before the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood for hearing on the 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' counterclaims. 
ORDER DENYING PLAn\JTIFFS'MOTION
 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1
 
LAW OFFICES OF 









































































Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw contained within this Court's July 2, 
2009 Memorandum Decision and Order, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. The Defendants' request for attorney fees and costs, as well as sanctions under Rule 
11, is reserved. --:-J 
DATED this& day o;J_rJ -----F_---1C­
T 
CLERK'S CE TIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~daWI f JA/, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by th~cated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas Maile, IV ~ U.S. Mail
 
Attorney at Law o Hand Delivered
 
380 West State Street o Overnight Mail
 
Eagle, ID 83616 o Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
 
Connie W. Taylor U.S. Mail
 
Clark and Feeney , 0 Hand Delivered
 
PO Box 285 o Overnight Mail
 
Lewiston, ID 83501 o Telecopy (FAX) 
Y
 
Mark Prusynski /~ U.S. Mail
 
MOFFATT THOMAS o Hand Delivered ",';:~~tf"
 
"~I ," 'l,~ 
101 S Capitol Blvd., lOth Floor o Overnight Mail ..."" ~!-\C 1 co{; 2''".,;­
PO Box 829 o Telecopy (FAX) (~~~!~••••'r/> ........ 
~ ~ •• .A •• ~, ":Boise, ID 83701 =~ : -~ -. ' 
• • ... 1 
1~.~11 THE DISTR[CT:COORT 
,,­
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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RECEIVED '-- NO. _ 
A.M_ "FirED-----­JUL 15 2a09 
---~-PM.--....­
Ada County Cler~. 
JUL 202009 
J. DAVID NAVAR 
By JENNIFER K RO, CI k 
DEPUTY ENNEDY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, 




CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIMS 
This cause came on before the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood for hearing on the 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. Based upon the findings offact and conclusions of 
law contained within this Court's July 2,2009 Memorandum Decision and Order, 
JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 





































NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. The Plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice. 
~~ (,;9~. --"'Tf1;H~8"'}D~e~p~ec.wcl~~u;A~t8,.,aM!'e'c11llmle;pr:nI"eev:vamitilinIig:t!"1'lP'dldi't~lte' 81&8-HiH:~ttl:llU-li !si;-IH:JH:aa~tt~fM' .• 
DATED this/& day od/, 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the rJrJ da of ,2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the m icated below, and addressed to the 
following: /' 
Thomas Maile, IV ,z:r U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law D Hand Delivered 
380 West State Street D Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616 D Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Connie W. Taylor ~ U.S. Mail
 
Clark and Feeney I D Hand Delivered
 
PO Box 285 D Overnight Mail
 
Lewiston, ID 83501 D Telecopy (FAX)
 
Mark Prusynski ~.S. Mail
 
MOFFATT THOMAS D Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., lOth Floor D Overnight Mail " .......,
 
PO Box 829 D Telecopy (FAY\f!lk~'!!f4',
• '$' ~\., ""I~'" \::"1'~ ,
B' ID 83701 ..........~ •••••••• ~o'"
Olse, ~ r§ ••• ;.. ~.'-:. 
:::>1".• .-n .• or~ J. '..' .... c. -. ~. ~i ,, ­
CLERK OF THIi ~lflTRK:Td=O~R~~-, : _ _. ::r:: "l] • "­-.,,-. a c;" ......~.:0- '...., :._ 
-;.. t~~ e. !... ~. r>, 
~;-'!'''. ". ,< .....' 
~, e-~~-'-'-"-­
De ut fIJ  
JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 001417
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
:~ If;~fz:!.~.r;_·_......__­
JUl2 1 2009 




Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile DepUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
I.R.c.P. RULE 54(B) RE: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDERIMOTION FOR 
PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 
12 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDERIMOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 ­
001418
 








County of Ada ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.	 Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-
Maile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the information and facts set forth 
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can 
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial 
ofthis matter. 
2.	 That attached hereto as "Exhibit A" is a true and correct copy of the recorded Lis 
Pendens, recorded July 13, 2009, the same incorporated herewith by reference herein as if 
set forth in full herein. 
DATED this 7) day of July, 2009. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
;l / day of July, 2009. 
Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30,2014 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 




AlLE, IV, pro se and 




I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the U day of July, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing, (1) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Mark Stephen Prusynski () u. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., Pro Se and counsel for 
Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDERIMOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 -




NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS 
KNOW ALL PERSON BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That the undersigned, THOMAS G. MAILE, N, on behalf of and as attorney for 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE and Pro se, whose address is 380 
W. State Street, Eagle, Idaho, does hereby release and forever discharge that certain Notice of Lis 
Pendens, dated March 25,2008 and recorded on March 25, 2008, as Instrument Number 108033598 
at the offices of the Ada County Recorder, State of Idaho, in and for that certain parcel of real 
property known described as follows: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 
1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
DATED This BayofJuly, 2009. 
( 
THOMJ\ G. 
BERKSHIREEST-MENTS, LLC, COLLEEN 
BIRCH-MAILE and Pro se 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County ofAda ) 
On this.-a day ofJuly, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public for said State, 
personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, N, known or acknowledged to me to be the attorney for 
BERKSHTREINVESTMENTS,LLC,COLLEENBIRCH-MAILEandProseandtheperson whose 
name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed said 
document. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day and 
yem tirst above written. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
I, PPViD ~~A/!\h,;(), /,. 
,-'~\' F, li[!U "_:~,:'~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AMENDED MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: 
JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMSIMOTION 
FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 
12 
COMES NOW, Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile and, Thomas G. 
Maile, IV, pro se and attorney of record for co-plaintiffs herein, and pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 
AMENDED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) 
RE: JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE 





    JNj.RKSIII1UN"" .. ld_~"   
54(b), request certification from the Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims entered July 20, 
2009, or in the alternative a request for a permissive appeal pursuant to LA.R. Rule 12, and 
incorporate by reference herein as if set forth in full herein the Motion, Affidavit and Brief filed 
on the 13th day of July, 2009 as if set forth in . 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED ON THIS MOTION. 
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2009. 
T SG. 
Pro Se and counsel erkshire Investments, LLC 
and Colleen Birch-Maile 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 3rd day of August, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy ofthe foregoing, (1) AMENDED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
LR.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION FOR 
PERMISSIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12, together with the (2) 
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Mark Stephen Prusynski () U. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
AMENDED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) 
RE: JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
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Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
AMENDED MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: 
JUDGMENT DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION 
FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 
12 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12 - Pg lc_"""kl_~"'~"\Il\BERKSHlIt"'V'<I''''_~''''''''''lIido''"ft'''",,,, 
001424
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County of Ada ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.	 Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-
Maile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the information and facts set forth 
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can 
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
2.	 That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the recorded Release of 
Lis Pendens filed August 3, 2009 bearing Instrument No. 109090496 and the same is 
incorporated herein by reference herein as if set forth in full herein. 
3.	 That attached hereto as "B" is a true and correct copy of the recorded Notice of Vendee's 
Lien filed August 3, 2009 bearing Instrument No. 109090497 and the same is 
incorporated herein by reference herein as if set forth in full herein. 
DATED thiS~' day of August, 2009. 
THOMAS G. M IL ,IV, pro se and 
Attorney for Berks ire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
i~ day of August, 2009. 
?;r~~ 
otary Pubhc for Idaho 






SEC( ND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL 













c,,"_""'"_~''I~''\R RERj(SHlR.IN\'''''''''' U_ffi'''''OIl''''''  
My Commission Expires July 30,2014 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the J~ of August, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing, (1) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE IN SUPPORT 
OF AMENDED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) 
RE: JUDGMENT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE 
APPEAL PURSUANT TO THE I.A.R. RULE 12, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Mark Stephen Prusynski () U. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail 
CLARK. and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
THOMAS G. MAILE, N., Pro Se and counsel for 
Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMSIMOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
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RELEASE OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That the undersigned, THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., individually, and on behalf of and as 
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN 
BIRCH-MAILE, whose address is 380 W. State Street, Eagle, Idaho, do hereby release that 
certain Not~ of Lis Pendens dated and recorded on May 18, 2006, as Instrument Number 
106078472 at the offices ofthe Ada County Recorder, State ofIdaho, in and for that certain 
parcel of real property described as The Northwest Quarter ofthe Southwest Quarter of Section 
36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
DATED This 3rd day of August, 2009. 
, //"?
f-···/ 
T G. MA E, IV., Individually and as 
attomey for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC 
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
On this 3rd day of August, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public for said 
State, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IY., known or acknowledged to me to be the 
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, and the 
person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he 
executed said document on behalf of said limited liability company, Colleen Birch-Maile and by 
himself. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day 
and year first above written. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30,2014 
Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
ADA COUNTY RECORDfP , DAVID NAVARRO AMOUNT 6.00 2 
BOISE IDAHO 08103109 -.111 AM 
~~~~~E~i:k~:~~~ST OF 1111111111111111111111111111111111111 
Berkshire Inveslments 113913913497 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES
 
Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
NOTICE OF VENDEE'S LIEN 
RE: Berkshire Investments L.L.C., Notice of Vendee's Lien 
The nature of the vendee's lien is made pursuant to I.C. 45-804, for the re-payment of the 
purchase price paid by Berkshire Investments L.L.C., to the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 











Trust. That the principal sum paid was $400,000.00 which is due and owing minus any costs 
and interest thereon awarded in the above captioned matter. 
Berkshire Investments L.L.C, claims its vendee's lien in said real property or properties 
described as follows: 
Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6, 7,8,9, Block 1 of Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, 
recorded in Book 90 of Plats, at pages 10457 and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also 
known as, the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, 
Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
DATED this 3rd day ofAugust, 2009. (/~-r---,,--'_7j~_7¥b,,--,-j_-_~{ _ 
yfoMAiG. ¥AILE, N., attorney for 
Berkshire Invest~nts L.L.C. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On this 3rd day of August, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for 
said state, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., known to be the attorney for Berkshire 
Investments L.L.C., and further known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for Berkshire 
Investments L.L.c. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day 
and year first above written. 
J:hLL~-z/L C~-
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30, 2014 
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CONNIE W, TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 743~9516 
ISBA No, 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants 
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor 
and the Theodore Johnson Trust 
NO.2472 P. 2 
ANOM·.~_:~(/_FllED - ~ ._P.M.__--t 
AUG 2 1 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE FOURTH roDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, N, 




CONNIE WRIGHT TAnOR, flkJa CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLANTAYLO~ 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trost; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR RULE 54(B) 
CERTIFICATION 
THE DEFENDANTS Theodore L. lohnsonRevocable Trost, Jo1m Taylorand DaHanTaylor, 
by and through their attomey ofrecord, hereby notify the court and counsel that they do not oppose 
entry of a certificate offinal judgment on this Court's order dismissing the claims of the Plaintiff. 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION 1 
LAW O"IC!::Si OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LE:WISTON, IOAH 0 63'30 I 001430
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Defendants' position is based upon the following considerations: 
1.	 The Plaintiff has stated unequivocally that he will appeal the order dismissing his 
claims, and we believe it is in the best interest of all parties to have that appeal 
concluded as soon as possible. Because this is the third appeal relating to these 
issues, we believe there is a good chance that the appeal 'Will proceed quickly. 
2.	 The existence of this litigation on the ownership ofthe property must be disclosed 
to potential lenders, which prevents the Jahnson Trust from borrowing the funds 
necessary to return the original purchase price to these Plaintiffs pursuant to Judge 
Wilper's judgments. 
3.	 The Plaintiffs' Fourth Affinnative Defense to the Defendants' cOlmterclaims (see 
Reply dated March 17,2009) alleges a failure to mitigate their damages. Defendants 
are concerned that this Plaintiffwill allege that any failure to cooperate in efforts to 
expedite the Plaintiffs' appeal is a breach of that duty. 
4.	 We are going into the eighth year of litigation involving the Plaintiffs' attempt to 
purchase the Linder Road property. lfthe appeal ofthe Plaintiffs' claim to quiet title 
to the property is delayed until after the November 2010 trial of the counterclaims, 
it will likely be 2012 or later before the title to the property is cleared. 
For the reasons stated above, the Jobnson Trust, John Taylor, and Dallan Taylor respectfully 
request that this Court grant the Plaintiffs' motion for certification under I.R.C.P. 54(b). 
DATED this 2I1!day of August, 2009. 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION 2
 
I.AW OFFICES OF' 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
t..e:W'SiON, IDAHO 8:3501 001431

























































































CLARK and FEENEY 
By_---=:::::::,~¢::~~~---~--­
~onnie . aylor, a member of the firm. 
A meys for Johnson Trust, John Taylor, and DaHan Taylor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 'l.dh day of August, 2009 I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV o U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street o Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, ID 83616 Overnight Mail
¢ Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
 
Mark Prusynski o U.S. Mail
 
MOFFATI THOMAS o Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., lOth Floor o Overnight Mail
 
PO Box 829 Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384
 
Boise, ID 83701 ~
 
2~~aYIOr 
Attorney for Defendants 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION 3
 
LAW OFFices 01" 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
L,"WISTON, IOAHO B31!!Ol 001432








































THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law '112 
380 West State Street C t: I V 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 Stp 12D 
Telephone: (208) 939-1QPc£ I,~") 2009 
Idaho State Bar No. 237g l q C'OU/Jf 
ijl Clerk 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
NO·-----rr'""relbr--­
A.M P.M. _ 
SEP 2B2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Cler.~ 
By JENNIFER KENNEDY 
OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATIONIMOTION FOR 
PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
THIS MATIER having come before the Court pursuant to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Certification/Motion for Permissive Appeal with Thomas G. Maile, IV appearing on behalf of the 
Plaintiffs and Connie Taylor appearing on behalf of DaHan Taylor, R. John Taylor and the 
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION/MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
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 · bad; 6cl locr ...-Jfilc5\o.\BUJERKSH1R.JN\"w;:I.~\  
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and Mark S. Prusynski appearing on behalf of Clark and 
Feeney and Connie Wright Taylor and the Court having considered the matter herein and none of 
the Defendants having opposed the motion, with defendants Dallan Taylor, R. John Taylor and 
the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust specifically filing their Notice of Non-Opposition to 
the plaintiffs' motions, and the court having considered the record and argument of counsel; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDER AND THIS DOES ORDER that permission is hereby granted 
for an interlocutory appeal of the Judgment entered on July 20, 2009 and the appeal is hereby 
authorized and ordered. That an interlocutory appeal of the issues contained in the court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order dated July 2,2009 which resulted in the above referenced 
Judgment would resolve controlling questions oflaw as to which there are substantial grounds 
for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the order and Judgment would 
materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation pursuant to LA.R. Rule 12(a). ; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the current scheduling 
order and trial date set on the Counter-Claim is vacated pending further order of this Court. 
DATED this & day of September, 2009. 







THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
DEC 03 2009 
,J. DAVID NAVARRO C 
By J. RANDALL' ler~ 
Oept/TV 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k1a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
RENEWED MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: 
JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 
2009 
COMES NOW, Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile and, Thomas G. 
Maile, IV, pro se and attorney of record for co-plaintiffs herein, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 
54(b), request that the Court enter its Judgment on the Memorandum Decision and Order filed 
RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) 








  M ;"""I ERKS"IR N\"''' '_ mo''~fi~" ,"' '.'
July 2,2009 and the resulting Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims entered July 20,2009, 
containing the language, as provided, to wit: 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has 
determined that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment 
and that the court has and does hereby direct that the above judgment or order 
shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be 
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules 
This Motion is on the grounds set fort above and the record and file herein, and the 
Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas Maile and the accompanying Memorandum Brief filed 
concurrently herewith. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED ON THIS MOTION. 
DATED this 3 day of December, 2009. 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments, LLC 
and Colleen Birch-Maile 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the .3 day of December, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, (1) RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT 
TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20,2009, (2) AFFIDAVIT OF 
THOMAS MAILE IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 2009 and (3) 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20,2009 to be delivered, addressed 
as follows: 
RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) 
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Mark Stephen Prusynski 
PO Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 785 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
() U. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
() U. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
THOMAS G. MA E ., Pro Se and counsel for 
Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.c.P. RULE 54(B) 








, "" . """ R"'' ""~", , ~"c."  "
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 









Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHJ-..rSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
RENEWED MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: 
JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 
2009 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
PURSUANT TO I.R.c.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20,2009 - Pg 1 












 ..-11;1 01.'11 J...Sf IR 1)I;\"d;.n.r«n<:\  ~.~(km' I,>onom,fic~lion,wpd 
1.	 Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-
Maile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the infonnation and facts set forth 
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can 
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
2.	 That the following pleadings were filed in the captioned matter known as Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IV and Colleen Maile and Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, 
Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D, to wit: Exhibit "A" is a true and correct 
copy of the Order Denying Motion for Order Releasing Vendee's Lien by Judge Wilper 
on October 14,2009, and the same is made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
3.	 That attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the Verified Motion for 
Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien filed November 5, 2009 and the same is made a part hereof 
as if set froth in full herein. 
DATED this 3 day of December, 2~?----,-==-- _ 
THOMAS G. MAI~ pro se and 
Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
~ day of December, 2009. 
Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30, 2014 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 2009 - Pg 2 






DATED this 3 day of December, ~~ 
MASG:MAItF,1 
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OCT 14 2009
 
.J. DAVI~ R;~, Clerk 
Fiy__ '" '. " 
.7 1)'Cf'I.'l' 
iN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIA 1/TPiCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT! OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
vs. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOC 0400473D
 






This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Releasing Vendee's 
Lien. The Court heard oral argument on Monday, October 5, 2009. Connie Taylor appeared 
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telephonically for the Plaintiffs and Thomas Maile appeared in person for the Defendants. At that 
time, the Court considered the matter fully under advisement. 
Thomas Maile was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included drafting 
the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, overseeing the administration of 
the trust, and representing the estate after Johnson's death. The underlying transaction in this case is 
a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor of the trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson 
entered into an earnest money agreement for the purchase of forty acres in Eagle, rD, which Maile 
had previously advised Johnson not to convey to a third party. The purchase price was $400,000 and 
the property was conveyed by the successor trustee after Johnson passed away. Beneficiaries of the 
trust brought suit. 
Maile fi led a lis pendens against the property on May 18, 2006. On July 21, 2006, the Court 
held that the land sale was void pursuant to Idaho law and ordered the land be returned to Plaintiffs 
and the purchase money be returned to Defendants, less any amounts the Defendants may be able to 
prove in an unjust enrichment counterclaim. On December 11, 2006, the Court entered a judgment 
in favor of the Plaintiffs on the counterclaim. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld this Court's 
judgment on January 30,2009. 
On December 31, 2007, Maile filed a new complaint against the beneficiaries and their 
attorneys, once again contesting ownership of the property. Maile filed a second lis pendens on May 
25,2008. On July 2,2009, the Honorable Judge Richard Greenwood dismissed all of Maile's claims 
under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion. In that litigation, the beneficiaries' counterclaims 
remain to be resolved. Maile and his related entities have informed this Court of their intention to 
appeal Judge Greenwood's ruling. 



















































































On May 7, 2009, the Court entered an Order Denying Motion to Compel Payment of 
Judgment and Interest, holding that it was the intention of this Court in its July 21,2006 order to 
void the underlying transaction returning all parties to the position they had been in prior to the 
transaction and that because the property had not been returned free of encumbrance, it was not the 
time to order a return of the purchase money. On August 3, 2009, Defendants filed a release of the 
May 2006 lis pendens. On that same day Defendants filed a notice of vendee's lien on the subject 
property. 
Plaintiffs seeks an order releasing the vendee's lien, contending that the lien is inappropriate 
in light of this Court's ruling that the transaction was void as a matter of law. Defendants counter 
that Plaintiffs are in possession of the purchase money and that Idaho Code § 45-804 authorizes a 
vendee's lien to secure the return of that money. 
Idaho Code § 45-804 states: 
One who pays to the owner any part of the price of real property, under an 
agreement for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the property, independent of 
possession, for such part of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover back, in 
case of a failure of consideration. 
Although there has not been a failure of consideration in this transaction, the Court has 
found the transaction to be void and ordered a return of the property and a return of the purchase 
money to return each party as nearly as possible to the position they would have been in had the 
transaction not occurred. As a matter of equity, Defendants are entitled to maintain a lien against the 
property to secure the return of the purchase price, less costs which have been previously awarded 
by the Court. Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Releasing Vendee's Lien is DENIED. 
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The Court finds that the vendee's lien filed August 3, 2009 is sufficient to secure the return 
of the purchase price. Therefore the Court orders that no new lis pendens are to be filed against the 
subject property in this litigation. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~ 
7 f 
Dated this /,P day of October, 2009. 
j 
,- ­






















































































CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, HEREBY CERTIFY that on the tf'-day of October, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy
 
of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ORDER RELEASING VENDEE'S LIEN to be
 
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
 
"tfi U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid Connie Taylor 
( ) Hand Delivered P.O. Drawer 285
 
( ) Overnight Mail Lewiston, ill 83501
 
( ) Facsimile 
t4U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid Thomas G. Maile 
( ) Hand Delivered 380 W. State 
( ) Overnight Mail Eagle, ill 83616
 
( ) Facsimile 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
AdaCountY0 
By i~,'f1. ;~···:~\.~~._':i~ 




































THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorney for Berkshire Investments LLC 
r' : . 
I 
, , ~ ,. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR 
FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S 
LIEN 
COMES NOW, the Defendants/Counter-Claimant, BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
by and through its attorney, Thomas G. Maile, IV., and hereby moves this Court for the following 
relief as follows: 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 1 
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The above captioned Court has determined the real estate closing by and between the 
parties was declared void and a return of the purchase price was ordered minus court costs 
incurred by the Plaintiff. That this Court as of October 14, 2009 denied the Plaintiffs Motion 




During all times herein mentioned, Berkshire Investments, LLC, is and was a limited
 
liability company authorized to transact business in the State ofIdaho.
 
II. 
During all times herein mentioned, plaintiff, the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, 
was a duly registered trust under the law of the State ofIdaho and currently holds the legal title to 
the real property subject to the vendee's lien hereinafter referenced. That consistent with the 
prior Orders, Berkshire Investment has not been paid any portion of the monies due and owing 
from the plaintiff "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust". That although repeatedly requested 
to do so the plaintiff "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" has not paid the $400,000.00 due 
and owing and/or paid any sums minus the costs awarded to Berkshire Investments above 
referenced. 
That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Vendee's Lien in the 
litigation above captioned which was recorded with the Ada County Recorder's Office on August 
3,2009 bearing Instrument No.1 09090497, which is incorporated by reference herein as if set 
forth in full herein. 
III. 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 2 
001446
" 
              
 
 
_____. .....~.~ ....... ~'IlIR,.·_,_~_'.1
 .•,­
That the Vendee's Lien filed and is perfected against the real property in the County of 
Ada, State ofIdaho. The real property is described as Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6, 7, 8,9, Block 1 of 
Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, recorded in Book 90 ofPlats, at pages 10457 
and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also known as, the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 
1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.. 
IV. 
The "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" is the owner or reputed owners of the
 
certain real property above describe in the County of Ada, State ofIdaho.
 
V. 
That pursuant to the Judgments of record and the subsequent orders entered herein there a 
fix liquidated and ascertainable sum due and owing Berkshire Investments LLC from the 
"Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust". That the sum of$400,000.00, (minus awarded costs 
and interest thereon) is the outstanding balance due to Berkshire Investments after deducting all 
just credits, payments and offsets, together with interest legal at the rate of twelve (12) percent 
per annum from October 14,2009, until paid in full is due from the "Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust". 
VI. 
Berkshire Investments LLC claims an interest in and to the subject property pursuant to 
that Vendee's Lien, and any right, title, claim or interest of the "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust" and/or the named plaintiffs (or any other interested party or person in and to the subject 
property, if such light, title, claim or interest exists) is junior and subservient to the interest of 
Berkshire Investments LLC in the subject property. That Berkshire Investments LLC is entitled 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 3 
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to a Decree allowing the foreclosure of its interest against the real propeliy above described and a 
detennination of the rights of the parties herein and any others who claim an interest therein. 
VlI. 
That annexed hereto as Exhibit "B" is one of the letters transmitted to the counsel for the 
plaintiffs dated October 21, 2009 requesting payment of the sums due and owing to Berkshire 
Investments LLC. There has been no reply from any party or counsel for any party. That 
Berkshire Investments LLC, has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law. 
IX. 
That Berkshire Investments LLC has been required to retain the services of Thomas G. 
Mails, IV, to pursue this matter. Pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 12-120, 12-121, 12-123, 
Berkshire Investments LLC is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $2,500.00 if 
this matter is uncontested and a further amount as may be awarded by the Court if this matter is 
contested, together with such costs as may be awarded by the Court pursuant to Rule 54(e) ofthe 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Berkshire Investments, LLC prays for judgment against the plaintiff 
"Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" and/or any other parties or third parties claiming an 
interest in the real property as follows: 
That Berkshire Investments, LLC be granted Jud,gment against "Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust" and/or any other parties or third parties in the principal 
sum of $400,000.00, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve (12) 
percent per annum from and after October 14,2009, minus costs and interests 




due and owing "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" and/or any other parties, 
to and including the date of Judgment and thereafter at the highest legal rate until 
paid in full. 
2 For Berkshire Investments, LLC's attorneys fees incurred herein in the sum of 
$2,500.00 if this matter is uncontested and a further amount as may be awarded by 
the Court if this matter is contested. 
3	 For Berkshire Investments, LLC's costs and disbursements incurred herein. 
4	 That the "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" be required to set forth herein by 
proper pleading the nature of their claims in and to said premises or any part 
thereof. 
5 That Berkshire Investments, LLC's interest in and to the subject property be 
declared senior and superior and that any other claim, right, title, or interest of 
the"Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" and/or any ofthe party (or any other 
interested party or person in and to the subject property, if such right, title, claim 
or interest exists) be declared junior and subservient to the interest of Berkshire 
Investments, LLC in the subject property to wit: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,8,9, 
Block 1 of Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, recorded in Book 90 
of Plats, at pages 10457 and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also known 
as, the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwc;:st 114, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 
1 West, Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
6 That a Decree be entered adjudging and decreeing that Berkshire Investments, 
LLC is the owner and is entitled to possession of the subject property, and further 









ordering that the "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust", has no right, title or 
interest or claim in and to the subject real property or any part thereof and that 
each of them, and further, that any person claiming under them and all persons 
having any lien, claim, judgment or decree on or against said real property or any 
part, parcel or portion thereof (either as purchaser, encumbrancer, or otherwise) be 
barred and foreclosed from all equity of redemption in and to the said real 
property and in and to every part, parcel and portion thereof. 
7	 That this Court order the sale of the subject real property according to law and the 
practice of this Court, and that the proceeds of said sale be applied in payment of 
amounts found due and owing to Berkshire Investments, LLC as aforesaid, and for 
Berkshire Investments, LLC's costs and expenses of this action. 
8	 That in the event the proceeds from the sale of said real property be insufficient to 
satisfY the amounts due to Berkshire Investments, LLC herein (together with the 
costs of sale and other proper charges), that Berkshire Investments, LLC have 
Judgment against the "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" for such deficiency, 
together with interest thereon at the highest legal rate until paid in full. 
9 For such other and further relief in law or equity that the Court may deem proper 
in the premises. 
DATED Thi3 day of November, 2009. 
THOMAS G. IL 
Attorney for Berkshire Investments, LLC 









STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
He is the attorney for the above named petitioner, Berkshire Investments LLC, in the 
above-entitled action, he has read the foregoing VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE 
ON VENDEE'S LIEN, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be true and correct 
to the best of his knowledge and belief and executes the same as attorney for the above named 
Berkshire Investments, LLC. 
DATED This 3 day of November, ?009. 
THOMAS G. AILE, IV., Attorney for 
Berkshire Inves , LLC 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, 
this 3 day of November, 2009. 
72J4/N'J-. C/f'r;y-
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Eagle, Idaho 
My Commission Expires January 21,2009 







AMOUNT b.UU. DAVID NAVAffROADA COUNTY RECOR~ 
BOISE IDAHO 08/03109 51 AM 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV-'" 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
DEPUTY Vicki Allen 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plainti ffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES
 
Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
NOTICE OF VENDEE'S LIEN 
RE: Berkshire Investments L.L.C., Notice of Vendee's Lien 
The nature of the vendee's lien is made pursuant to I.e. 45-804, for the re-payment of the 
purchase price paid by Berkshire Investments L.L.e., to the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Notice of Vendee's Lien - Page 1 
Exhibit "A" 
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Tmst. That the principal ~ paid was $400,000.00 which is due and';'wing minus any costs 
and interest thereon awarded in the above captioned matter. 
Berkshire Investments L.L.C, claims its vendee's lien in said real property or propeliies 
described as follows: 
Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, Block 1 of Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, 
recorded in Book 90 of Plats, at pages 10457 and 10458 ofAda County Recorder's Office, also 
known as, the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4, Section 36, Township 5 NOlih, Range 1 West, 
Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2009., /J i. 
-----'c----:7"\f~'--"----,YrJ~(}j~_{ _ 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., attorney for
" ./'
Berkshire Investments L.L.c. 




County of Ada )
 
On this 3rd day of August, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for 
said state, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., known to be the attorney for Berkshire 
Investments L.L.c., and further known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
within and foregoing instrwnent, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for Berkshire 
Investments L.L.C. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day 
and year first above written. 
'n

Mary Sue Chc.:;sr;~ 
f\IOIARY F'LJ8! IC; 
.sTATE OF i[)l\~-i':) 
-/J7<C'A-z,L (/~t';-:;-r'"f}? 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30,2014 
Notice of Vendee's Lien - Page 2 
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LA\Yl OFFICE OF .. ." 
Tli~K01~1[AS Go MAKLE, N, P.A. 
380 WEST STATE STREET, EACiLE, IDAHO 83616 
(208) 939-JOOO / Fax (208) 939-1001 















Re:	 Johnson Trust & Taylor v. Thomas & Colleen Maile, et.al
 
Consolidated Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D
 
Our File No. M04-51 09.0
 
Dear Ms. Taylor: 
Pursuant to the Court's Order of October 14,2009, we once again request payment of the 
amounts due and owing Berkshire Investments, LLC. 
Your prompt reply and payment is appreciated. 
Sincerely, // 
//' 
Dictated and ForWarded Without 
Signature to/A<;lid Delay 
/// 
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A.MI~~...,.. P.M--,---+­
DEC 2 t 2009 DEC 2 i 2009 
Ada County Clerk J. DAVID NAVARRO, CierI< 
By eARLY LATIMORE 
DEPUTY 













Attorneys for Defendants John Taylor
 
Dallan Taylor and the Johnson Trust
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, Case No. CV OC 0723232
 




Plaintiffs, OBJECTION TO RENEWED MOTION
 




CONl~IE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and the Johnson Trust object to the Plaintiffs' renewed motion 
for certification of the dismissal of their claims for the following reasons: 
1. This Court has already considered that motion and denied it on the grounds that the 
judgment on the Plaintiffs' claim will not be final until the issue of costs and 
attorneys fees has been addressed. 
OBJECTION TO RENEWED MOTION
 
FOR RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION
 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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2.	 As shown by the documents attached to the Affidavit of Counsel, Mr. Maile is 
seeking to enforce the Judgment entered by Judge Wilper which he claims, in this 
case, is void and should be set aside. This Court's dismissal ofPlaintiffs' claims will 
likely be upheld under the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel, and it is a waste ofjudicial 
resources to interpose an interlocutory appeal which will only delay the final 
resolution of this action. 
3.	 Defendants submit that the filing ofthis renewed motion is frivolous and request that 
it be denied. 
',. II]
DATED this -----'---__IX'_ day of December, 2009. 
CLARK and FEENEY 
By__----=.-.=--..:'-----_---=-_,..-~	 _ 
~ Conni 'aylor, a member of the firm. 
Attorneys for Defendants John Taylor 
DaHan Taylor and the Johnson Trust 
OBJECTION TO RENEWED MOTION 
FOR RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 








































CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
vt11 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the_I0__· day ofNovember, 2009, I caused to be served a true 




380 West State Street
 
Thomas G. Maile, IV 
Hand Delivered 
Eagle, 10 83616 Overnight Mail 







101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor Overnight Mail
 
PO Box 829




Mr. Christ Troupis ~ u.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law o Hand Delivered 
PO Box 2408 o Overnight Mail 
Eagle, 10 83616 til Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482 
ie W. Taylor ~ 
OBJECTION TO RENEWED MOTION 
FOR RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATION 3 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 001457
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 











John Taylor, DaHan Taylor
 
and the Theodore Johnson Trust
 
-
DEC 2 1 2009
 
J. DAVID NAVARRO. CI 
By eARLY LATIMORE 
I':>I:F'UT'r 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
 






CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE L: JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
Case No. CV OC 07 23232
 
AFFIDAVIT OF COm,HE W. TAYLOR IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED 
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
1
 
LAW OFFICES OF 









































































































CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state of Idaho and a member of 
Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor and Theodore Johnson 
Trust in the above entitled matter. The information contained herein is of my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of the Verified Motion for 
Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien filed in the Taylor v. Maile case Ada County Case No. CV OC 04 
00473D. 
3. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit B, a true and correct copy of the Affidavit ofThomas G. 
Maile, IV, in Support of Verified Motion for Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien filed in the Taylor v. 
Maile case Ada County Case No. CV OC 04 00473D. 
.-/17
DATED this f)f day of December, 2009. 
I, ..., 
' // " , //...._~-..... ..... 
",/ ~A ' ~ ''''<
'--~I.....-'~ .,  \
Connie Taylor " / . 
,r tl7 \._- . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thislll day of December, 2009. 
----~.. /1 
/ d/ )Nl[ ;« ()ttnJ 
Notary Public in nd for the State ofIdaho.
 
Residing at _ 'I) therein.
 
My commission expires: u~ (Lf' I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
(1~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ---/JJ:- day ofDecember, 2009, I caused to be served a true
 




Thomas G. Maile, IV ,~ U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street D Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, 10 83616 D Overnight Mail
 
¢ Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
 
Mark Prusynski D U.S. Mail
 
MOFFATT THOMAS D Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., loth Floor D Overnight Mail
 















 Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482
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THOMAS G. MAILE, TV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-100.1 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Att011lcy for Berkshirc Invcstments LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS . . 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHffiE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC. 
Defcndants/Counter-claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR 
FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S 
LIEN 
COMES NOW, the Defendants/Counter-Claimant, BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
by and through it.s attomey, Thomas G. Maile, IV., and hereby moves tlris Court for the following 
relief a~ follows: 
















The above captioned Court has determined the real estate closing by and between the 
parties was declared void and a return of the purchase price was ordered minus court costs 
incurred by the Plaintiff. That this Court as ofOctober 14, 2009 denied the Plaintiff's Motion 




During all times herein mentioned, Berkshire Investments, LLC, is and was a. limited 
1i ability company authorized to transact business in the State ofIdaho. 
II. 
During all times herein mentioned, plaintiff, the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, 
was a duly registered tntSt under the law of the State ofIdaho and. currently holds the legal title to 
the real property subject to the vendee's lien hereinafter referenced. That consistent with the 
prior Orders, Berkshire Investment has not been paid any portion of the monies due and owing 
from the plaintiff"Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust". That although repeatedly requested 
to do so the plaintiff"Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" has not paid the $400,000.00 due 
and owing and/or paid any sums minus the costs awarded to Berkshire Investments above 
referenced. 
That atta.ched hereto as Exhibit ItA" is a tnte and correct copy ofthe Vendee's Lien in the 
litigation abovc captioned which was recorded with the Ada County Recorder's Office on August 
3, 2009 bearing b1.strument No.1 09090497, which is incorporated by reference herein as if set 
forth in full herein. 
m. 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 2 
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That the Vendee's Lien filed and is perfected against the real property in the County of 
Ada~ State ofJdaho. The real property is described as Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6, 7, 8,9, Block 1 of 
Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, recorded in Book 90 of Plats, at pages 10457 
and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also known as, the Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 
1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1West, Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.. 
IV. 
The "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" is the owner or reputed owners of the 
certain rent property above describe in the County of Ada, State ofIdaho. 
v. 
That pursuant to the Judgments of record and the subsequent orders entered herein there a 
fix liquidated and ascertainable sum due and owing Berkshire Investments LLC from the 
''Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust", That the sum of $400,000.00, (minus awarded costs 
and interest thereon) is the outstanding balance due to Berkshire Investments after deducting all 
just credits~ payments and offsets, together with interest legal a.t the rate oftwelvc (12) percent 
per antltun from October 14,2009, until paid in full is due from the "Theodore L. Johnson .. ,. 
Revocable Trust", 
VI. 
Berkshire Tnvestmcnts LLC claims an interest in and to the subject property pursuant to 
that Vendee's Licn, and any right, title, claim or interest ofthe "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust" and/or the named plaintiffs (or any other interested party or person in and to the subject 
property, if such right, title, claim or interest exists) is junior and subservient to the interest of 
Berkshire Investments LLC in the subject property. That Berkshire Investments LLC is entitled 
VERIF1ED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN .. Page 3 
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to a Decree allowing the foreclosure of its interest against the real property above described and a 
detennination ofthe rights of the parties herein and any others who claim an interest therein. 
VII. 
That annexed hereto as Exh.ibit "B" is one of the letters transmitted to the counsel for the 
plaintiffs dated October 21 , 2009 requesting payment ofthe sums due and owing to Berkshire 
Investments LLC. There has been no reply from any party or counsel for any party. That 
Berkshire Inveshncnts LLC, has no pla.in, speedy or adequate remedy at law. 
lX. 
That Berkshire Investments LLC has been required to rctain the services of Thomas G. 
Mails, IV, to pursue this matter..Pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 12"120, 12-121, 12-]23, 
Berkshire Investments LLC is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $2,500.00 if 
this matter is uncontested and a further amount as may be awarded by the Court if this matter is 
contested, together with such costs as may be awarded by the Court pursuant to Rule 54(e) ofthe 
Idaho Rule..q ofCivil Procedure. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Berkshire Investments, LLC prays for judgment against the plaintiff 
~'Theodore 1. Jolmson Revocable Trusf' und/or any other parties or third parties claiming an 
interest in the real property as follows: 
That Berkshire Investments, LLC be granted Judgment against 'Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust" andlor any other pa.rties or third parties in the principal 
sum of $400.000.00, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve (12) 
percent per annum from and after October 14, 2009, minus costs and interests 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 4 














due and owin.g "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" andlor any other parties, 
to and including the date of Judgment and thereafter at the highest legal rate until 
paid in full. 
2 For Berkshire Investments, LLC's attorneys fees incurred herein in the sum of 
$2,500.00 if this matter is uncontested and a further amount as may be awarded by 
the Court if this matter is contested. 
3	 For Berkshire Jnvestments, LLC's costs and disbursements incurred herein. 
4	 71mt the "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" be required to set forth herein by 
proper pleading the nature of their claims in and to said premises or any part 
thereof. 
5	 That Berkshire Investments, LLC's interest in and to the subject property be 
declared senior and superior and that any other claim, right, title, or .interest of 
the<'Theodorc L. Johnson Revocable Trust" andlor any of the party (or any other 
interested party or person in and to the subject property, if such right, title, claim 
or interest exists) be declared junior and subservient to the interest of Berkshire 
Investments, LLC in the subject property to wit: Lots 1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
Block 1 of Fa.irfield Esta.tes Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, recorded in Book 90 
ofPlats, at pages 10457 and 10458 ofAda County Recorder's Office, also known 
a..q, the Northwest 1/4 ofthe Southwest 1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 
1 West, Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
6 That a Decree be entered adjudging and decreeing that Berkshire Investments, 
LLC is the owner and is entitled to possession of the suhject prope.rty, and further 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 5 












ordering that the «Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust'" has no right, title or 
interest or claim in and to the subject real property or any part thereof and that 
each of them, and further, that any person claiming under them and all persons 
having any lien, claim, judgment or decree on or against said real property or any 
part, parcel or ponion thereof (either as purchaser, encumbrancer, or otherwise) be 
barred and foreclosed from all equity of redemption in and to the said real 
property and in and to every part, parcel and portion thereof. 
7	 That this Court order the sale ofthe subject real property according to law and the 
practice of this Court, and that the proceeds of said sale be applied in payment of 
amounts found due and owing to Berkshire Investments, LLC as aforesaid, and for 
Berksbjre Investments, LLC's costs and expenses of this action. 
8	 That in the event the proceeds from the sale of sBid real property be insufficient to 
satisfy the amounts due to Berkshire Investments, LLC herein (together with the 
costs of sale and other proper charges), that Berkshire Investments, LLC have 
JUdgment against the "T11eodore L. Johnson, Revocable Trust" for such deficiency, 
together with interest thereon at the highest legal rate until paid in full. 
9 For such other and further relief in law or equity that the Court may deem proper 
in the premises. 
DATED Thi3 day ofNovember 2009. 
THOMAS G. " IL ..
 
Attorney for Berkshire Investments, LLC
 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF' VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 6 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., being fIrst duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follow,: 
He i~ the attorney for the above named petitioner, Berkshire Investments LtC. in the 
above-entitled action, he has read the foregoing VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE 
ON VENDEE'S LTEN, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be true and correct 
to the best of his knowledge and belief and executes the same as attomey for the above named 
Berkshire Investments. LLC. 
DATED ThiS.3 day ofNovember. 2009. 
-'"'-_;O'O:;"".... A.-f=-.;..-------- ­
THOMAS G. AILE, IV., Attorney for 
__ 
Berkshire Inves , LLC 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, 
this ~ day ofNovember, 2009. 
L2z~td'0--Mary Sue Chase 
Notary PubHc for Idaho NOTARY PUBLIC
 
STATE OF IDAHO
 Residing at Eagle, Idaho 
My Commission Expires January 21,2009 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FOR~CLOSUREOF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 7 
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Idaho State Bar No. 2378
 
Attomey for Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
.TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 





v. NOTICE OF VENDEE'S LIEN 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
 
MAILE, husband and wife, mOMAS
 









THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN
 





TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES 
RE: nerkshire Investments L..L.C., Notice of Vendee's Licn 
The nattlre of the vendee's lien. is made pursuant to I.e. 45-804, for the re~payment of the 
purchase price paid by Berkshire Investments L.L.C., to the Theodore 1. .Tohnson Revocable 
Notice of Vendee's Lien - Page 1 
Exhibit "A" 



























Trust. That the prh1cipal sum. paid was $400,000.00 which is due and owing minus any costs 
and interest tl1ereon awarded in the above captioned matter. 
Berbhire Investments L.L.C, claims its vendee's lien in said real property or properties 
described as follows: 
Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6, 7,8,9, Block] ofFairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada County, Idaho, 
recorded in Book 90 ofPlats, at pages 10457 and 10458 of Ada County Recorder's Office, also 
known as,thc NOlihwest 1/4 of the Southwest l/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1. West, 
Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) S8. 
County of Ada ) 
On this 3rd day of August, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in alld for 
~aid state, personally appeared THOMAS O. MAILE, IV., known to be the attorney for Berkshire 
InvestmentsL.L.C., and further known t.o me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for Berkshire 
Investments L.L.C. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day 
and year first above written. 
'Lh&~cdth= 
Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
] 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
SlATE OF IDAHO 
~-""""_'-'~"""""'!l"""'.~". ... 
My Commission Expires Jnly 30,2014 
Notice of Vendee's Lien ~ Page 2 
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Trr-JrOMfA.5 Go MAJLlE, N, FDA. 
380 WEST STATE STREET, EAGLE, IDAHO 83616 
















Rc:	 Johnson Trust & Taylor v. Thomas & Colleen Maile, et.al
 
Consolidated Ada County Case No. CV DC 04-00473D
 
Out .F.il.e No. M04-5109.0
 
Dear Ms. Taylor: 
Pursuant to the Court's Order of October 14, 2009, we once again request payment of the 
amounts due and owing Berkshire Investments, LLC. 
Your prompt reply and payment is appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
Dictot.ed f,U1(1 Po w'dcd Withollt 
Signature t . void Delay 
TGM/mp 
.Exhibit ".8" 




















- -------------,(­rI rTRAi'ISMISSION \/ERIFICATrON REPORT 
TIME 10/21/2eleJ9 14:53
NAME THOMAS MAILE 
FAX 1208'3391 ElEll 
iEL 1208939J.600 
SER.# 800H5J484204 
DATE,TIME HI/21 14: 52 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
. Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter~Defendants, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAlLE REAL ESTATE CaMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, TV and COLLEEN 
MAU",E, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC. 
DefendantsICounter-claitnants. 
STATE OF mAliO ) 
) 55. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. 
'MAILE, IV., IN SUPPORT OF 
VERIFffiD MOTION FOR 
FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S 
LIEN 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED MOTION FOR 
FORECl,OSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 1 C:~,""dYbo<ka.oltl\.,orv('J'lr.1"'A\MlM""'U~"'AYLOR"'tr1d.v~tr.nwCll~ .. 
EXHIBIT 








] ""dYbo<ka.olt \.,orv('J'lr.1"'A\MlM .... n_p'\"'AYLOR"'tr1d.v~tr.nwC 1 ______ 
L 
THOMAS G. MAILE~ IV, being first duly swom upon oath, deposes and says: 
Yom Affiant is the attorney for the above-named Defcndants/ColIDter-Claimants and 
further appears Pro Se, and provides this Affidavit in support of the Verified Motion for 
Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien. That the infonnation and facts set forth herein are based 
upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observation.s and can testify as to the truth 
of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial ofthis matter. 
2.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "N' is a true and correct copy of a July 10, 2009 letter from 
Connie Taylor to your Affiant and the same is incorporated by reference herein ~ ifset 
forth in full herein. 
3.	 There are three (3) different Orders/Judgment for costs and attorney fees in this matter 
which all are awarded interest at different rates. l1)e first Judgment in the amount of 
$12,424.04 was entered on Apri16, 2007 and bears interest at a rate of 10.125% with a 
per diem of$3.45. A second Judgment in the amount of$504.80 was entered on January 
17,2006 and bears interest at a.rate of8.375% with a perdicm of$.12. The third 
Judgment in the amount of$514.00 and bears interest at a rate of7.625% with a per diem 
of$.11. 
4.	 The total amount owing on all three Judgments as of August 3, 2009, the date the 
Vendce~s Lien in this matter was filed, is $16,537.76. The total amount owing as of 
December 15, 2009, the hearing on this matter, is $17,030.80. 
DATED this 'Z~y ofNovember, 2009. 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED MOTION FOR 
FORECLOSURE O.F VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 2 (:,\hlHl"\'bQ"kbotlcl\'enI... mb\"\MlMAn,li\T"'YI..oR\"lI'1(1ftvi!l~ven<le.~lIen.wpd 
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. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO hefore me, a Notary Public in an.d for said State, thisdeda.y ofNovember, 2009. 
"7/J~-:-=-~~,----_~ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
Commission Expires July 30,2014 
CERTIFlCATE OF SERVICE 
~. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on thisto day ofNove:mber, 2009. I caused a true and 
Con"eet copy of the foregoing (1) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE IN SUPPORT OF 
VERIFIED MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN, to be delivered, addressed 
as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail
 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission
 
P.O. Drawer 785 () I-land Delivery
 




Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
AFFlDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAlLE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED MOTION FOR
 
FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 3 C\hnndyl>nc'<hnckl\jlmttlfile1\n\~MAILIJITAYI.O!l.\ftmdovittBmv...d~IIen.""d
 
This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, visit: http://vvww.gfi.com 
001474
-
l.    








. AIL~, IV., Pro Se, 
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
J.  T  
T \ dyl nc' nckl 1 t lfile1\n\MlM I Il\ YLOll. nmd t Bm   "d 
/lNWW. fi
~---NO, 213B-P, 
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I'lON T. Ell.SWETT CLARK AND FEENEY, .
 
WlI.UI\M ",e:I'!E;MY CARR Tt1~ 'TR""IN ~TAnON. SWITE: lOS Tt1"tl'HC1l1>:
 
rAuL. T~IOMAS CLAR!'t (209' '43-9[;111,;'
THOMA5 w. I"I:ENlt'r' I :a~9 ~AIN STRl>tT (AQQl BEl5.!'!$ IS
iC;OTT O. GALI.INA •• 1'.0. r>Rl\wER 2Gl~
JONATHAN O. HALLY F'"M 
RUSt!: G. JUNiS" LEWISTON, IDAHO F.l3!SOI (;;!O~l) 74e-~I13QTINA I,. KI;;RNAN •• 
.;mrN G. "'IrCHItLL oi\QW@lewlll1On.oom
!:lQUGl.AS L MUSHLlT:l:
CH/lt:!!.E9. M. ST~oeCHEIN •• 
CQNNle TAYl..O~·· 
July 10, 2009 
Sent Via Ftlc..;imUe To: (208) 9j9~IOOl Total Pagef: 'i' 
Mr. Thomas Maile 
380 Wost State Street 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Re: Berks.hb:e Investments, LJ..C v. Taylor et. al. 
Dear Mr. Maile: 
I ha'Ve received yOUl' letter of July 9, 2009, with its enclosed proposed Satismction of Judgment~ 
which relates solely to t.he costs in the TaY[Qt v. Maile case. I am attaching printouts which show 
that the current amount owing on the three cost awards is $16,449.44, which brings the balance on 
the purchase price down to $383,550.56. 
In regard to your request that my clients make arrangements to obtain e. certified check, Pm afraid 
that in the current banking market, a bank would not be willing to even begin the PIOcesS ofloanJng 
money on this property unless an lis pendens have been released. Once that occurs~ it would likely 
take a number ofmonths to get the toan completed. 
TIle Taylors are willing to discuss a full settlement of all pending matters, including their 
coun:terclaims which ate not mentioned in yom letter. Because property values have plummeted 
wWle these lawsuits have beon pending, they belie"Je they will be able to ostablish losses which far 
exceed the $383,550.5G, In addition, the Ta.ylors have incurred costs and fees of$16,305.86 in the 
pending la'WSuit, which docs not include the fees and costs inoUtred by My. Prosynski's office, 
As a countc:roffer. the Taylors are willing to dismiss their COlUlterclaims and any claims for costs 
and attomey fees in the second lawsu.it in exchange for the release ofall Us pendens and your waiver 
of any furthet payment. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
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J look forward to hearing from you and bopefully getting this matter finally fesolved. 
Sincerely, 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Dictated /I)' Ms, TaylDr and $P.nt 
witJtaut sign~tllre tQ avoId delay 
By: Connie W, Taylor 
CWT:tc 
Enolosures 
cc:	 John Taylor w/enos.• Via US Mail 
DaHan Taylor w/encs. - Via US Mail 
Mark P.tUsynsld w/encs. Sent Via Facsimile ONLY, To: (208) 385-5384 Total Pages: ~ 
Thepagsscomprising thisjaosimile trl1nsmi.uio1t contain conjidmtial injorm.otfCmfrom ths Qjflce o/C/arkatuiPeen"J' 
This friformatian is tnrer'ld~d solal)! for USI! by the tndividlUll entity named as the recipient hereof 1jyou (lr@ not the 
tnt!mded t'eaipient, b~ aware that (11'1)' disclwur~ copying, dtstrt~uri()17 or ZlM a/the contlmts a/this trflrlwisslOl1 Is 
prohibitl!ui, .ifyou h(;flle receivedthtJ transmisston tn ~rror, pleaSf1 notij)'TJs by tal~phone immsdiate/y so we may arrange 
.....w orr"J~ QF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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The correct Interest rate and' method of calculation Wilf be selected by the program based on the 
amount of jUdgment, award date anq jurisdlotion, You mBy ovarridQ t~ aeleeted jnt~rast rate by 
entering e different rate in the "interest override" field. Rates 6re believed accurate for judgments 
awarded from Q1/01/1SS9 to the current date, howevar, National Judgment Network ascurnee no 
responsibJllty for lnaCCtlnllcies. In order to LlSS this calculator you must agree that YOI~ are u,c;ins it at 
your own risl<. rf an obvious error is encountered, please report it to National Judgment Network. 
Want 6lCCGlSS to morn tools like this?
 
Join National JUdgment Networkl
 
1of] '7110/2009 11: 17 AM 
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The correct int.ersst rate and method of calculation will be selected by the program based on the 
amount of JUdgment, award date and jurisdiction. You may override the selected Interest rate by 
enterIng a different rate in the "Interest override" field. Rates are beUeved accurate for judgments 
aw~rded from 01/01/1989 to the current date, however, National Judgment Network assurnes no 
responsibftity for inaccuracIes, In order to use this cslculetor you must agree that yc>1.J are ~IEljt1g it at 
your own rIsk. If aT'! obVioUQ grror Ie encountered, please report It to Natlon,,1 Judgment Network. 
Waot.AAOess to mora tools IlklLtbl~?
 
JoIn National JUdgment Networkl
 
I o( 1 7/10/200911:16 AM 
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The correct Interest rate and ~thod of calcuration will be selected by the program based on the 
amount of judgment, ~wartl date and JuriSdiction. You ImY override the selected infE/rest rate by 
entering a different nata In the "interest oV~lTjde" field. Rates are believed accurate for jUdgments 
award~d from 01/01/1989 to the 6urrem date, however, National Judgment Network assumes no 
responsibility for inaccuraeies. In ordar to use this calculator you must agree that you are usrng it at 
your own risk, If an obvIous error Is encountered, please report it to National JUdgment Network. 
~cess to more tools /Ike thIs? 
Join National JUdgment Network/ 
1 of 1 711 012009 ll: 17 AM 













JAN 08 2010 
CHRIST TROUPIS Ada County Clerk 
Address: PO Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
(208) 938-5584 
FAX: (208) 938-5482 
Attorney at Law 
Idaho State Bar No. 4549 
NO I~-.-"F~u..e:::'o---­
A.MY::._. PM , 
JAN 08 2010 





Pro Se and Counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; 
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. 
JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK 
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. 
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L. 
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an 
Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I ­
JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY 
RIGHT TO POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF RENEWED MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT 
ENTERED JULY 20, 2009 
Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile and, Thomas G. Maile, IV, by and 
through their attorneys of record, Christ Troupis and Thomas Maile, and pursuant to !.R.C.P. 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATION- Pg 1~ __,.."""'IO,"', 
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Rule 54(b), request that the Court enter its Judgment on the Memorandum Decision and Order 
filed July 2,2009 and the subsequent Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Claims entered on July 20, 
2009. 
1. The Plaintiffs Request That the Court Enter its Certification of the 
Judgment entered July 20, 2009. 
The court is aware that the Plaintiffs' filed their Motion for Pennissive Appeal, which 
was denied on November 6, 2009. The plaintiff') believe that a certification pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
54(B) is a sensible approach to the litigation. The defendants have filed their objection to the 
request for certification, which indicated in part that the court would be requested to entertain the 
issues of costs and attorneys fees. Judicial economy would be promoted by allowing the claims 
for costs and attorney fees to be advanced before this court, to allow an appellate decision on the 
issues raised in the plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. Significant issues have 
developed since the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order filed July 2,2009. 
The Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper in the case Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust vs 
Thomas Maile, IV and Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case 
Number CV OC 04-05656D entered his Order October 14,2009, affinning that the plaintiffs 
have a continued right to assert a Vendee's Lien for the return of the purchase price pursuant to 
I.e. 45-804 (attachment to the Affidavit in Support ofRenewed Motion for Certification 
Pursuant to I.R.e.P. Rule 54(b) Re: Judgment Entered July 20, 2009 filed December 3, 2009). 
In addition, the plaintiffs have filed on November 5, 2009, their Verified Motion for Foreclosure 
of Vendee's Lien. Judge Wilper has continued the matter for the submission of additional factual 
issues surrounding the vendee's foreclosure of the lien. 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR 
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The court in addition has been provided with additional facts which were not submitted 
as part of the record in the Court's order denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 
The Taylors, before Judge Wilper in 2007, requested that the court strike the Lis Pendens 
filed in May 2006 and/or requested that a bond be posted during the appeal. Judge Wilper 
entered his Order on March 1, 2007 denying the motion and pursuant to that order the Lis 
Pendens was authorized to remain of record through the appeal (February 2009) (Affidavit in 
Support ofMotion for Certification Pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 54(b) Re: Memorandum Decision 
and Order/motion for Permissive Appeal Pursuant to the I.A.R. Rule 12, filed July 13,2009). 
The plaintiffs filed their release of Lis Pendens before this court on July 13,2009 and 
released the lis pendens involved with Judge Wilper's case on August 3, 2009 and 
simultaneously filed their vendee's lien. The real property is not encumbered by any Lis 
Pendens. The pending claim is for lien enforcement oftheVendee's Lien to be determined by 
Judge Wilper. 
The Relevant portion of Idaho Code section 5-505, provides: 
5-505. LIS PENDENS. In an action affecting the title or the right o(possession 
of real property" the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint, and the defendant 
at the time of filing his answer, when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, 
or at any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in 
which the property or some part thereof is situated, a notice of the pendency of the 
action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the action or defense, and 
a description of the property in that county affected thereby. From the time of 
filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser or incumbrancer of the 
property affected thereby be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency 
of the action, and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real 
names. (emphasis added). 
The present matter before the court requires this court to construe the plain meaning and 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR 








           
 
 




intention of I. C. 5-505. The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which this Court 
exercises free review. The Idaho statute relating to the right to file a Lis Pendens is 
straightforward. The purchase price has not been returned and the plaintiff's have statutory rights 
to a vendee's lien affecting the title ofproperty, as with any other lien and/or foreclosure action. 
The case of Joseph C.L.U. Ins. Assoc., Inc. v. Vaught, 1171d. 555, 557, 789 P.2d 1146, 
1148 (Ct.App.l990), provides:. 
A lis pendens is a notice to the world of the existence of a claim affecting certain 
real property. See I.C. § 5-505; Suitts v. First Security Bank ofIdaho, N.A., 100 
Idaho 555, 559, 602 P.2d 53, 57 (1979). The lis pendens does not purport, by 
itself, to establish or to change anyone's legal rights. Of course, the filing of a lis 
pendens may highlight a possible legal problem affecting the property, thereby 
inducing an extra measure of caution by potential purchasers or lenders until the 
litigation is concluded. But this does not mean that any underlying legal rights 
have been altered. 
The Joseph, supra, case authority, establishes that the filing of a lis pendens does not 
"change the legal rights" of the litigants. It is simply a recorded document giving notice to the 
world that litigation has been instituted which may affect the underlying property. 
The defendants have not provided any appropriate authority or basis for the advancement 
in support of their proposition that the filing of the lis pendens under these facts can give rise to a 
valid claim for relief. The importance of such legal issues relate directly to the counter-claims 
advanced by the counter-defendants which technically is the only claim before this court. Under 
these facts, did the filing of the Lis Pendens and the ultimate release of the Lis Pendens by the 
plaintiffs give rise to any actionable torts? 
45-1302 DETERMINATION OF ALL RIGHTS UPON FORECLOSURE 
PROCEEDINGS. 










 ..... . ... , .. .-
In any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or lien upon real property or a 
lien on or security interest in personal property, the plaintiff, cross-complainant or 
plaintiff in intervention may make as party defendant in the same cause of action, 
any person, including parties mentioned in section 5-325, having, claiming or 
appearing to have or to claim any title, estate, or interest in or to any part of the 
real or personal property involved therein, and the court shall, in addition to 
granting relief in the foreclosure action, determine the title, estate or interest of all 
parties thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and effect as in the 
action to quiet title. 
The plaintiffs are lawfully pursuing their rights to foreclose the vendee's lien. The 
plaintiffs have consistently asserted that the right to pursue the vendee's lien and the foreclosure 
of the same, was part and parcel of the Lis Pendens which were previously filed of record. 
The plaintiffs have released their lis pendens. On July 13,2009 after receipt of the 
Court's Memorandum, the plaintiffs released the lis pendens relating to the current matter. 
Although, technically, the plaintiffs could have maintained the lis pendens through any appeal in 
the current case (as allowed by Judge Wilper during the appeal in Taylor v. Maile), the plaintiffs 
voluntarily removed the same. 
The case ofSuitts v. First Sec. Bank ofIdaho, N.A., 100 Id. 555, 602 P.2d 53 (1979) 
provides further support ofthe appellants' right to maintain the lis pendens during the appeal 
without the necessity of any bond. The Suitts court stated: 
It seems clear that under the statutory law existing at the time of the original 
action the lis pendens would continue to have effect until the final determination 
of the action on appeal. See Petty v. Hall, 257 Ala. 145,57 So.2d 620 (1952); 
Maedel v. Wies, 15 N.W.2d 692 (Mich.1944); 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens A§ 36. The 
effect of filing a lis pendens is that a person who purchases or acquires rights in 
the subject matter of the litigation during the pendency of the action (which 
encompasses appeal) takes subject to the final disposition of the case. 
Other jurisdictions are in accord, see generally, Blake v. Gilbert, 702 P.2d 631 (Alaska 
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1985), lis pendens remains in effect where appeal is taken, so that posting supersedeas bond or 
moving to continue lis pendens pending appeal is not necessary; Kennedy v. Dawson, 989 P.2d 
390,296 Mont. 430,(1999), notice of appeal and lis pendens, effectively preserves the status quo 
pending appeal; Gardner v. Perry City, 994 P.2d 811, 2000 UT 1, (2000), ordering reinstatement 
of the lis pendens because the appellant's interest in the subject property depended upon the 
outcome of the case on remand; Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1389-90 (Utah 1996), 
holding lis pendens was proper during appeal, as outcome of case would be determined after 
appeal. The plaintiffs could have continued their lis pendens in the current case pending any 
appeal. However, they have chosen to release the same. 
The Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper had previously ruled that the filing of the lis penden 
in the prior proceeding was warranted during the appeal. (Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support 
of Motion for CertificationIMotion for Permissive Appeal). There can be no prejudice to the 
defendants in allowing an immediate appellate review as the defendants can do what they so 
desire relative to the real property that has been the subject of these proceedings. 
As stated in the case of Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Id. 185, 125 P.3d 1061 (2005): 
The purpose of Rule 54(b) was to liberalize the appeals process by permitting 
some partial judgments to be appealed earlier than they otherwise could have been 
appealed. Merchants, Inc. v. Intermountain Indus., Inc., 97 Idaho 890, 556 P.2d 
366 (1976). "Rule 54(b) was adopted to overcome the' single judicial unit theory' 
which seriously inconvenienced persons involved in multi-party or multiple claim 
actions by forcing them to await the adjudication of 'the whole case and every 
matter in controversy in it' before being allowed to appeal." Id. at 892,556 P.2d at 
368. 
The legal issues presented by the plaintiffs involve substantial issues involving the 
integrity ofour judicial system. The certification under Rule 54(b) will produce an efficient, 
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orderly determination of rights of the parties which primarily centers on the doctrine of res 
judicata, and the exceptions thereto as raised by the plaintiffs. The parties would be best served 
by having the appellate court consider the issue which is central to this litigation, to wit: the 
affects of the doctrine of Res Judicata. This one legal issue controls the remaining claims 
contained in the counter-claims of the defendants. Our appellate court has not examined facts 
similar to the allegations raised by the plaintiffs relating to the defendants' misrepresentations to 
the court as to whether such facts are a "fraud upon the court". Our Supreme Court can provide 
guidance as to whether the plaintiffs' allegations of peIjury, obtaining money by false pretenses, 
and aiding and abetting peIjury constitute such facts amounting to ''tampering with the 
administration ofjustice' as to suggest 'a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and 
safeguard the public.'" Campbell v. Kildew, 141 rd. 640, 115 P.3d 731, (2005), Compton v. 
Compton, 101 rd. 328, 334, 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980). The facts of this case warrant an 
examination by our Supreme Court to determine the integrity of our judicial system. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs have released any and all lis pendens filed which may affect the subject real 
property. The defendants are free to deal with the subject real property in any manner they 
choose. The Honorable Judge Wilper had previously ruled that the filing of the Lis Pendens in 
the prior case was warranted during the appeal process in the prior proceedings. Judge Wilper 
has determined that the plaintiffs have a right to a vendee's lien and there is currently set before 
his court a verified motion for the foreclosure of that lien. There remains a controlling issue of 
Law, to wit: the affect of Res Judicata in light of the defendants' alleged wrongful behavior, that 
can be addressed by the Supreme Court. 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR 









_"" ""'' ';''' ~''.'b'' 
DATED this 7th day of January, 2010. 
(3h--1-) '7) ~ 
CHRIST TR~tt-o-m-e-Y-fl-or-B-er-k-sh-ir-e---
Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 7th day of January, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing, (1) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED 
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: 
JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 2009, (2) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
THOMAS MAILE IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 20, 2009 to be 
delivered, addressed as follows: 
Mark Stephen Prusynski ( ) U. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Thomas Maile () u. S. Mail 
380 W. State Street (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Eagle, Idaho () Hand Delivery 
Facsimile: (208-939-1001) () Overnight Delivery 
~1)LJ~===~ _
 
CHRIST TROUI1S, attorney for BerkshIre 
Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile 
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RECEIVED 
JAN 082010 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV Ada County Clerk ' 
Fl~.~ ~ = Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State BarNo. 2378 
JAN 0 8 2010 





Co-counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants-Counter-Claimants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF RENEWED 
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
PURSUANT TO IoRoC.Po RULE 
54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED 
JULY 20, 2009 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR 
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO IoRoC.Po RULE 54(B) RE: JUDGMENT ENTERED 
JULY 20, 2009 - Pg 1 
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. . .  
1.	 Your Affiant is the co-counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen 
Birch-Maile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the infonnation and facts 
set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and 
can testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the 
trial of this matter. 
2.	 That annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the recorded Release of 
Lis Pendens filed with the Ada County Recorder's Office on July 13,2009, relating to the 
above captioned matter. 
3.	 That Berkshire Investments has pursued its Verified Motion for Foreclosure of Vendee's 
Lien which was filed November 5, 2009 in the consolidated case Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, 
LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County 
Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. That your affiant is the managing member of 
Berkshire Investments LLC, and in such capacity has pursued the return of the purchase 
price as ordered by Judge Wilper, on behalf of Berkshire Investments LLC. There has 
been no unconditional tender of the monies due and owing although requests have been 
repeatedly made. That opposing counsel has filed pleadings indicating judicial estoppel 
should apply because of Berkshire Investments' demand for the return of the monies 
ordered by Judge Wilper. Berkshire Investments has requested the return of monies, and 
if at any point in time any court orders the parties to be returned to the status quo prior to 
the defendant's obtaining the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims, the monies will be 
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returned and deposited into the appropriate court or trust account. 




Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
,!Jc;< day of December, 2009. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30,2014 
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NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS 
KNOW ALL PERSON BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That the undersigned, THOMAS G. MAILE, N, on behalf of and as attorney for 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, COLLEEN BlRCH-:MAILE and Pro se, whose address is 380 
W. State Street, Eagle, Idaho, does hereby release and forever discharge that certain Notice of Us 
Pendens, dated March 25, 2008 and recorded on March 25, 2008, as Instrument Number 108033598 
at the offices of the Ada County Recorder, State of Idaho, in and for that certain parcel of real 
property known described as follows: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 
1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 




BERKSHIRE EST-MENTS, LLC, COLLEEN 
BIRCH-MAILE and Pro se 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
On this Jlday ofJuly, 2009, before me, theundersigned,a Notary Public for said State, 
personally appeared THO:MAS G. MAILE, IV, known or acknowledged to me to be the attorney for 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS,LLC, COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE and Pro se and the person whose 
name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed said 
document. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day and 
year tirst above written. 
"-1.-, ~)' 
/ /" f,-"t:='~'-="?c_;F-r=-,d_,-<---=l,-,/7,-"i-::~,-,»--,~--,-· _ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
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Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; 
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. 
JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK 
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. 
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L. 
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an 
Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I ­
JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY 
RIGHT TO POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
DEFENDANTS'COUNTERCLAIMS 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho Limited Liability Company, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRTH­
MAILE, by and through their counsel of record, hereby move for Summary Judgment against 
Defendants/Counterclaimants with respect to all of the Counterclaims, pursuant to Rule 56 of the 
















Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion is made on the grounds that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact in dispute and Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants are entitled to judgment as a 
matter oflaw with respect to all of the Defendants' Counterclaims. 
This motion is based upon the pleadings, files and record herein, the Affidavit of Thomas 
G. Maile IV filed in support ofthis Motion, the Statement of Material Facts filed on October 8, 
2008 as supplemented in the Memorandum filed in support of this Motion, and the Memorandum 
in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment submitted herewith. 
Oral Argument is requested. 
Dated: March 2,2010. 
Christ T. Troupis 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 2nd day of March, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor (X) U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY () Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 

















Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 




Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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MAR 03 2010 






IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; 
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. 
JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK 
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. 
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L. 
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an 
Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I ­
JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY 
RIGHT TO POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The plaintiffs' have filed their Motion for Summary Judgment against all of the 
defendants' counterclaims. The defendants assert claims of slander of title, intentional 














interference with a prospective business advantage, and abuse of process. 
STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS 
The Plaintiffs have previously filed a Statement of Uncontested Facts on October 8, 2008 
and the same is incorporated herein as if set forth in full herein. Since the Statement of 
Uncontested Facts was filed, additional facts have developed that warrant this motion for 
summary judgment. Those facts are as follows: 
Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper in the case Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs 
Thomas Maile, IV and Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case 
Number CV OC 04-056560 entered his Order October 14,2009, affirming that the plaintiffs 
have a continued right to assert a vendee's lien for the return of the purchase price pursuant to 
I.C.45-804. In addition, the plaintiffs filed on November 5,2009, their Verified Motion for 
Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien (attachments to the Affidavit in Support of Renewed Motion for 
Certification filed December 3, 2009). The foreclosure motion with respect to the real property 
titled in the name of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust is currently pending before Judge 
Wilper. 
In the litigation before Judge Wilper in 2007, the Taylors requested that the court strike 
the Lis Pendens filed in May 2006 and/or requested that a bond be posted during the appeal. On 
March 1,2007, Judge Wilper entered his Order denying the Taylors' motion. Pursuant to that 
order, the lis pendens was authorized to remain of record, (attachments to Affidavit in Support of 
Motion for Certification filed July 13, 2009). 
In an effort to obtain reimbursement of the purchase price of $400,000.00 which Judge 
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Wilper ordered returned to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs filed a Release of Lis Pendens in this 
litigation on July 13,2009. On August 3, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed their Vendee's lien, which his 
the subject of the pending action before Judge Wilper. The real property is not encumbered other 
than lien enforcement to be determined vendee's lien foreclosure before Judge Wilper. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In ruling on a summary judgment motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56©, all facts are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, IBM Com. 
v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194,677 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1984). The non-moving party is also given 
the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence in the record. Thomas v. 
Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984). 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. The Plaintiffs properlyfiled two (2) Lis Pendens relating to litigation. 
Taylors' counterclaims allege that the filing of the Lis Pendens slandered their title to the 
real property. However, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a slander of title claim based upon the 
recording of a notice of lis pendens coupled with failure to reconvey a deed of trust in 
Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 552, 165 P.3d 261, 266 (2007). The Court 
noted that" ... the publication of the notice of lis pendens is not defamatory. It merely informs the 
public that the property is involved in litigation." 
The counter-claimants' slander oftitle claim is based entirely on the filing of the notice of 
lis pendens, and therefore fails as a matter of law to state a viable cause ofaction. The mere filing 
of a notice of lis pendens cannot give rise to any actionable claim against the Plaintiffs. 
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Moreover, the lis pendens filing was lawful and proper in this case. The relevant 
portion of Idaho Code §5-505, provides: 
5-505. LIS PENDENS. In an action affecting the title or the right ofpossession 
of real property, the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint,... may file for 
record with the· recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof 
is situated, a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names of the 
parties, the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that 
county affected thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record only 
shall a purchaser or incumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to 
have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency 
against parties designated by their real names. (emphasis added). 
The application of this statute to the current litigation is clear. The original litigation 
directly concerned the title to the real property. The Court ordered the return of title to the real 
property to Taylors, but also ordered that the purchase price be returned to Berkshire, in order to 
rescind the transaction. A party seeking to rescind a contract ordinarily must return any 
consideration or the benefit received by the rescinding party before the rescission is valid. 
Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173,181,45 P.3d 829, 837 (2002). 
The Supreme Court made note of the order for repayment of the purchase price to Berkshire in 
Taylor v. Maile, 145 Idaho 705,201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009): 
"On June 7, 2006, the court entered judgment on that claim, quieting title to the Linder 
Road property in the Trust and dismissing the Mailes' counterclaims and defenses. On 
July 21, 2006, the court amended the judgment to clarify that the property is in a 
constructive trust, that Berkshire is entitled to repayment of the purchase price, and 
that the Mailes' counterclaim for unjust enrichment was the only remaining issue." 
Notwithstanding this order, and although title to the real property has been quieted in the 
Taylors, they have not returned any portion of the purchase price. On these facts, the Plaintiffs 
have established rights to a vendee's lien to secure repayment of the purchase price. Those rights 
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have been confirmed by Judge Wilper's order of October 14,2009. 
Prior to entry of the order rescinding the property sale, a lis pendens was proper because 
the litigation concerned the disputed title to the real property. Following entry of the order 
rescinding the property sale, a lis pendens was proper because rescission was not fully effected 
until the consideration was repaid to Berkshire by Taylors, and by operation oflaw, Berkshire 
retained a vendee's lien interest in the real property to secure the return of the consideration. 
The lis pendens was properly filed and did not slander the Taylors' title to the real 
property. In addition, the filing of a lis pendens did not alter any underlying legal rights to the 
real property. Joseph CL. U Ins. Assoc., Inc. v. Vaught, 117 Id. 555, 557, 789 P.2d 1146, 1148 
(Ct. App.1990) states: 
A lis pendens is a notice to the world of the existence of a claim affecting certain 
real property. See I.C. § 5-505; Suitts v. First Security Bank ofIdaho, N.A., 100 
Idaho 555, 559, 602 P.2d 53, 57 (1979). The lis pendens does not purport, by 
itself, to establish or to change anyone's legal rights." 
Since the lis pendens simply gives notice to the world that litigation has been instituted 
that may affect the underlying property, its filing cannot give rise to a cause of action for slander 
of title, or any other tort claim unless it was filed without legal authority and for an ulterior 
purpose. 
As noted above, the plaintiffs had legal authority to file a notice of lis pendens, as well as 
pursue foreclosure of their vendee's lien. The foreclosure of vendee's lien as with any lien 
foreclosure is addressed in I.C. § 45-1302, which provides: 
Determination of All Rights upon Foreclosure Proceedings. 
In any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or lien upon real properly... 
the plaintiff... , plaintiff in intervention may make as party defendant in the same 
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cause of action, any person, including parties mentioned in section 5-325, having, 
claiming or appearing to have or to claim any title, estate, or interest in or to any 
part of the real or personal property involved therein, and the court shall, in 
addition to granting relief in the foreclosure action, determine the title, estate or 
interest of all parties thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and effect 
as in the action to quiet title. 
Since July 21, 2006, the Plaintiffs had a statutory right to a vendee's lien securing the 
return of the purchase price as ordered by Judge Wilper. The entry of the Order by Judge Wilper 
on March 1,2007 confirmed the Plaintiffs right to foreclose their vendee's lien to recover the 
purchase price. 
A vendee's lien is afforded the same right as any other lien foreclosure referenced in I.C. 
§ 45-1302 and treated as a quiet title action. The specific language of the statute provides, 
"determine the title, estate, or interest of all parties thereto in the same manner and to the same 
extent and effect as in the action to quiet title". Determination of a vendee's lien is, according to 
the statute, equivalent to a quiet title action. 
There can be no dispute that the Plaintiffs lawfully were entitled to record a lis pendens 
on their claim for return of the purchase price, as provided in I.C. § 45-1302. The Defendants 
have admitted that they have not returned the purchase price, and would not return the purchase 
price unless the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their potential right to an appeal (Affidavit of Connie 
Taylor dated December 18,2009 filed 12/21/09; Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile, 
IV., In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Defendants' Counterclaim, 
filed concurrently herewith). The July 21, 2006 order cited in Taylor v. Maile,supra, at 1286 
stating that "Berkshire is entitled to repayment of the purchase price" does not include any 
condition that the Plaintiffs agree to waive or dismiss their appeal rights. 
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A plain reading of I.C. § 45-1302 supports the plaintiffs' position that filing of a lis 
pendens was proper until the vendee's lien has been foreclosed. The plaintiffs have consistently 
asserted that the right to pursue the foreclosure of their vendee's lien was part and parcel of the 
Lis Pendens that was previously filed of record. On July 13,2009, after receipt of the Court's 
Memorandum Decision, the plaintiffs released the lis pendens relating to the current matter. 
Until the purchase price was returned, pursuant to I.e. § 45-1302, the plaintiffs were entitled to 
maintain their lis pendens. Although the plaintiffs could have maintained the lis pendens through 
an appeal in the current case (as allowed by Judge Wilper during the appeal in Taylor v. Maile), 
the plaintiffs voluntarily removed the same. 
2. The Counter-Claimants' Slllnder ofTitle claim has no basis in law orfact. 
A notice of lis pendens may be filed by an interested party in any action "affecting the 
title to real property." See generally, Bengoechea v. Bengoechea, 106 Idaho 188,677 P.2d SOl 
(Cl. App.1984), wherein a claim for constructive trust relating to real property allegedly obtained 
by fraud allowed the filing of lis pendens. A constructive trust can be imposed where property 
was obtained either fraudulently or through violation of a fiduciary duty. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 
126 Idaho 467, 469,886 P.2d 772,774 (1994); Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165,722 P.2d 474 
(1986). 
A slander of title claim requires proof of four elements: 
"(1) publication of a slanderous statement; (2) its falsity; (3) malice; and (4) 
resulting special damages...." Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Id. 212, 192 P.3d 1036 
(2008) 
In the present case, the recording of a lis pendens is not actionable as a slander of title 
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because there was no slanderous statement, no falsity, no malice, and no resulting special 
damages. The counterclaimants have not suffered any special damages because they have not 
paid back the purchase price and as a result are not entitled to the removal of the vendee's lien 
from the property. 
The other required elements for slander of title are also missing. Idaho courts have 
defined malice as a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement. Weaver v. Stafford, 
134 Idaho 691, 701, 8 P.3d 1234, 1244 (2000). The 'statement' made by filing a lis pendens is 
that the filer is an interested party in an action relating to the title ofthe real property. As noted 
above, that 'statement' was and is true. However, even a false statement does not support a 
slander of title claim, if the statement was made in good faith with probable cause for believing 
it. Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). Given the facts in this 
case, the Plaintiffs certainly had probable cause to believe they had the right to file a notice of lis 
pendens. 
Moreover, as the Court declared in Clark v. Clark, 56 Idaho 6, 47 P.2d 914 (1935), 
malice cannot be imputed to a lawful act done pursuant to a statutory right. 
"It is quite generally held that what a person may lawfully do may be done with or 
without malice. (Authorities cited.) In other words, there can be no legal malice in 
contemplation of law where the thing done is lawful and the means employed are 
lawful. Courts must judge the intent a man has in doing an act by the means he 
employs and the thing to be accomplished, and if they all be lawful, courts cannot 
impute malicious or unlawful motives to the actor." 
In addition, the filing of a lis pendens is absolutely privileged as a filing in a judicial 
proceeding. In Overman v. Klein, 103 Idaho 795, 800, 654 P.2d 888 (1982), the Idaho Supreme 
Court discussed the breadth of immunity accorded statements in judicial proceedings, and with 
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approval cited a California case according immunity to the filing of a notice oflis pendens. 
"The cases cited usually involved verbal testimony, but the immunity or privilege attaches 
to affidavits, as well as pleadings. Sacks v. Stecker, supra; Young v. Young, 18 F.2d 807 
(D.C.Cir.l927); McGehee v. Insurance Co. ofNorth America, 112 F. 853 (5th Cir.l902). 
The immunity has been held to apply as to virtually any statement in documents which 
have been filed in a judicial proceeding. Richeson v. Kessler, supra, (attorney's letter); 
DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 197 A2d 245 (1964) (declaration in prior suit); 
Bartlett v. Christhi/f, 69 Md. 219,14 A 518 (1889) (petition); Kerpelman v. Bricker, 23 
Md.App. 628, 329 A2d 423 (1974) (letter of complaint); Gilpin v. Tack, 256 F.Supp. 562 
(W.D.Ark.1966) (interrogatories); O'Barr v. Feist, 292 Ala. 440, 296 So.2d 152 (1974) 
(physician's letter); Toddv. Cox, 20 Ariz.App. 347, 512 P.2d 1234 (1973) (affidavit); 
Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P.2d 405, 46 Cal.2d 375 (1956) (notice oflis pendens); 
McDonald v. Lakewood Country Club, 170 Colo. 355,461 P.2d 437 (1969) (criminal 
information); Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E.2d 248 (1954) (affidavit); Resciniti 
v. Padilla, 420 N.Y.S.2d 759, 72 AD.2d 557 (1979) (affidavit); Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 
1, 415 A2d 292 (1980) (psychiatric report, not filed in proceeding)" 
Other states are in accord with the principle that a notice of lis pendens is subject to a 
judicial privilege. See Powell v. Stevens, 449 Mass. 1109,873 N.E.2d 247 (2007); Zamarello v. 
Yale, 514 P.2d 228,230-232 (Alaska, 1973); Procacci v. Zacco, 402 So. 2d 425,426-428 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Woodcourt II Ltd. v. McDonald Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 245, 249-251 
(1981); Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Dev. Corp., 511 So. 2d 112, 117-118 (Miss. 1987); Hauptman 
v. Edwards, Inc. 170 Mont. 310, 317 (1976); Lone v. Brown, 199NJ. Super. 420, 427-429 
(1985); Superior Constr., Inc. v. Linnerooth, 103 N.M. 716, 719-720 (1986) (majority opinion); 
Brough v. Foley, 572 A.2d 63, 66-68 (R.!. 1990); Kropp v. Prather, 526 S.W.2d 283, 286-287 
(Tex. Civ. App. (1975); Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1976). 
None of the essential elements ofa slander oftitle claim are present here. 
Therefore, summary judgment is proper. 
3. There is no valid claim ofAbuse ofProcess. 
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"The essential elements of abuse of process are: (1) an ulterior, improper purpose; 
and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of 
the proceeding. Bird v. Rothman, [128 Ariz. 599] 627 P.2d 1097 (Ariz.App.1981) 
and Bull v. McCuskey, [96 Nev. 706] 615 P.2d 957 (Nev.1980)." 
Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 104, 765 P.2d 126(1988) 
The Court in Badell, supra, upheld the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the 
defendant on the abuse ofprocess claim, noting: 
" ... this court has concluded that the defendant attorney had probable cause for the filing 
of the malpractice complaint against Dr. Badell. Even assuming, arguendo, that a factual 
issue exists with regard to an ulterior, improper purpose, there is no evidence of 
subsequent misuse of process after it was lawfully issued. ...This court, therefore, 
concludes that the defendant attorney is also entitled to summary judgment on the abuse 
of process claim." (emphasis added) 
As in Badell, the 'process' in our case (the lis pendens) was properly filed in the regular 
conduct of the proceeding, instituted with probable cause and there is no evidence of subsequent 
misuse of process after it was lawfully issued. Therefore, the counterclaim for abuse ofprocess 
cannot be sustained. 
The absence of a 'subsequent misuse of process' is fatal to the claim for abuse of process. 
This was illustrated in a New York case, Wilderhomes v Zautner, 009-NY-0422.225 (2009 NY 
Slip Op 50718), which dealt with the filing of a complaint and lis pendens. That Court noted: 
"Here, defendants' claim the "process" plaintiffs allegedly abused consisted of instituting 
this action and in filing a lis pendens. The institution of this action, with its summons and 
complaint, does not form the basis for an abuse ofprocess claim, as a matter of law... 
Similarly, "even if it is assumed that the filing of a lis pendens can provide a basis for an 
abuse ofprocess claim, the critical fact remains that defendants do not assert that the lis 
pendens was improperly used after its issuance, but only that plaintiff acted maliciously in 
bringing the action." (Brown v. Bethlehem Terrace Associates, 136 AD2d 222, 225 [3d 
Dept. 1988]). An allegation of maliciousness alone is insufficient to state an abuse of 
process claim. Accordingly, defendants' abuse of process claim is dismissed." 
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Where it is alleged that the process "abused" is the very filing of a lawsuit, it is 
incumbent upon the party asserting that claim to show that the other party's claim is "devoid of 
factual support or if supportable in fact, has no cognizable basis in law". Yadon v. Lowry, 126 
P.3d 332,336 (Colo.App. 2005). 
Here, the Plaintiffs claims had factual support and a cognizable basis in law. 
Counterclaimants made written admissions regarding their disclaimer to the trust as beneficiaries 
(Connie Taylor letter to Bart Harwood on April 14,2004 which stated, "The Taylors are not 
willing to give up their rights as beneficiaries of the trust unless Beth will affirm her prior factual 
statements in the form of an affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. If 
we aren't able to reach an agreement on that, they will seek a full accounting of the trust and a 
copy ofthe trust and estate tax returns", (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One deposition of Beth 
Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing deposition exhibit 39). There was also a sworn statement under 
oath verifying the Taylors had disclaimed their interest in the trust as beneficiaries ("my mother 
is the beneficiary ofthe trust...Their mother stands to gain and, thereby, they have an interest in 
the proceeding." (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One transcript of probate court hearing Exhibit 
"A"). Testimony under oath verified that the Taylors were longer beneficiaries under the trust 
(Verified Petition in the probate court on November 12, 2004... which stated under oath, "the 
petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary ofthis trust by 
virtue ofthe terms ofa Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement." (Affidavit of Thomas 
Maile Part Two Exhibit "I"). 
On March 9, 2006, a Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, and prepared 
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by the co-defendant attorneys. Page I of the Verified Amended Complaint stated under oath, 
"Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a resident 
of Ada County Idaho. All of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. 
Johnson Trust." (The verified Amended Complaint is annexed to Amended Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial as Exhibit "B") (emphasis added) . 
In addition, and most importantly, the Idaho Supreme Court has established "law of the 
case" that the Taylors had disclaimed their interest in the trust (Taylor v. Maile 2). 
On all of these facts, the Plaintiffs had a factual and legal basis to bring their claims. 
Filing of a lis pendens was authorized because the claims affected the real property and included 
a specific request for a constructive trust based upon fraud. Constructive trusts are raised by 
equity for the purpose of working out right and justice, where there was no intention of the party 
to create such a relation, and often directly contrary to the intention of the one holding the legal 
title.... If one party obtains the legal title to property, not only by fraud... Bengoechea, supra. 
An action to impress a constructive trust on realty affects title to that property, so that a notice of 
lis pendens may be filed. Ross v. Specialty Risk Consultants, Inc., 240 Wis.2d 23, 621 N.W.2d 
669, 677 (Ct. App.2000). 
Plaintiffs sought to set aside the judgment quieting title in the Taylors based upon a fraud 
upon a court. The application of that legal theory was upheld in Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 
640, 115 P.3d 731 (2005), in which the Court stated: 
"Kildew and Campbell argue that a motion to set aside a judgment is governed by 
equitable principles.... In seeking equitable relief, the Daltosos were required to 
enter the court with clean hands. Daltoso previously entered into arbitration with 
Campbell which resulted in the subdivision of property confinned by a court 
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decree. According to Campbell, the Daltosos may not now argue against 
application of the very court exception they formerly relied on to their benefit. 
The Daltosos are not estopped based on either the doctrine of unclean hands or 
quasi-estoppel. The doctrine of unclean hands allows "a court to deny equitable 
relief to a litigant on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and 
dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy at issue." Sword v. 
Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 251,92 P.3d 492,501 (2004). Motions to set aside a 
judgment are governed by equitable principles. See Compton, 101 Idaho at 334, 
612 P.2d at 1181." 
Since it was based on facts evidencing fraud in obtaining title to real property, there was 
no abuse of process in filing a complaint and lis pendens in order to set aside a judgment 
affecting that property. Nor was it an abuse of process to record a lis pendens since the plaintiffs 
had a legitimate statutory right to pursue their vendee's lien for the return of their purchase price. 
All of the elements of a claim for abuse of process are missing and summary judgment is proper. 
3. There is no valid claim ofIntentional Interference with Prospective Business Advantage. 
To establish a claim for intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage, 
Taylors must show (1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the 
expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the 
expectancy, (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the 
interference itself, and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted. 
Highland Enter., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999). 
This tort also requires a showing that the interference was wrongful beyond the fact of 
interference itself. Lexington Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 286,92 P.3d 
526, 536 (2004). 
A claim of tortious interference is subject to a motion dismiss where the complaint shows 
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the interference was justified or privileged. Peoples Security Life Ins. Co. v. Hooks, 322 N.C. 
216,220,367 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1988). Interference of the contract must be without justification. 
The interference is "without justification" if the defendants' motives ... were "not reasonably 
related to the protection of a legitimate business interest' of the defendant." A complaint must 
admit of no motive for interference other than malice. Pinewood Homes, Inc. v. Harris, 184 
N.C. App. 597,601,646 S.E.2d 826, 830 (2007). 
The undisputed facts show that the filing of the complaint and the lis pendens were not 
wrongful. Judge Wilper ruled that the lis pendens could be maintained during the appeal. 
Following the appeal, continuation of the lis pendens was clearly authorized since the Taylors 
refused to repay the purchase price to Berkshire in accordance with the court order, but instead 
imposed additional conditions on that payment. The Plaintiffs' right to maintain its vendee's lien 
has likewise been established. I.C. § 45-1302 authorizes the foreclosure of a lien to the same 
status as a quiet title action. 
The counterdefendants have not exceeded their legal rights. They are entitled to the 
protection of the vendee's lien and have a right to foreclosure on the real property to enforce their 
right to reimbursement of the purchase price. 
Statutory protection is a defense to any alleged wrongful recording of a notice of claim. 
See generally, Hewson v. Asker's Thrift Shop, 120 Idaho 164, 167,814 P.2d 424, 427 (1991). 
Generally a right which stems from statutory protection is a defense to certain actions. See, 
generally, Rincover v. Slale, 128 Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996). 
There has been no conduct on the part of the counter-defendants other than filing the lis 
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pendens. For the reasons above outlined, the lis pendens were valid and/or arguably valid based 
upon fact and law. The counter-claimants have not alleged wrongful conduct beyond their 
allegations relating to the lis pendens. The essential elements of a claim for intentional 
interference with prospective business advantage are missing and summary judgment is proper 
CONCLUSION 
Berkshire has a right to maintain a vendee's lien foreclosure action against the real 
property. A vendee's lien is afforded the same analysis as a quiet title action affecting real 
property. The counter-claimants had a right to maintain their lis pendens in the current matter 
even through an appeal. The continuation of the lis pendens through August 2009 was proper 
because Taylors failed to reimburse Berkshire the purchase price after receiving back the 
property. The necessary elements relating to all three (3) counts of the counterclaim are missing. 
Counterdefendants are therefore entitled to Summary Judgment as to all counterclaims raised by 
the defendants in this matter. 
DATED this Z. day of March, 2010. 
/!k2)~ 
CHRIST T. TRo~o-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 2nd day of March, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS to be delivered, addressed 
as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor ( X) U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY () Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 




Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
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T Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 




Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
MAR 03 2010
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., 




CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; 
CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. 
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L. 
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho 
revocable trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; 
AND ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: 
DEFENDANTS' 
COUNTERCLAIM 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pg 1 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.	 Your Affiant is co-counsel of record in this matter and the Ada County Case No. CV OC 
04-00473D. That the information and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's 
personal knowledge and/or observations and can testify as to the truth of the matters 
asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this matter. 
2.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of a letter which was received 
via facsimile from COllilie Taylor dated July 28, 2009 and the same is made part hereof as 
if set forth in full herein. Your affiant provided his reply to this letter which is contained 
as a part of Exhibit "B" described below 
3.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy ofthe Affidavit of Thomas 
Maile filed in Ada County Case No. CV DC 04-00473D, Taylor vs Maile filed September 
23, 2009 and the same is made part hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
DATED this tb day of February, 201 . 
-----'"""--------"'--\"'--''-----l-------­
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
U,; day of February, 2010. 
(!//]~~ 
Notary Public for~ 
~ • I Residing atb(;', ~ , Idaho ~
 
My Commission Expires: IZ,};;; ~--C;()
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of March, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile, IV. In Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Defendants' Counterclaim to be delivered, addressed 
as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor (X) U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY () Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 








NO. 228r-p. 1JUL. 28. 2009 11: 26AM CLARK &FEENEY AllY 
LAW OI"F'le~ OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY
RON T. aL.EWe;TT Tf:L~F'HDNE; 
WILLIAM JE:RE:MY CARR (208) "743-9516THE: TRAIN STATION, SUITE 106 
PAUL. THOMAS CLA~K I ~29 MAIN STREET (800) 1365.951 e
THOMAS W. F'E:E:NE:V 
SCOTT O. GALLINA •• P.O. CFlAWER 285 FAX
,JONATHAN D. HA""'V 
RUBE (;J. JUNES· LEWISTON, IDAHO e~!501 (20a) ~74G-e 160 
TINA L. Ke:~NAN •• 
';llaw@IElwl~ton.comJO""N e. MITCHELL 
COUGLAS L MUSHWTZ 
CHARlES M. STROSCHEIN •• 
CONNIE: TIIYL.OFl ­
• UCENSm IN WASHINGTON & O"~DN DNI"V 
•• UCENSm IN. tOAHQ "WI\SHINGTON 
July 28, 2009 
Sent Via Facsimile To: (208) 939-1001 Total Pages: Z 
Mr. Thomas Maile
 




Re: Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor et. al. 
Dear Mr. Maile: 
The fact that you have recently recorded a release of lis pendens in this matter does not change 
the fact that you have filed a quiet title action against the property, As long as there is any 
possibility of an appeal of your claim to the Linder Road property, it will remain 
unmarketable. Because you have filed a motion for permissive appeal, which will not even be 
heard until September 9th, your demand for payment of the purchase price within 21 days is 
ludicrous and flies in the face of JUdge Wilper's most recent ruling. 
As a realtor, you undoubtedly understand that the reduction in value ofthe Linder Road property
 
over the years you have pursued your baseless claims far exceeds the amount of the purchase
 
price, As the market continues to decline, the damages incurred by the Taylors will increase. In
 
additian, Judge Greenwood sent a very clear message that he is quite likely to order you to pay
 
costs and attorney fees in the present action.
 
Yau state that you are unable to settle this matter in full because there are motions pending. The
 
only motion pending is your request far a permissive appeal, and I am certain you lUlderstand
 




You are the only one who has the ability to put an end to this insanity. The Taylors' offer tn
 
resolve this matter completely as set farth in my letter to you of July 15, 2009 will remain open
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Dictated by Ms. Taylor and sent 
without signature to avoid delay 




cc:	 John Taylor w/encs. ~ Via US Mail 
DaHan Taylor w/encs. - Via US Mail t') 
Mark Prusynski w/encs. Sent Via Facsimile ONLY To: (208) 385~5384 Total Pages:-=-=­
The pages comprising this facsimile transmission contain confidential information from the 
office ofClark and Feeney. This information is intended solelyfor use by the individual entity 
named as the recipient hereof Ifyou are not the intended recipient, be aware that any 
disclosure, copying, distribution or use ofthe contents ofthis transmission is prohibited. Ifyou 
have received this transmission in error) please notify us by telephone immediately so we may 
arrange to retrieve this transmission at no cost to you 
LAW OFFICES OF' 
CLARK AND FEENEY 















            
I  
   
 
9:3
~ _.,._ _ ~ .._._--.-.._-­
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
A.M."'~~==~ •. _ .. ~~I}~~{,! .. 
j, r.JAVID NAWU1f+", 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 5S. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
RELEASING VENDEE'S LIEN 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G" MAILE, IV. IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
ORDER RELEASING VENDEE'S LIEN - Page 1 C'Jl3lldybackbackl'serverlfiles\a\MMAILE 
: TAYlOR\atf.oppmtnreleasevendeeslien.v.'pd 
Exhibit B 001516
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.	 Your Affiant is the attorney for the above-named Defendants/Counter-Claimants and 
further appears Pro Se, and provides this Affidavit in opposition to the Motion for Order 
Releasing Vendee's Lien. That the information and facts set forth herein are based upon 
your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can testify as to the truth of 
the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this matter. 
2.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Release ofNotiee of Lis 
Pendens in the above captioned matter. 
3.	 That your affiant caused to be filed Exhibit "A" with the Ada County Recorder's Office 
on behalf of Berkshire Investments, LLC. There still remains as outstanding the purchase 
price which was fully paid in January 2004. 
4.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of an August 3, 2009 letter fi-om 
your affiant to counsel for the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants in the above referenced 
matter. 
DATED this -7 /day of September, 2009. 
[ 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this
 
"7 f day of September, 2009.
 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 


















Mary Sue Chose r.: 
NOTAHY PUBLIC ~. 
. ST,L\TE OF ID,L;HC ~ 
t~~'<~'"''\-7''<'''~~",~~''-r~-~ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
Commission Expires July 30,2014 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/'J • 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this{ Iday of September, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR ORDER RELEASING VENDEE'S LIEN, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail
 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission
 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery
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RELEASE OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That the undersigned, THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., individually, and on behalf of and as 
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN 
BIRCH-MAILE, whose address is 380 W. State Street, Eagle, Idaho, do hereby release that 
certain Not~ ofLis Pendens dated and recorded on May 18,2006, as Instrument Number 
106078472 at the offices of the Ada County Recorder, State of Idaho, in and for that certain 
parcel of real propeliy described as The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 
36, Township 5 NOlih, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
DATED This 3rd clay of August, 2009. 




County of Ada )
 
'W' On this 3rd day of August, 2009, before me, the undersi.~,'11ed, a Notary Public for said 
State, personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., known or acknowledged to me to be the 
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, and the 
person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he 
executed said document on behalf of said limited liability company, Colleen Birch-Maile and by 
himself. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day 
and year first above written. 
'--J:L..'- .- /1 " 
. . /; /~" .·/.-veL" I I ",:: 1 'L­
.,-"".l-'--'....'------_------'L=---'-Ll~!·=·-'___· =-- _ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 








THQMA:S/G. MAILE, IV., Individually and as 
attorney for BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC 
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
'--]:L"'-,- /1 " , '/1 ,r , -
~!~~~~ _ ~ = ~U~!·z~·~~ ______ _  
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'LAW OFFICE OF 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, P.A. 
380 WEST STATE STREET, EAGLE, IDAHO 83616 
(208) 939-1000/ Fax (208) 939··1001 















Re:	 Johnson Trust, Taylor v. Thomas & Colleen Maile, et.al
 
Consolidated Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D
 
Our File No. M04-51 09.0
 
Dear Ms. Taylor: 
In response to your most recent letter, the following should outline Berkshire Investment's 
position relative to the pending litigation. As a preliminary issue, there is no Realtor involved in this 
matter. The designation Realtor is a trade name for the National Association ofRealtors, which none 
of the parties are members. 
First, in the claim regarding Berkshire Investment v Connie Taylor et. aI., we have filed a 
Release of Lis Pendens with the County Recorder's Office which negates any issues regarding 
marketability of the real propeliy. As you know, we have continued to assert that Berkshire 
Investments has a Vendee's Lien on the subject real property and until the sums are paid that are due 
and owing pursuant to the Order entered by Judge Wilper, it is Berkshire Investment's position tbat 
the Vendee's Lien is covered by the Lis Pendens earlier filed. However, please note an executed 
Release ofLis Pendens and an executed Vendee's Lien which have been recorded today. Berkshire 
Investments continues to maintain it is entitled to the repayment of the purchase plice minus any 
costs. The payment is once again requested in a timely manner. An appropriate Release of the 
Vendee's Lien can be exchanged simultaneously with the payment by certified funds. 
Regarding the pending motion for an appeal, the claim for quiet title is not germane once 
Berkshire Investment has filed the Release of Lis Pendens with the County Recorder's Office. 
When the appeal is initiated and when an appellate court reverses the district court's decision 
regarding the Berkshire Investments' claims, it is quite conceivable the only remedy available, at that 
point in time, will be a suit for damages for the claims asserted by Berkshire Investment. By 
releasing the Lis Pendens, Berkshire Investments no longer claims any interest in the real property 
pursuant to counts set fort in the amended complaint. By the very nature of the recorded Releases 
















· Page 2 
August 3, 2009 
Berkshire-Johnson trust 
Berkshire Investments continues to request payment as outlined in this letter. 
The twenty-one (21) days requested should be more than sufficient for your client to obtain 
funds to pay offwhat is due and owing Berkshire Investments. As in any real estate transaction and 
as previously stated, an appropriate executed release of the vendee's lien will be recorded at such 
time a certified check is issued from a closing company, mortgage company and/or from your client. 
Finally, the Judgment that was entered awarding costs in the favor of Thomas Maile Real 
Estate Company L.L.c., was for the amount of $932.75. The Judgment was entered October 3, 
2005. Consequently, this amount, including interest should be used as an offset to any costs 




cc: Mark S. Prusynki/enclosures via fax (385-5384) 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 743-9516 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants 
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor 
and the Theodore Johnson Trust 
APR 7. 7 20m 
,to C'.'-\\'!D ~~;,~\\fj\iiF1U, (;;C:':, 
J~' E. l-jGLi't~~:~. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAlLE, IV, 




CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, an 
individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK PRUSYNSKI 
{ 
Case No. CV OC 07 23232 
AFFIDAVlT OF MARK PRUSYNSKI IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 











MARK PRUSYNSKI, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I was attorney for Defendants, Connie Taylor, Paul Thomas Clark, and Clark and Feeney. 
2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit "A" a true and correct copy of Moffatt Thomas' billing 
statement for services provided to these Defendants in defense of this matter. 
DATED this L ~ay of April, 2010. 




SUBSCRIBED AND S WORN to before me this ~ of April, 2010. 
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Date Initials Hours 
4/25/2008 MSP 0.20 
4/25/2008 MSP 0.10 
4/25/2008 MSP 0.20 
4/25/2008 MSP 0.10 
4/28/2008 MSP 0.10 
4/29/2008 MSP 0.30 
4/29/2008 MSP 1.50 
4/29/2008 MSP 1.20 
4/29/2008 MSP 0.90 
4/29/2008 MSP 0.50 
4/29/2008 MSP 0.10 
4/30/2008 MSP 1.50 
4/30/2008 MSP 0.20 
4/30/2008 MSP 0.10 
4/30/2008 MSP 0.20 
4/30/2008 MSP 0040 
4/30/2008 MSP 0.80 
5/2/2008 MSP 0.30 
Amount Description 








33.00 Receive and review complaint; 
16.50 Correspondence to insured regarding appearance; 
16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured
 
regarding substitution of attorney;
 




247.50 Analyze amended complaint; 








82.50 Receive and review brief from insured; 
16.50 Prepare Notice of Appearance; 




33.00 Receive and review retention letter; 








66.00 Begin preparation of answer to complaint; 




49.50 Prepare notice of substitution of counsel; 
I 
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Date Initials Hours 
5/2/2008 MSP 0.20 
5/2/2008 MSP 0.20 
5/2/2008 MSP lAO 
5/2/2008 MSP 0.10 
5/6/2008 MSP 1.20 
5/6/2008 MSP 0.50 
5/612008 MSP 0.80 
5/6/2008 MSP 0.50 
5/712008 MSP 1.00 
5/7/2008 MSP 0.20 
5/7/2008 MSP 0.10 
5/7/2008 MSP 0040 
5/8/2008 MSP 0.60 
5/8/2008 MSP 0.10 
5/8/2008 MSP 0.30 
5/8/2008 MSP 0.30 
Amount Description 




33.00 Receive and review response to correspondence
 
regarding notice of substitution of counsel;
 
231.00 Analyze appeal brief to determine basis for
 
possible motion to dismiss;
 








82.50 Draft affirmative defenses; 








165.00 Receive and review Supreme Court brief; 
33.00 Correspondence to client regarding Supreme
 
Court brief and possible motion to dismiss;
 
16.50 Receive and review notice of substitution; 












49.50 Telephone conference with insured regarding
 
notice of intent to take default and response
 
to motion to dismiss;
 





















1   
 
1  
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Date Initials Hours 
5/8/2008 MSP 1.80 
5/8/2008 MSP 0.20 
5/912008 MSP 0.20 
5/9/2008 MSP 0.20 
5/9/2008 MSP 0.10 
5/13/2008 MSP 0040 
5/13/2008 MSP 0.10 
5/13/2008 MSP 1.50 
5/13/2008 MSP 0040 
5/13/2008 MSP 0.70 
5/14/2008 MSP 0.20 
5/14/2008 MSP 0.10 
5/14/2008 MSP 0.20 
5/2112008 MSP 0.30 
5/29/2008 MSP 0.10 
6/12/2008 MSP 0.30 
6/24/2008 MSP 0.30 
Amount Description 
297.00 Draft answer; 
33.00 Finalize substitution of counsel; 
33.00 Finalize answer; 




16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
 
regarding notice of substitution and answer;
 
66.00 Receive and review co-defendant's motion to
 
dismiss, affidavit and exhibits;
 
16.50 Correspondence to client regarding
 
co-defendant's motion to dismiss;
 




66.00 Prepare motion to dismiss; 








16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
 
regarding possible recusal of judge;
 
33.00 Correspondence to client regarding possible
 
recusal of judge and motion to dismiss;
 








49.50 Prepare case management plan; 
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1 /  
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Date Initials Hours 
6/24/2008 MSP 0.30 
6/24/2008 MSP 0.40 
6/25/2008 MSP 0.20 
6/25/2008 MSP 2.80 
6/25/2008 MSP 0.30 
6/26/2008 MSP 0.30 
7/24/2008 MSP 1.20 
7/24/2008 MSP 1.00 
7/25/2008 MSP 0.30 
7/28/2008 MSP 0.60 
7/28/2008 MSP 1.50 
7129/2008 MSP 0.30 
7/29/2008 MSP 0.30 
7/29/2008 MSP 0.10 
7/29/2008 MSP 0.10 
7/30/2008 MSP 0.10 
7/30/2008 MSP 0.10 
7/3112008 MSP 0.20 
Amount Description 
49.50 Attend Court's status conference; 








462.00 Prepare case management plan; 
49.50 Prepare budget; 
49.50 Finalize case management plan and budget; 




165.00 Receive and review earlier deposition
 
transcript of Helen Taylor;
 




99.00 Prepare responses to requests for admissions; 
247.50 Analyze pleadings from prior case to prepare
 
responses to requests for admissions;
 




49.50 Correspondence from insured regarding
 
deposition of Helen Taylor;
 












16.50 Correspondence to client regarding depositions; 
33.00 Correspondence from client regarding responses 
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Date Initials Hours Amount Description 















to requests for admissions; 
1.00 165.00 Continue analysis of pleadings from prior case 
to determine grounds for dismissal; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding deposition; 
0.30 49.50 Correspondence to client regarding deadlines 
for requests for admissions and documents from 
first case; 
0.10 16.50 Correspondence to client regarding deposition; 
0.10 16.50 Correspondence from client regarding documents; 
0.20 33.00 Receive and review pleading index from first 
case; 
0.10 16.50 Correspondence from client regarding discovery 
from plaintiff; 
0.30 49.50 Correspondence to clients regarding discovery 
from plaintiff's counsel; 
0.20 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding pleading 
index and key documents; 
0.60 99.00 Receive and review deposition transcript of 
Doug Crandall; 
0.80 132.00 Receive and review Tom Maile's deposition 
transcript; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding additional depositions; 
0.10 16.50 Correspondence to client regarding additional 
depositions to be taken; 
0.70 I 15.50 Receive and review deposition transcript of B. 
Hardwood; 
2.20 363.00 Receive and review deposition transcript of B. 
Rogers; 
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Date Initials Hours 
8/7/2008 MSP 1.50 
8/7/2008 MSP 0.80 
8/7/2008 MSP 0.30 
8/8/2008 MSP 0.20 
8/8/2008 MSP 0.50 
8/8/2008 MSP 0.70 
8/11/2008 MSP 0.30 
8/12/2008 MSP 2.50 
8/12/2008 MSP 0040 
8/14/2008 MSP 1.50 
8/14/2008 MSP 0.20 
8/21/2008 MSP lAO 
8/2112008 MSP 0.60 
8/21/2008 MSP 0.50 
8/22/2008 MSP 0.50 
8/22/2008 MSP 0.30 
8/25/2008 MSP 0.20 
Amount Description 
















82.50 Receive and review deposition of S. Johnson; 
















247.50 Prepare responses to requests for admissions
 
and answers to interrogatories;
 
33.00 Correspondence to client regarding responses to
 




231.00 Continue preparation of discovery responses; 




82.50 Receive and review draft responses; 
82.50 Finalize discovery responses; 




33.00 Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding 
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17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours 
8/26/2008 MSP 0.20 
8/2712008 MSP 0.30 
8/27/2008 MSP 0.20 
8/29/2008 MSP 0.10 
8/29/2008 MSP 0.10 
9/2/2008 MSP 0.10 
9/2/2008 MSP 0.20 
9/2/2008 MSP 0.10 
9/8/2008 MSP 0.10 
9/16/2008 MSP 0.50 
9/17/2008 MSP 0.20 
9/17/2008 MSP 2.50 
9/18/2008 AJS 0.30 
9/18/2008 MSP 1.50 
Amount Description 
Helen Taylor's deposition; 
33.00 Correspondence to client regarding rescheduling
 
deposition of Helen Taylor;
 




33.00 Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding
 
deposition of Helen Taylor;
 
16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
 
regarding deposition of Helen Taylor;
 








33.00 Correspondence to client regarding amended
 
notice and subpoena for Helen Taylor;
 
16.50 Receive and review responses from client
 




16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
 
regarding deposition of Helen Taylor;
 
82.50 Receive and review correspondence from
 
plaintiffs counsel regarding objections to
 
discovery and motion to compel;
 
33.00 Correspondence to client regarding plaintiffs
 
threat of motion to compel;
 
412.50 Research regarding exceptions to
 




39.00 Conference to discuss research assignment
 
regarding attorney as attesting witness and
 
possible waiver of attorney-client privilege;
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of an exception to attorney-client privilege; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding discovery responses; 
0.20 33.00 Telephone conference with plaintiff regarding 
discovery responses; 
0.20 33.00 Telephone conference with client regarding 
discovery responses; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review letter from client regarding 
res judicata; 
0040 66.00 Research regarding res judicata; 
0.10 16.50 Correspondence to client regarding res 
judicata; 
0.20 26.00 Research the rules of evidence with regard to 
the attorney-as-witness exception to the 
attorney-client privilege; 
0.20 26.00 Review letter correspondence from opposing 
counsel asserting attorney-as-witness as waiver 
of the attorney-client privilege; 
2.20 286.00 Continue to research state law from multiple 
jurisdictions regarding scope and application 
of attorney as attesting witness exception to 
the attorney-client privilege; 
0.30 49.50 Research regarding attorney-client privilege; 
0040 66.00 Telephone conference with client regarding 
plaintiffs threat of motion to compel; 
0.20 33.00 Receive and review brief in support of motion 
for summary judgment; 
0.30 49.50 Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding 
motion to compel; 
0040 66.00 Continue analysis of co-defendant's brief on 
res judicata; 







17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours 
9/26/2008 MSP 0.50 
9/26/2008 AJS 1.90 
9/29/2008 AJS 1.10 
9/29/2008 MSP 0.10 
9/30/2008 MSP 0.20 
9/30/2008 AJS 1.80 
9/30/2008 AJS 0.40 
9/30/2008 AJS 0.30 
10/1 /2008 AJS 0.50 
10/1/2008 AJS 1.30 
10/ I/2008 AJS 0.20 
10/1/2008 MSP 2.00 
10/1 /2008 MSP 0.40 
Amount Description 
82.50 Research regarding res judicata; 
247.00 Continue to research state and federal law 
regarding scope and application of attorney as 
attesting witness exception to the 
attorney-client privilege; 
143.00 Research state and federal law regarding fraud 
as exception to attorney-client privilege in 
preparation for drafting motion for summary 
judgment; 
16.50 Receive and review letter from client regarding 
deposition; 
33.00 Correspondence to client regarding deposition 
and motion for protective order; 
234.00 Research state and federal law regarding issue 
of res judicata, particularly with regard to 
privies of party to prior suit, in preparation 
for drafting motion for summary judgment; 
52.00 Review complaints as necessary to direct 
research regarding issue of res judicata; 
39.00 Continue to research state and federal case law 
regarding crime-fraud exception to 
attorney-client privilege; 
65.00 Continue to research Idaho and Ninth Circuit 
law regarding crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege; 
169.00 Continue research regarding application of res 
judicata, specifically with regard to parties 
and their privies; 
26.00 Review co-defendants' summary judgment 
memorandum in preparation for drafting own 
summary judgment motion and memorandum; 
330.00 Analyze first Helen Taylor deposition to
 
prepare for second deposition;
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of Helen Taylor and possible conflict; 
1.20	 198.00 Receive and review motion for summary judgment,
 
affidavit and brief from co-defendants;
 
0.80	 132.00 Research regarding res judicata issues for 
summary judgment; 
0040 66,00 Continue preparation of brief in support of 
motion for summary judgment; 
0.60	 99.00 Analyze complaint and decisions in prior case 
to prepare motion for summary judgment; 
0040 66.00 Telephone conference with client regarding 
deposition of Helen Taylor; 
2.20	 363.00 Continue analysis of prior deposition to 
prepare for deposition of Helen Taylor; 
lAO 182.00 Continue to review plaintiffs complaint in 
preparation for drafting memorandum in support 
of motion for summary judgment; 
0040 52,00 Review Idaho Supreme Court case Taylor v. Maile 
to further develop case understanding and 
strategy in preparation for drafting memorandum 
in support of summary judgment; 
lAO 182.00 Review pleadings regarding prior summary 
judgment proceedings in this matter; 
0.80	 104.00 Continue research of case law regarding 
attorney as in privity with client for purposes 
of res judicata; 
0.80	 104.00 Outline memorandum in support of motion for 
summary judgment; 
0.30	 39.00 Review case law research and case file as 
necessary to complete memorandum in support of 
motion for summary judgment; 
0,30 39.00 Review case law research and case file as 
necessary to complete outline memorandum in 
support of motion for summary judgment; 
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2.10 273.00 Draft memorandum in support of motion for 
summary judgment; 
0.40 66.00 Conference with client regarding Helen Taylor 
deposition; 
0.20 33.00 Conference with Helen and DaHan Taylor 
regarding deposition; 
2.60 429.00 Attend deposition of Helen Taylor; 
0.30 49.50 Conference with client regarding motion for 
summary judgment and analysis of plaintiffs 
strategy; 
2.50 325.00 Continue to draft memorandum in support of 
motion for summary judgment in preparation for 
review by supervising attorney; 
2.60 338.00 Revise and edit memorandum in support of motion 
for summary judgment; 
0.30 39.00 Review complaint for additional facts relating 
to plaintiffs' claims as necessary to complete 
revisions to memorandum in support of summary 
judgment; 
0.50 82.50 Revise brief in support of motion for summary 
judgment; 
0.30 49.50 Receive and review amended motion for 
appointment of trustees; 
0.90 148.50 Receive and review redraft of brief in support 
of motion for summary judgment; 
0.50 65.00 Continue to review plaintiffs' complaint as 
necessary to complete revisions to memorandum 
in support of motion for summary judgment; 
2.90 377.00 Continue to revise and edit memorandum in 
support of motion for summary judgment to 
include additional references to plaintiffs' 
complaint and revise and edit generally; 
I I Client:16ll301.l 
001539
nt:1611 .1
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3.30 544.50 Revise motion for summary judgment; 
0.70 115.50 Analyze brief filed by co-defendants; 
0.60	 99.00 Research regarding dismissal while other action 
is on appeal for brief; 
0.40 66.00 Analyze claims made in complaint for brief; 
1.20 198.00 Finalize brief and motion for summary judgment; 
1.50	 247.50 Receive and review plaintiffs response to
 
motion to dismiss with affidavits and exhibits;
 
0.20	 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding briefing in 
previous case; 
3.30	 544.50 Receive and review reply brief in opposition to 
motion for summary judgment, supplemental memo 
regarding motion for summary judgment and brief 
in support of motion to reconsider; 
1.40	 182.00 Research and review case law from state and 
federal jurisdictions and secondary sources 
regarding dismissal of fraud-based claims by 
doctrine of res judicata in preparation for 
drafting reply brief in support of motion for 
summary judgment; 
0.30	 39.00 Continue to research and review case law 
discussing application of res judicata to fraud 
based claims derived from prior litigation in 
preparation for drafting reply brief in support 
of motion for summary judgment; 
0.90	 117.00 Research Idaho and other jurisdiction case law 
regarding application of res judicata to 
independent actions based on fraud in 
preparation for drafting reply memorandum in 
support of summary judgment; 
1.00	 165.00 Receive and review motion to compel, brief and 
affidavit; 
0.20	 33.00 Letters to clients regarding motion to compel, 
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0.20 33.00 Receive and review motion to continue motion 
for summary judgment; 
1.20 198.00 Analyze plaintiff's brief in support of motion 
to compel; 
0040 66.00 Conference with client regarding plaintiff's 
brief in support of motion to compel; 
2.40 396.00 Research regarding attorney-client privilege 
and exceptions for fraud claim; 
3.50 577.50 Research regarding elements offraud for motion 
for summary judgment and motion to compel; 
0.20 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding plaintiff's 
arguments on motion to compel; 
0.50 82.50 Outline issues for objection to motion to 
compel; 
1.30 214.50 Review plaintiff's brief regarding motion for 
summary judgment; 
0.20 26.00 Research Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to 
determine when response to motion to compel 
and/or motion for continuance due; 
1.10 143.00 Research Idaho and Ninth Circuit case law 
regarding crimelfraud exception to 
attorney-client privilege in preparation for 
responding to opposing counsel's motion to 
compel and/or in support of our motion for 
summary judgment; 
0.40 52.00 Review plaintiffs' summary judgment and motion 
to compel briefing in preparation for 
responding to same; 
0.30 39.00 Review secondary sources regarding crime-fraud 
exception to attorney-client privilege; 
1.70 221.00 Continue to research state and federal case law 
on issue of whether allegation regarding status 
as beneficiary is a legal conclusion and not a 
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Date Initials Hours 
10/24/2008 AJS 0.20 
10/24/2008 AJS 0.60 
10/24/2008 MSP 0.20 
10/24/2008 MSP 0.20 
10/24/2008 MSP 1.50 
10/27/2008 MSP 0.30 
10/27/2008 MSP 0.20 
10/27/2008 MSP 0.10 
10/27/2008 MSP 0.20 
10/2712008 MSP 0.40 
10/27/2008 AJS 0.20 
10/27/2008 AJS 0.70 
10/28/2008 MSP 0.10 
Amount Description 
material fact for purposes of evaluating 
plaintiffs' fraud claim; 
26.00 Review correspondence from client regarding
 
prior probate proceedings and statements made
 
regarding the status of beneficiaries;
 
78.00 Research state and federal case law regarding
 
the reliance element of fraud with respect to
 
an attorney's potential reliance on statements
 
made by opposing counsel;
 








247.50 Outline issues for response to plaintiffs
 
motion to compel and reply brief regarding
 
motion for summary judgment;
 












33.00 Correspondence to client regarding motion to
 




66.00 Outline brief regarding motion to compel; 
26.00 Analyze issues regarding content of plaintiffs'
 
motion to compel briefing response brief;
 
91.00 Review plaintiffs' motion to compel briefing in
 
preparation for drafting response brief;
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Date Initials Hours 
10/29/2008 MSP 0.10 
10/29/2008 MSP 0.10 
10129/2008 MSP 0.10 
11/612008 MSP 0040 
Il118/2008 MSP 0.30 
IlI1812008 MSP 0.30 
11/2112008 MSP 0.80 
12/1/2008 MSP 0.20 
12/1/2008 MSP 0.20 
12/1/2008 MSP 2.80 
12/2/2008 MSP 2.30 
12/2/2008 MSP 0.60 
12/3/2008 MSP 0.30 
12/4/2008 MSP 1.80 
12/5/2008 MSP 1.60 
12/8/2008 MSP 0.80 
Amount Description 
16.50 Receive and review notices of vacating motion
 
for summary judgment hearing;
 








66.00 Receive and review research regarding response
 
to motion to compel;
 
49.50 Conference with client regarding postponement
 
of hearing on motion for summary judgment;
 




132.00 Conference with client regarding outcome of
 
Idaho Supreme Court argument;
 
33.00 Receive and review correspondence from client
 
regarding motion for summary judgment;
 








379.50 Continue research regarding fraud exception to
 




99.00 Continue research regarding res judicata; 
49.50 Correspondence to client regarding motion for
 
summary judgment and motion to compel;
 
297.00 Analyze plaintiff's brief in opposition to
 
motion for summary judgment;
 
264.00 Continue analysis of briefs on motion to compel
 
and motion for summary judgment;
 
132.00 Continue research regarding motion for summary 
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Date Initials Hours 
12/15/2008 MSP 0.20 
12/24/2008 MSP 1.00 
12/24/2008 MSP 0.50 
12/24/2008 MSP 0.60 
1/2/2009 MSP 0.90 
1/8/2009 MSP 2.20 
1/8/2009 MSP 0.30 
1/8/2009 MSP 0.10 
1/12/2009 MSP 0.10 
1/12/2009 MSP 0.10 
1/14/2009 MSP 0.10 
1/ 19/2009 MSP 0.10 
1/19/2009 MSP 0.30 
2/2/2009 MSP 0.20 
2/3/2009 MSP 0040 
Amount Description 
judgment; 
33.00 Telephone conference with client regarding
 
motion for summary judgment;
 








99.00 Letters to client regarding results of research
 
regarding standing to sue lawyers;
 
148.50 Research regarding allegations of fraud on
 
court as defense to res judicata claim;
 
363.00 Receive and review plaintiffs motion for stay,
 
























16.50 Receive and review correspondence from
 
plaintiffs counsel regarding motion to stay;
 








66.00 Continue analysis of Supreme Court decision; 










1 /  
 







1 /  
 
1 /  
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2/1 0/2009 MSP 






0.20 33.00 Telephone conference with client regarding 
Supreme Court decision; 
0.20 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding summary 
judgment strategy; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review response from client 
regarding summary judgment strategy; 
2.20 363.00 Analyze prior motion for summary judgment 
briefing and pleadings regarding motion to lift 
stay and obtain hearing on motion for summary 
judgment; 
0.40 66.00 Correspondence to client regarding strategy for 
summary judgment motion; 
0.20 33.00 Receive and review response from client 
regarding strategy for summary judgment motion; 
0.20 33.00 Receive and review affidavit ofC. Taylor 
regarding recent case in support of summary 
judgment motion; 
0.20 33.00 Receive and review letters from client 
regarding possible dismissal; 
0.30 49.50 Correspondence to client regarding possible 
dismissal; 
0.90 148.50 Receive and review supplemental memorandum 
regarding Supreme Court Opinion; 
2.70 445.50 Receive and review affidavit in support of 
supplemental memo and attachments to motion for 
summary judgment; 
0.20 33.00 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding hearing on motion for summary 
judgment and counterclaim; 
0.20 33.00 Receive and review answers and counterclaim; 
0.30 49.50 Correspondence to Zurich regarding 
counterclaim; 
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Date Initials Hours 
212312009 MSP 0.10 
2/2312009 MSP 0.10 
3/2/2009 MSP 0.10 
3/3/2009 MSP 0.20 
3/3/2009 MSP 0.10 
3/5/2009 MSP 0.10 
3/5/2009 MSP 0.20 
3/6/2009 MSP 0.20 
3/11/2009 MSP 0.10 
3/18/2009 MSP 1.80 
3/18/2009 MSP 0.10 
3/18/2009 MSP 0.10 
3/18/2009 MSP 0.10 
4/2/2009 MSP 0.10 
4/8/2009 LCH 0.60 
4/13/2009 MSP 0.20 
Amount Description 
16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
 




16.50 Correspondence to client regarding hearing on
 
motion for summary judgment;
 




33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding
 
counterclaim and answer to complaint;
 
16.50 Correspondence from insured regarding
 
counterclaim and amending answer;
 








33.00 Receive and review counterclaim; 
16.50 Finalize amended complaint; 
297.00 Receive and review plaintiffs motion for
 
summary judgment, brief and affidavit;
 
16.50 Correspondence to client regarding response to
 
motion for partial summary judgment;
 
16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
 
regarding hearing on summary judgment motions;
 












33.00 Receive and review correspondence from client 






















1 /  
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Date Initials Hours 
4/13/2009 MSP 0.50 
4/1312009 MSP 0.30 
4/14/2009 MSP 0.70 
4/14/2009 MSP 0.50 
4/14/2009 MSP lAO 
4/14/2009 MSP 1.00 
4/14/2009 MSP 1.80 
4/15/2009 MSP lAO 
4/15/2009 MSP 0.50 
4/15/2009 MSP 0.30 
4/1612009 MSP 0.20 
4/17/2009 MSP 1.60 
4/20/2009 MSP 1.50 
4/20/2009 MSP 2.80 
Amount Description 
regarding reply briefs; 
82.50 Receive and review defendants' reply brief; 




115.50 Receive and review plaintiffs' supplemental
 
reply brief regarding summary judgment motion;
 




231.00 Review plaintiffs' two other supplemental
 
briefs, five affidavits and brief in opposition
 
















82.50 Receive and review plaintiffs reply brief and
 
motion to strike regarding counterclaim;
 
49.50 Correspondence to insured regarding strategy
 




33.00 Receive and review correspondence from insured
 
regarding strategy for hearing;
 




247.50 Analyze pleadings from prior case to locate
 




462.00 Analyze plaintiffs' motion to compel and brief; 




1 /  
 
1 /  
 




1 /  
 
1 /  
 
1 /  
 
1 /  
 










17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours 
4/20/2009 MSP 1.20 
4/2112009 MSP 5.20 
4/21/2009 MSP 0.10 
4/22/2009 MSP 3.20 
4/22/2009 MSP 1.50 
4/22/2009 MSP 2.30 
4/22/2009 MSP 0.20 
4/29/2009 MSP 0.20 
4/29/2009 MSP 1.50 
5/112009 MSP 2.30 
5/19/2009 MSP 0.20 
6/1/2009 MSP 0.10 
6/1/2009 MSP 0.10 
6/112009 MSP 0.50 
7/7/2009 MSP 0.80 
Amount Description 
198.00 Draft response brief to motion to compel; 
858.00 Analyze trial transcript filed by plaintiffs
 








528.00 Analyze Supreme Court briefs to obtain proof of
 
claims barred by res judicata;
 
247.50 Continue preparation for argument of three
 
motions for summary judgment;
 
379.50 Attend hearing on motions for summary judgment
 
and motion to compel;
 
33.00 Conference with client regarding hearing on
 
motions for summary judgment;
 
33.00 Correspondence to client regarding hearings on
 
motions for summary judgment;
 
247.50 Research cases cited by plaintiffs at the
 
hearings on motions for summary judgment;
 




33.00 Receive and review Judge Wilper's order denying
 
payment ofjudgment and interest;
 
16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client
 




16.50 Correspondence to client regarding decision on
 
motion for summary judgment;
 





























1 /  
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0.30	 49.50 Letters to clients regarding memorandum 
decision received regarding summary judgment; 
0.70	 115.50 Analyze issues regarding certifying decision as 
final and dismissal of counterclaim; 
0.10	 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding the Court's memorandum decision on 
our motion for summary judgment; 
0.30	 49.50 Receive and review settlement offer and 
proposed satisfaction ofjudgment; 
0.10	 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding settlement; 
0.20	 33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding settlement 
amount; 
0.10	 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding settlement and Bar complaint against 
Maile. 
1.20	 198.00 Receive and review plaintiffs motion to 
certify order as final and for permissive 
appeal, affidavit and brief in support of 
motion; 
0.20	 33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding plaintiffs' 
motion for permissive appeal and certified 
order as final; 
0.10	 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding settlement; 
0.10	 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured 
to plaintiff regarding settlement; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review proposed judgment and order; 
0.90	 148.50 Telephone conference with insured regarding 
costs and fees, permissive appeal and strategy 
for response to motion for permissive appeal; 
7/1512009 MSP 0.20 33.00 Receive and review notice of scheduling 
conference; 
21	 Client: 1611301.1 
001549
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Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
7/15/2009 MSP 0.20 33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding strategy 
for response to motion for pennissive appeal; 
7116/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Receive and review notice of hearing on motion 
for pennissive appeal; 
7/16/2009 MSP 1.20 198.00 Research regarding which costs should be 
requested after partial summary judgment; 
7/16/2009 MSP 0.20 33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding request for 
costs; 
7/16/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding settlement offer; 
7/21/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from 
plaintiff's counsel regarding settlement; 
7/21/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Receive and review supplemental affidavit 
regarding certification for appeal; 
7/22/2009 MSP 0.40 66.00 Receive and review plaintiff's first and second 
set of discovery to Connie Taylor; 
7/24/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Correspondence to client regarding discovery 
responses; 
7/27/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding discovery responses; 
7/28/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding settlement; 
8/3/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from 
co-counsel to plaintiff's counsel regarding 
proposed litigation plan; 
8/3/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Receive and review amended motion for 
certification for appeal; 
8/3/2009 MSP , 0.20 33.00 Receive and review correspondence from 
plaintiff's counsel regarding lis pendens; 
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Date Initials Hours 
8/5/2009 MSP 0.10 
8/5/2009 MSP 0.20 
8/5/2009 MSP 0.10 
8/5/2009 MSP 0.10 
8/12/2009 MSP 0.20 
8/14/2009 MSP 0.30 
8/17/2009 MSP 0.10 
8/17/2009 MSP 0.30 
8/21/2009 MSP 0.10 
8/21/2009 MSP 0.10 
8/28/2009 MSP 0.20 
8/31/2009 MSP 0.30 
9/4/2009 MSP 0.10 
9/4/2009 MSP 0.10 
9/9/2009 MSP 0.60 
Amount Description 




33.00 Correspondence to client regarding
 




16.50 Correspondence from client regarding
 




16.50 Correspondence to client responding to client's
 
response regarding certification for appeal;
 
33.00 Receive and review second supplemental
 
affidavit regarding permissive appeal;
 
49.50 Attend status conference with Judge,
 
















16.50 Receive and review order governing proceedings; 








16.50 Receive and review correspondence from
 




16.50 Correspondence to plaintiff regarding our
 
position concerning his motion to certify;
 
99.00 Analyze pleadings regarding motion to certify 
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1.30 214.50 Attend hearing on motion to certify appeal; 
0.30 49.50 Correspondence to client regarding appeal; 
0.10	 16.50 Receive and review proposed order certifying 
appeal; 
0.20	 33.00 Conference with client regarding proposed order 
granting motion to appeal; 
0.30	 49.50 Receive and review signed order authorizing 
appeal; 
0.10	 16.50 Correspondence to client regarding authorizing 
appeal; 
0.30	 49.50 Research regarding new Idaho Supreme Court 
decision on res judicata; 
0.10	 16.50 Correspondence to client regarding new Idaho 
Supreme Court decision on res judicata; 
0.10	 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding interlocutory appeal; 
0.20	 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding 
interlocutory appeal; 
1.20	 198.00 receive and review plaintiff's motion for 
permissive appeal with brief and affidavit 
attaching relevant pleadings; 
0.50 82.50 Research regarding applicable appellate rules; 
0.20	 33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding plaintiff's 
brief regarding permissive appeal and 
applicable rules; 
0.10	 16.50 Receive and review notice of non-opposition to 
appeal; 
0.10	 16.50 Receive and review notice from court regarding 
handling of permissive appeal; 
24	 Client: I61130 I.l 001552
11 /  
11 /  
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0.10 16.50 Receive and review order denying pennissive 
appeal; 
0.30 49.50 Correspondence to client regarding order 
denying pennissive appeal; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding withdrawing; 
0.20 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding probable 
date of final judgment; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review offer ofjudgment; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review scheduling order; 
0.30 49.50 Correspondence to client regarding stipulation 
to withdraw or substitute counsel; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review response from client 
regarding stipulation to withdraw or substitute 
counsel; 
0.20 33.00 Draft notice of substitution of counsel; 
0.20 33.00 Receive and review motion to reconsider; 
0.40 66.00 Letters to insured regarding renewed motion to 
reconsider; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review notice of appearance of 
counsel; 
0.30 49.50 Correspondence to Zurich regarding request for 
reconsideration, scheduling conference and 
withdrawal; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review notice of scheduling 
conference; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from 
plaintiffs' counsel regarding new attorney; 
0.40 66.00 Receive and review objection to renewed motion 
to certify with affidavit; 





1 /  
1 /
1 /













16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding court's scheduling conference; 
12/22/2009 MSP 0.20 33.00 Analyze court's scheduling order; 
12/22/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Correspondence to co-defendant regarding 
court's scheduling order; 
12/22/2009 MSP 0.30 49.50 Receive and review proposed stipulation 
regarding scheduling order; 
12/22/2009 MSP 0.20 33.00 Receive and review letters from insured 
regarding proposed stipulation regarding 
scheduling order; 
12/23/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding scheduling stipulation; 
12/28/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding revised stipulation; 
12/29/2009 MSP 0.10 16.50 Correspondence to insured regarding stipulation 
for trial; 
12/29/2009 MSP 0.20 33.00 Receive and review revised stipulation for 
trial; 
12/30/2009 MSP 0.20 33.00 Receive and review revised stipulation for 
scheduling and correspondence from other 
counsel regarding vacating scheduling 
conference; 
1/5/2010 MSP 0.20 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding status 
conference and hearing on second motion to 
certify for appeal; 
1/6/2010 MSP 0.30 49.50 Receive and review court's scheduling order; 
1/6/2010 MSP 0.20 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding court's 
scheduling order; 
11712010 MSP 0.30 49.50 Receive and review brief in support of renewed 
motion to certify for appeal; 
11712010 MSP 0.20 33.00 Receive and review supplemental affidavit 
regarding renewed motion to certify for appeal; 
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0.10	 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding response to renewed motion to certify 
for appeal; 
0.20	 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding renewed 
motion to certify for appeal; 
1.00	 165.00 Analyze prior pleadings and orders to prepare 
for hearing on renewed motion to certify for 
appeal; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review motion to disqualify judge; 
0.10	 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from counsel 
for co-defendant regarding attending hearing by 
telephone; 
0.50	 82.50 Review pleadings on renewed motion to certify 
case for appeal; 
0.30	 49.50 Telephone conference with client regarding 
hearing on motion to certify case for appeal; 
1.00	 165.00 Attend hearing on motion to certify case for 
appeal; 
0.50	 82.50 Letters to clients regarding status following 
hearing on motion to certify case for appeal; 
0.20	 33.00 Correspondence to Zurich regarding denial of 
motion, substitution of counsel and settlement; 
0.10	 16.50 Correspondence to client regarding substitution 
of counsel; 
0.10	 16.50 Receive and review response from client 
regarding substitution of counsel; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review notice of substitution; 
0.10 16.50 Receive and review order of disqualification; 
0.10	 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding substitution of counsel; 
27	 Client: 16113 0 I .1 001555
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Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
2/25/2010 MSP 0.10 16.50 Correspondence to client regarding substitutlon 
of counsel; 
2/26/2010 MSP 0.20 33.00 Correspondence to co-counsel regarding 
substitution of counsel and mediation; 
2/26/2010 MSP 0.10 16.50 Correspondence to client regarding substitution 
of counsel and mediation; --------­
228.70 36,521.00 TOTAL 
28 Client: 1611301.1 001556
- ---- - - ----
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS 
The Defendants submit this supplemental memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiffs' 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' counterclaims. 
Presumptions and inferences of intentional interference 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that intent, as an element ofintentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage, can be shown even if the interference is incidental to the actor's 
intended purpose and desire, if the interference is known to him to be a necessary consequence of 
his action. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTlFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAfMS 
LAW OF'F'ICE:5 OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 
LEW15"1'ON, IDAHO 8:.l1501 001557
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InHighlandEnterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 986 P.2d 996 (1999), the Court stated 
as follows: 
In proving the element of intent, the plaintiff may show that the interference "with 
the other's prospective contractual relation is intentional ifthe actor desires to bring 
it about or ifhe knows that the interference is certain or substantially certain to occur 
as a result ofhis action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §766B (1977). 
Intent can be shown even if the interference is incidental to the actor's intended 
purpose and desire "hut known to him to be a necessary consequence ofms action." 
Id. at § 766. 
Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho at 340. 
The Supreme Court went on to approve of the trial court's notation that "[w)hat motivates
 
a person to act seldom is susc!:ptible ofdirect proof." Kalgaard v. Lindo Mar Adventure Club, Ltd.,
 
147 OLApp. 61, 934 P.2d 637', 640 (1997) (addressing whether the lower court should have granted
 
summary judgment for a claim of tortious interference with a potential business relationship).
 
The Highland court also cited with approval a California case addressing the intentional tort
 
of interference with contract (and noting that intentional interference with contract and intentional
 
interference with economic lldvantage do not differ with regard to intent). That case held that
 
"[i]ntent, of course, may be established by inference as well as by direct proof," Highland, supra,
 
citing Savage 11. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 21 Cal.AppAth 434,26 Cal.Rptr.2d 305,314 (1993)
 
(quoting seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal.3d 752, 206 Cal.Rptr.
 
354,686 P.2d 1158, 1165 (1984)). Accordingly, the jury may infer culpable intent from conduct
 
substantially certain to interf<:re with the prospective economic relationship. Id.
 
In the present matter, there is a genuine issue offact as to whether Mr. Maile's interference 
with the Jolmson Trust's right to sell the Linder Road property was intentional. There is evidence 
SUPPLE1vlENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
 
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS 2
 
i-AlW OFFlce;s OF 
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that Thomas Maile is licensed both' as an attorney and a realtor, and is it more than reasonabl~: to 
infer that he was aware that interference with the Trust's ability to sell the Linder Road property was 
certain Or substantially certain to occur as a result of his filing a lawsuit which was barred by res 
judicataand recording alis pendens. The inference that his interference with the Trust's prospective 
economic advantage was intentional, taken together with the other issues raised in the Defendants' 
initial briefing, precludes summary judgment on that issue. 








CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2qTfijday of April, 20 I0 I caused to be served ntrue and 
correct copy of the foregoiIllg document by the method indicated below, and addressed to l:he 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV
 
380 West State Street
 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Mr. Christ Troupis 
Attorney at Law 
POBox 2408 
1299 East Iron Eagle Drive, Ste. 130 
Eagle, ID 83616 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS 3 
LAW OFFI(;~';; OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY. LLP 
L.E:WISTON. IOAHO 1il;ol~O' 
o	 U.S. Mail 
o	 Hand Delivered 
o	 Overnight Mail 
Teleoopy (FAX) (208) 939..1001f4 
o	 U.S. Mail 
o	 Hand ~rvered 
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P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 743-9516 
Attorneys for Defendants 




APR :l 9 ?TltO 
J. DAVID NAVARF:O. Clerk 
By REOOIE TOWNLEY 
f.'~:r·tn~·.r 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, 




CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k1a CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLANTAYLOR, 
an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, an 
individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE L. J0H1\1S0N REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
THE DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS 
1 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 










































R. JOHN TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the Defendants, and the infornlation contained herein is of my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am attaching as Exhibit A a true and correct copy of a Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Agreement offering to purchase the Johnson Trust property for $1.8 million in September 2005. The 
Trust was unable to accept this offer because of the lis pendens which had been filed by Mr. Maile 
against the property, and the offer was ultimately withdrawn when the real estate market plummeted. 
3. Before Thomas Maile acquired possession of my uncle Ted's property on Linder Road, 
it was taxed as farm land at a very low rate. As a result of Maile's subdividing the property, the 
taxes increased to the amounts set forth in the chart attached as Exhibit B to this affidavit. Since the 
property was returned to the Trust in 2006, the Johnson Trust has incurred taxes, interest and late 
fees in the amount of $99,279.76. The litigation has prevented the Trust from either selling the 
property or borrowing the money to pay these taxes and the $400,000 purchase price. 
4. From the filing of this Complaint to the date this Court denied the Plaintiffs' Renewed 
Motion for Certification Pursuant to IRCP 54(b) on January 27, 2010, the Johnson Trust incurred 
attorney fees and costs in defending the Plaintiffs' claims in the approximate amount of$22,937.36, 
as demonstrated by the billing statement ofClark and Feeney attached as Exhibit C to this affidavit. 
5. As one of the tmstees of the Johnson Trust, I requested that the Idaho State Bar 
investigate Mr. Maile's purchase of the Linder Road property. A true and correct copy of the 
Complaint which the Bar has flIed is attached as Exhibit D. 
~/rt{ 
DATED this L.J day of April, 2010. 
U--++-+-..,....=.-=-----------,.l--if-+--------­
R. Jo 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 2 
LAW OFFiCES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 













































r,l "-~~J"l i 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this t -:5 day of April, 2010. 
Notary Public ip and for the State ofIdaho. 
Residing at / It II I It Jot Vi 1/(' therein. 
My commission expires: l. i/o.£;/2c/Lj 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2:gthday ofApril, 2010, I caused to be served a trm: and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV o U.S. Mail 
380 West State Street o Hand Delivered 
Eagle, ID 83616 g Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mr. Christ Troupis o U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law o Hand Delivered 
PO Box 2408 ~. Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616 o Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482 
Connie W. Taylor / 
Attorney for Defendants G 
AFFIDAVIT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR 3 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT 
This Agreement is made effective as of September _, 2005, between Crandall
 
Law Office ("Buyer"), and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and John, Reedl and
 
Dallan Taylor, as co-trustees of the estate ("Sellers").
 
The parties agree as follows: 
1. PURCHASE AND SALE OF PROPERTY. 
1.1 Property. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the Sellers 
shall sell to Buyer and Buyer shall purchase the following real property and other assets (the 
"Property"): The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, 
Range I West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho known as 3900 Linder Road. The size of the 
property is approximately plus or minus 40 acres. 
1.2 Purchase Price Amount. The purchase price for the Property is One Million 
Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,800,000.00) (the "Purchase Price"). 
1.3 Purchase Price Payment. The Purchase Price shall be paid as follows: Earnest 
Money Deposit. Upon the execution of this Agreement by the Buyer and the Sellers, the Buyer 
shall deposit in escrow at Title One Title Insurance Company, Eagle, Idaho ("Closing Agent"), 
earnest money in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) to be held for the benefit of 
the Buyer and the Sellers. Such deposit shall be returned by the Closing Agent to the Buyer if 
this Agreement does not close because of (i) the failure of a condition precedent, or (ii) any 
reason not the fault of the Buyer. If this Agreement does not close because of any reason not 
specified in the preceding sentence, all earnest money shall be paid by the Closing Agent to the 
Sellers as the agreed liquidated damages which shall be the sole and exclusive remedy of the 
Sellers. The balance of the purchase price shall be paid in immediately available funds delivered 
at Closing to Closing Agent. 
1.4 Conveyance of Title. Title to the Real Property shall be conveyed by a General 
Warranty Deed. Title to the Property shall be marketable and insurable and shall be free and 
clear of all liens, encumbrances, and restrictions, exclusive of (i) real property taxes for the 
current year which are not due and payable on or before Closing, and (ii) liens, encumbrances, 
and conditions accepted in writing by the Buyer on or before Closing. 
1.5 Title Insuram:e. Upon the acceptance of this Agreement by the Sellers, the 
Buyer, for the account of the Sellers, shall order a Commitment for Title Insurance 
("Commitment") issued by Title One ("Title Company"), covering the Property. If any 
exceptions shown on the Commitment are not approved in writing by the Buyer prior to Closing 
and cannot be removed by the Sellers by Closing, then the Buyer shall have the right to 
terminate this Agreement, in which event all earnest money deposited shall be refunded to the 
Buyer and each party shall be: fully released and discharged from any further obligations lmder 
this Agreement. 
At Closing, the Sellers shall purchase and deliver to the Buyer an ALTA 
Owner's Policy title insurance policy ("Policy") satisfying the following specifications: The 





Policy shall name the Buyer as the insured in the amount of the Purchase Price. The Policy 
shall insure the Buyer as the owner of the Property, subject only to the following special 
exceptions: (i) real property taxes for the current year which are not due and payable on or 
before Closing, and (ii) liens, encumbrances, and conditions accepted in writing by the Buyer on 
or before Closing. The Policy shall include the following endorsements: (I) an endorsement 
deleting the general exceptions to the Policy, (ii) an endorsement insuring that each street 
adjacent to the Real Property is a public street and there is direct and unencumbered pedestrian 
and vehicular access to such street from the Property, and (iii) an endorsement insuring that 
there are no encroachments by or onto the Property with respect to property, easement, or 
setback lines. 
1.6 Possession. Sellers shall deliver actual possession of the Property to Buyer at 
Closing. 
1.7 Risk of Loss. Until Closing, the Sellers shall assume all risk of loss or damage 
with respect to the Property. In the event of any loss or damage to all or any part of the Property, 
the, Buyer shall have the right to (i) terminate this Agreement, in which event all earnest money 
deposited shall be refunded to the Buyer and each party shall be fully released and discharged 
from any further obligations under this Agreement, (ii) close the purchase of the Property and 
reduce the Purchase Price by an equitable amount equal to the loss or damage, such reduction to 
be applied first to the cash payment at Closing to be delivered at Closing, or (iii) close the 
purchase of the Property and elect to receive all insurance proceeds paid or payable by reason of 
the loss or damage. 
1.8 Prorated Items. The following items shall be prorated as of Closing: (i) taxes 
and water assessments using the last assessments available prior to Closing; (ii) rents; and 
(iii) utilities. 
1.9 Time for Acceptance. This Agreement shall be null and void and of no force or 
effect unless a fully executed original of this Agreement is delivered to and received by the 
Buyer on or before September _,2005. 
2. REPRESENTATIONS, WARRANTIES, AND COVENANTS OF THE SELLER. 
The Sellers represent and warrant to, and covenants with, the Buyer as follows: 
2.1 Authority of the Sellers. The execution, delivery, and consummation of this 
Agreement by the Sellers has been duly approved in accordance with applicable law and any 
documents or instruments governing the Sellers. The execution, delivery, and consummation of 
this Agreement by the Sellers will not cause the Sellers to be in violation or breach of any law, 
regulation, contract, agreement, or other restriction to or by which the Sellers or the Property is 
subject or bound. If the Sellers are a corporation, the Sellers, at Closing, shall provide to the 
Buyer (i) a certificate from the State of Idaho dated not more than 45 days prior to Closing 
indicating that the Sellers are in good standing and qualified to do business in Idaho" and 
(ii) resolutions of the board of directors of the Sellers authorizing and approving this Agreement 
and the transactions contemplated hereby. If the Sellers are a partnership, the Sellers, at Closing, 
shall provide to the Buyer resolutions of the partners of the Sellers authorizing and approving 
this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby. 
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2.2 Property Ownership. The Sellers own and possess all right, title, and interest in 
and to the Property free and clear of all covenants, conditions, easements, liens, and 
encumbrances. 
2.3 Condition of Property. All of the Property, including, but not limited to, 
parking areas, landscape areas, sprinkler system(s), structural components, electrical, plumbing, 
heating and air conditioning systems, is in good operating condition and repair, subject only to 
routine maintenance. 
2.4 Material Misstatement or Omissions. No representation or warranty made by 
the Sellers in this Agreement or in any document or agreement furnished in connection with this 
Agreement contains or will contain any untrue statement ofmaterial fact, or omits or will omit to 
state a material fact necessary to make the statements not misleading. 
2.5 No Default. The Sellers are not in default under the terms of any contract, 
agreement, lease, license or other understanding, and no condition or event has occurred which, 
after notice, the passage of time, or otherwise, would constitute a default under or breach of any 
such terms. The Sellers are not aware of any condition that will result in a default under any 
such terms. 
2.6 Broker Fees. Except as disclosed in writing to the Buyer prior to Closing, the 
Sellers are not obligated to pay any fee or commission to any broker, finder, or intermediary for 
or on account of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement. 
2.7 Information to be Provided. Within ten (10) business days after the date this 
Agreement is accepted by the Sellers, the Sellers shall deliver to the Buyer the following: All 
contracts of any kind or nature which shall survive the Closing and which relate to the Property; 
A copy of all leases relating to the Property, together with any amendments to such leases; A 
copy of any and all licenses, certificates, permits, approvals, conditions or similar items, in the 
Sellers' possession relating to all or any portion of the Property. 
2.8 Conduct Pending Closing. From the effective date of this Agreement to 
Closing, the Sellers shall (i) maintain the Property in good repair and in a broom clean condition, 
(ii) continue to operate the Property in the manner previously operated by the Sellers, (iii) not 
enter into any contracts or purchase orders relating to the Property, and (iv) perform all acts 
necessary to insure that the representations, warranties, and covenants of the Sellers shall be true, 
complete, and accurate in alI respects on and as of the date of closing to the same force and 
effect as if made at Closing. 
2.9 Access to Property. After the Sellers' acceptance of this Agreement, the Buyer 
and the Buyer's authorized representatives shall have reasonable access to the Property for 
inspection. 
3. HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES. The terms "hazardous substance," "release," and 
"removal" shall have the definition and meaning as set forth in Title 42 U.S. C. 9601 (or 
corresponding provision of any future law); provided, however that the term "hazardous 
substance" shall include "hazardous waste" as defined in Title 42 U.S.c. 6903 (or corresponding 




provision of any future law) and "petroleum" as defined in Title 42 U.S.C. 6991 (or 
corresponding provision of any future law). The Sellers represent and warrant to, and covenants 
with, the Buyer that: the Property is not contaminated with any hazardous substance:, the 
Sellers have not caused and will not cause the release of any hazardous substances on the 
Property, there is no asbestos on the Property, and there is no underground storage tank on the 
Property. 
4. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO CLOSING. The obligations of the Buyer under 
this Agreement are, at Buyer's option, subject to the satisfaction of the following conditions: 
4.1 The representations and warranties of the Sellers are true, complete, and aCGurate 
as of the date of this Agreement and as of the date of Closing as if made as of such date. 
4.2 The Sellers have performed all obligations, covenants and agreements to be 
performed prior to Closing as set forth in this Agreement. 
4.3 The Title Company is prepared to issue a policy in accordance with this 
agreement. The Sellers shaH have executed and delivered to the Closing Agent the Warranty 
Deed and same is recorded. 
4.4 The Buyer has obtained financing (effective to the date of Closing) £l'om a bank 
or other financial institution, for a loan of $1,500,000.00, bearing interest at a fixed rate of not 
more than six and one-half percent (6 Y2 %) per annum, with a maximum of one (1) point 
payable at funding. The loan shall be repayable in monthly installments of principal and interest 
amortized over a thirty (30) year term. 
4.5 The Buyer has obtained an appraisal of the Property indicating that the fair 
market value of the Property is not less than the Purchase Price. The Buyer has obtained, at the 
Buyer's sole cost, an inspection of the Property, including, without limitation, parking areas, 
landscape areas, sprinkler systems, structural components, electrical, plumbing, heating and air 
conditioning systems and roofs and has approved the condition of the Property, in Buyer's sole 
discretion. 
4.6 That the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust has been awarded through 
successful negotiation, settlement or litigation, clear and unencumbered title to the property set 
forth in paragraph 1.1 of this Agreement. 
4.7 The Sellers deliver to the Buyer an affidavit executed by the Sellers under penalty 
of perjury that provides the Sdlers' United States taxpayer identification number, and states that 
the Sellers are not foreign persons. 
5. CLOSING. The Closing Agent for this Agreement shall be Title One Title Insurance 
Company. ("Closing Agent"). Buyer and the Sellers shall each pay one-half of the Closing 
Agent's Closing Fees at Closing. Closing shall be at the offices of the Closing Agent on 
Explorer Drive in Eagle, Idaho on November 3, 2005, or at such other time, date, and pla.ce as 
may be mutually agreed between Sellers and Buyer. Buyer and Sellers shall execute and d(~liver 
to the Closing Agent instructions on the form generally provided by the Closing Agent with such 
modifications as are reasonably made by the Buyer. 






6. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
6.1 All notices, claims, requests and other communications ("Notices") under this 
Agreement (i) shall be in writing, and (ii) shall be addressed or delivered to the relevant address 
set forth in Section 7 below or at such other address as shall be given in writing by a party 1:0 the 
other. Notices complying with the provisions of this Section shall be deemed to have been 
delivered (1) upon the date of delivery if delivered in person, or (ii) on the date of the postmark 
on the return receipt if deposited in the United States Mail, with postage prepaid for certified or 
registered mail, return receipt requested. 
6.2 The Parties agree that if a party is in default under this Agreement, then such 
party shall pay to the other party (a) reasonable attorney fees and other costs and expenses 
incurred by the other party after default and referral to an attorney, (b) reasonable attorney fees 
and other costs and expenses incurred by the other party in any settlement negotiations, and 
© reasonable attorney fees and other costs and expenses incurred by the other party in preparing 
for and prosecuting any suit or action. This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho. The parties agree that the courts of Idaho shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction and agree that Ada County is the proper venue. Time is of the 
essence with respect to the obligations to be performed under this Agreement. Except as 
expressly provided in this Agreement, and to the extent permitted by law, any remedies 
described in this Agreement are cumulative and not alternative to any other remedies available at 
law or in equity.' The failure: or neglect of a party to enforce any remedy available by reason of 
the failure of the other party to observe or perform a term or condition set forth in this 
Agreement shall not constitute a waiver of such term or condition. A waiver by a party (I) shall 
not affect any term or condition other than the one specified in such waiver, and (ii) shall waive 
a specified term or condition only for the time and in a manner specifically stated in the waiver. 
6.3 This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties and 
their respective successors, assigns, heirs, and personal representatives. This Agreement, 
together with the Exhibits, constitutes the entire agreement among the parties and supersedes all 
prior correspondence, conversations and negotiations. The invalidity of any portion of this 
Agreement, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, shall not affect the validity of 
any other portion of this Agreement. This Agreement may be executed in one or more 
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, but all of which together shall 
constitute one and the same instruments. All representations, warranties, and covenants of the 
Sellers set forth in this Agreement shall survive the Closing and shall survive the recording of 
the Warranty Deed. 







Date<l;~L J-- , 2005
 
SELLER ACCEPTANCE 
Dated: , 2005 
(Signature) 
(Print or Type Name) 
(Street # and Name) 
(City, State and Zip) 
Dated: , :W05 
(Signature) 
(Print or Type Name) 
(Street # and Name) 
(City, State and Zip) 







Dated: , 2005 
(Signature) 
(Print or Type Name) 
(Street # and Name) 
(City, State and Zip) 
Dated: , 2005 
(Signature) 
(Print or Type Name) 
(Street # and Name) 
(City, State and Zip) 
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Lot 1 Lot 2 Lot 3 Lot 4 Lot 5 Lot 6 Lot 7 Grand Totals 
2006 taxes $ 2,252.56 $ 2,252.56 $ 2,252.56 $ 2,252.56 $ 2,252.56 $ 2,252.56 $ 2,252.56 $ 15,767.92 
Late Fees $ 45.02 $ 45.02 $ 45.02 $ 45.02 $ 45.02 $ 45.02 $ 45.02 $ 315.14 
Interest $ 737.34 $ 737.34 $ 737.34 $ 737.34 $ 737.34 $ 737.34 $ 737.34 $ 5,161.38 
ITotal 2006 I$ 3,034.92 I $ 3,034.92 I$ 3,034.92 I$ 3,03:4.92 I $ 3 034 92 1$-'·13'.~·~20·1~·-·3,00*~4~~c-'·~1244441' .. ' . ,,'~ '~'>"'"'"." ...... ', _ >__, ,9,·:"",.",_", '; .• c­ ,"'0. ", '~'~''"~'', • 
2007 taxes $ 3,285.82 $ 3,285.82 $ 3,285.82 $ 3,285.82 $ 3,285.82 $ 3,285.82 $ 3,285.82 $ 23,000.74 
Late Fees $ 65.68 $ 65.68 $ 65.68 $ 65.68 $ 65.68 $ 65.68 $ 65.68 $ 459.76 
Interest $ 709.18 $ 709.18 $ 709.18 $ 709.18 $ 709.18 $ 709.18 $ 937.12 $ 5,192.20 
ITota12007 1$ 4,060.68 I $ 4,060.68 I $ 4,060.68 I$ 4,060.68 I$ 4,060.68 I$ 4,060,68 1$ 4,283.621 $ 28,652.70 I 
2008 taxes $ 3,393.26 $ 3,393.26 $ 3,393.26 $ 3,393.26 $ 3,393.26 $ 3,393.26 $ 3,393.26 $ 23,752.82 
Late fees $ 67.82 $ 67.82 $ 67.82 $ 67.82 $ 67.82 $ 67.82 $ 67.82 $ 474.74 
Interest $ 551.56 $ 551.56 $ 551.56 $ 551.56 $ 551.56 $ 551.56 $ 551.56 $ 3,860.92 
1Tota12008 1$ 4,012.64 I $ 4,012.64 1 $ 4,012.64 I$ 4,012.64 I$ 4,012.641 $ 4,012.64 I$ 4,012.64'1 $ 28,088.481 
2009 taxes $ 2,953.14 $ 2,953.14 $ 2,953.14 $ 2,953.14 $ 2,953.14 $ 2,953.14 $ 2,953.14 $ 20,671.98 
Late Fees $ 29.51 $ 29.51 $ 29.51 $ 29.51 $ 29.51 $ 29.51 $ 29.51 $ 206.57 
Interest $ 59.37 $ 59.37 $ 59.37 $ 59.37 $ 59.37 $ 59.37 $ 59.37 $ 415.59 
ITota12009 1$ 3,042.02 I $ 3,042.02 I$ 3,042.02 I$ 3,042.02 I$ 3,042.021 $ 3,042.02 I $ 3,042.02 I$ 21,294.141 
Grand Totals $ 14,150.26 $ 14,150.26 $ 14,150.26 $ 14,150.26 $ 14,150.26 $ 14,150.26 $ 14,378.20 1$ 99,279.761 
Interest on unpaid taxes increases daily. Unpaid taxes for these properties include Lot 7 for year 2007 and all parcels for 2008 and 
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Date,	 04/22/2010 Detail Transaction File List 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Trans	 Stmt • HoursH Tcodel '''''' 
client Date 'I'mkr P Task Code Rate to Bill A»Ount Ref ff 
Fees 
11195.000 02/06/2008 20 P 190.00 0.50 
11195.000 02/06/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 
11195.000 04/08/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 
11195.000 04/16/2008 20 P 190.00 0.20 
11195.000 04/22/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 
11195.000 04/22/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.60 
11195.000 04/27/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.60 
11195.000 04/29/2008 20 P 19 190.00 2.00 
11195.000 05/07/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.60 
11195.000 05/07/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 
11195.000 05/07/2008 20 P 19 190.00 0.30 
11195.000 05/08/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 
11195.000 05/08/2008 20 P 19 190.00 0.40 
11195.000 05/13/2008 20 P 19 190.00 0.50 
11195.000 05/13/2008 30 P 80.00 0.20 
11195.000 05/14/2008 20 P 10 190.00 
11195.000 05/14/2008 20 P 19 190.00 0.50 
11195.000 05/19/2008 20 P 19 190.00 0.20 
11195.000 05/19/2008 30 P 80.00 0.20 
11195.000 07/23/2008 20 P 19 190.00 0.60 
11195.000 07/30/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 
11195.000 08/29/2008 20 P 19 190.00 0.10 
11195.000 09/03/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.70 
11195.000 09/16/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.40 
..........__.. _...._-_._-­ --- ­


































114.00	 Preparation of correspondence to the Clerk of 
the Court and to Da11an Taylor. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
114. 00 Preparation of Notice of Appearance f::>r John 
Taylor and correspondence to t.he Clerk. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
380. 00 Detailed review of Complaint ctnd Drafting 
Answer. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
114.00	 Preparation of Motion to Dismiss and 
correspondence to the Clerk of the court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
57. 00 Preparation of Affidavit in Support of Motion 10 
to Dismiss. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
57.00	 Preparation of Notice of Hearing. 11 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
57. 00 Preparation of correspondence to the :lerk of 12 
the court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
76.00	 Review of Three Day Notice of Intent to Take 13 
Default and correspondence to the cli,~nts 
enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
95. 00 Review of Motion to Strike Defendant Taylors I 14 
Motion to Dismiss and/or Consider the Same a 
Motion for Summary JUdgment. Preparation of 
correspondence to the client e,nclosin;r the 
same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
16.00	 Telephone conference with the Judge'S Clerk. 16 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
0.00	 No Charge, Preparation of Ame~nded Affidavit 15 





95.00	 Review of Recusal and Notice clf Reass ignment. 17 
Preparation of correspondence to the ':lient 
enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
38.00	 Review of Notice of Status Conference. 18 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
16.00	 Telephone conference with the Judge's Clerk. 19 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
114. 00 Review of Subpoena Duces Tecum for Helen Taylor 20 
and Notice of Taking Depositicln Duces Tecum of 
Helen Taylor. Preparation of correspondence to 
the client enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
57. 00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr. I~aile reo 21 
Helents deposition. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile ,v. 
19.00	 Review of correspondence from Mr. Pru.,ynski to 25 
Mr. Maile dated August 27, 20C8. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
133.00	 Review of Amended Subpoena Duc:es Tecum for 24 
Helen Taylor and Amended Notic:e of Ta:l(ing
 
.Deposition Duces Tecum of HelE:nm
l•or '.L 
p:eparation of correspondenc~ 13bIT 






76.00	 Review of Notice of Associatic,n of Co-Counsel 26 
and Substitution of Counsel and preparation of 
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2 Date, 04/22/2010 Page,Detail Transaction File List 
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Trans H Teods/~'" Stmt If Houre
 
Client Date Tmkr P Task Code Rate to Bill Amount Ref'
 
Fees 
correspondence to the clients enclosing the 
same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 09/22/2008 20 P 10 190.00 5.50 1,045.00 Research for and preparation of Memorandum in 27 
Support of Amended Motion to Dismiss and/or 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 09/24/2008 20 P 19 190.00 2.50 475.00 Review and revise Memorandum in Support of 28 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 09/26/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.60 114.00 Preparation of Second Affidavit in Support of 29 
Motion to Dismiss and correspondence to the 
clerk of the court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/02/2008 20 P 19 190.00 1. 00 190.00 Deposition preparation. 31 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/03/2008 20 P 19 190.00 5.50 1,045.00 Travel from Boise after Helen's deposition. 30 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Mai Ie v. 
11195.000 10/03/2008 20 P 19 190.00 0.25 47.50 Attendance at deposition. 32 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/08/2008 20 P 19 190.00 0.40 76.00 Review of Amended Notice of Substitution of 33 
Counsel for Appellants/Cross-Respondents. 
Preparation of correspondence to the client 
enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/23/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.60 114,00 Review of Motion to Continue Summary 34 
Judgment/Motion to Dismiss Hearing Set for 
November 6, 2008, Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile, 
IV, and Notice of Hearing. Pl::-eparation of 
correspondence to the client enclosing the 
same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/24/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of Notice VacatinH Hearing. 36 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/24/2008 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to the Clerk of 37 
the Court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/28/2008 20 P 19 190.00 0.00 Review of Certificate of Mail:.ng Statement of 35 
Facts in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion for Rule :.1 Sanctions I 
Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss/Summary Judgment and ~1otion for Rule 11 
sanctions, Affidavit of ThomaB Maile Part One 
and Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/09/2009 20 P 19 190.00 1. 30 247.00 Review of Motion for Stay and or Set for Jury 38 
Trial, Affidavit in Support, Notice of Hearing, 
Certificate of Mailing and Supplemental 
Memorandum in Opposition to Dj_spositive 
Motions. Preparation of corresondence to 
client enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/13/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.60 114.00 Preparation of Notice of Non-(~positi~n to 40 
Motion for Stay and correspondence to the Clerk 
of the Court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/14/2009 20 P 19 190.00 0.40 76.00 Review of Notice of Reassignment filej by the 39 
court. Preparation of correspondence to the 
client enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/20/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to the client 42 
with a copy of the proposed Order. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/21/2009 20 P 19 190.00 0.20 38.00 Review of correspondence and proposed order 41 
from Mr. Maile. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/26/2009 20 P 19 190.00 0.10 19.00 Review of Order for stay entered by the court. 43 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/26/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to the client 44 
enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 02/04/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of Affidavit of Connie Taylor. 45 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 02/05/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to the clerk of 46 
the court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 














Page: 3Date, 04/22/2010 Detail Transaction File List 
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Trane H Tcode/ ''''''' Stmt • Hours
 
Client Date Tmkr P Ta Bk Code Rate to Bill Amount R.ef ..
 
Fees 
11195,000 02/13/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.60 114.00 Preparation of Motion for Order Removing Lis 47 
Pendens and correspondence to the cou,rt. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 02/13/2009 20 P 19 190.00 0.10 19.00 Reviewed Mr. Maile's objection. to our costs. 50 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 02/17/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.60 114.00 Preparation of Amended Answer of John Taylor, 48 
Dallan Taylor, and Johnson Tn.:.st and 
Counterclaim. Preparation of correspondence to 
the Court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195, 000 02/17/2009 20 P 19 190.00 1. 50 285.00 Review of Supplemental Memorar..dum Bril:lf and 51 
Affidavit. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 02/18/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to the Ada County 52 
Recorder. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Mai Ie v. 
11195,000 02/23/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.60 114.00 Preparation of Notice of Hearing and 53 
correspondence to the clerk of the CO'lrt. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195, 000 03/03/2009 20 P 19 190.00 0.70 133.00 Reviewed and responded to e-mail from Mark 54 
Prusynski. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 03/05/2009 20 P 10 190 00 0.50 95.00 Review of Reply to Amended Answer of ,John 55 
Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and Jotnson Trlst and 
Counterclaim. Preparation of correspondence to 
the client enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 03/11/2009 20 P 19 190.00 0.10 19.00 Review of correspondence from Mr. Maile 56 
regarding the Amended Motion to Dismiss. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 03/19/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.80 152.00 Review of Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile, IV. in 57 
Support of Plaintiffs I Motion for Summary 
Judgment & in Opposition to Defendant:3 I Motion 
for Summary JUdgment; Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment Re: Defendants' Cowlterclaim; 
Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment Relating to ":he 
Defendants' Counter-Claim & and in Opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for SumfI1ary Jud1jT11ent and 
Notice of Hearing. Preparation of 
correspondence to the client enclosinq the 
same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 04/01/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of Supplemental Affidavit of Connie 58 
W. Taylor in support of Motion for Swnmary 
Judgment. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 04/01/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to the clerk of 59 
the court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 04/07/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to the Clerk of 60 
the Court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 04/07/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.60 114.00 Preparation of correspondence to the Clerk of 61 
the Court. Preparation of Affidavit of Cormie 
Taylor. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 04/07/2009 20 P 10 190.00 8.00 1,520,00 Review of Maile's Motion for Summary ,Judgment. 62 
Research and preparation of Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs r Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Counterclaims. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 04/08/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.60 114.00 Preparation of Third Supplemental Aff;Ldavit in 63 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Affidavit of Connie Taylor in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary JUdgment on the 
Counterclaims. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 04/08/2009 20 P 19 190.00 11.50 2,185.00 Reviewing the submissions by Mr. Maile, 65 
research and working on Reply Memorandum. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195,000 04/09/2009 20 P 19 190.00 7.50 1,425.00 Revising the Reply to Plaintiffs Oppol,ition to 66 
Motion for Summary JUdgment. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 04/10/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to the clerk. 64 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 04/14/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.50 95,00 Review of Reply Memorandum Brief in Sllpport of 67 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Relating to 
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the Defendants' Counter-Claim & in Opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Jud9ment. 
preparation of correspondence to the client 
enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 04/22/2009 20 P 19 190.00 4.00 760.00 Travel time to and from Boise for hearings. 68 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 04/22/2009 20 P 19 190.00 5.00 950.00 preparation for and attendance at hearing. 69 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 05/04/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.70 133.00 Review of Plaintifflg Request to Take Judicial 70 
Notice of Pleadings and Certificate oE Mailing. 
Preparation of correspondence to John and 
Dallan enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 05/12/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 preparation of correspondence to Jennifer 71 
Kennedy, Judge Greenwood I s Clerk. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/08/2009 20 P 10 190.00 1. 3 0 247,00 Review of Memorandum Decision and Ord,~r, Civil 72 
Case Order for Scheduling Conference :tnd Order 
Re. Motion practice, and Civil Case Stipulation 
for SchedUling and Planning. Preparation of 
correspondence to the client enclosin3' the 
same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/09/2009 20 P 19 190.00 0.70 133.00 Sending of emails to the clients re. the 76 
correspondence, proposed Release, and 
satisfaction received in the Taylor/M,:tile case. 
Telephone conference with JOml Taylor. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/09/2009 20 P 190.00 1. 00 190.00 Office conference with John. 77 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/10/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 preparation of correspondence to Mr. l'.1aile. 73 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/10/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.90 171 00 preparation of Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion 74 
for Summary Judgment, Judgment. Dismis3ing 
plaintiffs I Claims, and correE:pondenC'~ to the 
Clerk. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v, 
11195.000 07/13/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr, ~aile. 75 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v, 
11195.000 07/15/2009 20 P 10 190.00 1. 80 342.00 Review of Motion for Certification Pursuant to 78 
IRCP Rule 54 (8) re: Memorandum Decisi':m and 
Order/Motion for Permissive Appeal Pursuant to 
the IAR Rule 12, Affidavit in Support of 
Preparation of Motion for Cert.ificati:m 
Pursuant to IRCP Rule 54(B) re: Memor:tndum 
Decision and Order/Motion for Permissive Appeal 
Pursuant to the IAR Rule 12 f and Memorandum 
Brief in Support of Motion for Certification 
Pursuant to IRCP Rule 54 (5) rl:': Memor3.ndum 
Decision and Order/Motion for Permissive Appeal 
Pursuant to the IAR Rule 12 .. Prepar:ttion of 
correspondence to the client E'nclosin:r the 
same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/15/2009 20 P 19 190.00 0.10 19.00 Review of Notice of Hearing Re: Schejuling 79 
Conference. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/15/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr. ~ai1e. 80 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/15/2009 20 P 19 190.00 0.30 57.00 Exchanged e-mails with Mark P]~synski. 82 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/15/2009 20 P 190.00 0.20 38.00 Telephone conference with John Taylor. 83 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/15/2009 20 P 190.00 0.70 133.00 Telephone conference with Mark Prusynski. 84 
Theodore JohnBon Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/16/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.40 76.00 Review of Notice of Hearing reo Motion for 81 
Certification and Preparation of correspondence 
to the client. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/27/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Maile. 87 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/28/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Maile. 86 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/29/2009 20 P 19 190.00 0.10 19,00 Review of correspondence from Mr. Maile 88 
regarding access numbers for the telephonic 
hearing 08/14. 
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Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Maile. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Preparation of correspondence to the client. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Review of Amended Motion for Certification and 
correspondence from mr. Maile reo access code 
for telephonic hearing. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Review of Second Supplemental Affidavit in 
Support of Amended Motion for Certification and 
preparation of correspondence to the clients 
enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Preparation of Notice of Non-Opposition, 
correspondence to the Clerk and correspondence 
to Mr. Maile. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Mai Ie v. 
Review of pleading fi led by Mr. Maile. 
Communication with clients ancl co-counsel 
regarding Motion for Rule 54(b) certification. 
Research into Vendees lien statute. Review of 
Affirmative Defenses to counsE!1 claims. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Preparation of Answers to Interrogatories and 
Requests for production. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Preparation of Notice of Service. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Maile. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Preparation of correspondence to the Clerk of 
the court, 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Research into recent case law on attorney's 
fees on appeal. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Maile. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Mai Ie v. 
Review of the Motion for Permissive Appeal 
Pursuant to the I. A. R. Rule 1:£:, Memorandum 
Brief in Support of Motion for Permissive 
Appeal Pursuant to the I.A.R. Rule 12., and 
Affidavit of Thomas Maile in support of Motion 
for permissive Appeal Pursuant. to The I. A. R. 
Rule 12 directed to the Supreme Court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Mai Ie v. 
Preparation of correspondence to the clients 
enclosing the Motion for Permissive Appeal 
Pursuant to the I. A. R. Rule 1:£:, Memorandum 
Brief in Support of Motion for permissive 
Appeal Pursuant to the I.A.R. Rule 12., and 
Affidavit of Thomas Maile in Support :>f Motion 
for Permissive Appeal Pursuant. to The I .A. R. 
Rule 12 directed to the Supreme Court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Preparation of Notice of Non-Oppositi:>n. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Preparation of correspondence to the Supreme 
Court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Review of Order Denying Motion for Permissive 
Appeal and preparation of correspondence to 
the clients. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Preparation of Request for Scheduling 
Conference and Trial Setting. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
preparation of correspondence to the clerk. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v, 
Preparation of Affidavit in Opposition to 
Motion to Foreclose. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Review of Renewed Motion for Certification 
Pursuant to IRCP Rule 54 (b) rE" JUdgment 
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Affidavit in Support of Renewed Motio::1 for 
Certification. Preparation of corres:;>ondence 
to the client. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 12/17/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Troupis. 110 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195 000 12/17/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.50 95.00 Review of Notice of Associaticln and 111 
correspondence from Mr. Maile to Mr. ~rusyn5ki 
dated December 17, 2009. Preparation of 
correspondence to the clients enclosi::1g the 
same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 12/18/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.90 171.00 Preparation of Objection to Renewed M<:>tion for 112 
Rule 54 (B) Certification, Affidavit i:o 
Opposition to Renewed Motion for Certification 
and correspondence to the Clerk of th: Court. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v, 
11195.000 12/22/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.50 95.00 Review of correspondence and proposed 113 
stipulation received from Mr. Maile. 
Preparation of correspondence to the ,:lient 
enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 12/22/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr. Troupis. 114 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 12/22/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.20 38.00 Review of additional correspondence from Mr. 115 
Maile and his second proposed Stipula:ion 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 12/28/2009 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr. I"aile. 116 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 12/28/2009 20 P 190.00 0.20 38.00 Telephone conference with Jenr:.ifer KelUledy of 117 
Judge Greenwood's office. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/04/2010 20 P 10 190.00 0.50 95.00 Review of correspondence from Mr. Mail with a 118 
copy of the final Civil Case Stipulation for 
Scheduling and Planning. prefaration of 
correspondence to the client enc10sinq the 
same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/07/2010 20 P 10 190.00 0.80 152.00 Review of Memorandum Brief in Support of 123 
Renewed Motion for Certification Pursuant to 
IRCP Rule 54 (b) Re, Judgment Entered .July 20, 
2009 and Supplemental Affidavit in Support of 
the same. preparation of correspondence to the 
client enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/11/2010 20 P 10 190.00 0.60 114.00 Preparation of Motion to Disqualify Alternate 124 
Judge and Order to Deny Al terna te Jud!,e. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/12/2010 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57.00 preparation of correspondence to the (:ourt. 125 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/12/2010 20 P 10 190.00 0.40 76.00 Review of Order Governing proceedings and 126 
Setting Trial. Preparation of correspondence 
to the client enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/25/2010 20 P 10 190.00 0.30 57,00 Preparation of correspondence to Mr. r1aile and 127 
Mr. Troupis. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/25/2010 20 P 10 190.00 0.40 76.00 Review of Order Disqualifying Alternate JUdge. 128 
Preparation of correspondence to the client 
enclosing the same. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 01/27/2010 20 P 19 190.00 1. 50 285.00 Review file. prepare for I and attend hearing on 129 
Renewed Motion for 54(b) Certificate. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Total for Pees Billable 20,291.00 
Expenses 
11195.000 07/25/2008 20 P 37 1.00 Fax Transmission June/July 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 08/25/2008 20 P 37 15.00 Fax Transmission July/August 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 09/25/2008 20 P 37 6.00 Fax Transmission - August/September 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/25/2008 20 P 29 0.250 4.25 Photocopies - September/October 
Theodore Johnson Trust 































Amount - Ref' 
Expenses 
11195.000 11/18/2008 20 P 44 0.76 Postage 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 11/25/2008 20 P 29 0.250 4.00 Photocopies - October/Novembe" 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 02/18/2009 20 P 44 2.70 Postage 10 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 02/25/2009 20 P 37 124.00 Fax Transmission - January/February 11 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 02/25/2009 20 P 29 0.250 19.75 Photocopies - January/Februa~' 12 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 03/06/2009 20 P 44 1. 18 Postage 15 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 03/25/2009 20 P 37 25.00 Fax Transmission - February /MC:lrch 16 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 03/25/2009 20 P 29 0.250 4.00 photocopies - February/March 17 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 04/10/2009 20 P 44 21.85 Postage 18 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 04/25/2009 20 P 29 0.250 112.50 Photocopies - March/April 19 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 04/25/2009 20 P 43 5.00 Color Copies - March/April 20 
Theodore Johnson Trus t 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 04/25/2009 20 P 37 42.00 Fax Transmission - March/April 21 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 05/13/2009 20 P 44 1. 22 Postage 22 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 OS/25/2009 20 P 29 0.250 3.00 Photocopies - April/May 23 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 06/25/2009 20 P 45 175.00 Westlaw Charges - April 2009 26 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 06/25/2009 20 P 29 0.250 3.00 Photocopies - May/June 27 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/20/2009 20 P 44 9.39 Postage 30 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/23/2009 20 P 45 33.33 Westlaw Charges - June, 2009 29 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/25/2009 20 P 37 2.00 Fax Transmission - June/July 31 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/25/2009 20 P 29 0.250 26.50 Photocopies - June/July 32 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 06/17/2009 20 P 44 2.44 postage 33 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 08/25/2009 20 P 29 0.250 6.00 Photocopies - July/August 34 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 09/23/2009 20 P 44 0.61 Postage 35 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 09/25/2009 20 P 29 0.250 77.50 Photocopies - August/September 36 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/06/2009 20 P 44 9.26 Postage 37 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/19/2009 20 P 44 1.83 postage 38 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/25/2009 20 P 43 434.00 Color Copies - September/October 39 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/25/2009 20 P 29 0.250 14.25 Photocopies - September/October 40 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195_000 11/25/2009 20 P 29 0.250 3.75 Photocopies - October/November 41 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 11/25/2009 20 P 37 6.00 Fax Transmission - October/November 42 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 12/22/2009 20 P 44 22.49 postage 43 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 12/25/2009 20 P 29 0.250 7.25 Photocopies - November/December 44 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 12/25/2009 20 P 37 52.00 Fax Transmission November/December 45 
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Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
---­
Total for Expenses Billable 0.00 1,281.81 
Advances 
11195. 000 04/22/2006 20 P 21 69.60 Filing Fee (Notice of Appearance) - #45332 14 
Clerk of Ada County 
Theodore Jolmson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 04/28/2008 20 P 21 69.60 Filing Fee (Notice of Appearance) - #45380 13 
Clerk of Ada County 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/06/2008 20 P 27 163.62 Mileage (Boise on 9/2-3/061 - #47240 Connie 
Taylor 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 10/15/2008 20 P 26 62.33 Deposition (Helen Taylor) - #47185 Burnham, 
Habel & Associates, Inc. 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 02/18/2009 20 P 20 2.40 #48429 Ada County Recorder - Copy of Lis 
Pendens 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 OS/25/2009 20 P 20 533.60 Global Travel - Airfare for Connie Taylor on 24 
4-22-09 
Theodore Johnson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 06/15/2009 20 P 20 9.00 Connie Taylor - Reimbursement for Parking at 25 
Civic Plaza Court House on 04/22/09 
Theodore Jolmson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
11195.000 07/22/2009 20 P 20 434.40 Global Travel - Airfare for Connie Taylor on 28 
4/21/09 to Boise 
Theodore Jolmson Trust 
Thomas Maile v. 
Total for Advances Billable 0:00 1,364.55 
, 
-- -­ _._------_.-_.~----------------,----_. GRAND TOTALS 
----~-- .._.._-----­
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"ROFESSIONAL (..{)NDUGT SOARl· 
IDAHO STATE Si&,R 
Bradley G. Andrews 
DEC 1 6 2009Bar Counsel 
Idaho State Bar 
P.o. Box 895 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 334-4500 
ISB No. 2576 
BEFORE THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BOARD 
OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR 
) 
IDAHO STATE BAR, ) ISB File No. FC 09-04 
) 









The Idaho State Bar ("ISB") by and through its counsel, Bradley G. Andrews, hereby 
charges Thomas G. Maile N, an attorney at law admitted to practice before the courts of Idaho, 
with professional misconduct as follows: 
COMMON ALLEGATIONS 
1. Thomas G. Maile IV (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent") was admitted to 
the practice of law in the State of Idaho in 1979, at which time he took the oath required for 
admission, wherein he agreed to abide by the rules of professional conduct adopted by the [daho 
Supreme Court. At all times mentioned herein, Respondent has continuously been under the 
jurisdiction of the Idaho Supreme Court as a member of the ISB on active status. 









2. The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
("LR.P.C."), governing the ethical conduct of attorneys licensed to practice in the State of Idaho, 
which Rules were in effect at all times relevant herein. 
3. Pursuant to Rule 511(a)(l) of the Idaho Bar Commission Rules ("IBCR"), the 
Board of Commissioners has approved the filing of these charges against the Respondent. 
4. Quotations throughout this Complaint are from deposition testimony or from the 
documents being referred to. 
5. Respondent represented Theodore L. Johnson ("Ted") in various legal matters 
between 1992 and Ted's death in September 2002. In November 1997, Ted executed a 
Revocable Trust Agreement that created the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust ("Trust"). 
Respondent prepared the document, which designated Ted as trustee, and Ted's niece, Beth 
Rogers ("Beth) and her husband, Andrew, as co-successor trustees. Ted's nephews, Reed, 
Dallan and John Taylor ("Taylors"), were residual beneficiaries of the Trust. The Trust owned 
approximately forty acres of undeveloped property on Linder Road in Ada County, Idaho 
("Linder property"). 
6. On or around May 19, 2002, Ted received an unsolicited offer from Franz Witte, 
Jr., to purchase the Linder property for $400,000 ("Witte offer"). On May 22, 2002, Ted met 
with Respondent to review the terms of the Witte offer. Ted informed Respondent during their 
meeting that the Witte offer was for the same property that Respondent had previously indicated 
he was interested in purchasing, and asked Respondent if he was still interested. Respondent 
confirmed that he was still interested in the Linder property, and asked Ted whether that interest 
caused Ted "any difficulty" in having him review the Witte offer. Ted replied "no," and 
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indicated that he was not aware of the property's fair market value. Respondent and Ted then 
discussed "the necessity of trying to determine what the [Linder] property was worth." 
7. Respondent advised Ted that there were a "variety of ways" to dete.rmine the 
Linder property's fair market value, including obtaining "some appraisals" and asking "some 
real estate agents to provide their opinions." Respondent advised Ted that the best approach was 
to get an average from "three opinions from real estate agents" and, if possible, "extra opini.ons 
from appraisers." Respondent also informed Ted that the "best approach" was to retain a 
licensed appraiser to establish the fair market value, and indicated that such an approach was 
preferable to working with a realtor because the appraiser did not work for commissions. 
Respondent advised Ted not to inform any real estate agent or appraiser about the Witte offer, 
because a prospective purchase price could influence the appraiser's report. Ted did not 
comment further about the possible value of the property and they' then discussed the tax 
consequences of selling the property. 
8. Thereafter, Respondent contacted Ted's accountant, Imajean Hetherington, to 
discuss the tax implications of the Witte offer. On May 24, 2002, Ms. Hetherington sent 
Respondent a letter, in which she indicated that the $400,000 offer might be too low and 
referenced another of her cIient's sale of forty acres of undeveloped land in the area for $850.,000 
in 1996. Ms. Hetherington stated that if the properties were comparable, the Linder property 
could be worth up to $1,000,000 to a developer. She recommended that Ted determine the 
current fair market value based on the "highest and best use and on recent sales," and stated that 
Ted could make a counteroffer once the market value was determined. Ms. Hetherington added 
that if Ted carried a note on the sale, she recommended obtaining financial information from Mr. 




9. On May 29, 2002, Respondent sent Ted a letter stating that he had completed his 
review of the Witte offer and also discussed Ted's finances with Ms. Hetherington. Respondent 
told Ted it would be "prudent" for Ted to contact him to discuss the possibility of a counteroffer 
to Mr. Witte, to help determlne the fair market value of the Linder property. He told him that, as 
recommended by Ms. Hetherington, they needed to "do some due diligence relative to the 
buyers['] potential and fiscal responsibility," and asked Ted to schedule an appointment so 
Respondent could "pursue tt~s matter more diligently on [Ted's] behalf." 
10. On May 31, 2002, Respondent met with Ted to discuss the Witte offer and a 
possible counteroffer. The only other property they discussed during that meeting was the 
property referenced by Ms. Hetherington in her May 24, 2002 letter. 
11. On June 4, 2002, Respondent faxed Mr. Witte's attorney, Eric Haft, a letter 
advising that he represented the Trust and Ted, individually, regarding the Witte offer. 
Respondent stated that although Ted was willing to sell the Linder property, "based upon 
comparable values in the are,a, we feel your offer is extremely low." He added that because the 
Witte offer would require Ted to carry a short-term mortgage on the property, he would need to 
review Mr. Witte's "current financial statement, year-to-date profit and loss statements, and his 
federal and state income tax returns for the last three (3) years." 
12. Respondent has acknowledged that his statement to Mr. Haff that the Witte offer 
was extremely low based on comparable values in the area was "slightly inaccurate." He 
explained that "we" referred to himself, Ted and Ms. Hetherington, and that he referenced 
"comparable values" because he was aware of only "one comparable" and "did not think it 
would be to Ted's advantage to reference a singular comparable." Respondent also 




acknowledged that he had no information about the property referenced by Ms. Hetherington, 
and did not know whether that property was, in fact, comparable. 
13. On June 7,2002, Mr. Witte responded to Respondent's May 29, 2002 letter. With 
respect to Respondent's statements about the property value, Mr. Witte stated that his research 
showed that similar properties in the area had sold for 10% less than his offer, and added that he 
had "concerns over high water tables and City of Eagle issues that make development costs 
higher." With respect to ~is financial strength, Mr. Witte referenced his $100,000 down payment 
offer and the terms of the proposed loan. He concluded by extending the terms of his offer to 
June 20, 2002. 
14. Sometime in June 2002, Beth contacted Knipe Janoush Knipe ("Knipe"), to 
appraise the Linder property on behalf of the Trust. Beth sought the appraisal at Ted's request, 
independent of any advice from Respondent, and believed that the Witte offer had expired at the 
time she sought the appraisal. According to Beth, she obtained the appraisal because 'Ted was 
curious what the [property] was worth." On June 13, 2002, Knipe sent Ted a letter confirming 
its agreement to perform the appraisal. 
15. On June 17,2002, Respondent sent Ted a copy of Mr. Witte's letter. Ted did not 
accept the Witte offer, or propose a counteroffer, before the June 20, 2002 deadline. 
16. On July 15, 2002, Knipe sent Ted a report appraising the Linder property at 
$400,000. 
17. On or around July 19, 2002, Ted met with Respondent at his office. Ted informed 
Respondent about the Knipe appraisal and asked if he was still interested in purchasing the 
Linder property. Respondent told Ted that he had "always been interested" in purchasing the 
property and asked Ted about the sale price. Ted responded that he "want[ed.] the appraif;ed 
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value." When Respondent then asked about the possible terms of the purchase, Ted informed 
Respondent that he "would like to have $100,000 down and the thing to be paid off in five 
years." Respondent then advised Ted as follows: 
'Because I have represented you in the past there may be a question of a conflict 
of interest. So if you want, and it's your choice, if you want another attorney to 
draw up the real estate agreement, you have the right to seek independent counsel 
to do so, if you want to.' Ted replied, 'No, I trust you.' 
After Respondent informed Ted about the potential conflict of interest and Ted indicated 
that he still wanted Respondent to draft the purchase agreement, Respondent told Ted: 
'You should, and it is your choice, seek independent counsel either to review the 
contract or create the contract. Write the contract.' Ted replied, 'No, I trust you.' 
Respondent and Ted then discussed Respondent's development plans for the property "in 
great detail." There was also some discussion about how Ted obtained the appraisal, and 
Respondent asked Ted whether he had contacted other appraisers. Ted informed Respondent 
that he did not want to "pay for any more opinions" and "felt comfortable with this appraisal." 
Respondent told Ted that he would have the purchase contract ready in a few days. 
18. On July 22, 2002, Respondent and his wife, Colleen, signed an Earnest Money 
Agreement ("EMA") to purchase the Linder property for $400,000. In a section entitled 
"Attorney Fees and Costs," the EMA included the following provisions: waiver of the right to a 
jury trial, venue in Canyon County, and binding arbitration in lieu of court proceedings. The 
EMA also reduced the statute of limitation period to one year, instead of the five-year limitation 
generally applicable to written contracts. The last paragraph of the EMA stated: 
The parties acknowledge that Thomas Maile d/b/a! Thomas Maile Real Estate 
Company, is a licensed Real Estate Broker and is representing himself and 
Colleen Birch Maile, husband and wife, and/or their assigns in this transaction, 




19. An Addendum to EMA ("Addendum"), also signed by Respondent and Colleen 
on July 22, 2002, provided payment tenns and stated that they would secure the payments for the 
balance of the purchase price by executing a standard deed of trust, to be placed in escrow at 
Alliance Title ("Alliance"). A copy of a Deed of Trust naming Alliance as Trustee ("First 
Deed") was attached as Exhibit A-2 to the Addendum and incorporated by reference. Under the 
Addendum, the Trust agreed to the assignment of the Mailes' interests in the Linder property 
before or after closing, which was scheduled on or before September 15, 2002. The Addendum 
also stated that the parties acknowledged that "Thomas Maile df'o/a1 Thomas Maile Real Estate is 
a licensed Real Estate Broker and is representing himself and his wife," and provided that the 
purchase offer "shall expire:if not accepted by 5:00 o'clock p.m. on July 25,2002." 
20. Although Respondent had advised Ted to obtain the market value of the property 
by taking the average of three appraisals or real estate brokers' estimations, Respondent 
determined that $400,000 was an acceptable fair market value for the Linder property based on 
the single Knipe appraisal. Respondent believed that the language providing that the parties 
acknowledged that he was a licensed real estate broker and was representing only himself and 
Colleen, "spell[ed] out" that he did not represent the Trust or Ted in the transaction. 
21. On July 25, 2002, the date the offer expired, Respondent met with Ted and B,~th 
at Ted's house. Ted signed the EMA and Addendum on behalf of the Trust. The First Deed did 
not include a signature line for Ted. According to Respondent, he "didn't read the contract" with 
Ted, but instead "tried to explain to [Ted] the general provisions of the contract" and Addendum. 
He stated that he also "gene;rally explained" the Attorney Fees and Costs provision to Ted, and 
discussed his intention to create a limited liability company and assign his interests in the 




property to it. Respondent stated that when he informed Ted about "being able to see an 
independent attorney, if he wanted to," Ted indicated that he did not want to consult another 
attorney. When deposed, Beth testified that Respondent simply asked her and Ted to read the 
documents and asked if there were any questions. Ted requested a change to the Addendum to 
provide for a current lessee's onion seed crop and then executed the documents. Respondent did 
not have any further contact with Ted. 
22. On August 1, 2002, Respondent and Colleen formed Berkshire Investments, LLC 
("Berkshire"), for the purpose of acquiring the Linder property from the Trust and developing 
the property in a joint venture with Respondent's development company, Thomas Maile Real 
Estate Company. On or around August 2, 2002, Respondent was informed that Ted suffered 
another heart attack and had been placed in a nursing home. 
23. On August 15, 2002, pursuant to an Assignment of Earnest Money Agreement 
("Assignment") prepared by Respondent and executed on that date, Respondent and Colleen 
assigned their rights under the EMA and Addendum to Berkshire. In return, Berkshire agreed to 
pay the unpaid balance of the purchase price and released Respondent "from all future liability." 
The Assignment was executed by Respondent and Colleen as assignors, Respondent as assignee 
(manager of Berkshire), and Beth as Ted's attorney-in-fact. 
24. When the Assignment was executed, Berkshire had no assets other than 
"$100,000 either through a line of credit or in cash." Although Respondent had recommended 
that Ted conduct "due diligence" regarding Mr. Witte's financial strength, because the Witte 
offer provided for the assignment of Mr. Witte's rights to a limited liability company and a 





statements and tax returns) about himself, Colleen or Berkshire and Ted did not request that 
information. 
25. Respondent did not inform Beth about any conflict of interest or explain that the 
Assignment would release him and Colleen from all future liability regarding the transaction. 
Respondent also did not inform Beth that she should seek independent counsel regarding the 
transaction on behalf of Ted and/or the Trust. 
26. Sometime thereafter, Beth and Andrew contacted attorney David Wishney to 
review the terms of the transaction. Beth testified that she sought Mr. Wishney's counsel based 
on Andrew's suggestion, because Ted was in a nursing home at the time and she and Andrew 
were "not familiar with lega.l reading." According to Beth, she simply wanted Mr. Wishney to 
"make sure the paperwork was correct." 
27. On Septembe:r 5, 2002, Mr. Wishney sent Andrew a letter stating that he had 
reviewed the EMA, Addendum, First Deed and Assignment. Mr. Wishney stated that because 
the documents had already been executed, it was "really too late for [him] to provide any 
substantive input." He added, however, that if Respondent was "willing," Andrew should 
substitute a "standard form deed of trust" for the First Deed attached to the EMA. Mr. Wishney 
noted that the First Deed did not include standard language protecting the Trust's interests, 
including a requirement that taxes be paid before they become delinquent. Later that day, Beth 
left a message at Respondent's office, asking him to use the standard form deed of tmst 
recommended by Mr. Wishney. Beth also sent Respondent a copy of Mr. Wishney's letter. 
28. Respondent did not make the requested changes to the deed of trusts. Respondent 
also failed to include Mr. Wishney's suggested modification to the deed of trust that taxes be 
paid before they became delinquent. According to Respondent, Mr. Wishney contacted him by 






telephone in August 2002, but Beth never informed him about the concerns regarding the First 
Deed and he did not receive a copy of Mr. Wishney's letter prior to closing. 
29. On September 14, 2002, Ted passed away, and Beth and Andrew becarne 
successor co-trustees. Respondent did not have any conversation with Beth or Andrew about 
any potential or actual conflict of interest after they became successor co-trustees. 
30. On September 16, 2002, Respondent closed the sale on the Linder property. 
Under the terms of the sale, the Trust took a deed of trust on the property to secure payment of 
the remainder of the $400,000 purchase price. Beth and Andrew signed a standard form Request 
for Full Reconveyance ("Reconveyance") to Alliance. On the day of the closing, however, 
Respondent substituted a different Deed of Trust ("Second Deed") which named his friend, 
attorney Stephen Sherer, as the Trustee. Mr. Sherer had served as a trustee in several of 
Respondent's prior real estate transactions. Respondent did not disclose to Beth or Andrew that 
he changed the trustee from Alliance to Mr. Sherer. Beth never saw the Second Deed, which 
was recorded on September 26, 2002. 
31. Thereafter, the Taylors' attorney, Connie Taylor, sent Respondent a letter 
requesting information about the Trust's assets and indicated that the Taylors would challenge 
the sale of the Linder property. 
32. On May 7, 2003, Beth sent Respondent a letter immediately terminating his 
employment "in any capacity as attorney" for the Trust or Ted's estate because she did not want 
the Trust involved in a lawsuit. Beth testified that until May 2003, she considered Respondent to 
be the attorney for Ted andlor the Trust. 
33. Sometime thereafter, Respondent contacted Beth to ask if he could begin 
developing the Linder property, before paying it off, if he gave the Trust an extra payment. 
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Consistent with the EMA and Addendum, Beth told Respondent not to develop the property until 
it was paid off. 
34. On May 19,2003, Respondent sent Beth a check for $32,357, for Berkshire's first 
annual payment under the EMA. The Taylors instructed Beth not to cash the check because they 
questioned the propriety of the transaction, intended to proceed with a lawsuit against 
Respondent, and were concerned about his development of the property. Beth cashed the check 
because she and Andrew "were not in favor of any lawsuit." 
35. On July 7, 2003, Ms. Taylor sent Respondent a letter stating that she represented 
Beth, as successor trustee, and the Taylors, as Trust beneficiaries, with respect to Respondent's 
purchase of the Linder property. Ms. Taylor asserted that Respondent had purchased the Linder 
property for "far less than the fair market value," and indicated that she would file a civil 
complaint by July 22, 2003, unless she received Respondent's written waiver of the one-year 
statute of limitation provision. Beth did not consider Ms. Taylor to be her or the Trust's attorney 
at that time. Sometime thereafter, Beth retained attorney Bart Harwood to represent the Trust. 
36. On July 10, 2003, Respondent sent Ms. Taylor a letter, in which he agreed to 
waive the one-year statute of limitation. Respondent asserted that the "purchase price and tenus 
were fully explored" by Ted and Beth, an appraisal was conducted, and the purchase price 
represented the appraised value. He stated that the appraisal was conducted at Ted's request and 
with no involvement from his office. According to Respondent, Ted "honored his verbal 
commitment to me made years ago that if he ever decided to sale [sic] his land he would afford 
me first option to purchase the same." He added that "your client sought independent legal 






37. On July 22, 2003, Beth and Andrew sent Ms. Taylor a letter stating that, as co­
trustees, they wanted to "withdraw from all proceedings" against Respondent and Berkshire. 
They wanted to "let the purchase of the Linder property proceed as in the current contract with 
[Respondent]/Berkshire Development until said property is paid off in full." Beth sent a copy of 
her letter to Respondent, together with a note that indicated that she and Andrew "refused to sign 
the paperwork" provided by Ms. Taylor. 
38. On September 5, 2003, Mr. Harwood sent Ms. Taylor a letter advising that he had 
been retained by Beth and Andrew to represent the Trust. He stated that the Trust was not 
interested in pursuing a claim against Respondent. 
39. On or around November 7, 2003, Idaho Independent Bank retained an 
independent appraiser, Timothy Williams, to appraise the Linder property in connection with a 
potential commercial loan to Respondent and/or Berkshire for development of a subdivision on 
the property. On December 10, 2003, Mr. Williams completed his report, which valued the 
property at $410,000. 
40. On or around December 10, 2003, at Respondent's request, Mr. Sherer contacted 
Beth and asked her to consult her accountant about his calculation of the final payoff amount for 
the property. Beth testified that she did not have any prior contact with Mr. Sherer and was 
under the impression that he was simply handling the final payment of the property for 
Respondent. 
41. On January 8, 2004, Respondent finalized a commercial loan for the development 
of the subdivision. Also on that date, Mr. Sherer hand-delivered a cashier's check to Beth in the 
amount of $293,848.03, representing Berkshire's final payment on the Linder property. Be:th 
testified that Mr. Sherer explained to her that if she accepted the check, each party would be 




forever discharged from any further obligations or responsibilities. Beth testified that she 
understood that upon delivery and acceptance of the final payment, the Trust and Berkshire 
would "go their separate ways" and release each other from any liability for alleged wrongdoing. 
42. On January 9,2004, Mr. Sherer, as trustee of the Second Deed, signed a Release 
and Reconveyance ("First Release") prepared by Respondent. The First Release provided that 
Mr. Sherer agreed to "remise, release and forever discharge" Respondent and the Trust from all 
liability or causes of action relating to the Linder property. Beth was not consulted about, and 
was not aware of, the First Release. Respondent was aware of possible litigation when he 
prepared the First Release, but admitted that he did not provide a copy of the First Rdease to 
Beth or Mr. Harwood and did not know if Mr. Sherer or anyone else suggested that Beth or Mr. 
Harwood review the First Release. Mr. Sherer testified that he did not have any "stated 
authority" or good reason to execute the First Release and acknowledged that his duty as trustee 
of the Second Deed was to "protect" the Trust and beneficiaries. He explained that Respondent 
intended the First Release to bar any claim the Trust and/or beneficiaries may have against 
Respondent personally and stated that he considered the First Release to be "surplusage'" becau.se 
the transaction for the sale of the property had already been completed. 
43. On January 22, 2004, the Taylors filed a lis pendens against the Linder property. 
On January 23, 2004, as residual beneficiaries of the Trust, they filed a civil complai.nt 
("Complaint") against Respondent, Colleen and Berkshire, alleging breach of fiduciary duties 
and negligence. The Taylors alleged that Respondent breached his fiduciary duties as an 
attorney and real estate broker by acquiring the Linder property for less than fair market value, 
failing to disclose his conflict of interest, and failing to advise Ted andlor the Trust to seek 
independent legal counsel regarding the transaction. The Taylors sought at least $600,000 in 




compensatory damages, disgorgement of profits, rescission of the transaction, imposition of a 
constructive trust on the Linder property, and an order quieting title of the Linder property to the 
Trust. 
44. On February 16, 2004, Respondent faxed Mr. Harwood a letter attaching copies 
of the lis pendens and Comp:laint. Respondent also attached a proposed mutual release regarding 
the litigation for Mr. Harwood's consideration, based on Beth's statement that "the trust wanted 
no involvement with [the Taylors'] lawsuit." 
45. On February 18, 2004, Respondent prepared, and Mr. Sherer signed, a second 
Release and Reconveyance ("Second Release"). The Second Release removed Respondent's 
name from the Linder property transaction and substituted Berkshire in its place. It also 
provided that Mr. Sherer, as Trustee, agreed to "remise, release and forever discharge" Berkshire 
from all liability or causes of action relating to the Linder property. 
46. Beth and Mr. Harwood were not consulted about, and were not aware of, the 
Second Release. Respondent also failed to inform Ms. Sherer that, at the time the Second 
Release was executed, the Tmst was represented by other counsel, a lawsuit against Respondent 
had been filed, Beth was not aware of either release, and Respondent had attempted, but failed, 
to obtain a mutual release from the Trust. According to Mr. Sherer, he considered the Second 
Release to be simply a "ministerial correction," and therefore did not discuss the change with 
Beth. 
47. On February 23, 2004, Respondent filed a Verified Answer and Counterclaim, 
asserting the following affirmative defenses: (1) failure to state a cause of action; (2) proper 
venue was Canyon County based on the EMA and Addendum; (3) Plaintiffs lacked standing; (4) 








demand for jury trial should be dismissed consistent with the EMA waiver; (6) lack of 
consideration; (7) lack of contractual privity; (8) doctrine of laches because the lis pendens and 
Complaint were not filed until after the purchase price was paid; (9) doctrines of e,quitable 
estoppel and/or quasi-estoppel; (10) failure to mitigate alleged damages; (11) doctrine of unclean 
hands; (12) the Release(s) were binding upon the Taylors; and (13) accord and satisfaction. 
Respondent also asserted the following counterclaims: (1) tortious interference with contract; (2) 
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and/or opportunity; (3) slander of 
title; (4) wrongful cloud on title; (5) civil conspiracy; (6) breach of contract; (7) equitable 
estoppel; (8) quasi-estoppel; and (9) breach of good faith and fair dealing. Respondent also filed 
a Motion for Change of Venue, Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Compel Arbitration Order and 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Demand for Jury Trial. 
48. On February 24, 2004, Respondent faxed Mr. Harwood a letter asking him to 
coordinate a meeting with Mr. Harwood, himself, and Beth and Andrew, as co-trustees, to 
discuss the Taylors' lawsuit and the proposed mutual release. Mr. Harwood informed 
Respondent that the mutual release would not be signed, that the Trust would attempt to 
distribute all of the assets, and that Beth and Andrew planned to resign as co-trustees, 
49. On March 15" 2004, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Taylors' action 
based on lack of standing. On April 12, 2004, the district court advised the Taylors that their 
case would be dismissed unless they joined the co-trustees in the lawsuit by Aplil19, 2004. ll1e 
co-trustees were not joined by the deadline, and the district court dismissed the case in its 
entirety. The court's Order of Dismissal was subsequently amended to retain Respondent's 
counterclaims against the Taylors. On June 4, 2004, the Taylors appealed the Order of Dismissal 
to the Idaho Supreme Court. 





50. On June 10, 2004, Beth and Andrew resigned as trustees, effective immediately, 
and nominated the Taylors as co-successor trustees. 
51. On July 21, 2004, the Taylors, as trustees on behalf of the Trust, filed a new 
action against Respondent, Berkshire, and Respondent's real estate company for breach of 
fiduciary duties and negligence. On August 3, 2004, Respondent faxed Ms. Taylor and Mr. 
Harwood a SUbpoena Duces Tecum for Beth, and a notice setting her deposition on August 11, 
2004. Ms. Taylor's firm requested that Respondent vacate and reschedule the depositions of 
Beth and other trust beneficiaries because Ms. Taylor was unavailable until September 2, 2004. 
Mr. Harwood informed Respondent that Beth would attend her scheduled dep·osition. After 
Respondent refused to reschedule the depositions, Ms. Taylor's firm filed a Motion for 
Protective Order and sent Respondent a letter contending that the depositions should be 
rescheduled until after the August 16, 2004 hearing on the Motion for Protective Order. 
52. On August 11, 2004, Respondent deposed Beth on behalf of Berkshire and 
Colleen. Attorney Phillip Collaer appeared for Respondent in his capacity as a realtorlbroker, 
and attomey Jack Gjording appeared for Respondent in his capacity as attorney. Beth was not 
represented by counsel at the deposition because, consistent with Beth's instruction, :Mr. 
Harwood agreed not to attend. During the deposition, Respondent asked Beth about a number of 
issues regarding the Linder property transaction and the ensuing lawsuit, including: 
(1) Questions about Beth's discussions with Mr. Wishney regarding the Linder 
property sale. Respondent advised Beth that "all the detail" she could remember about 
her discussions with Mr. Wishney "would be helpful for us on the record." Respondent 







breach of fiduciary duty or "any areas of unprofessionalism by the law offices of 
[Respondent]"; 
(2) Whether Beth believed that Respondent had breached any fiduciary duty owed to 
the Trust or Ted during the time that Beth acted as co-trustee in August and September 
2002; 
(3) Whether Ms. Taylor indicated to Beth during their conversations what areas of 
malpractice or professional negligence Ms. Taylor believed were committed in the Linder 
property transaction; 
(4) Beth's "understanding of how this lawsuit is going to be divided up" in the event 
any wrongdoing was established; and 
(5) Whether Beth was aware of Respondent's counterclaim and whether there was 
"ever any discussion between the beneficiaries" about that counterclaim. Respondent 
specifically asked Beth whether the Taylors had made any statements about the "merits" 
and "appropriateness" of his counterclaim. 
53. On August 12, 2004, Respondent filed a Motion to Consolidate the two cases. 
54. After the August 16. 2004 hearing on the Motion for Protective Order. the district 
court vacated the remaining August depositions and ordered that Respondent coordinate with 
Ms. Taylor to reschedule the depositions in September 2004. 
55. On or around September 6, 2004, Respondent filed an Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim, asserting that the Taylors' action was barred by the Release and/or th~: Second 
Release. 
56. On September 29, 2004, the district court entered an Order consolidating the two 
cases against Respondent. 
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57. On October 20, 2004, Respondent filed a Motion to DisrnissfMotion for Summary 
Judgment and a supporting Memorandum and Affidavit. Respondent asserted that the Trust was 
barred from pursuing the action because the Trust Agreement prohibited the assignment and/or 
appointment of successor trustees and the co-trustees failed to follow the prescribed statutory 
requirements for their appointments. Alternatively, Respondent asserted that he was entitled to 
summary judgment on the negligence and breach of fiduciary duties claims because no duty was 
owed and no breach of any standards of care could be established. According to Respondent, he 
advised Ted to seek independent counsel, the Trust received independent legal counsel prior to 
closing, and Respondent did not act as attorney for Ted and/or the Trust at any time after May 
31, 2002. Respondent also sought summary judgment on the equitable claims of rescission and 
constructive trust because the Trust accepted final payment for the Linder property and the 
releases executed by Mr. Sherer "settled the rights and obligations of each party." 
58. On November 15, 2004, the Taylors filed a Petition for Appointment of Trustees 
in Ada County, based on Beth and Andrew's June 10,2004 resignation. On November 17, 2004, 
Magistrate Judge Bieter entered an Order appointing the Taylors as co-successor trustees for the 
Trust, effective retroactively to June 10,2004. Also on November 17, 2004, Respondent filed a 
Demand for Notice & Verified Objection to Petition for Appointment of Trustees. On 
November 22, 2004, Respondent filed a Motion to Set Aside Order Dated November 17, 2004 
and/or Motion to Re-Consider [sic] based on the Taylors' failure to provide notice of their 
Petition for Appointment. 
59. On February 28, 2005, Respondent filed a second Demand for Notice & Verified 
Objection to Petition for Appointment ofT~stees. 





60. On April 18, 2005, Judge Bieter entered an Order Setting Aside Order for 
Appointment of Trustees. Also on that date, the Taylors filed an Amended Petition for 
Appointment of Trustees. On May 2, 2005, Judge Bieter entered an Order appointing the 
Taylors as co-successor trustees, but denied their request to be appointed retroactively. 
61. On May 13, 2005, the Taylors filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. In a 
suppOlting memorandum, they stated that Respondent had substituted the Reconveyance signed 
by Beth and Andrew at closing with the Second Deed naming Mr. Sherer as trustee. The Taylors 
noted that Beth was not aware of and had not been consulted about the Second Deed, which was 
"drastically different" from the Reconveyance because it purported to release "all claims 
whatsoever relating to the purchase." They stated that Beth was also not aware of nor consulted 
about the Release or Second Release, which were executed without the Trust's knowledge or 
permission and therefore could not be pled as an affirmative defense by Respondent. 
62. On June 6, 2005, Respondent filed a Reply Brief to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. He asserted that there was no attorney-client relationship between the Trust and him 
after June 2002, and that any "irregularities" in the real estate documents were cured by Beth and 
Andrew's acceptance of the full payment of the purchase price in January 2004. 
63. On July 28, 2005, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order 
dismissing the Taylors' rescission claim and their claims against Maile as a real estate broker. 
The constructive trust claim and the Taylors' claims against Respondent as an attorney survived. 
The court noted that the Taylors alleged that Respondent had a conflict of interest because, as a 
lawyer, he was "supposed to help the Trust get the best price for its land." However, as a 
purchaser, Respondent "wanted to get the land for the lowest possible price." With respect to 






time of the purchase, the Court stated that Respondent "never did formally terminate the 
relationship" and therefore there was a material issue of fact about the existence of an attomey­
client relationship. The court also found there was a material issue of fact regarding whether 
Respondent properly advised Ted and/or the Trust to seek independent legal counsel and 
breached the necessary standard of care. 
64. On September 7, 2005, Respondent filed a Verified Amended Answer and 
Counter-Claim and Demand for Jury Trial asserting the following affirmative defenses: (1) the 
Taylors' claims were based on the EMA; (2) failure to join indispensable parties; (3) doctrine of 
laches; (4) equitable estoppel and/or quasi-estoppel; (5) failure to mitigate; (6) doctrine of 
unclean hands; (7) the binding releases barred the claims; (8) accord and satisfaction; and (9) 
lack of standing. Respondent also asserted the following counterclaims: (1) tortious interference 
with contract; (2) tortious interference of prospective economic advantage and/or opportunity; 
(3) slander of title; (4) wrongful cloud of title; (5) civil conspiracy; (6) breach of contract; (7) 
equitable estoppel; (8) quasi·-estoppel; (9) breach of good faith and fair dealing; (10) fraudulent 
conveyance; (11) unjust enrichment; (12) indemnification agreement among trustees; (13) breach 
of peace and quiet enjoyment:; (14) breach of warranty deed; and (15) continuing tort. 
65. On September 28, 2005, the Taylors filed an Amended Complaint, asserting 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duties and seeking the following relief: (1) judgment against 
Respondent for compensatory damages for the difference between the $400,000 purchase price 
and the fair market value of the Linder property; (2) disgorgement of profits; (3) rescission of 
sale and return of the Linder property to the Trust beneficiaries; (4) imposition of a constructi ve 
trust pending resolution of the litigation; (5) an order quieting title to the Linder property in the 
Trust; (6) pre- and post- judgment interest; and (7) costs and attorney fees. 




66. On October 3, 2005, the Taylors filed an Amended Motion for Summary 
Judgment. On October 7, 2005, Respondent filed a Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, 
seeking an order dismissing the professional malpractice claim. 
67. On November 7, 2005, the district court entered a Judgment granting summary 
judgment in favor of Respondent on all claims brought against him in his capacity as a real estate 
broker. 
68. On November 14, 2005, Respondent filed a Memorandum in support of his 
Motion in Limine to exclude certain expert witness testimony regarding the terms of the EMA 
and Addendum. He noted that he had waived the one-year statute of limitation and the case was 
set for jury trial in Ada County. He added that he was "no longer asserting the defense of 
Release and Reconveyance" and explained in a footnote that it was his position that the 
affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction "achieves the same result anyway." 
69. On December 23, 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed 
in part, the district court's decision ("Taylor I"). In its Opinion, the Court stated that LR.C.P. 
17(a) did not require dismissal, since the rule did not expressly prohibit trust beneficiaries from 
bringing a cause of action against a third party, particularly where the trustee declined to protect. 
the beneficiaries' interests. The Court stated that the professional malpractice claim was 
correctly dismissed, "because no attorney-client or broker-client relationship existed between the 
Taylors and [Respondent]." The Court determined that the Complaint alleged sufficient support 
to find standing "to pursue a claim against [Respondent] for acquisition of trust property with 
knowledge of a potential breach of trust by, or conflict of interest on the part of, the tmstees." 
The Court noted that Respondent purchased the Linder property for $400,000, despite 





amount two months earlier. The Court stated that it was "reasonable to infer" that Ted was 
aware that the Linder propelty was valued at over $400,000, and that Beth and Andrew were 
aware of the Taylors' objections to the sale. The Court stated that as trustee, Ted had a fiduciary 
duty to the Trust beneficiaries, and that his agreement to transfer the Linder property "for 
substantially less than its fair market value" would violate that duty. The Court noted that there 
was "no indication in the record" that Beth and Andrew "carefully examined the sale 
transaction" to determine whether $400,000 was the property's fair market value, or that they 
acted with "due regard to their obligations as fiduciaries in proceeding with and consummating 
the sale." The Court further noted that there was no indication in the record that Beth and 
Andrew obtained the necessary court approval for the transaction, and added that "one could 
reasonably infer that they did not, since the sale occurred just one week after Mr. Johnson's 
death." The Court held that because the Taylors alleged that Respondent was aware of "all of the 
facts because of Respondent's position as attorney and realtor for both parties and purchaser of 
the property," Respondent and his wife were not "bona fide purchasers for value." The Court 
also held that the Taylors "sufficiently alleged a claim against Respondent for relief, including 
imposition of a constructive trust, for aiding the trustees in disposing of trust property in 
violation of their fiduciary responsibilities and receiving the property with knowledge of the 
same." 
70. On February 13, 2006, the Taylors filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claim, seeking summary judgment on the constructive trust claim and 1m order 
quieting title in the Linder property. In a supporting memorandum, the Taylors asselted that 
there was an "undisputed conflict of interest" between the Trust's residual beneficiaries and 
Beth, since she was one of only a few beneficiaries entitled to receive her share of the Trust 
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corpus immediately. The Taylors stated that because Respondent drafted the initial Trust 
agreement, he was aware that Beth was both a successor trustee and a beneficiary who would 
benefit from the immediate sale of the Linder property. 
71. Also on February 13, 2006, the district court entered an Order regarding the 
Taylors' Motion for Summary Judgment on Respondent's counterclaims and affirmative 
defenses. The court granted summary judgment on the following counterclaims: (1) tortious 
interference with contract; (2) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage; (3) 
slander of title; (4) wrongful cloud of title; (5) civil conspiracy; (6) breach of contract; (7) good 
faith and fair dealing; (8) breach of peace and quiet enjoyment; (9) breach of warranty deed; and 
(10) continuing tort. The court denied summary judgment on the following counterclaims: (1) 
equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel; (2) fraudulent transfer of Trust corpus; and (3) unjust 
enrichment. The court denied the Taylors' motion to strike the following affirmative defenses: 
(1) laches; (2) failure to mitigate; and (3) unclean hands. With respect to Respondent's assertion 
that the Release and/or Second Release barred any tort claims brought on behalf of the Trust, the 
court stated that the terms of the purchase agreement did not bar the Taylors' claim that 
Respondent breached his fiduciary duty. 
72. On March 9, 2006, the district court granted the Taylors' motion to amend their 
Complaint in accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's decision. The Amended Complaint 
contained a single cause of action alleging that Respondent aided the trustees in disposing of the 
Linder property in violation of his fiduciary duties, and received the Linder property with 
knowledge of such violation, including knowledge that the sale had not been court-approved as 
required by I.e. § 18-108(b). According to the Taylors, Beth's decision as co-trustee to close the 




transaction, because Beth (an income beneficiary) would benefit from the sale of the Trust 
corpus (the Linder property), to the detriment of the Taylors (residual beneficiaries). 
73. On May 15, 2006, the district court entered an Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim. The court found that Beth's "dual role as 
trustee and beneficiary created a conflict of interest as a matter of law." The court further found 
that the scope of Beth's powl~r subject to judicial oversight included not only her power to enter 
into a contract for the sale of the Linder property, "but also the power to close a sale of real 
property." According to the court, Beth's conflict of interest "necessitated prior court approval 
of the closing of the sale," and that, without such approval, the transaction was void as a matter 
of law. The court found that Respondent had "actual knowledge that [Beth and Andrew] were 
exceeding or improperly exercising their powers as a matter of law," and noted that Respondent 
had prepared the trust agreement which created the conflict of interest. Accordingly, the court 
granted the Taylors' motion for summary judgment, and ordered that the Linder property be held 
in constructive trust for the benefit of the Trust. The ruling did not decide Respondent's 
counterclaim for unjust enrichment. 
74. On May 30, 2:006, Respondent filed a Motion to Reconsider, on the ground that 
the Taylors never raised the issue of whether the transaction was void and therefore the 
evidentiary record was incomplete. 
75. On June 7, 2006, the district court entered its Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims 
("Judgment"), which provid.ed the following: (1) the EMA and all subsequent documents 
relating to the Linder property transaction were "void as a matter of law"; (2) title to the Linder 
property was quieted to the Trust in fee simple; and (3) Respondent's remaining counterclaims 
and affirmative defenses, all of which were based on eqUitable claims or assertions that the 
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Taylors wrongfully interfered with Respondent's right to possess the Linder property, were 
dismissed. 
76. Thereafter, Respondent filed a Motion to Amend Judgment and/or Motion 1.0 
Reconsider and objections to the Judgment. On June 20, 2006, the district court denied that 
motion. The court noted, however, that Respondent's objections to the Judgment were "well 
taken," and found that the issue as to what offset, if any, Respondent was entitled to claim 
against the $400,000 purchase price remained to be litigated. Specifically, Respondent had 
counterclaimed on the ground of unjust enrichment based upon his development of the Linder 
property into seven lots during the litigation, which he estimated was now valued at 
approximately $633,900 (determined by subtracting the current raw value from the current 
developed value). 
77. On July 21, 2006, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order 
clarifying that Respondent's unjust enrichment claim was not dismissed and that the constructive 
trust returned the Linder property to the Trust, quieted title of the property in favor of the Trust, 
and required the Trust beneficiaries to return the $400,000 purchase money less any amounts 
Respondent may prove in his counterclaim for unjust eruichment. 
78. On Novembl~r 29, 2006, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and 
Order, denying Respondent's claim for damages based on the theory of unjust enrichment. The 
court stated that it had previously ruled that the Linder property transaction was void: 
[B]ased on the fact that [Respondent] himself had drafted the documents 
effectuating the sale of the property to himself, and he had drafted the Trust 
documents that creatled the conflict of interest between Beth Rogers as co-trustee 
and beneficiary. [Respondent] was not a good faith purchaser without notice of 
the Trustees' violation of her fiduciary duties to the Trust. 




The court continued by stating: 
[There was] evidence in the record to support [Respondent's] claim that the 
property really was worth only $400,000 at the time he purchased it from the 
Trust including the unsolicited offer to purchase the property for exactly that 
amount and an independent appraisal obtained by Mr. Johnson which also said the 
property was worth $400,000. On the other hand, [Respondent] also knew that 
the property might be worth considerably more than $400,000 at the time he 
offered to purchase it for this amount. In any event, [Respondent] apparently 
thought it would be a good buy at $400,000. In hindsight, [Respondent's] 
professional judgment. which he had a duty to exercise for the benefit of his 
client, may have been obscured by his personal desire to take advantage of what 
he believed to be an attractive business transaction. [Respondent] should have 
advised Mr. Johnson to seek independent advice about selling him the land for 
$400,000. Indeed, [Respondent] testified at trial that he did exactly that. The 
Court is not persuaded that [Respondent] so advised Mr. Johnson. 
The court further stated: 
[There was] also ample evidence in the record to support the contention that 
[Respondent] engaged in sharp practices in drafting the documents connected to 
the transaction. For example, [Respondent] included a clause in the contract that 
would have barred any cause of action against himself after only one year. This is 
an unusual deviation from the statutory limitation on causes of action in this type. 
[Respondent] claimed that this was a scrivener's error; however, this claim is 
belied by the fact that he pled it as an affirmative defense in this lawsuit. This is 
the type of self-dealing that has led to the claim that [Respondent] has unclean 
hands and should not be granted any equitable relief. 
The court stated, however, that Respondent's counterclaim could be decided on its 
merits, "without proclaiming that [Respondent] is barred from seeking equitable relief based on 
the doctrine of unclean hands." The court found that the Trust was not unjustly enriched by 
Respondent's expenditures after the transaction, since those expenditures did not increase the 
value of the property or confer any benefit upon the Trust, the trustees or the beneficiaries. The 
court found that the property's fair market value was the same regardless of the expenditures, 
and again ordered the Trust to pay Respondent the $400,000 purchase price. 




79. On December 11, 2006, the district court entered a Judgment denying 
Respondent's counterclaim for unjust enrichment. Also on that date, Respondent filed a Motion 
to Amend and/or Reconsider the November 29, 2006 Order because it did not address the issue 
of approximately $80,000 in pre-judgment interest from September 2002 through October 2006. 
80. On December 21,2006, Respondent appealed from the district court's judgments. 
81. On April 6, 2007, the district court entered an Order denying RespDndent's 
request for pre-judgment interest. Also on that date, the court granted the Taylors' request for 
approximately $12,500 in costs. On May 7,2007, the July 1,2006 Order was amended to reduce 
the purchase price by the assessed costs. 
82. On May 10, 2007, the district court entered a Second Amended Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claims as follows: (1) the closing of the sale and the Linder property sale contract 
as a whole were void as a matter of law; (2) the Linder property was currently being held in a 
constructive trust for the benefit of the Trust; (3) title to the Linder property was quieted in favor 
of the Trust; (4) Berkshire was entitled to repayment of the $400,000 purchase price less 
assessed costs; and (5) Respondent's unjust enrichment counterclaim was denied. 
83. On December 31, 2007, Respondent and Berkshire filed a civil action against the 
Trust, the Taylors, Connie Taylor and her law firm (hereinafter referred to as "the Berkshire 
case") on the following grounds: quiet title, constructive trust, tortious interference with 
contract, tortious interference with prospective business advantage, abuse of process, negligence, 
negligence per se, gross negligence, equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel, criminal racketeering, 
and judicial estoppel. 
84. Thereafter, the Taylors and Connie Taylor's firm individually filed motions for 
summary judgment in the Berkshire case based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. They also 
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counterclaimed for slander of title, abuse of process, and intentional interference with a 
prospective economic advantage. 
85. On January 30, 2009, the Idaho Supreme COUlt issued its Opinion in Taylor II, 
which affinned the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Taylors on the claim of 
professional negligence against Respondent. The Idaho Supreme Court held that since Beth had 
a conflict of interest because she was both a trustee and a beneficiary, the district court was 
correct that the trustee's power to close a land sale was subject to judicial oversight pursuant to 
Idaho Code §68-108(b) and Taylor 1. The Idaho Supreme Court also held that it was 
uncontroverted that Respondent had knowledge of that conflict of interest since Respondent, 
acting as Ted's attorney, drafted the Trust that created the various classes of beneficiaries and 
named Beth as a successor trustee. 
86. On July 2, 2009, the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order in 
the Berkshire case. The court detennined that Respondent's claims were identical to those 
pleaded in the prior litigation and that Berkshire had "a full and fair opportunity to present" those 
claims earlier. Accordingly, Respondent's claims for quiet title, tortious interference with a 
contract, tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, equitable estoppel and 
quasi estoppel were dismisse:d. Respondent's remaining claims were dismissed based on claim 
preclusion, and his motion for summary judgment on the Taylors' counterclaims was denied. A 
Judgment consistent with the Memorandum Decision and Order was entered on July 20,2009. 
87. References to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct ("1.R.P.C.") below are to 
the rules of conduct effective on the date of the complained conduct. 




(Lack of Diligence) 
88. Paragraphs 1 through 87 above are hereby realleged and incorporated as if fully 
set forth herein. 
89. The conduct described in paragraphs 1 through 88 above, including, but not 
limited to, the EMA errors, the First and Second Deeds, the First and Second Releases, and 
closing the sale of the Linder property without judicial approval, constitutes violations of Idaho 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 [Lack of diligence]. 
COUNT TWO 
(Conflict of Interest, Failure to Exercise Independent Professional Judgment 
and Render Candid Advice) 
90. Paragraphs 1 through 89 above are hereby realleged and incorporated as if fully 
set forth herein. 
91. The conduct described in paragraphs 1 through 90, including, but not limited to, 
the Assignment of the EMA from Respondent to Berkshire and the First and Second Deeds, 
constitutes violations of Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(a) [Conflict of interest] and 2.1 
[Failure to exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice]. 
COUNT THREE 
(Conflict of Interest, Failure to Exercise Independent Professional Judgment 
and Render Candid Advice) 
92. Paragraphs 1 through 91 above are hereby realleged and incorporated as if fully 
set forth herein. 




93. The conduct described in paragraphs 1 through 92, including, but not limited to, 
the EMA between Respondent and Ted, Assignment of the EMA to Berkshire, and closing the 
sale of the Linder property with Beth, constitutes violations of Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct 1.7(b) [Conflict of interest] and 2.1 [Failure to exercise independent professional 
judgment and render candid advice]. 
COUNT FOUR 
(prohibited Transactions) 
94. Paragraphs 1 through 93 above are hereby realleged and incorporated as if fully 
set forth herein. 
95. The conduct described in paragraphs 1 through 94, including, but not limited to, 
the First and Second Releases, constitutes violations of Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 
1.8(h) [A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a 
client for malpractice under certain conditions are satisfied]. 
COUNT FIVE 
(Conflict of Interest - Former Client) 
96. Paragraphs 1 through 95 above are hereby realleged and incorporated as if fully 
set forth herein. 
97. The conduct d.escribed in paragraphs 1 through 96, including, but not limited 10, 
the First and Second Releases, Respondent's representation of Colleen and Berkshire in the 
Taylor litigation, and Respondent's deposition of Beth constitutes violations of Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct 1.9 [Conflict of interest relating to former clients]. 




WHEREFORE based on the matters alleged above, Plaintiff prays for judgment against 
Respondent as follows: 
That Respondent be~ suspended from the practice of law; placed upon an appropriate 
probation; be ordered to pay the costs and expenses incurred in investigating and prosecuting this 
matter; and such other relief as is deemed necessary and proper. 
DATED this --,--(ro_(1_",,:, day of _~ , 2009. 
Br~6~ 
Bar Counsel 









I hereby certify that on the l ¥' day of , 2009, I served a true and 
cOITect copy of the foregoing COMPLAINT upon the following by U.S. certified mail, return 
receipt requested, to the Respondent's last known address as filed with the Idaho State Bar: 
Thomas G. Maile IV 
Law Offices of Thomas G. Maile IV, PA 
380 W. State Street 
Eagle, ID 83616 
j1A~ 
Bradley G. Andrews 
Bar Counsel 
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CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state of Idaho and a member of 
Clark and Feeney, attorneys for all Defendants in the above entitled matter. The information 
contained herein is of my own personal knowledge. 
2. I am attaching hereto true and correct copies of the following documents: 
a.	 Exhibit A is the Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Foreclosure of Vendee's 
Lien andDenying Plaintiffs' Motionfor Sanctions entered by the trial cOUli on March 
15,2010 in Taylor v. Maile, Ada County Case No. CV OC 04 004730, as well as the 
Affidavit of Greg Charlton and the letter from Virgil Garland to which the Court 
referred in its order. 
b.	 Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the testimony of John Woods at the October 
11, 2006 trial of Mailes' unjust emichment claim in Taylor v. Maile. 
c.	 Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Memorandum Decision & Order elated 
July 28,2005 filed in the Taylor v. Maile, Ada County Case No. CV OC 04 00473D. 
d.	 Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the April 14,2004 correspondence from me 
to Bart W. Harwood. 
'/ ()'i i) 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this?-u day of April, 2010. 
Notary Public i ,and for the State of Idaho. 
Residing at '7 ft.! I) Cu l/ Ic. therein. 
My commission expir s: [; ().! / 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2'C--!h I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _<1_ day of April, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
 




Thomas G. Maile, IV o U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street o Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, ID 83616 /~r Overnight Mail
 
o Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
 
Mr. Christ Troupis o U.S. Mail
 
Attorney at Law o Hand Delivered
 
PO Box 2408 p Overnight Mail
 
Eagle, ID 83616 o Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICI:L 
:/' 
,./
DI ,- C'fl'tjilNG".l:·""-"".,:"""t}..,-;.:?, 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
VS. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter··Claimants. 
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f'.1AR 15 2010 
cONNIE W. TAYLOR 
ATTORNEY 
Case No. CVOC 04004730°8.743-9516 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
 
MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF
 






This matter came before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Foreclosure of Vendee's 
Lien and on Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions. The Court heard oral argument on December 14, 
2009. Connie Taylor appeared for the Plaintiffs and Christ Troupis appeared for the Defendants. At 
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the hearing, the Court expressed approval that Defendants had obtained outside counsel and 
provided time for Mr. Troupis to familiarize himself with this litigation. The Court allowed 
Plaintiffs thirty days to suppl)') e..vidence in support of the argument that they are unable to secure a 
loan against the Property and allowed Defendants thirty days to respond to such evidence. Finally, 
the Court encouraged the parties to work together toward a resolution of this matter and ordered the 
parties to meet and confer by February 19, 2010. The Court considered the mattt:r fully under 
advisement on February 19, 2010. 
Thomas Maile was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included drafting 
the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, overseeing the administration of 
the trust, and representing the estate after Johnson's death. The underlying transaction in this case is 
a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor of the trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson 
entered into an earnest money agreement for the purchase of forty acres in Eagle, ID" which Maile 
had previously advised Johnson not to convey to a third party. The purchase price was $400,000 and 
the Property was conveyed by the successor trustee after Johnson passed away. Beneficiaries of the 
trust brought suit. 
On July 21, 2006, tht: Court held that the land sale was void pursuant to Idaho law and 
ordered the land be returned to Plaintiffs and the purchase money be returned to Defendants. The 
Idaho Supreme Court upheld this Court's judgment on January 30, 2009. On December 31,2007, 
Maile filed a new complaint against the beneficiaries and their attorneys, once again contesting 
ownership of the Property. Maile filed a second lis pendens on May 25, 2008. On July 2, 2009, the 
Honorable Judge Richard Greenwood dismissed all of Maile's claims under the doctrines of issue 
and claim preclusion. On November 6, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court entered its Order Denying 
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Motion for Pennissive Appeal. In that litigation, the beneficiaries' counterclaims remain to be 
resolved. Defendants have indicated an intention to appeal Judge Greenwood's ruling dismissing 
Maile's claims at the conclusion of that litigation. 
On May 7, 2009, th~: Court entered an Order Denying Motion to Compel Payment of 
Judgment and Interest, holding that it was the intention of this Court in its July 21, 2006 order to 
void the underlying transaction returning all parties to the position they had been in prior to the 
transaction and that because the Property had not been returned free of encumbrance, it was not the 
time to order a return of the purchase money. On August 3, 2009, Defendants filed a release of the 
May 2006 lis pendens and filed a notice of vendee's lien on the Property. Subsequently, Plaintiffs 
sought an order releasing Defendants' vendee's lien. On October 14, 2009, the Court denied 
Plaintiffs' motion for an order releasing Defendants' vendee's lien, holding that as a matter of 
equity, Defendants are entitled to maintain a lien against the Property to secure the retUnl of the 
purchase price. 
At this time, Defendants seek an order foreclosing the vendee's lien, contending that 
judgment has been entered in favor of Defendants but that Plaintiffs have made no effort to satisfy 
that judgment. Plaintiffs counter that continuing litigation constitutes a cloud on the titk which 
prevents Plaintiffs from obtaining a loan secured by the Property to satisfy the judgment. 
Plaintiffs have provided evidence which indicates that Plaintiffs have contacted at least two 
financial institutions with the intention of obtaining a $400,000 loan secured by the Property and 
that Plaintiffs have been denied such a loan as a result of the pending motion to foreclose vendee's 
lien and the pending suit before Judge Greenwood. The Court finds that it is Defendants' actions 
which prevent Plaintiffs from satisfying the judgment at this time. Defendants' attempt to enforce 
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this Court's judgment, while simultaneously attempting in a collateral proceeding to c:hallenge that 
judgment, is disingenuous. The Court has previously held that Defendants are entitled to a return of 
the purchase price. Further, the Court finds that the continued existence of the vend(~e's lien filed 
August 3, 2009 is sufficient to secure the return of the purchase price. The Court will not t:nter an 
order foreclosing the vendee's lien while there is pending litigation between these parties 
challenging the title of the Property. Defendants' Motion for Order Foreclosing Vendee's Lien is 
DENIED. 
Plaintiffs request that the Court sanction Defendants for bringing this motion to foreclose, 
arguing that the motion is frivolous. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)( 1) states in pertinent part: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party 
has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's 
knowledge, infonnation, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact 
and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or- needless increase in the 
cost of litigation.... If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this 
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person 
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The standard of review for an appellate court reviewing a trial court's decision whether to impose 
sanctions is one of abuse of discretion. Gubler v. Brydon, 125 Idaho 112, 113-14, 867 P.2d 986,
 
987-88 (1994). "The power to impose sanctions under this rule is exercised narrowly, focusing on 
discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct within the overalJl course of a 
lawsuit." Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 22,23,773 P.2d 290, 291 (Ct. App. 1989). '''Rt~asonableness
 
under the circumstances' is the appropriate standard to apply under I.R.C.P. Rule 11." Riggins v. 
Smith, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021,895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995). "When detennining whether Rule 11
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sanctions should be imposed, the trial court must only consider the attorney's conduct in the filing 
of pleadings, motions or other papers." [d. 
Defendants paid $400,000 for the Property in January 2004. The Court has voided the land 
sale and ordered repayment of the purchase price. Defendants have made repeated requests for 
satisfaction of judgment. Prior to this motion, there is no evidence in the record to support a finding 
that Plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the judgment. Plaintiffs' efforts to determine the value of the 
Property and to obtain a lo<m against the Property appear to have resulted from this motion. 
Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants' motion to foreclose the vendee's lien is not without a 
basis in law or fact and was reasonable under the circumstances. Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions is 
DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
9r ­
Dated this _f_ day of March, 2010. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN AND DENYING
 


























































CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, HEREBY CERTIFY that on the1day ofMarch, 2010, 1caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF 
VENDEE'S LIEN AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS to be served by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Connie Taylor 
1229 Main Street 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Christ Troupis 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste. 130 
P.o. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
~) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
1. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Co 
Ada CountyyKllID9V 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR FORECLOSURE OF VENDEE'S LIEN AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS - Page 6 001619
 lday  I 
ounty.,4U~UjY" 


















IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 55. 
County of Ada 
I 
'I 
AFFIDAVIT OF Greg Charlton 1 




































Fror, known Page: 3/5 Date 1/13/20108:15 11 
'-''-' 
Greg Charlton, being fIrst duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
I, I am a Senior Vice President of Idaho Independent Bank, and have held that position 
for _10__ years. I have been engaged in the banking profession for _40__ years, fmd have 
many years of experience in the processing of conunercial and real property loans. 
2. Idaho Independent Bank. has received an inquiry from John Taylor about the 
possibility of extending a lmm for approximately $400,000. In conjunction with that inquiry" I 
was informed of the following: 
A.	 That the loan would be secured by 40 acres of unimproved real property 
near E:igle, Idaho which is owned by the Johnson Trust. 
B.	 That the property is en(;wubered by a vendee's lien in the am.ount ()f 
$400,000 less any costs and interest awarded, and that there is a pending 
motion to foreclose on that lien. 
C.	 That there is a second lawsuit pending relating to the ownership of the 
property. 
3. Based upon the facts as represented, Idaho Independent Bank would not considt::r 
making a loan on this property. 
DATED this _12__ day of January, 2010. 
Greg Ch n 
AFFIDAVIT OF Greg Charlton 













Frat. '<nown Page: 4/5 Date: 1/13/20108:15:, 1 
"-''-' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of January, 2010. 
(:;iGW-4 A ~J 
Notary Public in and for the S~at9 of Idaho. 
Residing at sf{o I U J doJ( ~ therein. 
My commission expires: '1 / '2 t// "2.01.Qr ( 
AFFlDAVTT OF Greg Charlton 3 







  i./ ,8:J 1.   
t :/ Vv'VvW. i.
Fr( .lknown Page: 5/5 Date 1/13/2010 8: 15 ,iV1.....,.'-­
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13#1 day of January, 2010, I caused to be served a 
we and correct copy of the above document by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Thomas G. Maile Christ Troupis U.S. Mail
 
Attorney at Law
 Attorney at Law Hand Delivered 
380 W. State PO Box 2408 Overnight Mail 
Eagle, 10 83616 XEagle, ID 83616?2ec.oyY(F.AX)//\. 




e W. Taylot---- -, 
'- Attorney for Plaintiff J 
.I 
AFFIDAVIT OF Greg CbarUon 4 
This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, visit: http://\NINWgfi.com 001623
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/ 
January 1ih, 2010 
Mr. John Taylor 
P.D.Box 538 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Dear John, 
Thank you for your inquiry regarding acquisition and real estate development loans 
with Sterling Savings Banle. 
It is with regret that I inform you that, at the present time Sterling Savings Bank has a 
moratorium on making real estate development loans ( commercial or residential real 
estate), as well as bare land loans, or non-owner occupied commercial real estate loans, 
given our portfolio mix and current economic conditions. 
It is my understanding that the property discussed has been in litigation for a number 
of years. That fact would cause additional concerns which would be an impediment to 
obtaining financing. 
·· ~~~ ~ff.~r~. .@ST~t\.~n~\J! • ~..... I 
SAVINGS BANK~" 
sterlingsavingsbank.com 
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1 A. Yes. 1
 
2 Q. There is no indication, in the record, that 2 DIRECT EXAMINATION
 
3 Mr. Maile said, wait Ted, you told me you would sell me 3 BY MS. TAYLOR::
 
4 this property. So] want to purchase the property; and 4 Q. Would you please state your name.
 
5 you shouldn't sell it to Franz Witte? 5 A. John Wood.
 
6 A. No.. I don't recall :reading anything like 6 Q. Would you spell your last name.
 
7 that. 7 A. W-O-O-D.
 
8 Q. So, in fact, the evidence would tend to 8 Q. Mr. Wood, where do you reside?
 
9 support the claim that he did not try to enforce.the 9 A. At 3390 Flint Drive, Eagle, Idaho.
 
10 verbal discussion that they had had; correct? 10 Q. And how are you employed:'
 
11 A. I assume so. 11 A. I work for a corporation called Park Hampton
 
12 MR. CHARNEY: No further questions. 12 LLC.
 
13 THE COURT: All right. May the witness be 13 Q. What position do you hold with Park Hampton?
 
14 excused? 14 A. Land acquisition and development services, in
 
15 MS. TAYLOR: YeS,YourHonor. 15 bringing the projects through the cities.
 
16 MR. CHARNEY: Yes, Your Honor. 16 Q. And what, specifically, are your duties at
 
17 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Grober. 17 Park Hampton LLC?
 
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Judge. 18 A. Coordinating with the engineers, the surveys,
 
19 19 the applications to the City, and also presenting to the
 
20 (The witness left the stand at 11:54 a.m.) 20 City, and getting the properties ready for development,
 
21 21 to be sold to the open market.
 
22 THE COURT: Are you ready to call your next 22 Q. And does Park Hampton own any properties in
 
23 witness? We can take a five-minute break, if you like. 23 the Eagle area?
 
24 MS. TAYLOR: A break would be great. 24 A. It owns approximately -- about a hundred
 
25 THE COURT: Okay.. Let's take five, and then you 25 and -- just shy of 100 acres.
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1 can call your next witness. Are we still on track to end 1 
2 by 2:00, do you think? 2 
3 Ms. Taylor? 3 
4 MS. TAYLOR: Pardon? 4 
5 THE COURT: Do you think we're still on track to 5 
6 fmish by 2:00? 6 
7 MS. TAYLOR: I believe so, yes. 7 
S THE COURT; And, Mr. Charney, do you have a B 
9 rebuttal witness? 9 
10 MR. 'CHARNEY; Currently, yes. We'll discuss it. 10 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 11 
12 MR. CHARNEY: Thanks. 12 
13 13 
14 (Recess taken 11 :54 a.m. to. 12:02 p.m.) 14 
15 15 
16 THE COURT: Please be seated. 16 
17 Ms. Taylor, are you ready to call your next 17 
18 witness? 18 
19 MS. TAYLOR: Weare, Your Honor. We call 19 
20 John Wood. 20 
21 21 
22 JOHN WOOD, 22 
23 called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiffs, 23 
24 having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified; 24 
25 as follows: I25 
Page 333 
Q. What stage of development is this land in? 
A. All of them are in final plat. Some of them 
have been sold over the last year, which was 
Covenant Hill, off of Eagle. It was ajoint effort with 
Hillview Development. 
Q. How does the property Park Hampton already 
owns compare geographically to the Linder Road property? 
A. It's all within the -- as the City would call 
it, is the mile - the expansion mile property. 
We have -- currently we have the property -­
16 acres of commercial, right across from the new Eagle 
Island State Park, that we've been working "vith the Parks 
Department and the State ofldaho, with the Governor's 
office, for the new entrance for Eagle Island State Park. 
This land continues, goes up. There's about 
350 homes behind Eagle High School that is -- some has 
already been through preliminary plat, some is through 
final plat. 
And it's probably about less than a half mile 
away, this property. 
Q. Mr. Wood, has your LLC made an offer to 
purchase the Linder Road property from the Johnson Trust? 
A. We've -- we've asked to -- to put in an 
offer. But we have not put in an offer, because of the 
litigation, and where it stands with the lis pl:ndens and 
81 (Pages 330 to 333) 
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1 the timing of the market of this property. 1 the front, they're very narrow in the front and very wide 
2 Q. Okay. Had you previously submitted an offer, 2 lots in the rear. And for long-term marketability, and 
3 
4 
through Doug Crandall's office? 
A. Yes, we have. 
3 
4 
for the properties to hold their resale value with the 
market, 5-acre pieces normally are a -- have to be a I 
5 Q. What was the amount offered? 5 square, long entrance. 
6 A. 1.8 million. 6 When people drive up the driveway, they like 
7 Q. And that offer did not disclose Park Hampton 7 the feel -- of the marketing side is, they like to feel 
8 as the purchaser, did it? 8 that they have a large piece ofland, and a -- where 
9 A. Normally, none of the properties that we buy 9 their home sits as a focal point of the land, and not a 
10 will ever disclose Park Hampton from its initial buying. 10 narrow driveway with fences bordering each side. 
11 Q. Why is that? 11 Q. Is that the reason why you would have the 
12 A. Because of the price of the land. When we 12 land replatted? 
13 bought it -- Flynn Estates, we had to buy ten 5-acre 13 A. I would immediately have it replatt,~d, and I 
14 parcels in order to own the CC and Rs. There was 14 14 would make a more ofa grand entrance on the front. And 
lS pieces of property. And as people know who is buying it, 15 redesign the road, and put a loop road in there, and -­
16 
17 
or actively looking at that, a lot of times the price 
will change. Whether it's a Wal-Mart coming to town -­
16 
17 
except a straight road back, for marketability and for 
long-term value, to hold its value. I 




already been bought. 





$1.8 million for this property, did you take into 
consideration the improvements that have been placed on 
it up to this point? I 
22 A. A lot oftimes. It's always done through 22 A. Basically, the improvements that are on the 
23 
24 
attorneys, as a client, attorney-clie:nt privilege to -­
to be able to make the offer. 
23 
24 
property right now - anytime that we buy a piece of 
property, or if we buy something that has already been I 
2S Q. If you acquire this property, what would your 25 preplatted, we take an accountability that we more than 
Page 335 
1 plan be to do with it? 1 
2 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; relevance. 2 
3 THE COURT: Well, no. I think it is relevant, 3 
4 under this -- under the context. Go ahead. I'll 4 
5 overrule the objection. 5 
6 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: You can go ahead and answ 6 
7 A. The plans with this property would be to -- 7 
8 first, to go ahead and get it resurveyed, get the -- find 8 
9 out the water rights and the land use. Right now, in the 9 
10 City of Eagle and the county. this property is dedicated 10 
11 to five acres and above. It's on what they call -- north 11 
12 of Beacon Light and East ofLind<:T, which will all be 12 
13 staying 5-acre parcels. 13 
14 Then, what we would do is, we would go in and 14 
15 redesign the property. We would .- right now, the 15 
16 current plat is long, pinwheel, nan'ow lots. 16 
17 Q. Okay. And there's a copy of that in the 17 
18 notebook up there by you, if you would tum to Exhibit 18 
19 No. 122. 19 
20 20 
21 (Witness complied.) 21 
22 22 
23 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Can you explain to the Court 23 
24 what you mean by your reference to pinwheel lots. 24 
25 A. If you look the way the lots are designed in !2S 
Page 337 I 
likely will not use any of those improvemenits, as - so 
that we can know how to maximize our dollars and be able 
to improve the best value for the land. IQ. SO does the offer, as it sits, include 
additional value because of the improvements? 
A. No. It does not. 
Q. Is this offer any more than you would pay if I 
it were just raw land? 
A. No. It would not. 
Q. I would like to have you tum to the I 
photographs that are at Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 133. 
To lay a foundation, have you been to this 
property recently? I
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Can you just look through those photos and 
tell me if they're a true and accurate depiction of the 
condition of the property? I 
A. Yes, they are. 
Q. Specifically, does the barn that's on the 
property now add any value to it, for your purposes? I 
A. No. The preliminary look of the bam, 
there's no value to it, nor would it be the type of 
subdivision that would allow that type ofbaJll there. IQ. What is the problem with the bam, as you see 
it? 
B2 (Pages 334 to 337) I 
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Page 1 1 
1 A. The way it sits on the property and, also, MS. TAYLOR: I have no further questions. 
2 it's -- as we all can tell, it's been opened and 2 THE COURT: Mr: Charney, you may cross-examine. 
3 weathered. And it's just in the wrong placement of the 3M.'...,.  
4 property. 4 CROSS-EXAMINATION
 
5 Q. SO is there any value to the bam at all? 5 BY MR. CHARNEY:
 




7 Q. Will you have to pay to have it removed? 7 A. Good afternoon.
 
8 A. Almost all -- like on Flynn Estates, on the 8 Q. How long have you worked -for Park'Hampton?
 
9 parcels down there, that we will put a sign out front and I 9 A. For two years.
 
10 a lot oftimes we can get people to get the stuff moved 110 Q. Where were you prior to that? 
•
"·1 
'.,' 11 off. They'll come in and move the stuff ofHoI' 11 A. My family owned -- we still do -- we own 
· "',,
12 materials. 12 17 body shops in California.
 
13 Q. And would you have any objection to Mr. Maile 13 Q. SO you have only moved to Idaho in the past
 
, :; .;~. ;~; 14 removing this bam? 14 two years?
 15 A. No objection. 15 A. Three years.
 16 Q. Okay. I would like to go back to the road. 16 Q. Three years. I'm sorry.
 17 Is it Park Hamilton's intention to leave the road where 17 When this property was sold to Mr. Maile, 
18 it is located? 118 then, you didn't even live in this area, did you? 
19 A. No. We were -- had a tentative with 19 A. 2003 is when we first moved up, yes. 
20 Toothman-Orton, have done an initial sketch. It would 20 Q. Since you have moved here, you have become ill ,
 21 be a loop road. 21 somewhat familiar with the value of property in this




23 replatting, will the existing lateral lines for power and 23 A. 90percent of this area; correct.
 
24 gas, telephone, things likc~ that, be left in place? 24 Q. The property, as it exits now, is split into
 
25 A. They will be -- ny to be, on the new plat. 25 lots that are slightly larger than five acres each;
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J'~:'I-' 
1 We'll by to keep them, if we can. But more than likely, 1 correct?
 
2 with new lot lines drawn and new roads, that they will 2 A. Correct.
 
3 have to be moved, maybe 30 feet one way or 30 feet the 3 Q. That is consistent with the zoning
 
4 other way. 4 requirements in this particular area; correct?
 
5 Q. Is -- is your pending offer, will it remain 5 A. That's -- yes.
 
6 open indefinitely?6 Q. To tum these 40 acres -- it's a little less
 
7 A. It will. The only thing that I am worried -- 7 than 40 acres, but let's call it 40 -- to tum these
 
8 and I believe that most pe<lple in this Valley, in 8 40 acres into almost track housing, if you will, would be 
••
9 Park Hampton, or Capital Development, or anybody, is 9 next to impossible under current zoning laws? 
10 that, especially in Eagle, like Correnta Bello and 10 A. It's -- it's totally impossible, yeah. 
11 Covenant Hill, that the buyers are backing out faster 11 Q. SO the best use that you could make of this 
12 than -- you know, the lots were reserved -- a lot of the 12 parcel, in that area currently, would be 5-acre lots? 
13 lots in the new subdivisions that are on line were 13 A. That -- at this point in time:, that's the 
14 reserved nine months, a year ago. 14 only thing that is -- and the City of Eagle has been 
15 Now that these projects are finished, 15 through two cornp plan changes, and it's still there. 
16 Covenant Hill's only had five close and Brentabello, 16 Q. What steps have you taken to check into the 
17 I believe had about 20 more builders walk away last week. 17 septic requirements that are in this particular area? 
18 So, the market is changing fast. It wasn't like it was 18 A. The septic, I have not checked into.
 
19 nine months or a year ago, when you had a piece of 19 Q. You have no idea about the septic?
 
20 property and somebody would come in and buy it. 20 A. I do know that it's 1.8 acres and above, in
 
21 Q. Is there any possibility that this offer will 21 the City of Eagle.
 
22 be withdrawn if the litigation isn't concluded so you can 22 Q. For a requirement; correct?
 
23 buy it? 23 A. For a requirement.
 
24 A. It depends on the length of the litigation 24 Q. You also know that there is not sewer that
 
25 and the -- the climate of the market. 25 has been brought out to this particular-property yet?
 
83 (Pages 338 to 341) 











~',',','.,:,:,',~"C.;.:,.,L :--:.: . 
II 




















































Taylor v. Maile 10/11/2006 
Page 342 
1 A. I'm very aware of that. 1 
2 Q. You don't know anything about the wa~er table 2 
3 problems that currently exist on this 40 acres, do you? 3 
4 A. The water table that I do have, I hav~ 4 
5 actually -- the water table on State Street, which is 5 
6 down the road from this -- 6 
7 Q. I'm talking about this particular area. 7 
8 A. Right. This particular area, no. a 
9 Q. Okay. You weren't aware of the fact that 9 
10 Mr. Maile actually designed this pinwheel pattern because 10 
11 of the septic requirements and the water table in this 11 
12 area; correct? 12 
13 A. I -- from my knowledge, }, don't believe that 13 
14 there is a water table problem up there. 14 
15 Q. But you don't know this, do you? 15 
16 A. No. But a friend of mine owns the property 16 
17 across the street. 17 
18 Q. SO, you are speculating" now, on what some 18 
19 friend of yours told you about tbe property; correct? 19 
20 A. Yes. 20 
21 Q. All right. So, your knowledge -- 21 
22 A. And he's a professional. 22 
23 Q. SO, your knowledge, sir, is you don't know 23 
24 anything about the septic requirements or the water table 24 
25 issues on this particular parcel of property, do you? 25 
Page 343 
1 A. No. I do not. 1 
2 Q. You don't know that Mr. Maile chose the 2 
3 pinwheel design to accommodate the high water table and 3 
4 the septic requirements for this area; correct? 4 
5 A. No. I do not. 5 
6 Q. You also don't have any guarantee, from the 6 
7 City, that you, in fact, would be: successful in 7 
B replatting this property to fit the 5-acre lots that you 8 
9 envision would be more saleable? 9 
10 A. That's false. I've spoken to the City many 10 
11 times on this property. 11 
12 Q. And they've guaranteed you you could replat 12 
13 it that way? 13 
14 A. Correct. 14 
15 Q. Okay. And you've got documentation to back 15 
16 that up? 16 
17 A. No. But I -- I'm at the City on a biweekly 17 
18 basis. 18 
19 Q. Okay. Once you replatted this, what would be 19 
20 the value of the lots? 20 
21 MS. TAYLOR: Objection; relevance, beyond the 1 21 
22 scope of direct. I! 22 
23 MR. CHARNEY: He's talking about he wants to corot 23 
24 in and rip this whole thing apart and start from scratch. i 24 
25 So, I would like to know why this individual would choos~ 25 
84 (Pages 342 to 345) 
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THE COlJRT: l'1\ overrule the objection.
 
. THE WITNESS: The -- the target market would be
 
about 350 to 450, depending on -- on the lot. The
 
problem, now, anytime that you do a subdivision, say down
 




Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: Okay. 
A. Right now, the resale value, the way these 
are designed, would be very, very tough sa]es at the 
current design of it. 
Q. But you don't know whether or not somebody
 
would or would not purchase these lots currently, do you?
 
A. Right now it would be a very tough sale. 
Q. You're saying that once you have replatted 
it, that the lots would be worth anywhere from $350- to 
$450,000? 
A. Correct. 
Q. What's the current value of the lots? 
A. At the current value, we're probably looking 
about -- probably the 250, 275. But that is also with 
improvements which, if you look how long the celtain 
properties are, the fencing and the buffering f 
requirements would eat a ton of that to sta"rt out. 
PagE~ 345 
Q. But, nevertheless, you're saying current 
value of these lots is 250 to 275,000. And ifyou were 
successful in replatting, you could sell them for 350 to 
450? 
A. Correct. 
Q. SO, roughly about 100,000 mow per lot, give 
or take? 
A. Well, the main thing here is -- I think what 
you're missing is, it's the resale value. You can buy 
something, but it's to have the people that can build the 
estate home on the property, so they could get the proper 
value down the road. 
Q. You've made no application, though, to the 
City, to actually have this replatted; correct? 
A. No. 
Q. And you don't know where, if you wen~ to 
replat this into these lots that you envision, the septic 
would have to be required on each lot; correct? 
A. The septic will be required on eaeh lot. 
Q. Right. But you don't where, on each lot, the 
septic would wind up having to go; coneet? 
A. Well, I've -- I've spent --I don't want to 
get exact, but huge amounts of dollars with 
Toothman-Orton, which is an engineering finn here in 
town, and all the way up to Floating Feather. 
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I 
1 And just with doing Covenant Hill, next to 1 another partner and worked, in the '70s, on lands 
2 the middle school up there, we have had no seepage or 2 throughout the Idaho, Washington, Idaho, Montana area. 
3 water issues, anything, from about the high school up 3 Obtained an MAl designation. Kept appraising counties 
4 north. 4 all across the United States; Tennessee, Nashville, 
5 Q. Okay. So your vi,~w is, you could replat this 5 Mobile, Alabama, Nebraska, Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. 
I 6 into squares, as.opposed to a pinwheel, and you could ge 6 Then sold that business, in 1988, and w(~nt 
• 
7 a septic permit for each lot? 7 into appraising, with myself and my son, which I've been 
8 A. Unless there was something out there that we 8 doing ever since out ofmy home in Clarkston. 
9 did not know. 9 Q. And during the course of that, have you had 
10 Q. We'll talk about that later. 10 continuing education? 
11 MR. CHARNEY: Thank you. No further questions. 11 A. Oh, I've taken 15 to 20 classes. They 
•

• 12 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
 13 THE COURT: Now, hang on a second sir.
 14 Do you have any Tl~direct examination?
 15 MS. TAYLOR: I don't. 
16 THE COURT: May the witness be excused? 








20 THE WITNESS: ThalIlk you very much.
 
21 THE COURT: And you can just leave those right
 
22 there. Thanks. 
23 THE WITNESS: Th11Ilk you. 
• 
24 














7 called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff,
 









II 12 BY MS. TAYLOR:




14 A. Terry Rudd, R-U-D-D.
 
15 Q. Mr. Rudd, how are you employed?
 
16 A. A real estate app:raiser.
 
17 Q. Can you give the Court the background on your

•
 18 real estate appraisal expetience.
 19 A. Well, I started in 1957 for the Forest
 20 Service. And, in 1963, I went into business with
 21 Mr. Tom Clifton, here in Boise. We had an office here
 
12 require -- well, the initial education for the MAl
 
13 designation was about 200 hours of classroom education,
 
14 plus demonstration reports and exams. And then, since
 
15 then, I have been obtaining about 16 to 20 hours per
 
16 year, as required by all three states, for education.
 




19 A. Idaho, Washington, and Oregon.
 




22 A. Well, I've taught three differerlt courses;
 
23 one at the University ofIdaho, another for Lewis Clark
 
24 State College. And the other was a private course that I
 
25 gave on bell curve appraising.
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1 Q. Mr. Rudd, are you familiar with the property 
2 located on Linder Road that is currently owned by the 
3 Johnson Trust? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. How did you first become familiar with that 
6 property? 
7 A. Someone from your firm, either yourself or 
8 Tom, asked me to appraise the property, which involved a 
9 trip to Boise. I went out and inspect(~d the property, 
10 with Dallan Taylor. And I contacted realtors, went to 
11 the MLS and looked at comparable sales, and then came up 
12 with a value determination. 
13 Q. And are -- is the contact with realtors and 
14 looking at comparable sales in the MLS the type of 
15 information that appraisers normaIly rely on in forming 
16 their opinions? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Did you prepare an appraisal report as a 
19 result of your review of the property? 
20 A. I completed the appraisal. And then I 
21 verbally relayed the information to your fiml. And then 
II 22 on State Street and one iTl Lewiston. And we started 122 it was requested that I produce a minimal report, which 23 appraising timberlands, highways, right of ways, power )23 is a restricted use report. 
• 
24 lines. 24 Q. Okay. Do you have that report with you 
1 
25 And, eventually, he retired and I took on 25 today?1
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JUL 28 2005 
, Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D~JL,""-
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY F ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAl-J" TAYLOR, 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs,! Counter··Defendants, Case No. CVOC0400473D 
vs. MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER 
THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/ Counter-Claimants. 
This matter came before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to DismissIMotion for 
Summary Judgment, the Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Amend, Defendants' Motions: to Strike, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike. On June 13,2005, the Court 
heard oral arguments regarding the motions. After considering the briefs and arguments of the 
parties, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, DENIES Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss, GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, 
DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and refuses to consider Defendants' Motions to Strike. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Thomas Maile, IV was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included 
drafting the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and overseeing the 
administration ofthe trust. After Johnson's death, Maile represented Johnson's estate. 
The underlying transaction in this case is a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor 






























































of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson entered into an earnest 
money agreement for the purchase of 40 acres in Eagle, ID. The purchase price was $400,000. 
Maile later assigned his interest in the purchase money agreement to Berkshire Investments, LLC. 
The assignment was approved by Beth Rogers acting for Theodore Johnson through a power of 
attorney. Johnson died of cancer before title was conveyed. After Johnson's death, co-trustees Beth 
Rogers and Andrew Rogers conveyed title to Berkshire Investments and executed a warranty deed on 
behalf of the trust as seller. The title was subject to a deed of trust, which was paid in full on January 
04,2004. 
On January 22, 2004, Plaintiffs, certain residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson 
Trust, filed a lis pendens against the 40 acres in Eagle. On January 23, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a 
lawsuit, alleging three causes of action and seeking damages and/or rescission of the sale. Plaintiffs 
claimed the property at the time Maile entered into the earnest money agreement with Johnson was 
worth at least $1.2 million. Plaintiffs asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Maile, 
arguing Maile owed Theodore Johnson a fiduciary duty by virtue of their attorney client relationship 
and that Maile breached this duty by not dealing fairly with Johnson, not advising Johnson to consult 
independent counsel, paying less than fair market value for the property, and offering to purchase the 
property on tenns unfavorable to Johnson. Plaintiffs also asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
against Maile in his capacity as a realtor/broker, alleging he breached his fiduciary duty by failing to 
deal honestly with Johnson and by purchasing the property for less than fair market value. Finally, 
Plaintiffs asserted professional negligence claims against Maile in his capacity as attorney and as real 
estate broker. 





















































































Maile answered the complaint and then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the residual 
beneficiaries lacked standing to bring every asserted cause of action. On April 23, 2004, the Co 
dismissed the claims of tht: Plaintiffs based upon a lack of standing. The Court found that th 
Plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the trust and only the trustee could bring a claim. The Plaintiffs hav 
appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court. However, a Counterclaim filed by Defendants is stil 
ongoing on that case. 
On July 22, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a new action against Defendants. Plaintiffs were believed t 
be the new co-trustees of the trust. The original trustees supposedly transferred their status as trustee 
to the Plaintiffs. 
On September 29, 2004 the Court ordered that the two cases be consolidated. 
On November 17, 2004, the Honorable Christopher Bieter entered an order appointing th 
Plaintiffs as co-successor trustees of the Trust. On April 13, 2005, Judge Bieter set aside th 
November 17, 2004 order. On May 2, 2005, Judge Bieter allowed the Plaintiffs to be appointed a 
successor trustees, but denied their request to be appointed retroactively. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND 
Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint to clarify their status as trustees. 
amendments to relate back to the time of the filing of the complaint. Basically, Plaintiffs seeks t 
have their status as trustees applied retroactively to the time of the filing of the complaint. 
The trial court has the discretion to determine whether to grant or deny a motion to amend.
 
Trimble v. Engelking, 134 Idaho 195, 196 (2000). Motions to amend a pleading under IRCP Rul
 
15(a) should be liberally granted by the court. Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342
 
345 (2001). Rule 15(a) states that motions to amend at this stage in a case should be "freely give
 

























































































when justice so requires." LRCP Rule l5(a). The Court must consider the potential prejudice to th 
opposing party when deciding on a motion to amend. Jordan v. Cnty of Los Angele~, 669 F.2d 1311
 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
Plaintiffs argue that IRCP 15(c) and 17(a) allow for the amendment to relate back to the tim 
of the filing of the complaint. IRCP 15(c) allows amendments to relate back to the time of the filin 
of the complaint if they arose out of the same conduct set forth in the complaint. IRCP 17(a) provide 
that all actions shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. 
In Hayward, the Idaho Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to change the representativ 
capacity in which he brought the suit. The plaintiff had sued as a personal representative of 
decedent's estate and he wanted to sue as an heir of the estate. The court allowed him to make thi 
change. 
, The Hayward court noted that "the good faith of the plaintiff and prejudice experienced by the 
defendant are factors to consider .... Ru1e 17(a) is not intended to validate claims filed without any 
real basis but with the hope that a proper party will eventually materialize in order to benefit from 
suspended statutes of limitation. However, this principle has no application to cases in which 
substitution of the real party in interest is necessary to avoid injustice." Id. at 348 (citing Conda 
Partnership, Inc. v. M.D. Constr. Co.. Inc., 115 Idaho 902, 922 (Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted).
 
The Hayward court also noted "that courts from other jurisdictions have applied a more 
lenient standard to the relation back of a motion to amend that primarily centers around the capacity 
in which the plaintiff brings the action." Id. 
Defendants argue that the suit was not filed in good faith, but they do not claim any prejudice. 
Because Title 68 of the Idaho Code specifically provides that a trustee may not delegate his office and 

























































































mandates that a court must a appoint a trustee, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should have known 
that they were not legal trustt::es when they filed suit on June 21, 2004. 
The Court finds no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Plaintiff. It appears that they were 
not aware of their error until receiving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in October. Plaintiffs then 
applied to the court to be appointed as trustees. Therefore, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend. The Court finds that the amendments relate back to the time of the filing of the 
complaint.
 
Ill. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is based on the failure of the Plaintiffs to file suit as trustees. 
Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs were not properly appointed trustees when they filed suit, 
the case should be dismissed. However, due to the Court's granting of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, 
this argument fails. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 
IV. DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants have also filed motions for partial summary judgment seeking the dismissal of (1) 
Plaintiffs' claims against Maile as a real estate broker; (2) Plaintiffs' claims against Maile as an 
attorney; and (3) Plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief. 
A. MAILE AS A REAL ESTATE BROKER 
Maile argues that there was no relationship between himself as a broker and Plaintiffs. Idaho 
Code §54-2084 provides: 
(1) A buyer or seller is not represented by a brokerage in a regulated real estate 
transaction unless the buyer or seller and the brokerage agree, in a separate written 
document, to such reprt::sentation. No type of agency representation may be asswned 
by a brokerage, buyer or seller or created orally or by implication. 
IC 54-2084. 




















































































There was no written representation agreement in this case. As a result, The Court finds that 
there was no broker-client re:lationship, and thus no claims against Maile in his capac:ity as a broker 
can survive. 
Plaintiffs also argue that Maile violated Idaho law by acting as a realtor and failing to 
obtain a written representation agreement in violation ofIdaho Code §54-2085. However, the 
Court finds that while Maile could be subject to discipline for violating Idaho Code §54-2085, 
the disciplinary sections provided for in this section do not allow for clients suing the broker. 
The Idaho Real Estate Commission handles disciplinary matters in this area. 
Plaintiffs further argue that because Maile did not disclose to the Trust that the appraisal 
I
 
conducted was defective and the property was worth more, he violated his Idaho Code §54-2086 
duties as a customer. However, as Maile points out, a customer owes "no duty to independently 
verify the accuracy or completeness of any statement or representation made by the seller or any 
source reasonably believed by the licensee to be reliable." IC §54-2086(2). Maile also argues that the 
appraisal was an opinion, not a material fact that required disclosure. The Court agrees with Maile's 
arguments and consequently finds that no issue of material fact exists with respect to this claim. 
B. NUULEASANATTORNEY 
To establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out ofa civil action, the plaintiff 
must show: (1) the creation of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a 
duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or the standard ofcare by the 
lawyer; and (4) that the failure to perform the duty was a proximate cause ofthe 
damages suffered by the plaintiff. 
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 590 (2001).
 
. Plaintiffs have provided the affidavit of Richard Mollerup, their legal expert, who claims that 
Maile violated his fiduciary duties, violated his ethical duties and was negligent, all of which were the 
proximate cause of damages to the Plaintiffs. 
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Plaintiffs claim that Maile had a conflict of interest. On one hand, as a lawyer" he was 
supposed to help the Trust get the best price for its land, on the other hand, as a purchaser, he wanted 
get the land for the lowest possible price. 
1. Attorney-Client Relationship 
Defendants argue that no attorney-client relationship existed between Maile and the Trust at 
the time Maile purchased the: property. Maile had represented Johnson in various matters in the ten 
years prior to the land purchase. Maile represented Johnson with respect to an offer (the Witte offer) 
that was made in May 2002 on the same property that Maile later bought. Maile claims his 
representation ended after his work dealing with this offer because he performed no further work for 
the Trust. Beth Rogers wrote Maile a letter in May 2003 declining further representation by him. 
Maile never did formally tenninate the relationship. The Court finds that Rogers did terminate the 
relationship in May 2003. The Comment to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 states: 
If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the 
client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing 
basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client­
lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, 
so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's 
affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. 
IRPC 1.3 cmt. 
Maile had served the Trust in various matters for the past ten years. The Cowt finds that 
there is a material issue of fact about the existence of an attorney-client relationship. 
2. Breach of the Standard of Care 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot show that Maile breached the standard of care for an 
attorney. Plaintiffs' legal expert, Richard Mollerup, states that he felt that Maile breached his 

























































































fiduciary obligations to the Trust because the tenns of the transaction under which Maile purchased 
the subject property from the trust were not fair and reasonable. 
Mollerup notes that se:veral provisions in the Purchase Agreement and Deed of Trust were 
irregular and favorable to Maile. Defendants contend that these irregularities are irrelevant to the 
issue of whether the deal was fair. However, Mollerup also states that the purchase price itself was 
unfair, considering it was identical to an offer previously rejected by Maile. 
Additionally, Defendcmts argue that Maile complied with Rules 1.8 and 1.9 of the Idaho Rules 
of Professional Conduct because Maile told Johnson of his right of seek independent counsel at least 
twice. Plaintiffs claim that Maile made no such representations. Based on the above, the Court finds 
that a material issue of fact exists as to whether the representations were made and as to whether a 
breach of the standard of care occurred. 
3. Damages 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot prove any damages because Maile paid the market 
value for the property. However, Plaintiffs have submitted appraisals and affidavits stlting that the 
$400,000 price was far too low and that others were ready, willing and able to pay for the property. 
Also, Maile himself had previously stated that the $400,000 price was too low. Based on these 
assertions, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' have adequately demonstrated damages. 
Based on the above, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiffs' claims against Maile as an attorney. 
C. EQUITABLE RELIEF 
1. Rescission 


















































































Rescission is an equitable remedy that totally abrogates the contract and seeks to 
restore the parties to their original positions. It is normally granted only in those 
circumstances in which one of the parties has committed a breach so material that it 
destroys or vitiates the entire purpose for entering into the contract. 
Blinzlerv. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, 485 P.2d 957 (1971).
 
The Rogers, as trustees, were informed by the Taylors that the purchase price was unfair 
before the deal was done. Tht: Rogers chose to ignore the Taylors and to accept the payment for the 
property. Maile argues that the Plaintiffs are bound by the decision made by the trustees. On July 22, 
2003, Beth Rogers told Maile that no legal action would be pursued by the Trust. "Under the 
common law, it is well established that the party seeking rescission must act promptly once the 
grounds for rescission arise. Once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts 
givin~ rise to a right of rescission, the right of rescission is waived." White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882,
 
888 (2004). 
Maile argues that he relied on the Rogers' assurances in obtaining financing to develop the 
subject property. Plaintiffs argue that Maile was on notice in July 2003 that they were upset about the 
sale and that legal action was imminent. Maile argues that he did not worry about the Plaintiffs at tha 
time because they were not trustees and had no standing to sue. Their fIrst lawsuit was dismissed due 
to a lack of standing. Maile relied on the assertions of the trustees, at that time, Beth and Andy 
Rogers. 
, The Court finds that the Plaintiffs, now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to 
pursue rescission once the grounds for it arose. Therefore, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' 
motion with respect to this claim. 
2. Constructive: Trust 
























































































Constructive trusts are: raised by equity for the purpose of working out right and 
justice, where there was no intention of the party to create such a relation, and often 
directly contrary to th(~ intention of the one holding the legal title.... If one party 
obtains the legal title to property, not only by fraud or by violation of confidence or of 
fiduciary relations, but in any other unconscientious manner, so that he cannot 
equitably retain the property which really belongs to another, equity carries out its 
theory of a double ownership, equitable and legal, by impressing a constructive trust 
upon the property in favor of the one who is in good conscience entitled to it, and who 
is considered in equity as the beneficial owner. 
Hanger v. Hess, 49 Idaho 325, 328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930).
 
In this case, it is allege:d that Maile obtained the property by violating his fiduciary obligations. 
The Court finds that there is an issue of fact about that claim. Therefore, the Court DENIES 
Defendants' motion with respect to the Plaintiffs' constructive trust claim. 
3. Estoppel 
Maile asserts the equitable defenses ofequitable estoppel and quasi estoppel against the 
Plaintiffs. He argues that he rdied on the trustees' July 2003 assertions that litigation would not be 
pursued when he obtained fimmcing for the development of the property. He argues that the trustees 
cannot now change their position. The Plaintiffs argue that Maile has unclean hands because of his 
alleged misconduct and thus cannot assert equitable remedies. 
Because the Court finds that there is an issue of fact about Maile's unclean hands, it will not 
consider estoppel as a defense at this time. 
v. DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE 
Defendants seek to strike Richard White's affidavit and portions of Richard Mollerup's 
affidavit. Richard White is Plaintiffs' expert real estate broker. Mollerup is Plaintiffs' expert on lega 
malpractice. 






























































































Plaintiffs have objected to even hearing Defendants' motions to strike at the June 13,2005 
hearing because Defendants did not comply with IRCP 7(b)(3) in filing the motions. IRCP 7(b)(3) 
requires that motions be filed at least 14 days before the hearing. In this case, the motions to strike 
were filed on June 6, 2005 for a June 13, 2005 hearing. No motions to shorten time were filed. 
Plaintiffs claimed that they did not have enough time to respond to the motions. At the hearing both 
parties rested on the record regarding the motions to strike and no arguments were presented. 
Because IRCP 7(b)(3) was not complied with, the Court will not entertain Defendants' 
Motions to Strike. 
VI. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
Plaintiffs seek to strike the testimony of Maile as it relates to any unwritten communication or 
agreement with the decedent, Ted Johnson, relating to the property which forms the su~ject matter of 
this litigation because they argue that it be inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiffs do not articulate exactly 
what they wish to exclude. 
Defendants argue that as a trustee of the Trust which is now suing Maile, Johnson's 
statements are admissions of a party-opponent pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2). The 
Coourt finds that Johnson's statements are admissions ofa party-opponent and thus DENIES 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, DENIES 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motions for 
Partial Summary Judgment, DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and refuses to consider Defendants' 
Motions to Strike. 


























































































IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated thiJ ld;of _~ (V 2005. 
/ 






















































































CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
L HEREBY CERTIFY that on the :J~ day of tLtl~ ,2005, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION ORDER to be served by the method 
indicated below, and address1ed to the following: / 
Paul Thomas Clark (1 u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 




(~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid Phillip J. Collaer 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP ( ) Hand Delivered 
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April 14, 2004 
SENT VIA FACSIMILE TO: 208-395-8585 
Bart W. Harwood . 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ill 83701 
Re: Taylor v. Maile 
Dear Mr. Harwood: 
My clients have reviewed the documents you e-mailed to me, and have a number of concerns. 
First, Helen's Taylor's share ofthe trust should be distributed to her at this time. They realize they 
could make that distribution as soon as the current trustees have resigned, but they would like to 
avoid the incorrect impression that the funds are going to Helen's children rather than to her. 
Second, they are quite concerned with the demand that all of the Taylors release the trustees from 
any potential claims and waive their right to an accounting of the trust as a precondition to them 
being allowed to pursue the suit against Mr. Maile on behalf of the trust. It is extremely irregular 
for a trustee to refuse to provide any accounting, but none' has been provided in this case. 
Third, they need assurances that both Beth and Andy will be supportive ofthis lawsuit, as there is 
no getting around the fact that :at least Beth will be an essential witness. This suit was filed based 
on Beth's totally unequivocal r,epresentations that Mr. Maile had never informed Ted Johnson that 
it was a conflict of interest for him to enter into a business transaction with a client, had never 
informed Mr. Johnson that he should seek independent counsel, had never advised he obtain an 
appraisal ofthe property at devdopment value, and had never informed her or Andy ofany ofthose 
facts. In fact, she reported that she felt Mr. Maile had treated her quite unfairly, putting pressure on 
her and demanding that the reall estate transaction be closed right when she was planning a funeral 
for Ted, who had been like a father to her. She made these unequivocal statements at a meeting 
attended by a number offamily members on July 5, 2003, and acknowledged that it was the trustees' 
fiduciary duty to bring an action against Mr. Maile. She repeated these statements to Reed Taylor 
.::<.r\EXHIBITNO.~ 
r,; r\)~. '"_J;;.......f:::£..%f;.9 . 
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Bart W. Harwood 
April 14, 2004 
Page 2 
and his son Jud when they met with her in Boise on several occasions. The events which are 
concerning to us are as follows: 
1.	 On July 22, 2003, I received a letter informing me that the Rogers had decided the 
suit "has not thl~ merit to benefit the trust." We have never received an explanation 
of the basis for this conclusion, which was entirely contrary to Beth's previous 
statements. TIle letter did, however, follow a request for an accounting made by 
Dallan Taylor. When I talked to Beth about the letter, she made overt threats against 
Dallan ifhe didn't "back off." 
2.	 On February 23,2004, we received Mr. Maile's Answer and Counterclaim, which 
attached the JuJly 22, 2003 letter to me as an Exhibit. We most certainly did not 
provide him with a copy of that letter, and must assume he received it from Beth. 
3.	 Beth attended the hearing on Monday with Mr. Maile and his attorneys. She 
appeared to be on very good tenns with all of them, and made comments in the 
hallway which have caused grave concerns about where her loyalties lie" 
4.	 After the hearing, Beth told me unequivocally that it will not be possible to obtain all 
ofthe signatures ofthe beneficiaries by the Monday deadline the court has given us. 
Because nearly all of the beneficiaries have already assigned their rights as 
beneficiaries under the Maile lawsuit to Reed Taylor and any other beneficiaries who 
wish to pursue it, there is no valid basis for her insistence on obtaining all the 
signatures before she and Andy resign. 
My clients recognize Beth and the sisters' concerns that this action must not in any way put Ted 
Johnson's reputation or physicE~ state at the time of the Maile transaction in an unfavorable light. 
Theyabsolutely share that view and have agreed to prosecute this case in a manner which will filCUS 
on Mr. Maile's conduct only. Beth has agreed to this strategy, but now attempts to frustrate. 
The Taylors are not willing to give up their rights as beneficiaries ofthe trust unless Beth will affirm 
her prior factual statements in the form ofan affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against 
Mr. Maile. Ifwe aren't able to reach an agreement on that, they will seek a full accounting of the 
trust and a copy of the trust and estate tax returns. They will also require an accounting of all 
distributions from the estate and nontestamentary transfers, including copies ofall records relating 




















Bart W. Harwood 
April 14, 2004 
Page 3 
ever been given on where that money has gone. We will need records establishing whether the 
beneficiaries on the annuities were changed, when, by whom, and who received the funds. We also 
need a copy of the power ofattorney given to Beth and a summary of the actions taken pursuant to 
that power of attorney. 
My clients will waive their right to these records only ifBeth executes an affidavit and expedites the 
signing of the docwnents so they may proceed with the suit against Mr. Maile. 
Judge Wilpur has given us only until close of business on Monday, April 19th, to either join or 
substitute the trust as a plaintiff in the pending lawsuit. We would ofcourse be able to refile, but 
deem it extremely unwise to provide Mr. Maile with a window ofopportunity to dispose of the real 
property, which may well be our only potential source ofcollecting on ajudgment. 
Time is very critical. Dallan Taylor is in Boise and is willing to meet with you and Beth to review 
and copy the changes to the docwnents described above. 
Sincerely, 
CLARK. and FEENEY 
By: Connie W. Taylor 
CWT:st 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
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Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR 
vs. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
The Defendants submit this memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiffs' Second Motion for 
, Summary Judgment on the Defendants' counterclaims. 
Because the Plaintiffs in this case were the Defendants in Taylor v. Maile, the use of the 
I designations "Plaintiff' and "Defendant" becomes very confusing. For the sake ofclarity, we will 
I 
refer to the parties by name, with the Plaintiffs collectively identified as "Mailes" and the Defendants 
collectively identified as "Taylors." 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
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SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The Mailes filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relating to the Taylors' 
counterclaims on March 17,2009. This Court denied that motion in its Memorandum Decision and 
Order dated July 7, 2009, holding that there are factual issues to be determined which preclude 
summary judgment on the Taylors' claims of slander oftitle, abuse ofprocess, and interference with 
prospective economic adv,mtage. 
The Mailes filed another Motion for Summary Judgment on the counterclaims on March 2, 
2010. The brief in support of this second motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims 
contains a "Statement ofUncontested Facts" which relate solely to filings and decisions in the initial 
lawsuit relating to the Linder Road property, Taylor v. Maile. The present motion appears to be 
premised primarily on theMailles.filingofavendee.slien and efforts to foreclose on that lien. See 
Motion for foreclosure of Vendee's Lien which is attached as Exhibit B to Thomas Maile's 
December 3,2009 Affidavit in Support of Renewed Motion for Certification. 
While titled as a motion to foreclose, rather than simply seeking repayment ofthe purchase 
I price, that motion in actuality sought an order returning title to the Linder Road property to Mailes' 
LLC. I On March 15, 2010, Judge Wilper entered an Order Denying Defendants' Motion for 






I Verified Motion for Foreclosure of Vendee's Lien, Exhibit B to December 3, 2009 Affidavit in Support 
of Renewed Motion for Certification Pursuant to IRCP Rule 54(b). Prayer, paragraph 6, page 5, asks "that a decree 
be entered adjudging and decreeing the Berkshire Investments LLC is the owner and is entitled to possession of the 
subject property, and further ordering that the "Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust" has no right, title or interest 
or claim in and to the subject real property..." 
2 A copy of that order and the bankers' statements upon which it was based are attached as Exhibit A to the 
April 28, 2009 Affidavit of Counsel. 
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he had entered an Order Denying Mailes' Motion to Compel Payment of Judgment and Interest, 
holding that it was the intention of the court in its July 21, 2006 order "to void the underlying 
1 
transaction returning all parties to the position they had been in prior to the transaction and that 
2 
because the Property had not b(:en returned free ofencumbrance, it was not the time to order a return 3 
4 of the purchase money." 
On the Motion to Foreclose the Vendee's lien, Judge Wilper ruled: 
6 
The Court finds that it is Defendants' [Mailes'] actions which prevent Plaintiffs
 
7
 [Taylors] from satisfying the judgment at this time. Defendants' attempt to enforce 
this Court's judgment, while simultaneously attempting in a collateral proceeding to 
8 challenge that judgment, is disingenuous. The Court has previously held that 
Defendants are entitled to a return ofthe purchase price. Further, the Court finds that 9 
the continued existence of the vendee's lien filed August 3, 2009 is sufficient to 
secure the return ofthe purchase price. The Court will not enter an order foreclosing 
the vendee's lien while there is pending litigation between these parties challenging 
11 the title of the Property. Defendants' Motion for Order Foreclosing Vendee's Lien 
is DENIED. 12 
13 : At the trial of Mailes' unjust enrichment claim in October of 2006, local developer John 
14 Wood testified that Park Hampton, LLC (though Boise attorney Doug Crandall) had offered to 
purchase the Linder Road property (which consists of seven lots of five acres or more) for 
16 
$1,800,000,3 but that the offer could be withdrawn, depending on "the length of the litigation and 
17 
the - the climate of the market.,,4 The offer was ultimately withdrawn.5 Connie Shannahan of
18 




3 A copy of the written Purchase and Sale Agreement is Exhibit A to the Affidavit ofR. John Taylor dated 
April 23, 2010. 
22 
4 Pages 334, 339 of trial transcript, Exhibit B to Affidavit of Counsel dated April 28, 2010. 23 
5 April 23, 20 I0 Affidavit ofR. John Taylor 24 
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comparable five acre lots were selling for between $325,000 and $699,000; in contrast, between 
January 2009 and 2010 a single comparable five acre lot sold for only $149,900. She suggested that 
the five-acre lots on Linder Road be listed for between $125,000 and $150,000.6 During the time 
this property has been in litigation following Judge Wilper's order voiding the Mailes' purchase, the 
Johnson Trust has incurred real property taxes, interest and late fees in the amount of$99,279.76. 
The litigation has prevented the Trust from either selling the property or borrowing the money to 
pay these taxes and the $400,000 purchase price. 7 The Defendants incurred $59,458.36 in attorneys 
fees for defending Mailes' claims against them in this case. 8 
The Idaho Supreme Court affinned the lower court ruling which returned the Linder Road 
property to the Johnson Trust on January 30, 2009. Maile waited over six months before he 
released the lis pendens he had filed in the Taylor v. Maile case on August 3, 2009. That was the 
date he recorded the Notice ofVendee's Lien. On December 16,2009, the Idaho State Bar counsel 
filed a five count Complaint against Thomas Maile based upon his conduct relating to the purchase 
of the property and during the litigation.9 
6 Affidavit of Connie Shannahan dated April 22, 2010. 
7 Paragraph 3, Affidavit ofR. John Taylor dated April 23, 2010. 
8 Affidavit of Mark Prusynski; Exhibit C to Affidavit of R. John Taylor dated April 23, 20 IO. 
9
 Exhibit D to Affidavit orR. John Taylor dated April 23, 2010. 
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1. SLANDER Oli' TITLE 
In Weaver v, Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 701, 8 P,3d 1234, 1244 (2000), the Idaho Supreme
 
Court ruled that an assertion in a pleading claiming an interest in real property satisfies the
 
publication element of slander of title. This holding supported the Taylors' counterclaim for
 
slander of title, for two reasons: (1) the Complaint and Amended Complaint filed in this action
 
claimed an interest in the Lindc:r Road property and asked that title be quieted to the Mailes; and (2)
 
the Mailes maintained a lis pendens against the real property in Taylorv. Maile for over six months
 




However, on April 2, 2010 the Idaho Supreme Court in Weitz v. Green, 040210 IDSCCI, 
33696, overruled Weaver, finding that defamatory statements as to the title to property published 
in a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged. In light ofthis reversal, the Taylors have filed 
a Motion for Leave to Amend their Counterclaims to eliminate the slander of title claim. Because 




 claims, the Amended Counterclaim also clarifies that those claims are based on Mailes' conduct in 
both this case and the underlying case. 
2. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
The burden ofproving the absence ofa material fact rests at all times upon the moving party. 
Harris v. State Dept. ofHealth, 123 Idaho 295, 298,847 P.2d 1156 (1992). This burden is onerous 
because even circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact. Harris, supra, 
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citing McCoy v, Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). This Court is required to
 
liberally construe facts in the existing record in favor ofthe Defendants on this motion, and to draw
 
all reasonable inferences from the record in their favor. Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho
 
322,326,48 P.3d 651, 655 (2002).
 
3.	 THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT ON THE ABUSE OF PROCESS 
CLAIM 
When this issue was last briefed, the Defendants argued that there was a genuine issue offact 
as to whether Maile had a colorable claim to ownership of the Linder Road property. That question 
has been answered, twice: once by this Court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims, and again by 
Judge Wilper's order denying the Mailes' request that they be allowed to foreclose on the lien which 
secures the repayment of the $400,000 purchase price. 
On the abuse of process claims, there remain a genuine issues of material fact as to whether 
the Plaintiffs have engaged in willful acts in the use ofprocess for an ulterior or improper purposes, 
which precludes summary judgment. 
A. Law of the Case. 
The majority of the Memorandum Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment simply repeats Mailes' unsuccessful arguments that the Taylor beneficiaries did not have 
standing to object to his purchase ofthe Linder Road property from his client, Ted Johnson. There 
is no legal basis for this argument, as it has been decided repeatedly. 
The law of the case doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a case 
presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such 
pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent 
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progress, both in the district court and upon subsequent appeal." Swanson v, Swanson, 134 Idaho 
512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled, twice, that the Taylor beneficiaries have standing to 
challengeMailes.purchaseofthisproperty.Taylorv.Maile I, 142 Idaho 253,261, 127 P.3d 156,
 
164 (2005) ; Taylor v. Maile II, 146 Idaho 705, 708, 201 P.3d 1282, 1285 (2009). The law ofthe
 
case doctrine precludes Mailes' attempts to revisit that issue at this point, and his attempt to use
 
them raises an inference that he is improperly attempting to mislead this court for an improper
 
purpose; i.e. to avoid responsibility for his actions and deprive the Taylors of their right to seek
 
redress for his conduct.
 
B.	 Wrongful conduct in addition to the recording of the lis pendens 
TheMailes.briefing incorrectly presumes that the sole basis for the abuse of process claim 
was their filing of the lis pende:ns. This view is simplistic and inaccurate. 
The Taylors assert that the Plaintiffs, by their conduct in Taylor v. Maile and in the present 
lawsuit, have affirmatively used the legal process primarily to accomplish an improper purpose 
outside of simply gaining an advantage in the underlying litigation for which the process was not 
designed. The specific acts ofthe Plaintiffs which support this claim include, but are not necessarily 
limited to, the following: 
a.	 Filing the second lawsuit in spite of the fact that the claims contained therein were 
totally barred by the doctrine of res judicata 
b.	 Filing the second lawsuit even though the Plaintiffs' claims were devoid of factual 
support or if supportable in fact, had no cognizable basis in law 
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c.	 During the litigation of both cases, repeatedly asserting claims which have been 
rejected by the: Idaho Supreme Court and misrepresenting the decisions of the 
Supreme Court in pleadings 
d.	 Presenting fals(;~ and misleading affidavits and pleadings to the district court in tihs 
action 
e.	 Asserting claims (both in the Complaint and in the briefing which has been submitted 
since) which were not well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law 
f.	 Asserting claims (both in the Complaint and in the briefing which has been submitted 
since) which were interposed for a improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause 
unnecessary delay, and/or to needlessly increase in the cost of litigation 
g.	 Asserting baseless claims for the purpose of delay, in an attempt to forestall 
disciplinary proceedings by the Idaho State Bar. 
h.	 Failing to release the lis pendens filed in Taylor v. Maile for six months after the 
Supreme Court decision affirming the district court order quieting title in the Linder 
Road prope11y to the Johnson Trust 
1.	 Attempting to n:gain title to the Linder Road property through improper means, by 
seeking to foreclose on a vendee's lien while concurrently seeking to set aside the 
judgment upon which that lien was based 
J.	 Repeatedly filing duplicate motions and/or seeking reconsideration of rulings. 
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The Taylors allege that the Plaintiffs' actions were taken for ulterior, improp(;:r purposes 
including but not limited to the following: to delay, stall, and subverting the Johnson Trust's right 
to the Linder Road property; to needlessly increase the cost oflitigation, to gain collateral advantage 
in the proceeding not authorize:d by law; to delay the resolution of these matters for the purpose of 
keeping the real property tied up beyond the time of the appeal of the initial lawsuit in which the 
property was ordered returned to the Johnson Trust; and to attempt to forestall disciplinary 
proceedings by the Idaho State Bar. 
An abuse of process claim can be based on the entire range of procedures incident to the 
litigation process. See, e.g., General Refractories Co. v. Fireman's Fund. Ins. Co., 337 F.3d297 (3rd 
Cir. 2003) (use of discovery proceedings, making misrepresentations to opposing counsel and the 
court and filing motions); Hopper v. Drysdale, 524 F.Supp. 1039 (D.Mont. 1981) (filing notice of 
deposition can be the basis for an abuse ofprocess claim); Crackel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 P.3d 882 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (a litigant may commit abuse ofprocess while merely defending an underlying 
action through conduct such as serving an unreasonable offer in bad faith, asserting bogus defenses, 
exercising procedural rights, engaging in misconduct at mandatory settlement conferences); 
Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (the entire range ofcourt procedures incident 
to litigation, including the noticing of depositions, entry of defaults and the utilizations of various 
motions, could be the basis for an abuse of process claim); Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 567 S.E.2d 251,253 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002) (process embraces full 
range of activities and procedures attendant to litigation including taking discovery and filing 
motions). 
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C. Misrepresentations and bogus defenses 
Mailes entire lawsuit, and his attempt to justifY the filing of the lawsuit to avoid liability for 
abuse of process and intentional interference with prospective advantage, are based on repeated 
misrepresentations. Those include the following: 
1. Taylors' standing to seek the return ofthe property. 
In their Memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at page 4, Mailes state 
"In addition, and most importantly, the Idaho Supreme Court has established "law ofth<;: case" that 
the Taylors had disclaimed their interest in the trust (Taylor v. Maile 2)."10 This statement is a 
blatant misrepresentation. In actuality, the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile II acknowledged that 
the Taylor beneficiaries had retained their right to pursue the lawsuit against Mailes: 
While the first appeal to this Court was pending, the beneficiaries of the Trust 
executed the Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity Agreement (Disclaimer) in June 
2004. In the Disclaimer, the beneficiaries, other than the Tavlors, disclaimed any 
interest in the lawsuit against the Mailes. In addition, the Taylors disclaimed their 
interest in all other Trust property in favor of their mother, the beneficiaries agreed 
to an immediate distribution to beneficiaries, the Rogers resigned as trustees, the 
named successor trustee declined to serve as trustee, and the beneficiaries nominated 
and appointed the Taylors as trustees. 
Taylor v. Maile 11, 146 Idaho 705, 708, 201 P.3d 1282, 1285 (2009) (emphasis added).
 
Misstatements of this type have occurred with alarming frequency during the litigation over
 
the Linder Road property, and are relevant to the abuse ofprocess counterclaim. As the person who
 
drafted the Theodore Johnson trust documents, Mr. Maile knows that under the terms of the trust
 
Helen Taylor had the right to receive interest only, with the entire principal being distributed to her
 
10 Page 12, March 2, 2010 Memorandum Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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children upon her death. He received a copy ofthe Disclaimer agreement referred to in the Supreme 
Court opinion, and therefore knew that the Taylor beneficiaries had retained their interest in the 
lawsuit against him. There is no scenario which will justify this misrepresentation as to the facts, 
and those misrepresentations are sufficient to create the inference that his continued attempts to 
relitigate that issue are improper acts for an ulterior or improper purpose. 
2. Rescission o/the Maile / Johnson Trust purchase contract 
In this Motion, the Mailes put a great deal of weight on their argument that they retained an 
colorable interest in the property because there was a rescission oftheir purchase contract which will 
not be effective until the purchase price is returned. This is a total misrepresentation of the 
proceedings in Taylor v. Maile. They state "The original litigation directly concerned th~: title to the 
real property. The Court ordered the return of title to the real property to Taylors, but also ordered 
that the purchase price be returned to Berkshire, in order to rescind the transaction. "lIOn the 
following page, they assert: 
Prior to entry of the order rescinding the property sale, a lis pendens was proper 
because the litigation concerned the disputed title to the real property. Following 
entry of the order rescinding the property sale, a lis pendens was proper because 
rescission was not fully effected until the consideraiton was repaid to erkshire by 
Taylors... ,,12 
II Page 4 of Mailes' March 2, 2010 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Counterclaims 
12 Page 5 ofMailes' March 2, 2010 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Counterc laims 
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This is a misrepresentation ofJudge Wilper' s ruling. The purchase was found to be void, not 
rescinded. As noted in the Supreme Court decision in Taylor II, the trial court ruled that the initial 
contract for Mailes' purchase of the property was void. Judge Wilper's May 7, 2009 order 
reiterated the fact that it was the intention of the court in its July 21, 2006 order "to void the 
underlying transaction returning all parties to the position they had been in prior to the transaction..." 
This no simple error. It was obvious that the Taylor v. Maile trial court did not order a 
rescission ofthe contract; in fact, Maile had obtained an order granting summary judgment on the 
Taylors' claim for rescission. 13 For him to now misrepresent that fact to this court in an attempt 
to avoid liability is further evidence of improper acts for an ulterior or improper purpose. 
3. Misrepresentation as to negotiations on the Disclaimer 
Another example of misrepresenting facts in order to try to create the appearance that there 
was a factual basis for the now-dismissed claim is Maile's repeated references to a letter between 
Connie Taylor and Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004. 14 Maile points to this letter to supp0l1 his 
argument that the Taylor beneficiaries lacked standing, ignoring the fact that the Idaho Supreme 
Court has ruled twice that they do. Maile points to a single sentence and takes it out of context. 
When the letter is read in full, it is clear that the "rights as beneficiaries" which the Taylors did not 
want to give up was the right to require an accounting from the prior trustee and a copy of the trust 
and estate tax records. 
13 Memorandum Decision and Order, pages 8-9, Exhibit C to April 27, 2010 Affidavit of Counsel. 
14 Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One; for each of reference, an additional copy is attached as Exhibit D 
II to the Affidavit of Counsel dated April 28, 2010. 
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Maile knows that the Taylors all retained the right to pursue the lawsuit against him, and 
filing documents with the court which misrepresent those facts support an inference that he had an 
ulterior, improper purpose and engaged in willful acts not proper in the regular conduct of the 
proceeding. There can be no argument that to misrepresent facts and attempt to mislead the court 
is "regular conduct of the proceeding." 
4. Misleading statements as to Taylors' duty to repay the purchase money 
Mailes argue (p. 4) that notwithstanding Judge Wilper's order for return of the purchase 
price, the Taylors "have not returned any portion of the purchase price." This statement is 
misleading, as it fails to acknowledge that Judge Wilper has repeatedly ruled that as long as the 
Mailes pursue litigation over title to the property, they are not entitled to repayment of the purchase 
price and their attempts to force payment are "disingenuous." 
5. Asserting that the vendee's lien creates an interest in real property 
The Mailes' argument is difficult to follow, but they appear to claim that there is no 
distinction between a vendee's lien, an action to foreclose a vendee's lien, and a quiet title action. 
They argue this leads to the conclusion that a lis pendens was appropriate from the time of Judge 
Wilper's July 21, 2006 order returning the property to the Trust and ordering the return of the 
purchase money. 
There are a number ofproblems with this argument. First, it ignores the fact that the Mailes 
did not file a vendee's lien in the underlying suit until August 3, 2009, which was over three years 
after the District Court's order returning the property, over a year and a half after they filed the 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
 
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS 13
 
LAW OFFICES OF 




















































































Complaint in this matter, six months after the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision 
returning the property, and a full month after this court had dismissed their claims in this case. They 
cannot use the August 2009 vtmdee's lien to legitimize their conduct prior to that time. 
Second, this argument is now baseless because Judge Wilper has denied their motion to 
foreclose on the vendee's lien, noting that MaBes' "attempt to enforce this Court's judgment, while 
simultaneously attempting in a collateral proceeding to challenge that judgment, is disingenuous." 
This is not a new development; Judge Wilper has ruled repeatedly that MaBes are not entitled to the 
return of the purchase price as long as they are continuing to litigate the ownership of the Linder 
Road property. 
Most importantly, the argument that the vendee's lien supports a lis pendens has no legal 
merit. The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a lien creates a personal property right, not an 
interest in real property. Under Idaho law, a lien is a charge upon property to secure payment of 
a debt and transfers no title to the property subjectto the lien. I.C. § 45-109; I.C. § 45-10 1. Chavez 
v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 221,,192 P.3d 1036, 1045 (2008), citing Middlekau.fJv. Lake Cascade,
 
Inc., 103 Idaho 832, 834, 654 JP.2d 1385, 1387 (1982); 51 AmJur.2d Liens § 2 (stating that a lien
 
confers no ownership interest).
 
Thomas Maile often represented himselfin the underlying litigation, and even when he hired 
other counsel, he was present at all hearings. He cannot claim to be unaware ofthe fact that he had 
raised the issue of whether the Taylor beneficiaries had standing repeatedly and lost on that issue 
every time, including two trips to the Supreme Court. It is reasonable to infer that, as a licensed 
attorney, he was well aware of the doctrine of res judicata and the fact that it would act as a 
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complete bar to these efforts to relitigate the claims to the Linder Road property. A thirty second 
research session on Casemaker reveals that res judicata has been addressed by the Idaho appellate 
1 




 55 P. 1067 (1899) and ending with Ridgleyv. State ofIdaho, ISCCRNo. 35823, March 17,2010. 
4 
4. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH A PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC 
ADVANTAGE.5 
6 
There are also genuine issues of material fact as to the counterclaim for intentional 
7 
interference with a prospective economic advantage. 
8 
The elements of the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage 9 
10 I are as follows: 1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; 2) knowledge of the {~xpectancy 
11 on the part ofthe interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy; (4) 
12 
I the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that 
13 I 
the defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper means) and (5) resulting damage to 
14 













Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 284-85, 824 P.2d 841,859-60 (1991). 
Mailes' do not dispute the first three elements; their sole argument on this claim is that the 
interference was "justified or privileged" and that the Taylors were not damaged. They cite to a 
North Carolina case which states that "a complaint must admit of no motive for interference other 
than malice," but malice is not a required element under Idaho law. Their argument is based entirely 
on their position that the complaint in this case and lis pendens weren't wrongful, ignoring the fact 
that they maintained the lis pendens in Taylor v. Maile for six months following the decision ofthe 
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appeal. They also rely heavily on the fact that the Taylors have not repaid the purchase money, 
ignoring Judge Wilpers' orders stating that they are not entitled to repayment as long as they 
continue to litigate the ownership of the property. In support of a nebulous argument about 
"statutory protection," they cite two Idaho cases which have no relevance whatsoever to the facts of 
this case. Hewson v. Asker's Thrift Shop15 deals with the question of whether an injured employee 
may tape record an evaluation by a workers' compensation panel, and Rincover v. State l6 addresses 
state officials' qualified immunity for discretionary functions. 
The July 21,2006 trial court ruling in Taylor v. Maile, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, 
establish the validity of the Taylors' ownership of the land, and the offer from Park Hampton LLC 
establishes their economic expectancy to sell the land. Mr. Maile has been aware ofthese rulings, 
was present during testimony about the pending offer to purchase, and has intentionally and 
successfully prevented the Taylors from selling the land. 
On a claim for tortious interference with contract, the improper conduct may be shown 
through evidence of (among other things) fraud, misrepresentation, or abusive civil suits. Fortson 
v. Brown, 690 S.E.2d 239 (Ga.App. 2010); Anesthesia Associates ofMount Kisco, LLP v. Northern 
Westchester Hosp. Center, 873 N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y.App.Div.2.Dept.,2009). Unfounded litigation 
may form the basis for a tortious interference with business relationship. Overstock. com, Inc. v. 
SmartBargains, Inc., 192 P.3d 858 (Utah, 2008). 
15 120 Idaho 164,167,814 P.2d 424, 427 (1991)
 
16 128 Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996)
 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
 
JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIMS 16
 
LAW OFFICES OF 





































The misrepresentations which have been and continue to be made were addressed in the 
preceding section. This court's dismissal ofthe Plaintiffs' claims on summary judgment raises the 
1
 
inference that there was no legal merit to the second lawsuit. Judge Wilper's denial of their 
2
 
"disingenuous" attempt to regain possession ofthe property by foreclosing on a vendee's lien raises 3
 
4
 the same inference as to their continued attempts to force the Taylors to pay them $400,000 while 












 to sell the real property. This inference, when taken in the light most favorable to the Taylors, 
creates an issue of fact which precludes summary judgment on this counterclaim. 
11
 
As an alternative to establishing an improper purpose, the plaintiff alleging intentional 
12
 





 interference was improper under the circumstances. Santoro v. Schulthess, 681 S.E.2d 897
 








in an effort to relitigate issues which he has already raised repeatedly and lost on, repeatedly. As 
18
 




which requires that pleadings be filed only when they are well grounded in fact, warranted by
 
21
 existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal ofexisting law, and 
22
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Wrongful motive may be inferred from Mailes' continued attempts to get title to the property 
back, by any means, whether it be duplicative lawsuits, continued appeals of issues repeat(~dly argued 
unsuccessfully, or "disingenuous" attempts to foreclose on the vendee's lien while also challenging 
the very judgment upon which the lien is based. 
DAMAGES. The Plaintiffs argue that there has been no damage to the Defendants because 
they have not returned the $400,000 purchase price. This argument ignores the following facts: 
a.	 Judge Wilper has ruled that Mailes' continued litigation over the title to the property 
is the reason the Taylors have not been able to borrow money to return the purchase 
price to him; 
b.	 Had the Taylors been able to accept the offer from Park Hampton, they could have 
paid the $400,000 and still had $1,400,000; 
c.	 Because of the precipitous decline in the real estate market since 2006, the property 
is now valued at no more than $1,050,000, for a loss of at least $750,000. 
d.	 Because of its inability to either sell the property or borrow against it, the Johnson 
Trust has incurred incurred real property taxes, interest and late fees in the amount 
of $99,279.76. 
e.	 The Defendants have incurred $59,458.36 in attorneys fees for defending Mailes' 
claims against them. 
There are many issues of fact which remain to be decided by the jury in this case, making 
summary judgment improper at this time. 
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For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants request that this court deny the Plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment on the Defendants' counterclaims. 
DATED this ~ay of April, 2010. 
CLARK and FEENEY 





By /(__ / O;{~_ -,~"U 
Conni ·W. Taylor, a member of the finn. 
I I 
Attorneys for Defendants. '0 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the zg1hday ofApril, 2010 I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G, Maile, IV o U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street o Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, ID 83616 ~ Overnight Mail
 
b Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mr. Christ Troupis o U.S. Mail
 
Attorney at Law o Hand Delivered
 
PO Box 2408 ~ Overnight Mail
 
1299 East Iron Eagle Drive, Ste. 130 o T.eleco, (F~) (208} 9l8-5482
 Eagle, ID 83616
 
/ • '\ i 
i ,;;/ 'i;' )I,J,' I. \: /4/ /::;r~-
I,.. -k~ .' // I/V( ------r;xP..Li 
C--..Qnnie W. Taylor ! 
Attorney for Defendants I 
~/ 
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Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IBERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE I'AYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-·claimants. 
. .J-- . _ 
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through co-counsel of record, Christ Troupis, 
hereby moves this Court to strike certain attachments to Affidavit of Counsel and Affidavit ofR. 













Court to enter it's Order striking the attachments described in the Affidavit of Christ Troupis, 
filed contemporaneously herewith, as the same have no relevancy in this matter. 
This motion is based on the records, papers, pleadings, and files of this action, and 
I.R.C.P. Rules 12(F) & 56(c), of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion is further 
made and based upon the record and files in this action. Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants request 
timely oral argument on the matters contained herein. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 'WILL BE REQUESTED.
 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 3rd day of May, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
---l 
Connie W. Taylor . () U. S. Mail i 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
: Lewiston, Idaho 83501 i () Overnight Delivery
I 
I Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 --1--­
I Thomas G. Maile, IV. ( ) U. S. Mail 
380 W. State Street (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 ( ) Hand Delivery 
1 
I Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
C~, Co-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
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Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
i	 BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. Case No. CV-OC-0723232
 
MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN BIRCH­

MAILE, husband and wife,
 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
STRIKE 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kJa 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
! trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
! ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
• CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
L....-..	 --I------------ _ 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 












CHRIST TROUPIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1.	 Your Affiant is co-counsel for the above-named Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, and as 
such, is well familiar with the facts contained in the record herein and provides this 
affidavit in support of Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendant's Motion to Strike portions of the 
attachments to the Affidavit of Counsel and the Affidavit of R. John Taylor filed in 
opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed herein. That the 
information and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge 
and/or observations and can testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called 
upon as a witness at the trial of this matter. 
2.	 That your affiant received the affidavits referenced above and the affidavits contain 
improper, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter, to wit: any and all billings 
relating to this litigation and the copy of the Idaho State Bar Complaint filed on 
December 16,2009. That such material has no relevance to the motion for summary 
judgment. 
3.	 That said attachments to the affidavit are inadmissible as the same are not relevant for 
consideration by the court. 
Wherefore, your affiant prays that the court enter its order striking from the record, those 
allegations and/or documents which lack any foundation the court's consideration relating to the 
pending motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2010. 







SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, 
this 3rd day ofMay, 2010. 
(~;;:-r==:::f-M::;t;~ 
\~:\=------"::\=:=;les::.~~~~==::::::...-_------
Notary P lie fo d 0 
Residing at ~C) \ . {.:ti? ~Pl ~6 . 
My Commission Expires ~  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 3rd day of May, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
STRIKE to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
-
I Connie W. Taylor 
I 
-I ~:C) -~U. S. Mail 
I CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
II P.O. Drawer 785 ()I Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 I () Overnight Delivery I 
• Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
, 
I 
, Thomas G. Maile, IV. I ( ) 
380 W. State Street 
I Eagle, Idaho 83616 
L!acsimile: (208) 939-1001 
CHRIST T. TROUPIS, Co-counsel for 
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TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
Ii BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
i Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
I MAILE, IV., and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION 
TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS 
MOTION TO AMEND TID: 
COUNTER-CLAIM 
The plaintiffs provide the following Reply Memorandum Brief in support oftheir Motion 
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for Summary Judgment against all of the defendants' counterclaims. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. The Counter-claimants havejailed to adequately Reply with Evidence and/or Briefing to 
rebut the Plaintiffs' Contentions on Summary Judgment. 
There are significant developments established in the record, which the Counter-
Claimants have failed to address in opposition to the Plaintiffs' motion. The Honorable Judge 
Ronald Wilper in the case Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IV and 
Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D 
entered his Order October 14,2009, affirming that the plaintiffs have a continued right to assert a 
vendee's lien for the return of the purchase price pursuant to I.C. 45-804. The decision of 
March 11, 2010, only suspends the foreclosure until there is a resolution in the current 
proceedings. 
A plain reading of I.C. § 45-1302 supports the plaintiffs' position that a lis pendens was 
proper until the vendee's lien is foreclosed upon. The plaintiffs have consistently asserted that 
the right to pursue the vendee"s lien and the foreclosure of the same, was part and parcel of the 
Lis Pendens which were previously filed of record. Judge Wilper has validated the counter-
defendants' right to file the vendee's lien. I.C. § 45-1302 authorizes the foreclosure of a lien to 
the same status as a quiet title action. Although Taylors argue that the vendee's lien does not 
create an interest in the real property, they admit that "Under Idaho law, a lien is a charge upon 
property to secure payment of a debt..." Def. Memo, pg. 14. Moreover, the Taylors' claim that 
the contract was declared void, but not rescinded, is merely semantic, since the July 21,2006 
order mandated "returning all parties to the position they had been in prior to the transaction... " 
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which is the substantive effect of the rescission remedy. See Def. Memo, p. 12. 
The Counter-claimants have failed to argue any position relating to the interplay between 
I.C. § 45-1302 & I.C. 45-804. As stated in the opening brief, a foreclosure of a vendel~'s lien is 
treated as an action to quiet title. An action to quiet title affects the legal and equitable claims 
affecting real property. A filing of Lis Pendens is proper to give notice of the competing claims 
in any quiet-title action. 
In addition the counter-claimants failed to address the plaintiffs' good faith equitable 
claims asserted by the plaintiffs for quieting title based upon a "fraud upon the court". The 
counter-claimants failed to argue against the clear basis for equitable relief afforded under the 
case of Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731 (2005), which provided that actions to 
set aside a judgment are governed by equitable principles. This court ruled that the doctrine of 
Res Judicata applied to bar the plaintiffs' requested relief. The plaintiffs respectively disagree 
with the court's ruling, for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the defendants filed verified 
pleadings asserting they were beneficiaries when in truth and established fact they were not. The 
plaintiffs are supported in their proposition by the Idaho Supreme Court which has established 
"law of the case" that the Taylors had disclaimed their interest in the trust. Consequently the 
Taylors were not beneficiaries as they submitted in their verified pleading in January 2006 which 
gave rise to the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim (Taylor v. Maile 2). The plaintiffs have 
alleged there was a "fraud upon the court" which was sought to be corrected by seeking equitable 
relief, consistent with the Campbell case. In any case alleging an independent basis for equitable 
relief based upon fraud upon the court, there will always be a previous judicial proceeding that 
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gave rise to the judgment sought to be set aside. That in and of itself does not make the filing for 
equitable relief wrongful conduct that will give rise to a civil remedy. 
Nor have the counter-claimants argued against the established law relating to a 
constructive trust remedy. The plaintiffs alleged fraud upon the court as one of the bases to set 
aside the Judgment and quiet title to the real property in Berkshire Investments. Any action 
"affecting the title to real property" clearly allows the filing of a lis pendens by an interested 
party in order to protect their interest in the property subject to the litigation. Such actions 
include actions attempting to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property; actions to 
establish a constructive trust over real estate which may have been obtained by fraud. See 
generally, Bengoechea v. Bengoechea, 106 Idaho 188, 677 P.2d 501 (Ct. App.l984), wherein a 
claim for constructive trust relating to real property allegedly obtained by fraud allowed the 
filing oflis pendens. A constructive trust can be imposed where property was obtained either 
fraudulently or through violation ofa fiduciary duty. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 469, 
886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994), Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 722 P.2d 474 (1986). The counter-
claimants have failed to argue or provide any law in opposition to these basic principll~s oflaw. 
The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. Levinger 
v. Mercy Medical Center, Nampa, 139 Idaho 192, 195, 75 P.3d 1202, 1205 (2003); I.R.c.P. 
56(c). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue by sufficiently raising 
the issue as to an element of the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to 
show that a genuine issue ofmaterial fact on the challenged element of the claim does exist. Id. 
The party opposing summary judgment, therefore, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS MOTION TO AMEND THE 












denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for triaL" I.R.C.P. 56(e). This rule 
facilitates the dismissal of factually unsupported claims prior to trial. Venters v. Sorn::nto 
Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 108 P.3d 392 (2005). 
Idaho appellate courts will not consider any issue when a party fails to support it with 
argument or authority. Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 187, 75 P.3d 743, 748 (2003), 
United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Severson, 143 Idaho 628, 151 P.3d 824 (2007). Assignments of 
error are deemed waived and should not be considered by an appellate court. State v. Creech, 
132 Idaho 1,966 P.2d 1 (1998). Appellate courts need not address an issue when an appellant 
has made only conclusory assertions and has failed to cite any legal authority. Such conduct 
amounts to a waiver by an appellant of issues to be reviewed. Suitts V. Nix 141 Id. 706, 117 
P.3d 120 (2005), Eagle Water Co., Inc. v. Roundy Pole Fence Co., Inc., 134 Id. 626, 7' P.3d 1103 
(2000). 
The granting of Summary Judgment against all ofthe claims set forth in the 
counterclaims is proper in the current case. 
2. The Supreme Court has provided recent authority to support the Plaintiffs' Right to a 
Summary Judgment on all claims raised in the Counter-Claim. 
The Idaho Supreme Court on April 2, 2010, issued a decision in the case of Weitz v. 
Green, 33696 (IDSCCI) which provided: 
"Slander of title requires proof of four elements: (1) publication of a 
slanderous statement; (2) its falsity; (3) malice; and (4) resulting special 
damages."" Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399,405, 195 P.3d 1212, 1218 (2008) 
(quoting McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003)). 
Slander is "[a] defamatory assertion expressed in a transitory form." Black"s Law 
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Dictionary 660 (3rd pocket ed. 2006). A "defamatory" statement is one "tending 
to harm a person"s reputation, [usually] by subjecting the person to public 
contempt, disgrace, or ridicule, or by adversely affecting the person"s business." 
Id. at 188. ""Malice has been generally defined by Idaho courts as a reckless 
disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement. An action will not lie where a 
statement in slander of title, although false, was made in good faith with probable 
cause for believing it."" Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 557, 130 P.3d 1087, 
1095 (2006) (internal dtation omitted) (quoting Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 
691, 701, 8 P.3d 1234" 1244 (2000)). Attorney fees and legal expenses incurred in 
removing a cloud from title constitute special damages for purposes of a slander 
oftitle claim. Rayl v. Shull Enters., Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 530, 700 P.2d 567, 573 
(1984). 
The district court concluded that Appellants made assertions in their 
Amended Complaint that satisfied the first two elements of publication of a 
slanderous and false statement. The Amended Complaint contains allegations that 
Appellants, and not R{:spondents, are the title-holders of the property, and that 
Respondents trespassed on Appellants" land and caused damages. The district 
court found that the Amended Complaint constituted the publication of a 
defamatory and false statement. As to malice, the district court made the factual 
finding that Appellants had recklessly made numerous false statements in their 
Amended Complaint, including a statement that a hogwire fence on the eastern 
portion of the disputed. property extended to intersect with another fence, when 
they knew that it did not. 
The district court"s finding as to the publication element was erroneous as a 
matter oflaw. As this Court noted in Richeson v. Kessler, "[w]ith certain 
exceptions, unimportant here, defamatory matter published in the due course of a 
judicial proceeding, having some reasonable relation to the cause, is absolutely 
privileged and will not support a civil action for defamation although made 
maliciously and with knowledge of its falsity." 73 Idaho 548, 551-52,255 P.2d 
707,709 (1953). If the defamatory statement was made in the course ofa 
proceeding and had a reasonable relation to the cause of action of that proceeding, 
that statement may not be used as the basis for a civil action for defamation. 
Carpenter v. Grimes Pass Placer Mining Co., 19 Idaho 384, 393-94, 114 P. 42, 45 
(1911). A cause of action for defamation in Idaho has very similar elements to a 
cause of action for slander of title; a plaintiff suing for defamation must show that 
the defendant: "(1) communicated information concerning the plaintiffto others; 
(2) that the information was defamatory; and (3) that the plaintiff was damaged 
because of the communication." Clark v. Spokesman-Review, 144 Idaho 427, 
430, 163 P.3d 216,219 (2007). The public policy behind granting immunity from 
civil defamation actions holds also for actions alleging slander oftitle, as has been 
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recognized by several other jurisdictions. See Conservative Club of Washington 
v. Finkelstein, 738 F.Supp. 6, 13-14 (D. D.C. 1990); Wilton v. Mountain Wood 
Homeowners Ass'n, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 473 (Cal.Ct.App. 1993). 
Respondents cite to our decision in Weaver v. Stafford, in support of their 
argument that the publication requirement may be satisfied through statements 
made in a pleading. 134 Idaho 691, 701,8 P.3d 1234, 1244 (2000) (stating 
"[h]ere, Stafford"s pleadings assert an interest in Lot 16 and thus satisfy the 
publication element of slander of title. "). We find no compelling reason why the 
public policy granting civil immunity for statements made in judicial proceedings 
as applied to defamation actions should not also apply to slander of title actions. 
Therefore, to the extent Weaver conflicts with the general rule articulated in 
Richeson, 73 Idaho at 551-52,255 P.2d at 709, and quoted above, we overrule it. 
As the finding of slander of title in this case was premised upon a statement 
made in the complaint, a necessary first step in litigation, where such statement 
was related to the underlying claim against Respondents, that statement is deemed 
immune. Therefore, this Court reverses the district court"s determination that 
Appellants committed slander of title against Respondents. Accordingly, the 
award of $40,000 in attorney fees as special damages under the slander of title 
claim was improperly granted and is reversed. 
The Weitz, supra, caSt: has important implications relating to established Idaho Law to 
the present proceedings. All ofthe counter-claimants' contentions relate to an alleged improper 
filing of Lis Pendens and the alleged misuse ofjudicial process relating to allegations contained 
in the amended complaint filed by the plaintiff. As the Weitz case holds such statements 
whether set forth in a lis pendens filed of record or contained in allegations of a complaint are 
judicially immune from liability if they "had a reasonable relation to the cause of action of that 
proceeding". In both cases whether protected under a vendee's lien or a claim for a constructive 
trust, the pleadings and the Lis Pendens were reasonably related to the claims for relief in both 
cases. 
Such judicial statements may not be used as the basis for a civil action for defmnation, 
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whether it be a slander of title, abuse of process, or a claim for intentional interference with a 
prospective economic advantage. The plaintiffs alleged the Taylors committed a "fraud upon 
the court" and prayed for equitable relief to set aside the judgment and quiet title in Berkshire 
Investments. The plaintiffs are supported in their proposition by the Idaho Supreme Court which 
has established "law of the case" that the Taylors had disclaimed their interest in the trust. Every 
claim advanced by the counter-claimants is premised upon a general principle that such 
statements were defamatory or false. Such can not be the case under Weitz, supra, as these 
allegations and Lis Pendens had a reasonably relation to the cause of actions. Summary 
Judgment for the plaintiff') is proper on all counts. of the defendants' counterclaims. 
3. The March yJr 2010 Order Affirms That the Plaintifft Have Not Improperly Pursued 
Litigation Su"ounding Any Filings to Secure Their Vendee's Lien on the Real Property. 
The Honorable Judge Wilper has currently denied the plaintiffs' right to seek 
enforcement of their vendee's lien, in essence ruling that while this litigation is pending it would 
be inappropriate to foreclosun~ the vendee's lien. The Court however, denied sanctions against 
the plaintiffs. The denial of the sanctions provides the basis for this court to determine that there 
are legitimate factual and legal issues surrounding the plaintiffs' right to seek the enforcement of 
a vendee's lien. The Decision and Order relating to the defendants' request for sanctions 
provides additional basis for summary judgment. First, if the district court failed to assess 
sanctions it is a finding that establishes that there are meritorious issues raised by the plaintiffs. 
The case of Cunningham, et aL v. Jensen, et aI., 31332 (IDSCCI), illustrates the available 
remedies in civil litigation relating to alleged wrongful conduct. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION "OR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT .AND IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS 








~  .. PA "W_~"Y 
I i1 L!i\Maile.Tom l"eplymcmc ndumbrie('J6naLdoc 
There are troubling concerns in adopting a broader definition for the tort of abuse 
of process. There is clearly the potential for litigants to abuse this cause of action, 
filing lawsuits outside the main litigation to obtain undue advantage in the 
underlying suit, or burdening the courts with claims of improper litigation tactics 
for every perceived slight by their opponents. Further, there are remedies within 
the litigation itself, such as court-ordered sanctions, which can compensate 
litigants for abusive tactics by the opposing party. Allowing recovery of damages 
in an abuse of process action that could be recoverable and addressed by the court 
in the underlying litigation would be inefficient and could create the possibility 
that a disappointed litigant would seek a "second opinion" ifthe litigant didn't feel 
the sanctions were sufficient in the first case. As one court has noted: Attorneys 
have a relatively swift mechanism for redressing careless, slick, underhanded, or 
tacky conduct: court-imposed sanctions. Once imposed, sanctions may be 
reviewed by an appellate court. They may not, however, be tried de novo under 
the guise... of a tort action. [Such would] represent[] an intolerable attempt to end­
run and abuse the judicial system and could lead to a geometric proliferation of 
litigation. Pollack v. Superior Court, 279 Cal.Rptr. 634, 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
The fact that the Honorable Judge Wilper did not find a basis for an award of sanctions 
relating to the filing and/or attempt to enforce the vendee's lien, establishes that the plaintiffs did 
not commit wrongful conduct. If they had arguably Judge Wilper would have so found. The 
counterclaim cannot advance as Judge Wilper has ruled that there were meritorious issues and 
facts which are to be resolved. 
Second, the detemlination by Judge Wilper serves as Res Judicata and Collateral 
Estoppel relating to the current counter-claim. There are five factors required for collateral 
estoppel to bar re-litigation of an issue decided in an earlier proceeding: (1) the party against 
whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue 
decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue 
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the 
prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the 
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party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. 
Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. The determination made by Judge Wilper 
satisfies all the elements under Ticor case. The plaintiffs unless they committed fraud, cannot be 
held accountable under the counter-claim for alleged wrongful conduct. The plaintiffs have 
properly asserted that they have a valid vendee's lien as the same has been litigated and resolved 
in the plaintiffs' favor. 
5. The plaintitTs in good faith advanced their colorable claim for a constructive trust. 
The plaintiffs filed suit seeking equitable relief. Relative hereto 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 
310 provides: 
.... In order for a party to obtain relief under such a rule, the party seeking relic~f 
must prove the most egregious conduct involving corruption of the judicial 
process itself by establishing to the satisfaction of the trial judge that there was 
perjured testimony which influenced the judgment of the court..,. 
In any event, some courts hold that a judgment may be vacated for perjury under 
certain conditions, as where a party obtains a judgment by that party's own willful 
perjury, or by the use of false testimony, which the party knows at the time to be 
false. 
The district court entered its "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim", solely upon the direct 
material misrepresentations of the Taylors and their counsel of record. A colorable cllaim was 
advanced by the plaintiffs in the present matter. All the allegations against the plaintiffs stem 
from a "reasonable relation" to the allegations surrounding the "fraud upon the court". 
The case of Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 128,212 P.2d 1031,1034 (1949) 
provides the initial standards of application of Res Judicata. Commencing at page 128 of 70 Id. 
Reports, the Supreme Court declared: 
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One of the oldest and most universally accepted juridical principles is that 
embraced in the doctrine of res judicata. In the absence offraud or collusion a 
judgment is conclusive as between the parties and their privies on all issues which 
were (or should have been) litigated in the action.... 
Generally speaking, the fraud which will invalidate a judgment must be 
extrinsic or collateral to the issues tried, by which the aggrieved party has been 
prejudiced, or prevented from having a fair trial. It is not sufficient to charge only 
intrinsic fraud, or that which is involved in the issues tried, such as the 
presentation of peIjun::d testimony. (citation omitted). 
Our Supreme Court has confirmed the principle that a party committing fraud will not be 
afforded the protection of res judicata. Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3,896 P.2d 329 (1995), 
Stoddard V. the Hagadone Corporation (2009-ID-04l6.l58 Docket No. 34335). The plaintiffs 
have legitimately and properly advanced sound legal and factual argument relating to the 
defendants' alleged misconduct in obtaining their "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". 
Summary Judgment is proper. 
4. Certain Attachment to John R. Taylor's should be stricken and not considered relevant to 
the Summary Judgement. 
The attachment relating to the Idaho State Bar Complaint filed on December 16, 2009 is 
improper. R. John Taylor has provided the attachment to the record which is improper and 
serves no purpose to the present proceeding and must be stricken for lack of foundation. 
Rule 12(F) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading 
or, if no responsive pl{:ading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a 
party within twenty (20) days after the service of the pleading upon the party or 
upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any 
pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter. 
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the evidence submitted in 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO 









opposition must be admissible evidence. The complaint serves no purpose to the court in its 
detennination of the legal issues involved in the motion for summary judgment. The recent case 
of Homes Corp. v. R. Herr, 2005 Idaho 30667, provides: 
In order to be considered on a summary judgment motion, affidavits must be 
based on personal knowledge, set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence 
at trial, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the stated matters. 
I.R.C.P. 56(e). In determining the admissibility of evidence, trial courts are given 
broad discretion and will be reversed on appeal only when there has been a clear 
abuse of discretion. State, Dep't ofHealth and Welfare v. Altman, 122 Idaho 
1004, 1007, 842 P.2d 683,686 (1992); Baker v. Shavers, Inc., 117 Idaho 696, 
698, 791 P.2d 1275, 1277 (1990). 
The court exercises free review of the standards of the admissibility of evidence on 
summary judgment motions, and will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of 
discretion. The complaint must be stricken from the record and should not be considered as 
legitimate fact in support of the motion for summary judgment. 
6. The Court should deny thf~ Counte,.-claimants motion to amend its counte,.-claim. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that, once a responsive pleading has been 
filed, a pleading may only be amended by "leave of court or by written consent of the adverse 
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires...." An abuse-of-discretion 
standard is employed in reviewing a district court"s denial of a motion to amend a complaint to 
add an additional cause ofaction. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Tucker, 142 Idaho 191, 193, 125 P.3d 
1067, 1069 (2005). If the amended pleading does not set out a valid claim, or if the opposing 
party would be prejudiced by the delay in adding the new claim ... it is not an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to file the amended complaint." Black Canyon 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
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Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991). 
The motion to am(~nd the counter-claim does not alter the underlying facts established in 
the record to create any additional basis for any claims. The proposed amendment does not alter 
the underlying facts that the allegations contained in the plaintiffs' amended complaint and the 
filing ofthe Lis Pendens were: not reasonably related to the cause of actions involving the real 
property subject the plaintiffs' claims for a constructive trust and/or the judicially authorized and 
established claim for the foreclosure of a vendee's lien. 
CONCLUSION 
There are ample undisputed facts supporting the continued right to maintain a vendee's 
lien foreclosure action against the real property. A vendee's lien is afforded the same analysis as 
a quiet title action affecting re:al property. The counter-claimants had a legitimate right to 
maintain their lis pendens in the current matter even through an appeal. The continuation of the 
lis pendens through August 2009 were proper. The Counter-defendants are entitled to Summary 
Judgment as to all counter-claims raised in this matter. 
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2010. 
CH~o-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 3rd day of May, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing (1) REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTER­
CLAIMANTS MOTION TO AMEND THE COUNTER-CLAIM to be delivered, addressed as 
follows: 
Connie W. Taylor I ( ) U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 I ~ ~ Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
I Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
I Thomas G. Maile, IV. 
I
I 380 W. State Street 
! Eagle, Idaho 83616 
I Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) U. S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile Transmission 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
__J'-------- _ 
~/)/ 
CHRIST T. TRO~ co-counsd for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION F'OR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS 
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Ada CountY c\erk. J. DAVID NAVARFlO, ( 
By K. JOHNSON 
D"PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. Case No. CV OC 0723232 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
vs. JUDGEMENT ON THE DEFENDANTS' 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et a1. 
Defendants. 
This cause came on before the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood for hearing on the 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' counterclaims. 
Based upon and for the reasons stated on the record, the court finds there are genuine 
issues ofmaterial fact that pr,event it from granting a Motion for Summary Judgement at this time. 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' Counterclaim is 
therefore DENIED. 
DATED this 7%y of June, 2010. 
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ClJERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of June, 2010, I caused to be served a true
 
and correct copy ofthe foregoing documents by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV
 




Mr. Christ Troupis 




























ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF [DAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
 Case No. CV OC 0723232
 




Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
 




CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
This cause came on before the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood for hearing on the 
Defendants' Motion to Amend Counterclaims. Following Defendants' counsel's agreement to 
redact references made in thl~ proposed Amended Counterclaim to disciplinary proceedings by 
the Idaho State Bar against Mr. Maile, the Plaintiffs had no further objection thereto. 
The Defendants' Motion to Amend Counterclaims is hereby GRANTED. 
DATED thi,6l;;l day OfJune,;o. .~ ./ _. ~ 
'h~ JJ-&~ ~. ~jJPl 11I 
/ By"....----,__---,,----_-"=- _ 
c:&.-1/2.- Judge Greenwood 
{/ 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO AMEND COUNTERCLAIMS 
LAW OFFiCES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 001686
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~;r)~ay of June, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy ofthe foregoing documents by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV ¥i U.S. Mail 
380 West State Street o Hand Delivered 
Eagle, ID 83616 o 
o 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mr. Christ Troupis 
Attorney at Law 







Eagle, ID 83616 o Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482 
Connie Taylor 
Clark and Feeney 







1229 Main Street, Ste 201 o Te1ecopy (FAX) (208) 746-9160 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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4 ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants 
5 
6 
7 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
8 
9 BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
 Case No. CV OC 0723232 
10 
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and 
11 wife, 




CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE 
15 TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; and R. JOI-IN TAYLOR, an 
16 individual, CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;17 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
18 TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 





22 As an amended counterclaim against the Plaintiffs, the Defendants allege as follows: 
23 
1. The allegations as to residency and jurisdiction admitted in the Answer are 
24 
incorporated herein by reference. 
25 
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2. Abuse of Process. Plaintiffs, by their conduct in Taylor v. Maile and in the present 
lawsuit, have affirmatively engaged in willful acts in the use of the legal process primarily to 
accomplish an improper purpose outside ofsimply gaining an advantage in the underlying litigation 
for which the process was not designed. The specific acts of the Plaintiffs which support this claim 
include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: 
a.	 Filing the instant lawsuit in spite of the fact that the claims contained therein were 
totally barred by the doctrine of res judicata 
b.	 Filing the instant lawsuit even though the Plaintiffs' claims were devoid of factual 
support or if supportable in fact, had no cognizable basis in law 
c.	 Asserting claims which had previously been rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court and 
misrepresenting the decisions of the Supreme Court in pleadings 
d.	 Presenting false and misleading affidavits and pleadings to the district court 
e.	 Asserting claims which were not well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or 
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law 
f.	 Asserting claims which were interposed for a improper purpose, such as to harass, 
to cause unnecessary delay, to needlessly increase in the cost of litigation 
g.	 Asserting baseless claims for the purpose of delay. 
h.	 Failing to release the lis pendens filed in Taylor v. Maile for six months after the 
Supreme Court decision affirming the district court order quieting title in the Linder 
Road property to the Johnson Trust 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM	 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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1.	 Attempting to regain title to the Linder Road property through improper means, by 
seeking to foreclose on a vendee's lien while concurrently seeking to set aside the 
judgment upon which that lien was based 
J.	 Repeatedly filing duplicate motions and/or seeking reconsideration of rulings. 
Plaintiffs' actions were taken for ulterior, improper purposes including but not limited to: 
to delay, stall, and subverting the Johnson Trust's right to the Linder Road property; to needlessly 
increase the cost of litigation, to gain collateral advantages in the proceeding not authorized by law; 
to delay the resolution of these matters for the purpose of keeping the real property tied up beyond 
the time ofthe appeal ofthe initial lawsuit in which the property was ordered returned to the Johnson 
trust. 
As a result of these acts by the Plaintiffs, they have prevented and significantly delayed the 
Defendants from selling the Linder Road property, which has precipitously declined in value since 
the filing of this action, damaging the Defendants by misuse of the process external to th(~ litigation 
that cannot be compensated in the underlying proceeding. 
3. Intentional interference with a prospective economic advanta2e. By wrongfully 
continuing to assert an ownership interest in the Linder Road property, the Plaintiffs have committed 
the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. Defendants have lost 
opportunities to sell the property because of the Plaintiffs' ongoing litigation over the title to the 
property, including but not limited to the loss of an offer to purchase the property for $1.8 million 
dollars of which the Plaintiffs had knowledge. The Plaintiffs' interference was for an improper 
purpose, and has caused resulting damage to the Johnson Trust. 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM	 3
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4. Attorney fees: As a result ofthe actions ofPlaintiffs in this matter, Defendants have 
been required to retain the legal counsel from the law offices of Clark and Feeney, and are entitled 
to recover their attorneys fees incurred in this matter pursuant to IRCP 11 and Idaho Code sections 
12-121 and 12-123. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that the Court enter an order granting the following relief: 
1.	 That j udgment be entered against the Plaintiffs in an amount to be determined at trial 
for abuse of process. 
2.	 That j udgment be entered against the Plaintiffs in an amount to be determined at trial 
for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. 
3.	 That the Defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in
 
bringing their counterclaim pursuant to I.C. 12-121, 12-123 and I.R.C.P 11.
 
28'"DATED this __ day of May, 2010. 




, / /" i
 
By . \,~::"" /(>=1/'-. (':,.".e~"J--· 






LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 








   
  
 
   
 
 


















































STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ) 
R. John Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That I am the one of the trustees for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, the Plaintiff 
in the above-entitled action; that I have read the foregoing Amended Counterclaim and know the 
contents thereof and believe the same to be true. 
t;:1 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this L day of June, 2010. 
Not~: Public?~nd for th~/State of Idaho 
ResIdmg at (-lrt<..F1$<J/IIIe.. therein. 
My Commission expires: ()jfOlp!2JJ/ i 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 5 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of June, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
 








Thomas G. Maile o U.S. Mail
 
Attorney at Law o Hand Delivered
 
4
 380 W. State St. [] Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616 )Q- Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
 5
 
Mr. Christ Troupis o U.S. Mail
 
6
 Attorney at Law o Hand Delivered
 
PO Box 2408 o Overnight Mail
 
7
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Connie W. Taylor, a member ofthefiI1ri..10
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AUG 04 2010 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, ClerkTROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
By J. RAI\IDALL
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 DEPUTY 
PO Box 2408 




Attorney for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
r BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
I Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
II MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH- . 
MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, ,ill Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
I ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
I CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
'-- D_efl_e_n_dan_ts_/C_ounte_r_-C_I_ai_m_an_ts_.__
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 






The above named Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through attorney, Christ Troupis 
Maile hereby provide their Reply to Defendants/Counter-claimants' Amended Counterclaim and 










___     -____ .__  
1. Plaintiffs' deny each and every allegation of Defendant's Amended Counterclaim 
which is not specifically admitted herein. 
2. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 of the Counter-Claim. 
3. Plaintiffs specifically deny paragraphs 2, 3, & 4 of the Counter-Claim. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that the defendants have been required to return the 
purchase price of $400,000.00 by previous court proceedings. The same remains unpaid, 
including interest thereon and the plaintiffs are entitled to a "vendee's lien" on the subject real 
property pursuant to the previous court proceedings and further pursuant to Idaho Cod€:: section 
45-804. That in addition, the plaintiffs herein have previously filed their Lis Pendens in the prior 
proceedings which remained of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, as further 
protection of the vendee's lien. That such liens are superior to the Lis Pendens herein and as 
such the Lis Pendens filed herein has not impaired the title to the subject real property ,md as 
such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the present action. That the court in 
the prior proceeding captioned Taylor v. Maile, allowed the filing of the notice oflis p€::ndens 
and as such the claims are barred. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs have alleged allegations of wrongful conduct in violation of Chapter 18 Title 78 
of the Idaho Code. That plaintiffs are availed of certain remedies set forth below including but 
not limited to: 
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES. 
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived 
directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person 
has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or 









the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any 
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or real property. 
Whoever violates this ,Subsection is guilty of a felony. 
18-7805 RACKETEERING -- CIVIL REMEDIES. 
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a 
pattern of racketeering activity may file an action in the district court for the 
recovery of three (3) times the actual damages proved and the cost of the suit, 
including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(c) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy 
racketeering after making provisions for the rights of all innocent persons affected 
by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate 
orders. Prior to a d<::termination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not 
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions, 
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with 
any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture or other restraints 
pursuant to this section as it deems proper. 
(d) Following a determination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not 
limited to: 
(1) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in 
any enterprise; 
That such potential remedy, including the request for a constructive trust, authorizes the 
filing a Lis Pendens herein and as such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the 
present action. 
TmRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs allege the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel by the 
action above referenced. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damages. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 






Defendants are not entitled to all or part of the relief they seek by way of their Counter­
Claim for the reason that the damages alleged in their claim reasonably could have been avoided 
by the counter-claimants. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants/Counter-claimants were alleged to commit a fraud upon the court giving 
rising to a colorable claim for the relief sought by the plaintiffs. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, all possible 
affirmative defenses may not have been alleged and set forth herein because sufficient facts are 
not available at this time to form an adequate factual basis for the defenses, after counter­
defendants have made reasonable inquiry to obtain such facts. Therefore, counter-defendants 
reserves the right to raise additional affirmative defenses as fact-gathering and discovery in this 
matter progresses. 
DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL 
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial upon all facts triable by a jury. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
Plaintiffs have engaged the services ofThomas G. Maile, IV., and Christ Troupis to 
defend this action and reasonable attorney fees plus costs should be ordered against the 
Defendants and Idaho Code 12-120; 12-121; 12-123. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows:
 
1
 That Defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed against the Plaintiffs. 










2 For Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees, plus costs. 
3 For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the 
premises. 
DATED this 1L day of July, 2010. 
(jL:;f)-,/'I 
CHRIST T. TR~ 
Attorney for counter-defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 3rd day ofAugust, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy ofthe foregoing REPLY TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM to be delivered, addressed as 
follows: 
'I?onnie W. Taylor- U. S. MailIT)

CLARK and FEENEY : (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 I ( ) Hand Delivery
 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 . ( ) Overnight Delivery
 
I 
I Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
! Thomas G. Maile, IV. ( ) U. S. Mail 
, 380 W. State Street (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 ( ) Hand Delivery 
• Facsimile: (208) 939-100 I ( ) Overnight Delivery 
Attorney for Counter-defendants 

















f'~1 -' SfJ> 19 1\\\\\ 
... t c\et~
Ada (.Joun '/ 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # -4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
J. OAVlt: ;", (
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
----------,------------------, 
I 
i BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
I Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
I MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
, MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT l'AYLOR, file/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, ~m Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 





Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
--J-----­ ~_  
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendant by and through their undersigned 
counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for its reconsideration of 
the following, to wit: (1) Memorandum Decision & Order entered July 2, 2009, (2) Order 
001699
t.= \/E\ ~I c.. 
)   












-_______________ -___________  
Denying Plaintiffs Summary Judgment entered July 20, 2009, (3) the Judgment Dismissing 
Plaintiffs Claims entered 07/20/2009, together with (4) the Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the Defendants' Counterclaims entered on 06/23/2009. 
The motion is brought pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 11 (a)(2)(B), on the grounds that the 
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI), decided 
on September 3,2010, significantly alters the legal positions of the parties to this action with 
respect to the Plaintiffs' dismissed claims. 
This Motion is further made based upon the record and file contained herein, Affidavit in 
Support of the Motion to ReconsiderlMotion to Amend, and the Memorandum Brief in Support 
of the Motion, filed concurrently herewith. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants requests this Honorable Court to amend 
said Orders, Memorandum Decision, and Judgments above referenced. 
ORAL ARGUMENT is requested upon the motion. 
DATED this 28th day of September, 2010. 
&:V/7
CHRIST T. TRO@iS7 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-­
Defendants 








CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 28th day of September, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing (1) PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER, (2) AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER, together with (3) 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 785 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. 
380 W. State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
! (X) 
I ( ) 
I ( ) 















Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter·· 
Defendants 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Pg 3 
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